Access to the territory and push backs

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The sections below describe the numerous hurdles faced by migrants and asylum seekers in accessing Spanish territory and subsequently the asylum procedure. This includes incidents of push backs, collective expulsions, police violence (especially on the Moroccan side of the border), bilateral agreements with third countries to swiftly return persons back, and dangerous attempts by the concerned individuals to reach Spanish territory or cross over the border fences.

In December 2022, Ministers and high-level representatives of the partner countries and organisations of the Rabat Process met in Cádiz for the 6^th Ministerial Conference of the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (the so called ‘Rabat Process’) to adopt the Dialogue’s new multi-annual cooperation programme for the next five years (2023-2027). During the event, the Cadiz Action Plan was adopted: it addresses five action areas, including on regular migration and mobility, on asylum and protection of persons in need of international protection, and on prevention and effective reduction of irregular migration, fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.^[2]

In a meeting held in April 2024, the five members (Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus) of the Mediterranean Alliance called on the EU to continue with ensuring its presence in the Sahel region, with the aim of fighting against, inter alia, organised crime. They also called on the EU to continue with agreements with the main origin and transit countries in Africa and the Middle East, as well as to look for a better cooperation in the context of returns, including voluntary returns.^[3] Following their 2025 annual meeting, the countries of the MED5 urged the EU to increase funding dedicated to preventing irregular migration.[4]

In June 2025, the ‘Minerva’ operation started in the Gibraltar Strait, concretely in the cities of Algeciras, Tarifa and Ceuta, with the aim of fighting against trafficking in persons and irregular migration. The operation was coordinated by the Spanish National Police and Frontex, involving police officers from 15 European countries, and lasted until the beginning of September. In 2024, the operation led to 3,729 police actions, resulting in 234 arrests, 1,035 administrative offences and 92 refusals of entry decisions issued.^[5]

In January 2025, 21 people from Pakistan were identified among the survivors of a boat shipwrecked off the Canary Islands. According to investigations, it seems that a “new Asian route” to Europe might be emerging.[6]

In the same month, a boat with 19 bodies was found off the costs of St. Kitts and Nevis (in the Caribbean). The authorities believed that the vessel originated off the West African coast with migrants on board.[7]

According to the information released by the Moroccan Minister of Interior, in 2024 Morocco stopped almost 80,000 attempts of migrants to reach the EU.[8]

According to a report published in March 2025, the Western Mediterranean Route has become increasingly inaccessible to sub-Saharan Africans considering the strict measures adopted by Morocco to prevent them from entering the country. Concretely, the report stressed that a key risk on this route continued to be the levels of hostility towards Sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco.[9]

In June, the National Police of Alicante started an investigation in relation to the discovery of the bodies of 31 migrants – with tied hands and feet – found at sea near the Balearic Islands. The investigators have linked the bodies to a small boat that arrived in Alicante.[10]

During the same month, the Guardia Civil, supported by Europol, reported having dismantled a criminal network smuggling migrants by boats from Algeria to Spain and to other EU countries.[11]

In August, around 600 migrants arrived in the Balearic Islands in around thirty small boats in one week.[12] The figures on arrivals in 2025 showed a change in trends until August, with a slight decrease in arrivals and a shift in sea routes — a rise in the Balearic Islands and a decrease in the Canary Islands.[13] Already in July the State Secretary for Migration held a mission in the Balearic Islands to find and set up facilities for the initial reception and temporary care of migrants after their arrival on the archipelago.[14] The trend seemed to continue at the beginning of 2026.[15]

During the same month, the Government of the Canary Islands has submitted a proposal to the European Commission requesting a significant material (i.e. aerial means, vessels, radars and other systems) and human reinforcement of the deployment of Frontex in the archipelago, in order to improve maritime and border surveillance.[16]

A report published by Human Rights Watch denounced the violence and the serious human rights violations committed against migrants and refugees by local authorities in Mauritania between 2020 and 2025, linking these episodes to the decrease in the number of boats arriving to the Canary Islands.[17]

In September, the Andalusian Forum for the Integration of People of Migrant Origin approved an agreement to urge the Governing Council of the Regional Government of Andalusia to request both the Spanish Government and the EU to officially recognise Andalusia as a ‘southern border’ for migration purposes. The national recognition would allow the autonomous community to receive the same treatment as the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla in terms of migration, and to access the necessary resources to work with migrants and promote their full integration into society.[18]

In November, the European Commission announced the EU countries which will be eligible for receiving funds or other forms of solidarity under the EU Solidarity Pool scheme to deal with migratory pressure. Spain, together with Greece, Cyprus, and Italy have been formally recognized as being under severe migratory pressure following the increase in arrivals over the past year and are thus eligible for assistance from the pool from mid-2026.[19]

According to Frontex, smugglers are switching their operations from Morocco to Algeria due to perceived less stringent controls and are using faster boats, being the Balearic Islands their main destination. Departures from Algeria represent the 75% of people using the Western Mediterranean route, while in 2024 it was 40%, behind Morocco.[20]

Frontex consolidated its presence in the Canary Islands since 2020, counting with 70 agents and specialised staff on the islands, including 18 interpreters and cultural mediators by the summer 2025.[21]

Following the reinforcement of migration controls by Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco, migrants turned to Guinea as a new departure point in 2025.[22] In addition, an increase of departures from The Gambia to the Canary Islands has been registered.[23]

In January 2026, the UNHCR warned that, despite the decrease in see arrivals in Spain and in the number of asylum applications lodged, international protection needs remain high, particularly among the most vulnerable people.[24]

At the beginning of 2026, arrivals to Ceuta from Morocco registered an important increase with almost 1,000 migrants who arrived in the enclave in one month and a half.[25] Arrivals – including of UAMs – started increasing from the end of 2025.[26]

According to the Red Cross, in 2025 migrants started to use more distant and riskier departure points (i.e. the Gambia and south Mauritania) to reach the Canary Islands following a crackdown by Mauritania on irregular migration.[27]

Since mid-January 2026, the NGO Humanitarian Pilots Initiative (HPI) carried out monitoring flights over the Atlantic Ocean – a zone where humanitarian ships are not present – and found numerous migrant boats in distress.[28]

A report published by the organisations porCausa and the Centre Delàs d’Estudis per la Pau analysed the use of artificial intelligence and other forms of technology in migration control policies. Concretely, it examined around 700 contracts of the Spanish government subscribed for this sector, with a total expenditure amounting to €541 million. The research concluded that ‘these contracts reflect highly concentrated spending, both by category and by company and procedure, with a significant emphasis on surveillance technologies, border control and cyber intelligence, technological infrastructure and biometric systems. And with a special emphasis on capabilities associated with internal security, immigration control and advanced data analysis’.[29]

In March 2026, the Ministry of the Interior informed on the plans to reinforce the border perimeter around the former Barrio Chino land border post in Melilla, with an investment of over €1.5 million. The project will begin in 2026 and will last for two years.[30]

Arrivals in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla

The number of persons arriving in Ceuta and Melilla by land in 2025 was 3,850, marking an increase compared to 2024, when 2,647 persons entered the enclaves. In addition, a total of 29 people arrived by sea to the enclaves, with 25 reaching Melilla (representing a 19% increase compared to 2024), and 4 Ceuta (a 85.7% decrease compared to the previous year).[31]

Source: Ministerio del Interior, ‘Inmigración irregular 2025. Datos acumulados del 1 de enero al 31 de diciembre’, January 2026, available here.

In recent years, the main obstacles regarding access to the Spanish territory have been faced at the Ceuta and Melilla borders and checkpoints. These obstacles are mainly due to the impossibility for asylum seekers to cross the border and exit Morocco. There are several reported cases concerning refusal of entry, refoulement, collective expulsions and push backs, including incidents involving hundreds of people throughout, that continued throughout 2025. In its 2024 annual report on human rights at Southern borders, the Asociación Pro-Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA) reported the continued problem of pushbacks at the borders in Ceuta and Melilla.[32]

One of the ways used by migrants and asylum seekers to enter the territory is the attempt to climb border fences in groups. The increasing number of attempts to jump border fences is linked to the fact that migrants and asylum seekers, and especially Sub-Saharan nationals, still face significant obstacles in accessing the asylum procedure at Spanish borders, as a result of border controls exercised by the Moroccan police on the Moroccan side of the border.^[33] This can be illustrated when looking at data provided by the Government on asylum claims lodged at the border, which indicates that no asylum application was made at Ceuta’s border crossing, and that persons from sub-Saharan countries are underrepresented among the nationalities of asylum seekers at Melilla’s border (see section on Access to the Territory).

