Differential treatment of specific nationalities in the procedure

Author

Dutch Council for Refugees Visit Website

No applications from specific nationalities are considered as manifestly well-founded. However, Dutch authorities publish country-specific policy recommendations for processing asylum cases of various specific nationalities. This country-specific policy includes for example which groups are considered to be at risk, in which areas an armed conflict is considered to reach the Article 15c Qualification Directive standard, but also for which nationalities there is a Postponement of Decision and Departure in place (see below).

In general, applications from asylum applicants from ‘safe countries of origin’ are considered manifestly unfounded and subject to an Accelerated Procedure (‘Track 2’). However, in policy rules exceptions are being made with regard to certain groups, like LGBTQI+ asylum applicants or specific ethnicities. The safe countries of origin are listed in the section on Safe Country of Origin.

For all other nationalities there is no differentiated treatment in the procedure.

Public Country-specific policy

The Minister publishes country-specific policy for specific nationalities; these are usually based on an official country report from the ministry of Foreign Affairs.^[1] It is published in the Aliens Circular C7 ^[2]. As of 2025, there are country specific policies for 30 countries:

• Afghanistan
• Azerbaijan
• Belarus
• Cameroon
• China
• Colombia
• Democratic Republic Congo
• Egypt
• Eritrea
• Ethiopia
• Gambia
• Guinee
• Iraq
• Iran
• Ivory Coast
• Lebanon: situation for Palestinians
• Libya
• Mali
• Nepal
• Nigeria
• Pakistan
• Palestinian Territories
• Russian Federation
• Somalia
• Sudan
• Syria
• Türkiye
• Uganda
• Venezuela
• Yemen

The following paragraphs explain which categories and groups can be distinguished in a country-specific policy and provides some examples. For the complete and up-to-date public country-specific policy please see paragraph C7 of the Aliens Circular.^[3]

The standard country-specific policy consists of the following paragraphs:

1. Postponement of Decision
2. Article 1F Refugee Convention
3. Persecution under the Refugee Convention
4. Serious Harm under art 15 Qualification Directive
5. Protection
6. Adequate reception for unaccompanied minors
7. Postponement of Departure
8. Particularities

Postponement of Decision and Departure

When the situation in a certain country is uncertain, Dutch authorities can proclaim a general Postponement of Decision and Departure for a certain nationality or certain groups within a country of origin. This means that the time limit for deciding is prolonged for six months. During these six months there will usually also be no forced returns executed. The Postponement of Decision and Departure can be prolonged with an additional 6 months. In 2023, there was a Postponement of Decision and Departure in place for Ukraine (prolonged for the third time for 3 additional months until 28 November 2023, exactly 21 months since the first Postponement of Decision and Departure was in place). The postponement of decisions and departures for Ukraine ended as of 28 November.

In 2023, there was a Postponement of Decision and Departure for Sudan (since 8 July 2023, and prolonged for 6 additional months on 8 January 2024), but this ended as of July 2024.

Due to the current situation in Gaza, the Minister announced a Postponement of Decision and Departure for the Palestinian Territories (Gaza and Westbank) on 19 December 2023. ^[4] The Dutch Council for Refugees has unsuccessfully called on the outgoing government to no longer postpone deciding on the asylum requests of Palestinian asylum applicants as they are entitled to protection according to international law and it is obvious that they are at risk in Gaza.^[5] On 24 April 2024, the Council of State ruled the Postponement of Decision and Departure for the Palestinian Territories to be unlawful pursuant to an injunction filed by the Dutch Council for Refugees.^[6] On 28 June 2024, a new country policy on the Palestinian Territories was published.^[7] The policy implemented the ruling of the Council of State. The Minister assumes there is an Article 15(c) Qualification Directive situation in Gaza, but not in the Westbank. It is also assumed that the UNRWA cannot meet its protection mandate in Gaza, while in the Westbank, this might be possible in individual cases.

Article 1F Refugee Convention

For some nationalities the Dutch authorities have included a description of categories in which ‘personal and knowing participation’ within the meaning ofArticle 1F Refugee Convention is assumed. These categories include lists of military positions within a certain military branch or during a certain regime or time. In 2025 the country-specific policy of Afghanistan and Iraq include an 1F-paragraph.^[8]

Refugee protection: Group Persecution and Groups at Risk

The country-specific policy first identifies groups that have well-founded fear of being persecuted under the Refugee Convention. A group can be identified as being at risk of group persecution. As a result, being a member of this groups is enough to qualify for refugee protection. In 2025 groups that have been identified as being at risk of group persecution are:

• Afghanistan: translators that have been working for international military or policy missions.^[9]
• China: Uyghurs and Tibetans subjected to repression.^[10]
• China: Active followers of religious and spiritual movements identified as xie jiao by the Chinese authorities.^[11]
• Iraq: LGBT.^[12]
• Iran: Christians who are active in ‘new churches’ or evangelize and/or members of house churches attending meetings.^[13]
• Russian Federation: LGBT individuals from Chechnya.^[14]
• Sudan: Masalit.^[15]

Before the first of July 2024, a group could also be qualified as a Group at Risk.^[16] This means that the Dutch authorities accept there is an elevated risk of persecution for members of this group in the country of origin. In theory, applicants being a member of a Group at Risk should have a lower burden of proof and it should be easier to qualify for international protection. In practice, the effect of being qualified as a Group at Risk on the protection rate varies greatly. A Group at Risk can consist of an ethnicity (for example Hazara in Afghanistan), a social group (for example LGBTQI+ in Egypt) or religious group (for example Christians in Libya and Pakistan). Some Groups at Risk had a very broad definition (for example ‘journalists’ in Libya and Burundi), others had a very narrow and specific definition (for example in Somalia one Group at Risk is defined as: ‘Leaders of clans who support the government or elections, or other prominent persons with a large public reach and who openly spoke out against Al-Shabaab’).

As of July 2024, Groups at Risk have been removed from the Aliens Circular as a category and replaced with the so-called ‘Risk Profiles’. Being part of a Risk Profile does not entail a lower burden of proof and does not make it easier to qualify for international protection per se. It merely means that some these Risk Profiles may be subject to risk of persecution or treatment in the sense of Article 15b Qualification Directive. Most Groups at Risk have been transposed into Risk Profiles.^[17]

Subsidiary Protection: Systemic Exposure and Vulnerable groups

Next, country policies include a section regarding the concept of serious harm under Article 15 Qualification Directive (subsidiary protection). This section sets forward groups that might be eligible for subsidiary protection (as opposed to refugee protection). The groups identified are those at risk of systemic exposure to serious harm. As a result, being a member of this group is enough to qualify for subsidiary protection. As of 2025, there are two countries that have groups that are considered to be at risk of systemic exposure: Somalia and Eritrea. In Somalia, the human rights situation in southern and central Somalia, where Al-Shabaab is in power or controls the area, is considered so severe that any returnee is considered to be at risk of serious harm. However, under certain conditions, it can be argued that an internal protection alternative exists, mainly in an area where Al-Shabaab is not in power. For Eritrea, there are two groups that are considered to suffer from Systematic Exposure: persons required to serve in the military component of national services and military deserters. Aside from the Systematic Exposure policy, the IND grants subsidiary protection to Eritreans who have left their country illegally. The rationale for this policy is that Eritreans need prior approval from their government to leave Eritrea. If an Eritrean leaves the country without this approval and then returns, negative attention from the authorities is attracted.

Before