Similarly to the previous update of the report, the following list provides an overview of several incidents that were reported at the border in 2025 and at the beginning of 2026:

• In March 2025, the High Court of Justice of Andalusia (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía) ruled on a case that was considered a pushback. The case regarded man who was trying to reach the coast of Ceuta by swimming in March 2023, while the Guardia Civil’s boat intercepted him. The officers took him on board and transferred him to Ceuta, where he was attended by the Red Cross. Immediately afterwards, the Guardia Civil brought the migrant to the Tarajal border and handed him over to the Moroccan authorities. A year later, the Contentious Administrative Court of Ceuta declared this action illegal, and the High Court of Justice of Andalusia confirmed the decision.[34]
• In June, CEAR denounced the impunity still existing after three years since the incident occurred in Melilla on 24 June 2022, when around 2,000 persons attempted to enter the city from Morocco by jumping the fence, resulting in 37 persons dead and hundreds injured, while 133 individuals managed to enter the Spanish enclave. CEAR condemned the lack of justice for the victims after three years, as well as the lack of news on the whereabouts of 70 missing persons, due to the refusal by Morocco to provide the list of deceased persons and its obstruction to the attempts made by families and organisations to access hospitals and morgues.[35]
• In July, around 50 unaccompanied Moroccan children reached Ceuta by swimming.[36]
• In August, the Guardia Civil prevented a Moroccan man to enter Melilla by sea.[37]
• During the same month, Morocco informed it would investigate a Moroccan soldier for beating a child who was trying to reach Ceuta by swimming.[38]
• On 15 August, around 300 migrants and refugees attempted to reach Ceuta by swimming from Morocco. In addition, authorities informed that the bodies of 21 persons have been found so far since the beginning of the year.[39]
• In October, a young sub-Saharan migrant managed to enter Ceuta by paragliding, despite the rain and strong wind.[40]

The 2025 EUAA Asylum Report underlined the continued concerns about effective access to territory for those seeking protection at the land and sea borders of Ceuta and Melilla.[41]

The above incidents illustrate how migrants and asylum seekers continue resorting to dangerous ways to enter Ceuta and Melilla, sometimes resulting in their deaths.

The persisting problem of pushbacks (devoluciones en caliente)

The situation at borders and regarding access to territory has gradually worsened since March 2015, after the Spanish government adopted an amendment to the Immigration Law, introducing the possibility to “reject at borders” third-country nationals found crossing the border irregularly.

The amendment, introduced through the adoption of the Law “on the protection of citizen security”,^[42] includes a specific regulation within the Immigration Law concerning the “Special regime of Ceuta and Melilla”. This regime consists of three elements:

• It rules that “those foreigners who are detected at Ceuta’s and Melilla’s border lines when trying to pass the border’s contentious elements to irregularly cross the border, can be rejected to avoid their illegal entry in Spain”;
• It declares that “these rejections will be realised respecting the international law on human rights and international protection ratified by Spain”;
• Lastly, it states that “international protection claims will be formalised at the ad hoc border point in line with international protection obligations.”

In practice, when a person is found within Spanish border territory, which includes the land between the Moroccan and Spanish border, they are taken outside the Spanish border through existing passages and doors controlled by border guards.

The amendment aimed at legalising the push backs (devoluciones en caliente) practiced in Ceuta and Melilla and has been criticised for ignoring human rights and international law obligations towards asylum seekers and refugees by several European and international organisations such as UNHCR,^[43] the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights,^[44] and the United Nations Committee against Torture. Critics underline that people are not able to request asylum, and that the law mostly affects groups in vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors and victims of trafficking.

These circumstances made Spain one of the European countries with the highest numbers of refusal of entry at the border between 2017 and 2019, with a peak of 493,455 refusals of entry in 2019.

Following a parliamentary request by the Popular Party, the Government informed that, since 2018 until 31 August 2025, Spain has carried out more than 54,530 refusals of entry and 23,958 forced returns (‘expulsiones’), as well as 19,392 returns at borders (‘devoluciones’).[46]

In October 2024, the Congress reopened the debate on the reform of the Law on Citizen Security (the so-called Ley Mordaza), which was adopted in 2015 and provided, inter alia, for the modification of the Immigration Law, by allowing, in practice, collective expulsions at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. The reform – agreed between PSOE, Sumar and Bildu – aims at recognising and guaranteeing the rights of migrants, at prohibiting collective explosions, and at processing asylum applications according to human rights legal provisions and to the international protection regulations.[47] After the agreement of all political parties – with the exclusion of the Partido Popular and Vox -, the reform underwent the urgent legislative procedure.[48] The proposal is still under discussion in the Parliament at the time of writing of this report.[49]

In previous years, several cases have been brought to court to challenge the conduct of Spanish border control patrols and guards.

N.D and N.T v Spain

The case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerned two Sub-Saharan men – from Mali and the Ivory Coast respectively – who alleged having been summarily and collectively expelled from Spanish territory on 13 August 2014 as part of a group of over 75 individuals. On 3 October 2017, the ECtHR held unanimously that there had been a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions of the right to an effective remedy in conjunction with said prohibition under Article 4 Protocol 4 and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).^[50]

On 13 February 2020, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (GC) published its judgment in the case of N.D and N.T v Spain concerning the immediate return of the two men to Morocco after attempting to cross the border of the Melilla enclave,^[51] overturning the 2017 judgment. The GC addressed whether the removal of the applicants amounted to an expulsion or ‘non-admission’ of entry.^[52]

Moreover, the GC was not convinced that the State had failed to provide a genuine and effective access to means of legal entry and concluded that the applicants had in fact placed themselves in jeopardy by participating in storming the border rather than using the existing procedures. In particular, the GC observed that the applicants could have applied for visas or for international protection at a border crossing point. It concluded that the applicants’ expulsions did not violate Article 4 Protocol 4.^[53]

Furthermore, the GC found that the applicants placed themselves in an unlawful situation by deliberately attempting to enter Spain as part of a large group rather than using available legal procedures. The lack of available individual procedures to challenge the removal was therefore deemed a consequence of the applicant’s unlawful attempt to gain entry. The GC held there was no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 4 Protocol 4.^[54]

This GC’s decision has been heavily criticised by civil society organisations and other stakeholders, including the Progressists’ Union of Public Prosecutors,^[55] who saw the case as a lost opportunity in condemning the Spanish authorities for their pushback practices at the border.^[56]

For further details on the case, see AIDA Country Report: Spain 2020 Update.

The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19 November 2020

On 19 November 2020, the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) endorsed the Organic Law on the protection of citizen security, which establishes a special regime for the rejection at the borders in Ceuta and Melilla.^[57] After analysing the constitutional doctrine and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court concluded that the law is in line with the Spanish Constitution. Regarding specifically the legal framework on Ceuta and Melilla, the Court concluded that the special regime foreseen is constitutional as in line with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the material execution of a rejection at the border. Nevertheless, the Court underlined the importance of judicial control and effective remedies to appeal a rejection at the border. In addition, the Court stated that a rejection decision at the border should be issued considering all the guarantees provided by national and international law, and that the procedure for allowing or refusing legal entry to Spain must be real and effective. The Court further held that law enforcement officials have to pay particular attention to vulnerable groups (i.e. children, pregnant women and elderly persons).

Other pushback cases and incidents

Pushback practices in Spain have been strongly condemned in the past. This includes a decision adopted on 12 February 2019 by the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding the case D.D. vs Spain.^[58]

In February 2014, 15 migrants drowned after attempting to reach the Spanish enclave of Ceuta by sea and were repelled with rubber bullets and smoke grenades by officers from the Guardia Civil. Since then, the so known “El Tarajal” case was decided and removed from the register in different occasions, until in June 2022 the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) rejected the cassation appeals lodged by different NGOs against the decision to remove the case from the register taken by the Provincial Court of Cádiz.^[59] Previous updates of this report provide more details on the case. (See AIDA Country Report on Spain – 2021 and 2020 Updates). In June 2023, the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) admitted the appeal lodged by different NGOs against the removal of the case from the register decided by the High Court (Tribunal Supremo) and the Provincial Court of Cádiz.^[60] In February 2024, a 25-year-old Cameroonian national filed a complaint at the UN against Spain, for multiple violations of the Convention against Torture which occurred during the incident.[61] In February 2025, a survivor who lost the eye vision during the incident filed a complaint against Spain at the UN Committee against Torture.[62]

Since the event in El Tarajal, each year many NGOs, groups of activists and other stakeholders join in Ceuta at the border, in order to commemorate the deaths and strive for justice.[63]

In a decision issued in January 2024, the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) established that Spanish authorities should have made an individual assessment on the returns of the unaccompanied migrant children that were collectively pushed back to Morocco in August 2021.[64]

On the second anniversary of the death of 37 migrants and the disappearance of 77 persons caused by the response given by Spanish and Moroccan immigration authorities to a group of migrants jumping the fence in Melilla in June 2022, gatherings have been organised in different cities (i.e. Madrid, Valencia, Cádiz and Barcelona) to continue to call for accountability and justice for what occurred that day.[65]  Different organisations (Border Forensics, in collaboration with Irídia-Centre for the Defense of Human Rights and AMDH-Moroccan Association for Human Rights) launched a report providing a counter-investigation carried out on the incident, because despite the many images filmed by different stakeholders, there are still many grey areas concerning the developments of the events on that day. According to the authors of the report, the Spanish and Moroccan authorities are far away of fully shedding light on what occurred and have instead prevented any independent investigation and access to some essential elements of the evidence. The authors concluded on the total impunity still existing after two years from the incident.[66]

In September 2025, the former Delegate of the Government and the former first vice president of the city government in Ceuta were sentenced to 9 years disqualification from holding public office, due to the expulsion of 55 children to Morocco in 2021.[67]

Bilateral agreements with third countries

Spain has signed different bilateral agreements with third countries such as Mauritania, Algeria, Senegal and Morocco. Some of these agreements are solely focused on returns, while others also aim at strengthening border management in partner countries.

Since 2019, Mauritania has become the main country to receive deportation flights from Spain (chartered by Frontex), inter alia due to the increase of arrivals to the Canary Islands. This is based on a bilateral agreement signed back in 2003.^[68] In July 2025, Spain renewed its cooperation agreement on migration with Mauritania.[69] Since mid-October, two detention centres for migrants were opened in Mauritania with funding from the Spanish Ministry of External Affairs. The Spanish authorities informed that these facilities are inspired by the Temporary Foreigners’ Assistance Centres (CATE) in the Canary Islands and that will also detain children and infants.[70]

In February 2024, Spain and Mauritania, under the auspices of the EU, signed an agreement for 210 million Euros aimed at, among other objectives, fighting against irregular migration and smuggling.[71] Since Mauritania became one of the main departure points for migrants reaching the Canary Islands at the end of 2023, it has intensified its efforts to combat irregular migration since the beginning of 2025. It intensified and increased operations, both on land and at sea, resulting in thousands of arrests of foreign nationals who were subsequently largely turned back at the borders. Between January and April 2025, Mauritania intercepted more than 30,000 migrants at sea.[72]

In August 2024, the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez visited Gambia, Senegal and Mauritania, three of the main countries of origin of people arriving to the Canary Islands. He signed agreements with those three countries to, inter alia, promote regular migration in the form of circular migration programmes and fight against migrant smuggling.[73]

In a paper published in October 2024, ECRE highlighted how the dynamics of the negotiations between the EU and Mauritania suggest a restructuring of relations between the EU and Mauritania. Such a readjustment is, according to the organisation, is connected to the political concern with migration in Spain, but also by the shifting geopolitical landscape in the Sahel region.[74]

In October 2024, the EU announced the approval of €30 million funds dedicated to strengthening the Senegalese authorities’ capacity to aid migrants at risk and fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The European Commission already funded a €5.75 million project strengthening the capacity of Senegalese security forces to combat irregular immigration, trafficking and migrant smuggling.[75]

In a report published in June 2025, the Council of Europe informed that ‘reports of unlawful arrests, collective expulsions, excessive use of force and other human rights violations as a result of Spain’s migration co-operation with Mauritania and Morocco date back to the 2000s’, and that Spain continues to pursue co-operation with these countries to date,[76]

In 2025, Spain and Senegal’s cooperation in combatting human trafficking and smuggling networks prevented 3,500 irregular migrant departures. Until the end of October 2025, less than 600 people have arrived irregularly in the Canary Islands from the Senegalese coast. Spain currently has 40 security agents stationed in Senegal, working together with the Gendarmerie and National Police through land, sea, and river patrols, supported by patrol boats, a helicopter, vehicles, and surveillance aircraft.[77]

In addition, in November the Spanish Minister of Interior visited Algeria with the aim of exploring ways to strengthen bilateral collaboration and trying to replicate models of cooperation already in place with Morocco and Mauritania, as key actors in the management of migratory flows.[78]

A media investigation published in the same month raised concerns regarding the use of EU funding in Senegal, suggesting that it may be contributing to strengthened migration control to the detriment of the persons attempting to reach Europe.[79]

In its 2025 annual report, Human Rights Watch reported that “Spanish security forces continued to cooperate with Mauritanian and Moroccan authorities. Spain assisted Mauritania with border control, migration management, and anti-smuggling operations, including through financial and material support, and deployment of some Spanish forces in Mauritania, despite ongoing migrants’ rights violations by local authorities. Spain increased financial and material support to Morocco for border surveillance”.[80]

According to a report published in 2022 by the European Migration Network (EMN), Spain has readmission agreements with several additional African countries (Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Mali, and Niger).^[81] A legal brief published in April 2024, contained a list of all the migration agreements on readmission or cooperation signed by Spain.[82] No information has been found on how widely they are applied nor how many persons are readmitted through the agreements.

The role of Moroccan authorities in migration and border control

According to official data, in December 2023 the Moroccan Government declared having prevented the arrival of 70,000 migrants to Spain during the last 3 years, by impeding 70 jumps of the fences of Ceuta and Melilla.^[83] The decrease of arrivals of almost 26% in 2022 compared to 2021 has been connected also to the renewal of the cooperation between Morocco and Spain.^[84] See the 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 updates of the AIDA report for more details on the issue on previous years.

In the past years, Spain has provided Morocco with consistent funding and different kind of equipment for the purpose of border and migration control. Information on funding to Morocco indicates that a total of 118 million Euros deriving from EU funding have been granted so far by Spain since 2019 to the beginning of 2024. The new allocation of funding seemed to relate to the maintenance of three patrol boats of the Guardia Civil, five refrigerated trucks, and 190 thermal cameras.[85]

The closure of the Moroccan borders, along with the COVID-19 pandemic and the Spanish migration policy in the Mediterranean,^[86] are probably the main reasons for the notable increase in arrivals on the Canary Islands registered since the end of 2019, despite the higher risks that such a route involves. In November 2020, the Spanish Government further announced a joint mission with Frontex aimed at limiting arrivals and closing the ‘Canary migratory route’.^[87]

In 2025, Frontex maintained three active missions (Indalo, Minerva and Canarias) in Spain under the control of the Guardia Civil and National Police, providing air and maritime resources and specialist personnel in identification, intelligence and the fight against cross-border crime.[88]

In August 2022, the EU announced the intention to allocate more than EUR 500 million to Morocco for the period 2021-2027, a budget that is 50% higher than the previous one, including for border management and police cooperation.^[89]

The joint declaration adopted following the 13^th high-level meeting between Morocco and Spain held at the beginning of December 2025 acknowledged their commitments in strengthening their efforts in the fight against irregular immigration, human smuggling, forgery of documents and human trafficking by adopting effective measures and developing cooperation with third countries, among other means. In this regard, Spain welcomed ‘Morocco’s exemplary and loyal cooperation in these areas’.[90]

Operational coordination between Spain and Morocco in border management and maritime surveillance led to a significant drop in irregular arrivals from the West African route in 2025, with monitoring operations decreasing by 63% and departures from Morocco falling by 17%.[91]

Arrivals by sea

In 2025, persons and 1,235 boats reached Spain via sea routes.^[92]

Out of the total number of persons arriving by sea, the vast majority (17,788 persons) were disembarked on the Canary Islands, which has become one of the main destinations for boats since the last months of 2019, while a total of 15,108 persons arrived on the mainland (7,787 persons) and the Balearic Islands (7,321 persons). Only a few migrants disembarked in Ceuta (4 persons) and Melilla (25 persons).^[93]

Regarding the number of deaths in the Mediterranean, several figures have been reported. The NGO Caminando Fronteras (Walking Borders) estimates that 3,090 persons died while reaching Spain in 2025, including 1,906 who lost their life on the Canary route.^[94] It further reported that 192 of victims were women, 437 were children, and that a total of 70 vessels disappeared with those 3,090 persons on board. The persons who died belonged to 30 different nationalities.

According to IOM’s figures, a total of 424 persons died in the Atlantic route, and 270 in the Western Mediterranean route.[95] It is worth noting, looking at the gap between the figures provided by IOM and Caminando Fronteras that the methodology and source differ between the two data sets. According to the author’s knowledge, Caminando Fronteras receives calls from people who have lost contact with their family members who had undertaken a migratory journey, and report disappearances accordingly, thus indicating higher numbers than, IOM, Salvamento Marítimo and the National Police.

Situation on the Canary Islands

As demonstrated by the figures above, boats arrivals to the Canary Islands continued in significant numbers throughout 2025. It is very likely that the Canary Islands will continue to be one of the main points of entry to Spain for migrants and refugees throughout 2026.

According to a report published in March 2025, migrants travelling along the Atlantic route are primarily West Africans and include also nationals from the countries of embarkation, i.e. Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco. The number of Malians using the Atlantic route has increased due to ongoing conflict and insecurity, with 10,000 arrivals between January and September 2024. The report informed also on the increasingly use of the Atlantic route by nationals of south-Asian countries.[96]

Reports of violence on the ships during the crossing of the Atlantic route have also been described.[97] In addition, a rising number of boats have been departing from other parts of Africa (i.e. Guinea-Conakry), implying dangerous sea journeys surpassing 2,000 kilometres.[98]

Serious concerns regarding the access to reception, overcrowding and poor living conditions on the Canary Islands are described in the Reception Chapter of this report (see Access and forms of reception conditions).

As mentioned, to support the authorities in the early identification of international protection needs, in capacity building, in registration and assistance to newcomers, UNHCR has deployed a team in the archipelago since January 2021 until mid-2025, when UNHCR permanent presence at the main entry points was reduced throughout the year and will be discontinued from July 2026 due to funding cuts.[99] Similarly, the EUAA deployed a team of experts to the Canary Islands in March 2021 with the aim of supporting the Spanish authorities to manage the reception centres, in light of the increase in arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers.^[100]

In June 2023, a new operational plan for 2023-2026 was agreed between Spain and the EUAA, which foresees a set of measures aiming at supporting and reinforcing the national reception authorities for the international protection, the temporary protection and the humanitarian assistance systems. In addition, compared to the previous operational plan, the new one foresees support to national authorities to foster common action in reception of unaccompanied migrant children in the Spanish territory, and to enhance the capacity of authorities and practitioners through training and professional development.[101]

Throughout 2025, the EUAA deployed a total of 77 experts in Spain,[102] 43 of which were external experts and 28 temporary agency workers. This included 11 protection experts, 9 intermediate asylum and reception programme and project management experts, 9 intermediate reception training experts as well as other monitoring, legal and administrative staff (e.g., TP-IP hotline information provision assistants, access to asylum procedures experts, helpdesk information provision vulnerability assistants, etc).[103]

As of 15 December 2025, there were 60 EUAA experts present in Spain, mainly protection experts (9), asylum/reception training experts (7), access to asylum procedures experts (6) and TP-IP hotline information provision assistants (6).[104]

In 2025, the EUAA delivered 109 training sessions to a total of 2,590 local staff.[105]

In May 2025, a delegation of members from the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) visited the Canary Islands to assess ‘first-hand’ the institutional response to the migratory situation in the archipelago and the institutional response to manage it.[106]

Search and Rescue (SAR) operations

Since April 2015, the NGO CEAR, in coordination with other NGOs (including Accem), is running the campaign ‘UErfanos’ to denounce the deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and the breaches to the right to asylum by the EU, which produce more ‘UEorphans’. The webpage of the campaign contains updated information on number of arrivals and deaths on the route to Europe and Spain.

Maritime Rescue (Salvamento Marítimo), an authority under the Ministry of Transport and Sustainable Mobility, is responsible for search and rescue carried out in the search and rescue zone belonging to Spain and Morocco.^[107] The Maritime Rescue always informs the Spanish Red Cross (Cruz Roja Española)^[108] of arrivals. The Spanish Red Cross notifies its Emergency Immediate Response Teams (Equipos de Respuesta Inmediata en Emergencia, ERIE) that operate in Almería, Motril, Málaga, Tarifa and Ceuta, where migrants are taken upon their arrival.

In February 2025, the Council of Ministers approved the new National Plan on Maritime Rescue for the period 2025-2027, with the allocation of a budget of €163 million.[109]

The ERIE is composed of Red Cross staff and volunteers who are usually medical personnel, nurses and some intercultural mediators. Their first action consists in a health assessment to check the state of health and detect medical needs and the preparation of a health card for each of the newly arrived persons, which contains their personal data. As already mentioned, UNHCR also deployed personnel in different points of arrival in Spain until mid-2025. The main objective of the presence of UNHCR was to work in the field of identification, referral and protection of people who need international protection.

After this health screening, the ERIE distributes food, water, dry clothes and a hygiene kit. Normally, men are separated from women in shelters. The Spanish Red Cross further provides humanitarian and health care at this stage. This process must be carried out within a period of 72 hours in accordance with the maximum term of preventive detention foreseen by the Spanish legal system.

An investigation carried out by different media, including El País, revealed that Frontex has been illegally sharing personal data and information on migrants and activists to Europol, including those of the Spanish activist Helena Maleno.[110] As detailed in previous updates of this report, Helena Maleno is the founder of the NGO Caminando Fronteras, she was accused in 2020 by Salvamento Marítimo of being responsible of the deaths of migrants, even after the charges of migrant smuggling and human trafficking held against her, which were dropped in March 2019 by the Appeal Court of Tangier.

In January 2021, the Municipality of Barcelona announced its intention to intervene as civil party in the criminal procedure in the process in Palermo (Italy) against the former Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, for impeding the disembarkation of the Open Arms boat in Italy. The Open Arms was carrying 130 migrants and refugees during the summer of 2019.^[111] The judgement started in Palermo in October 2021.^[112] The first hearings were held in 2022.^[113] In September 2024, the competent public prosecutor asked for 6 years of imprisonment for the former Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, for committing the crimes of kidnapping and refusal of official acts. The parties – both rescued people and the NGOs – of the civil action in the context of the criminal procedures asked for a compensation of 1 million Euros.[114] In December 2024, Matteo Salvini was acquitted by the Court of Palermo with the formula ‘because the alleged fact does not exist’, and that Spain and not Italy should have assigned a port for the Open Arms rescue ship.[115] In July 2025, the public prosecutors appealed the acquittal decision in front of the Court of Cassation as they considered the first instance judge did not apply correctly the international legislation.[116] In December, Matteo Salvini was acquitted definitively, as the Court of Cassation rejected the Public Prosecutor’s appeal.[117]

In August 2025, the leader of the far-right party Vox referred to the Open Arms vessel as ‘slave ship’ and called for its seizure and sinking. More than 200 persons and 26 groups denounced the fact as a possible hate crime at the Public Prosecutor Office.[118]

Following Vox’s proposal to increase the presence of Navy vessels in Gibraltar Strait and near the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, the admiral general informed that their obligation is to rescue people, not fighting against irregular migration.[119]

Denial of asylum following disembarkation from the Aquarius vessel

For more details on this topic, see previous updates of the report.

Police stations, CATE and CAED

All adults arriving to mainland by boat are placed in Detention for up to 72 hours in police facilities for identification and processing. This is also the case of families and women travelling with children, while children who arrive unaccompanied are usually taken to the competent protection centre.^[120]

All persons rescued at sea are issued an expulsion order. If the person who irregularly entered Spain and received an expulsion order lodges an application for international protection, the expulsion order is suspended during the asylum procedure and resumes only in case of rejection of the application. If the person does not apply for international protection, but the order cannot be executed within a period of 72 hours, migrants are transferred to detention in a Foreigners Detention Centre (CIE) to proceed with the expulsion. Most migrants who are sent there are eventually not removed from the country,^[121] as Spain does not have bilateral agreements with the relevant countries of origin. Once the maximum 60-day Duration of Detention in CIE has expired, the person is released with a pending expulsion order.

Shortcomings concerning access to legal assistance for persons arriving by sea have been reported in recent years. This includes contacting lawyers only following the notification of the expulsion order rather than at the moment of arrival of migrants in Spain. Lawyers meet with clients once they are in the CIE, but these interviews are in most cases collective and are conducted in the presence of police officers.

In September 2025, the Spanish Bar Association has requested to the Minister of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration that the representation of foreign nationals in migration proceedings be exclusively provided by legal professionals specialised on the matter, in order to guarantee high-quality legal advice and prevent the violation of rights.[122]

In addition, in order to respond to the increasing number of arrivals, from 2018 the Spanish Government put in place resources to manage arrivals and to carry out the identification of persons’ vulnerabilities in the first days of arrival. Specific facilities for emergency and referral have been created: these are referred to as Centres for the Temporary Assistance of Foreigners (Centros de Atención Temporal de Extranjeros, CATE) and Centres for Emergency Assistance and Referral (Centros de Atención de Emergencia y Derivación, CAED).^[123]

• CATEs are managed by the National Police and are aimed at facilitating the identification of persons by the police, i.e. recording of personal data, fingerprinting etc. In practice these are closed centres which function as police stations and all newly arrived persons must pass through CATE. The maximum duration of stay in CATE is 72 hours.

CATE are located in all the main points of sea arrivals, and their number can vary according to the number of arrivals. In 2024, there were 10 CATEs in Spain: San Roque (Cádiz), Málaga, Motril (Granada), Almería, Cartagena (Murcia), Arguineguín (Gran Canarias), Barranco Seco (Gran Canarias), El Hierro, Muelle de Puerto del Rosario (Fuerteventura) and Adeje (Tenerife).[124] CATE are usually large facilities. The one in San Roque has a capacity of about 600 places, for example. The one in Málaga has a capacity for 300 persons, with a space of 2.3m² per person, which is a 42.5% less than what is foreseen by the law for those detained in police station’s prisons. Concerns relating to the conditions of detention and of the facilities have been raised and continued to be a concern.^[125] The construction of a new CATE in Cartagena, announced in 2020, was due to be finalised in 2021, but its construction was finalised in September 2022.^[126] The Government further announced the construction of two additional CATEs in 2021, namely in Motril (Granada),^[127] for which construction works were finalised in October 2022 and which opened in 2025,^[128] and in Las Palmas in the Canary Islands, which  was opened  in Barranco Seco with a capacity of 1,000 places.^[129]

In a decision taken in November 2024, the Supreme Court clarified the juridical nature of CATEs, by establishing that foreign nationals apprehended whilst attempting to enter Spain irregularly and who are taken to and detained in a CATE are deprived of liberty, and the nature of these facilities is that of police facilities. Consequently, the legal regime applicable to such centres is that applicable to police facilities, and therefore persons detained therein shall be entitled to the rights granted by current legislation to foreign nationals who are deprived of their liberty in police facilities.[130]

Despite recognising some improvements in the conditions in CATEs, in its 2024 annual report the Spanish Ombudsperson, in its capacity as National Mechanism for Prevention of Torture, highlighted that the conditions of stay continued not to be adequate.^[131] The body also stated that there has been no progress in terms of the need for greater availability of female interpreters to assist migrant or refugee women, as well as interpreters of languages and dialects from sub-Saharan African countries. Furthermore, the Ombudsperson highlighted that the language used by interpreters must be adapted to the vulnerable situation of migrants, their gender and their age. The Administration reiterated that its possibilities are limited to the resources of external translation companies that are contracted to provide interpretation services.

In its 2024 annual report, the Spanish Ombudsperson acknowledged the improvements of the facilities carried out at the CATEs of El Hierro and Tenerife (Canary Islands).[132]

In January 2026, the construction works for a new CATE in the south of Tenerife started, with a budget of €7 million. The plan foresees the construction of two main buildings with 256 beds, and a smaller module with 92 additional places. Thus, the facility will be able to accommodate 348 people arriving by boat. The planned construction period is 10 months.[133]

• CAEDs are open centres managed by NGOs, i.e. the Spanish Red Cross, Accem and CEAR, under the coordination of the Directorate-General for Inclusion and Humanitarian Assistance (Dirección General de Inclusión y Atención Humanitaria, DGIAH) of the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, and are usually large centres where certain assistance services are provided, including information, social and legal assistance.^[134] For example, the CAED in Chiclana de la Frontera, Cádiz is managed by the Spanish Red Cross and has capacity for 600-700 persons. Its aim is to establish the status of each newly arrived migrant and to facilitate them the possibility of contacting family members and friends across Spain and the EU.^[135]

As of March 2026, there was a total of four CAED managed by NGOs (i.e. Accem and the Spanish Red Cross).^[136] The Spanish Red Cross manages 1 CAED in Madrid and Accem manages 3 of such facilities (in Mérida, Cartagena and Alcalá de Henares).

In its 2024 annual report, the Spanish Ombudsperson informed about the numerous complaints it received in 2024 regarding the reception conditions in the various facilities of the humanitarian reception system.[137] Following an unannounced visit to the CAED in Alcalá de Henares (Madrid), the Ombudsperson forwarded to the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Assistance and the International Protection Reception System its conclusions, which include the inadequacy of the facilities for a prolonged stay; the limitations in the number of interpreters, legal, health and psychosocial services; the presence of alleged UAMs and a large number of people who claimed to be in need of international protection but were unable to obtain an appointment to apply for asylum during their stay at the centre.

Border monitoring

UNHCR carries out monitoring activities at Spanish sea and land borders. Until the beginning of 2025, UNHCR carried out these activities including through presence of its staff in Melilla, Algeciras (covering Ceuta and Cádiz), Málaga (covering Málaga, Granada and Almería), and in the Canary Islands.

In 2025, due to a sharp reduction in funding in the framework of a global financial crisis that affected the UN system at large, UNHCR had to reduce in its presence and operations in Spain. UNHCR permanent presence at the main entry points was reduced throughout the year and, at the current state of affairs, will be discontinued from July 2026. Fundraising and advocacy efforts are ongoing to support the continuation of this important field presence in key locations of arrival of mixed migration flows, such as the Canary Islands.

Regular monitoring activities at Spanish sea and land borders were reduced in mid-2025. UNHCR presence in Melilla was fully discontinued, while the presence in Malaga and Algeciras (covering Ceuta) was reduced from three staff members to one, and only two out of four staff members remained in the Canary Islands, each covering one province.

UNHCR’s capacity was hence considerably reduced in core mandate-related areas, such as the early identification of international protection needs and specific needs, fostering appropriate access to the asylum procedure, information provision on asylum, training of different stakeholders on international protection and refugee rights, and support to actors responsible for the registration, documentation, reception and assistance of asylum seekers.

Regular visits were carried out to detention and reception centres where UNHCR was able to interview and engage with recently arrived persons by sea or land, including unaccompanied children. During these visits, UNHCR documented refoulement-related incidents and identified individuals with specific needs and international protection needs. UNHCR also worked closely with border police by providing training on interviewing techniques and the identification of international protection needs and supported the authorities in promoting quality interpretation services.

UNHCR also worked extensively with Spanish central and regional authorities at the technical level to ensure child-focused asylum management, particularly in the Canary Islands.[138]

Legal access to the territory

Resettlement

Resettled refugees access the asylum reception system and are entitled to reception conditions as asylum applicants. In relation to the procedure, they arrive with a decision already taken on their status. As soon as they arrive, they receive the notification of the decision (in some cases also directly at the airport upon arrival) and thus, once in Spain, they just have to apply for receiving accommodation and receiving a work permit.

UNHCR supported the resettlement programme through its participation in the national resettlement coordination group and the community sponsorship initiative through a specific consultancy, which informed discussions on the way forward for these programmes in the future.^[139]

In December 2023 the Government allocated 1.8 million Euros for the resettlement of 1,200 refugees from Costa Rica, Lebanon and Türkiye.[140] In February 2024, the Government announced the programme’s enlargement, with the aim of including other 1,500 refugees coming from Central and South America in 2024 and 2025.[141] In addition, in January 2024 the Council of Ministers approved the Annual programme for the Resettlement of Refugees, with the commitment to resettle 1,200 refugees. In 2025, a total of 817 refugees were resettled to Spain from Costa Rica (453 Nicaraguan) and Lebanon (364 Syrians).[142]

In 2025, a total of 860 refugees were resettled in Spain, being 364 Syrian refugees displaced in Lebanon and 496 Nicaraguan refugees from Costa Rica.[143]

As underlined by UNHCR, Spain´s National Resettlement Programme reached 72% implementation in 2025, with 861 arrivals out of the 1,200 places initially pledged. Arrivals included 497 Nicaraguan refugees from Costa Rica and 364 Syrian refugees from Lebanon. Among the Nicaraguan refugees resettled, 44 arrived under the “Resettlement + jobs” scheme that started in 2023 and was discontinued at the end of 2025. UNHCR welcomed Spain’s commitment to maintain the 1,200 places for the coming two years under the EU Resettlement Framework.[144]

In October 2023, the Minister of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration started to implement a project, together with Accem and the Council of the City of Valladolid to foster access to the job market for more than 100 Nicaraguan refugees resettled from Costa Rica to Spain, specifically in the field of renewable energies.^[145] In December 2023, 74 persons arrived to Spain within this framework.^[146] The project continued in 2024 and 2025, involving almost 200 Nicaraguan refugees resettled from Costa Rica until the beginning of 2025.[147]

In June 2024, the Spanish Government (concretely the Minister of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration) was chosen by the UNHCR to chair the 2025 annual Consultations on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways, which will be co-chaired also by the Spanish NGO Accem.[148] The Consultations took place in Geneva at the end of June 2025.[149] According to UNHCR, this demonstrated a strong positioning by the Spanish Government and messaging as a solutions-focused country, at a time when global support for resettlement has declined. Community sponsorship initiatives in Navarra and the Basque Country consolidated as permanent programmes in these regions. Three new families were admitted to the Navarra programme, including two Nicaraguan families for the first time.[150]

A new resettlement quota of up to 1,200 places for 2025 was approved by the Council of Ministers at the end of 2024.[151]

In December 2025, the IOM and the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration signed an agreement for the implementation of projects in the areas of resettlement, assisted voluntary return and reintegration, labour mobility and social inclusion during 2026 with a total budget of €4 million.[152]

In 2025, UNHCR supported the implementation of the University of Barcelona refugee programme, and initial steps were taken to develop a pilot educational pathways for refugees in 2026, with the participation of several public universities.[153]

In January 2026, the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration launched an informative video on resettlement, which explains in detail how the resettlement programme works and outlines the work carried out in each of its phases.[154]

In March, the Council of Ministers adopted the national resettlement program for 2026, with 1,200 places pledged.[155]

Complementary pathways and other forms of regular entry for people in need of protection

In December 2024, the organisation CEAR launched the campaign ‘El abrazo más esperado’ to raise awareness and advocate for family reunification, as one of the safe and legal pathways to obtain protection according to Spanish legislation.[156]

In March 2025, UNHCR called for more labour migration channels to Spain to curb the dangerous route to the Canary Island. [157]

After the shipwreck of a boat in El Hierro (Canary Islands) in May 2025, Accem and CEAR called for legal and safe pathways to Spain.[158]

As specified in the section on Differential treatment, after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, Spain started to transfer persons fleeing the country, also by issuing visa to Spain to Afghans at the embassies and consulates in Iran and Pakistan.

Family reunification opportunities are discussed further in the final chapters of the report. On the occasion of the 2025 Migrant International Day, CEAR called for guaranteeing the right of refugees to live with their families. The organisation denounced the legal, administrative and economic barriers that refugees have to overcome in order to guarantee their right to family unity and to live with their families and highlighted that family reunification is one of the legal and safe pathways available to them.[159]

^[1] Ministerio del Interior, ‘Inmigración irregular 2025. Datos acumulados del 1 de enero al 31 de diciembre’, January 2026, available here.

^[2] Rabat Process, ‘6th Ministerial Conference: Adoption of the Cadiz Action Plan’, 21 December 2023, available here.

^[3] EU MED5, Ministerial Conference, ‘Declaración común del MED5. Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 19-20.04.24’, April 2024, available here. 

[4] Press Digital, ‘España, Italia, Grecia, Chipre y Malta piden a la UE elevar la financiación en prevención migratoria’, 12 April 2025, available here.

^[5]  Ministerio del Interior, ‘La Policía Nacional coordina y dirige junto a FRONTEX la Operación MINERVA’25 en los puertos de Algeciras, Ceuta y Tarifa’, 11 June 2025, available here.

[6] Info Migrants, ‘Pakistan to the Canary Islands: Does a migrant shipwreck shed light on a new route?, 21 January 2025, available here.

[7] Info Migrants, ‘Caribbean: 19 suspected migrants from West Africa found dead in drifting fishing boat’, 31 January 2025, available here.

[8] Info Migrants, ‘Morocco: Nearly 80,000 attempts to reach the EU prevented in 2024’, 7 February 2025, available here.

[9] Mixed Migration Centre, ‘Beyond restrictions: migration & smuggling across the Mediterranean, the Atlantic & the English Channel’, march 2025, available here.

[10] Majorca Daily Bulletin, ‘Mallorca migrant crisis: shackled bodies linked to a boat that arrived in Alicante’, 30 June 2025, available here.

[11] Europol, ‘Spain dismantles criminal network smuggling migrants from Algeria to the EU’, June 2025, available here.

[12] Público, ‘Unos 600 migrantes llegan a Balears en una treintena de pateras en lo que va de semana’, 13 August 2025, available here.

[13] El Boletí, ‘Inmigración en España: menos llegadas, giro hacia Baleares y fin de la Golden Visa’, 25 August 2025, available here.

[14] Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones, ‘La secretaria de Estado de Migraciones, Pilar Cancela, viaja a Baleares para habilitar nuevos recursos de atención humanitaria’, 8 July 2025, available here.

[15] ABC, ‘472 inmigrantes irregulares ya han pasado por el módulo de acogida del puerto de Palma’, 23 january 2026, available here.

[16] La Voz de Lanzarote, ‘Canary Islands proposes to the European Union a “significant” reinforcement of Frontex with aerial and maritime means’, 20 August 2025, available here.

[17] Human Rights Watch, ‘Mauritania: Years of Migration Control Abuses’, 27 August 2025, available here; El País, ‘Palizas, hambre y expulsiones: la violencia en Mauritania que explica la caída de llegadas de cayucos a Canarias’, 27 August 2025, available here.

[18] La Vanguardia, ‘El Foro para la integración de migrantes pide reconocer a Andalucía como frontera sur’, 19 September 2025, available here; Federación Sur Acoge, ‘Andalucía Acoge pide profundizar en el reconocimiento de Andalucía como Frontera Sur europea ‘, 19 September 2025, available here.

[19] Politico, ‘Brussels announces who’ll get — and who’ll pay for — new EU migration aid’, 11 November 2025, available here.

[20] Reuters, ‘Migrant arrivals in Spain’s Balearics surge as smugglers switch routes’, 13 November 2025, available here.

[21] El Salto Diario, ‘Frontex consolida su red de control indirecto en África más allá de la ruta canaria de migración’, 1 December 2025, available here.

[22] Arab News, ‘Guinea offers new migration route for weary, young west Africans’, 5 December 2025, available here.

[23] Info Migrants, ‘Senegal intercepts boat with over 120 migrants headed for Canaries amid increased departures from The Gambia’, 16 October 2025, available here.

[24] UNHCR, ‘Asylum applications and sea arrivals decline, but international protection needs among people arriving in Spain persist’, 29 January 2026, available here; Europa Press, ‘ACNUR advierte de “mayor vulnerabilidad y peligro” para los migrantes pese al descenso de llegadas a España’, 30 January 2026, available here.

[25] Info Migrants, ‘Ceuta migrant center overwhelmed as arrivals from Morocco increase’, 20 February 2026, available here.

[26] El Pueblo de Ceuta, ‘Continúa el goteo de menores entrando a Ceuta’, 12 October 2025, available here.

[27] Reuters, ‘Migrants using more distant, riskier departure points to Canaries after Mauritania crackdown, Red Cross finds’, 14 january 2026, available here.

[28] Info Migrants, ‘NGO monitors Atlantic migration route to the Canary Islands from the sky’, 13 February 2026, available here.

[29] porCausa, Centre Delàs d’Estudis per la Pau, ‘Fronteras “inteligentes”, democracias negligentes. Un análisis del uso de la inteligencia artificial y otras formas de tecnología en las políticas de control migratorio’, January 2026, available here.

[30] RTVE, ‘Interior prevé “reforzar” la valla del paso de Barrio Chino en Melilla, mientras Amnistía Internacional critica el “blindaje” de fronteras’, 27 March 2026, available here.

[31] Ministerio del Interior, ‘Inmigración irregular 2025. Datos acumulados del 1 de enero al 31 de diciembre’, January 2026, available here.

[32] Asociación Pro-Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA), ‘Derechos Humanos en la Frontera Sur 2024’, January 2025, available here; El Pueblo de Ceuta, ‘APDHA sostiene que Ceuta sigue siendo escenario de devoluciones en caliente’, 22 January 2025, available here.

^[33] CEAR, ‘Informe 2020: las personas refugiadas en España y Europa’, June 2020, available here, 74.

[34] Levante, ‘El Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía ratifica como ilegales las devoluciones en caliente de los migrantes rescatados en el mar’, 27 March 2025, available here.

[35] CEAR, ‘Masacre de Melilla: Tres años de impunidad’, 24 June 2025, available here.

[36] Antena 3, ‘Crisis migratoria en Ceuta: 54 menores no acompañados llegan nadando por la zona del Tarajal’, 26 July 2025, available here; La Sexta , ‘Más de medio centenar de menores no acompañados llegan a nado a Ceuta’, 26 July 2025, available here; Europa Sur, ‘Marruecos se despliega en el mar junto a Ceuta para evitar la entrada de jóvenes que quieren pasar hacia Algeciras’, 27 July 2025, available here; El Pueblo de Ceuta, ‘Gran despliegue de Marruecos en la frontera para evitar la entrada de migrantes a Ceuta’, 27 July 2025, available here; Morocco World News, ‘Over 80 Irregular Immigrants Swim to Ceuta in Summer’s Largest Irregular Migration Wave’, 27 July 2025, available here.

[37] Melilla Hoy, ‘La Guardia Civil frustra la entrada a Melilla de un migrante a nado pese al fuerte oleaje’, 6 August 2025, available here.

[38] Ceuta Actualidad, ‘”Inaceptable”: Marruecos investiga la actuación de un militar contra un menor cerca de Ceuta’, 13 August 2025, available here.

[39] Info Migrants, ‘Ceuta : quelque 300 migrants tentent la traversée en une nuit, 21 morts depuis le début de l’année’, 22 August 2025, available here.

[40] La Vanguardia, ‘Un joven migrante subsahariano logra entrar en Ceuta en parapente’, 29 october 2025, available here.

[41]  EUAA, ‘Asylum Report 2025’, June 2025, available here.

^[42] Organic Law 4/2015 of 30 March 2015 on the protection of citizen security.

^[43]  UNHCR Spain, ‘Enmienda a Ley de Extranjería vincula gestión fronteriza y respeto de obligaciones internacionales’, 13 March 2015, available here. See also ECRE, ‘Spain: New law giving legal cover to pushbacks in Ceuta and Melilla threats the right to asylum – Op-Ed by Estrella Galán, CEAR’, 27 March 2015, available here.

^[44] Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Third party intervention in N.D. v. Spain and N.T. v. Spain, 9 November 2015, available here. 

^[45]  Eurostat; migr_eirfs.

[46]  Demócrata, ‘España registra más de 54 mil denegaciones de entrada y cerca de 24 mil expulsiones desde 2018’, 22 November 2025, available here.

[47] Huffington Post, ‘El Congreso inicia de nuevo la reforma de la ley mordaza si Podemos lo permite’, 29 October 2024, available here; Público, ‘La reforma de la ley mordaza pactada con EH Bildu llega al Congreso con el aviso de Podemos y Junts de que habrá enmiendas’, 28 October 2024, available here; Newtral, ‘El acuerdo para acabar con la ley mordaza prevé prohibir las devoluciones en caliente y las pelotas de goma’, 3 October 2024, available here; Onda Cero, ‘Gobierno y Bildu pactan la reforma de la ley mordaza: estos son los puntos clave de la nueva normativa’, 3 October 2024, available here; Ceuta Actualidad, ‘Las devoluciones en caliente se acabarán si sale adelante el acuerdo entre Bildu y el Gobierno para derogar la Ley Mordaza’, 3 October 2024, available here.

[48] El Independiente, ‘El Congreso inicia la reforma de la ‘ley mordaza’ con la negativa del PP y Vox: “Dan a Bildu la protección de la Policía”’, 29 October 2024, available here.

[49]20 minutos, ‘La ley mordaza se acerca a su primera década de vigencia con la reforma que prometió el Gobierno atascada en el Congreso’, 17 April 2025, available here.

^[50] ECtHR, ‘N.D. and N.T. v. Spain’, Application Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, Judgment of 3 October 2017. 

^[51] ECtHR, Grand Chamber, ‘Case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain’, Applications nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15’, 13 February 2020, available here.

^[52] See EDAL summary here. For an analysis, see also Stavros Papageorgopoulos, ‘N.D. and N.T. v. Spain: do hot returns require cold decision-making?’, 28 February 2020, available here. 

^[53] Ibid.

^[54]  Ibid.

^[55]  Atresmedia, ‘La Unión Progresista de Fiscales tilda de “brutal retroceso” el fallo del Tribunal Europeo que avala las devoluciones en caliente’, 15 February 2020, available here.

^[56] Servicio Jesuita a Migrantes, ‘Nota de prensa Sentencia TEDH: Una sentencia dolorosa para demandantes y sociedad civil, pero que no legitima las devoluciones sumarias’, 14 February 2020, available here.

^[57] Tribunal Constitucional, Recurso de inconstitucionalidad STC 2015-2896, 19 November 2020, available here; Tribunal Constitucional, ‘NOTA INFORMATIVA Nº 108/2020. El Pleno del TC avala la constitucionalidad de la ley de protección de la seguridad ciudadana de 2015 salvo las grabaciones “no autorizadas” a la policía’, 19 November 2020, available here.

^[58]  Committee on the Rights of the Child, Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, concerning communication No. 4/2016- CRC/C/80/D/4/2016, 12 February 2019, available here.

^[59]  El Correo, ‘El Supremo confirma el archivo de la causa sobre la tragedia de El Tarajal’, 2 June 2022, available here.

^[60] Cadena Ser, ‘El Constitucional admite a trámite el recurso que presentaron varias ONG contra el archivo de la causa del Tarajal’, 28 June 2023, available here.

[61] The Guardian, ‘Refugee files complaint to UN against Spain over 2014 border deaths’, 1 February 2024, available here.

[62] El País, ‘Un superviviente que perdió visión en un ojo en la tragedia de El Tarajal denuncia a España ante la ONU’, 6 February 2025, available here.

[63]  CEAR, ‘Tarajal nunca más: 12 años exigiendo verdad, justicia y reparación’, 6 February 2026, available here.

[64]  Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Contencioso, STS 114/2024 – ECLI:ES:TS:2024:114, 22 January 2024, available here.

[65] El Salto, ‘Para el movimiento migrante y antirracista, la masacre en la valla de Melilla continúa en la impunidad’, 23 June 2024, available here.

[66]  Border Forensics, in collaboration with Irídia-Centre for the Defense of Human Rights and AMDH-Moroccan Association for Human Rights, ‘The Nador-Melilla border trap’, 18 June 2024, available here.

[67] El País, ‘Condenadas la exdelegada del Gobierno y la exvicepresidenta de Ceuta por la devolución exprés de menores marroquíes en 2021’, 11 September 2025, available here.

^[68] El País, ‘Mauritania recibe un tercio de los vuelos de expulsión de inmigrantes desde España’, 1 July 2020, available here.

[69] Euractiv, ‘Spain boosts cooperation with ‘key partner’ Mauritania on migration, security’, 17 July 2025, available here.

[70] Afroféminas, ‘Cárceles para migrantes en Mauritania con dinero público español’, 6 November 2025, available here; El Salto Diario, ‘El Gobierno de España abre dos cárceles de migrantes en Mauritania’, 5 November 2025, available here.

[71] Espiral 21, ‘España y Mauritania ponen en marcha la migración circular’, 8 February 2024, available here; The Guardian, ‘EU leaders unveil €210m Mauritania deal in bid to curb people-smuggling’, 8 Febryary 2024, available here; Canarias 7, ‘Pestana pide refuerzo policial para atender el repunte migratorio’, 8 February 2024, available here.

[72] Info Migrants, ‘’Authorities blame us for all the problems’, say Senegalese migrants expelled from Mauritania’, 2 March 2026, available here.

[73]  Radio France International, ‘Spain signs accords with Mauritania, Gambia to curb illegal migration’, 28 August 2024, available here; Euronews, ‘Spain and The Gambia sign partnership agreement on migration control in the Canary Islands’, 29 August 2024, available here; Associated Press News, ‘Spain’s leader in Senegal concludes West Africa tour aimed at tackling irregular migration’, 29 August 2024, available here; Info Migrants, ‘Spain’s circular migration policy explained’, 5 September 2024, available here; Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones, ‘Elma Saiz viaja a Mauritania para reforzar los programas de migración circular, que en 2023 beneficiaron a empresas y 17.200 trabajadores’, 28 August 2024, available here;

[74] ECRE, ‘The EU-Mauritania partnership: whose priorities?’, ECRE Working Paper 21, October 2024, available here.

[75] Le monde, ‘EU announces €30 million package to prevent irregular migration from Senegal’, 16 October 2024, available here.

[76]  Council of Europe, ‘CoE, Externalised asylum and migration policies and human rights law, June 2025, available here.

[77] Info Migrants, ‘Atlantic route: Spain and Senegal join forces against irregular migration, IOM launches West Africa initiative’, 6 November 2025, available here.

[78] La Voz de Ibiza, ‘Government seeks rapprochement with Algeria while defending Frontex action in countries of origin’, 25 November 2025, available here.

[79] Follow the Money, ‘Senegal’s EU-funded migration crackdown puts innocent people behind bars’, 20 November 2025, available here.

[80] Human Rights Watch, ‘World report 2026. Spain. Events of 2025’, February 2026, available here; Público, ‘Regularizar dentro, blindar fuera: Human Rights Watch suspende a España en política migratoria’, 5 February 2026, available here.

^[81] European Migration Network (EMN), ‘Bilateral Readmission Agreements’, September 2022, available here.

[82] Claudia Finotelli, Laura Cassain and Gabriel Echeverria, ‘Spain Country Brief on Irregular Migration Policy Context’, April 2024, available here.

^[83]  Heraldo, ‘Marruecos impidió en los últimos tres años a 10.000 migrantes entrar en Ceuta y Melilla’, 7 December 2023, available here.

^[84]  Atalayar, ‘El acuerdo entre España y Marruecos hace descender la inmigración irregular en un 26%’, 4 January 2023, available here; Público, ‘La nueva relación con Marruecos atenúa la migración hacia Canarias’, 3 September 2022, available here.

[85] The Objective, ‘El Gobierno ya lleva donados 118 millones a Marruecos para vigilar sus fronteras y costas’, 18 February 2024, available here.

^[86]  ECSaharaui, ‘Covid-19 cambia la ruta de la inmigración ilegal procedente de Marruecos; del estrecho de Gibraltar a Gran Canarias’, 19 July 2020, available here.

^[87]  El País, ‘España y Frontex negocian una operación para cerrar la ruta migratoria canaria’, 7 November 2020, available here. 

[88] Mallorca Diario, ‘Frontex mantiene tres misiones activas en España bajo control de Guardia Civil y Policía Nacional’, 17 October 2025, available here.

^[89] News EsEuro, ‘Inmigración ilegal: La UE prevé destinar más de 500 millones de euros a Marruecos (Medios españoles)’, 15 August 2022, available here.

[90] La Moncloa, ‘XIII Reunión de alto nivel Marruecos-España. 4 de diciembre de 2025. Declaración Conjunta’, 4 december 2025, available here.

[91] Yabiladi, ‘Morocco and Spain cooperation reduces West African migration by 63 percent’, 13 March 2026, available here.

^[92]  Ministerio del Interior, ‘Inmigración irregular 2025. Datos acumulados del 1 de enero al 31 de diciembre’, January 2026, available here.

^[93]  Ibidem.

^[94]  Caminando Fronteras, ‘Monitoreo del derecho a la vida – Año 2025’, December 2025, available here.

[95]  IOM, ‘Migration Flow to Europe. Dead and Missing’, 2025, available here.

[96] Mixed Migration Centre, ‘Beyond restrictions: migration & smuggling across the Mediterranean, the Atlantic & the English Channel’, march 2025, available here.

[97]  Politico, ‘The Cost of Passage: Violence and Death on the Atlantic Route to Spain’, 16 June 2025, available here.

[98] Info Migrants, ‘Spain: Migrants taking riskier 2,000-kilometer sea journeys to reach Canaries’, 27 June 2025, available here.

[99] Information provided by UNHCR in March 2026.

^[100] EASO, ‘EASO support to Spain becomes fully operational’, 10 March 2021, available here.

[101]  EUAA, ‘Operational Plan 2023-2026 agreed by the European Union Agency for Asylum and Spain’, 12 June 2023, available here.

^[102]  EUAA personnel numbers do not include deployed interpreters by the EUAA in support of asylum and reception activities.

[103] Information provided by the EUAA, 05 March 2026. In the course of 2025, 25 persons were deployed in Spain under two different profiles. These cases are reported separately under each category.

[104] Information provided by the EUAA, 05 March 2026. In the figures above, the same persons may have been included under different profiles, if a change of profile took place in the course of 2024.

[105] Information provided by the EUAA, 05 March 2026.

[106] La Razón, ‘Una misión del Parlamento Europeo analizará en Canarias la “incapacidad” del Gobierno para gestionar la crisis migratoria’, 22 May 2025, available here.

^[107] CEAR, ‘Refugiados y migrantes en España: Los muros invisibles tras la frontera sur’, December 2017, 8.

^[108] Cruz Roja Española, see here.

[109] Ministerio de Transportes y Movilidad Sostenible, ‘El Gobierno aprueba el nuevo Plan Nacional de Salvamento Marítimo con una inversión de 163 millones de euros para modernizarse’, 4 February 2025, available here.

[110] El País, ‘Frontex transfirió durante años ilegalmente a Europol datos de migrantes y activistas, 7 July 2025, available here.

^[111]       Europapress, ‘Barcelona se personará en el juicio en Italia contra Salvini por el bloqueo del Open Arms’, 27 January 2021, available here.

^[112] La Vanguardia, ‘Arranca el juicio contra Salvini por bloquear el desembarco del Open Arms’, 23 October 2021, available here.

^[113] La Notizia, ‘Processo Open Arms, nuova udienza a Palermo per Salvini. Il vicepremier: “Rischio 15 anni di carcere”’, 13 January 2023, available here; Il Sicilia, ‘Salvini a palermo per il processo Open Arms, incontrerà i dirigenti del partito’, 1 March 2022, available here. Ansa, ‘”Difeso la sicurezza nazionale”, Salvini in aula per Open Arms’, 12 January 2024, available here.

[114]  Ansa, ‘Open Arms, le parti civili chiedono oltre un milione a Salvini’, 20 September 2024, available here.

[115]  Euro New, ‘Open Arms, Matteo Salvini assolto dal tribunale di Palermo perché il fatto non sussiste’, 21 December 2024, available here; Info Migrants, ‘Open Arms case: Spain should have assigned port, not Italy’, 23 Juen 2025, available here.

[116] Il Manifesto, ‘Open Arms arriva dritto in Cassazione. Salvini: scelta politica’, 28 July 2025, available here; Rai News, ‘Open Arms, la Procura di Palermo impugna in Cassazione l’assoluzione di Salvini’, 18 July 2025, available here.

[117] Fanpage, ‘Processo Open Arms, Salvini assolto in via definitiva: la Cassazione respinge il ricorso della Procura’, 17 December 2025, available here.

[118] El País, ‘Abascal se refiere al Open Arms como “barco negrero” y llama a “confiscarlo y hundirlo”, 28.8.25, available here; El Diario, ‘Open Arms responde a Abascal: “Ser atacados por los enemigos del mundo es una medalla”’, 29 August 2025, available here; Europa Press, ‘Más de 200 personas y 26 colectivos llevan a Abascal ante la Fiscalía por pedir el hundimiento del barco de Open Arms, 5.9.25, available here.

[119] El País, ‘El jefe de la Armada, a Vox: “Que nadie piense que vamos a estar combatiendo en la mar la inmigración ilegal”’, 17 september 2025, available here.

^[120]  Ibid, 10.

^[121] El País, ‘España expulsa 30 inmigrantes por día desde 2013’, 7 January 2019, available here.

[122] Consejo General de la Abogacía Española, ‘La Abogacía solicita que las personas extranjeras estén siempre representadas por abogados’, 25 September 2025, available here; Iustel, ‘La Abogacía pide al Ministerio de Inclusión que la asistencia letrada a extranjeros la realicen abogados especializados’, 20 February 2026, available here.

^[123]  Europapress, ‘Un total de 22.082 personas han sido atendidas a pie de playa en lo que va de 2018, casi la cifra total de 2017’, 30 July 2018, available here; El Periódico, ‘La inusual llegada de pateras a Málaga obliga a buscar soluciones de emergencia’, 13 November 2018, available here.

[124] Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía – APDHA, ‘Derechos humanos en la Frontera sur 2024’, March 2024, available here.

^[125] Defensor del Pueblo, Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención, ‘Infome anual 2023’, March 2024, 45, available here.   

^[126] La Opinión de Murcia, ‘El CATE provisional de Cartagena abrió sin luz ni Internet y carece de zona de desembarco’, 9 October 2022, available here; La Verdad, ‘La apertura del CATE de Cartagena depende ahora de una prórroga sobre el suelo’, 4 February 2022, available here.

^[127]  Andalucía Información, ‘El Nuevo CATE de Motril entrará en funcionamiento en 2022, según Gobierno’, 23 September 2021, available here.

^[128] Granada Hoy, ‘El nuevo CATE de Motril recibe solo una patera en dos meses de funcionamiento’, 10 June 2025, available here.  

^[129] APDHA, Derechos Humanos en la Frontera Sur 2021, March 2021, available here, 60.

[130] Tribunal Supremo, Sala de los Contencioso, STS 5869/2024, 27 November 2024, available here.

^[131] Defensor del Pueblo, Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención, ‘Infome anual 2024. Anexos. Anexos del Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención (MNP)’, March 2025, available here. 

[132] Defensor del Pueblo, ‘Informe anual 2024, March 2025, available here.

[133] Canarian Weekly, ‘Work starts on new €7 million migrant reception centre in the south of Tenerife’, 10 January 2026, available here; Canarian weekly, ‘Work begins on new Migrant Reception Centre in the south of Tenerife’, 22 February 2026, available here.

^[134] Europa Press, ‘El centro para la acogida temporal de migrantes en Mérida atiende a 196 personas en su primera semana en servicio’, 3 August 2018, available here.

^[135]  APDHA, ‘Derechos Humanos en la Frontera Sur 2019’, February 2019, 36-37.

^[136] Information provided by Accem’s reception department in March 2026.

[137] Defensor del Pueblo, ‘Informe anual 2024’, March 2025, available here.

[138] Information provided by UNHCR in March 2026.

^[139] Information provided by UNHCR in March 2023. See also ECRE, ‘Pathways to Protection: Mapping visa schemes and other practices enabling people in need of international protection to reach Europe safely’, March 2024, available here.

[140] El Periódico de Canarias, ‘España dedica 1,8 millones a reasentar a 1.200 refugiados de Turquía, Costa Rica y Líbano’, 24 December 2023, available here.

[141] Europa Press, ‘España recibirá a 1.500 personas de América Central y Sur en 2024-2025 por la ampliación del programa de reasentamiento’, 5 February 2024, available here.

[142 Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones, ‘El Gobierno recibe al último grupo de personas refugiadas del Plan Nacional de Reasentamiento de 2025, que ha acogido a más de 800 personas en nuestro país este año’, 19 December 2025, available here.

[143] International Organisation for Migration – Spain, ‘España recibe el último grupo de personas refugiadas del Plan Nacional de Reasentamiento de 2025 acogiendo en 2025 a más de 800 personas’, 19 December 2025, available here.

[144] Information provided by UNHCR in March 2026.

^[145] El Español, ‘Más de un centenar de refugiados nicaragüenses serán reasentados en Valladolid para trabajar en un proyecto pionero’, 13 October 2023, available here.

^[146] Accem, ‘Accem recibe a 70 personas refugiadas de Nicaragua en el marco de un proyecto piloto para trabajar en el sector de las renovables’, 12 December 2023, available here.

[147] Diario de Valladolid, ‘Valladolid acogerá a otros cien nicaragüenses para las plantas eólicas de Villalba de los Alcores’, 7 January 2025, available here.

[148] Accem, ‘Accem copreside las Consultas Anuales sobre Reasentamiento y Vías Complementarias de ACNUR junto con el Gobierno de España’, 13 June 2024, available here.

[149] Accem ‘Se celebran en Ginebra las Consultas sobre Reasentamiento y Vías Complementarias de 2025’, 25 June 2025, available here.

[150] Information provided by UNHCR in March 2026.

[151] Information provided by UNHCR in March 2025.

[152] Boletín Oficial del estado, ‘Acuerdo suscrito entre el Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones del Reino de España y la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) para la realización de proyectos en las áreas temáticas de reasentamiento, retorno voluntario asistido y reintegración, movilidad laboral e inclusión social, hecho en Madrid el 17 de noviembre y 2 de diciembre de 2025’, 10 January 2026, available here.

[153] Information provided by UNHCR in March 2026.

[154] International Organisation for Migration – Spain, ‘El Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones publica un vídeo informativo sobre el trabajo de reasentamiento donde la OIM España resulta un actor clave’, 13 January 2026, available here.

[155] Europa Press, ‘El Gobierno aprueba el Programa Nacional de Reasentamiento de refugiados para 2026, con 1.200 plazas’, 17 March 2026, available here.

[156] CEAR, ‘‘El abrazo más esperado’, la nueva campaña de CEAR para garantizar el derecho a la reagrupación familiar’, 12 december 2024, available here.

[157] El Diario, ‘ACNUR pide más vías de migración laboral a España para frenar la peligrosa ruta canaria’, 12 March 2025, available here.

[158] Europa Press, ‘CEAR y Accem reclaman “vías legales y seguras” tras el naufragio de migrantes en El Hierro’, 28 May 2025, available here.

[159] CEAR, ‘CEAR reclama que se garantice el derecho a vivir en familia a las personas refugiadas’, 18 December 2025, available here.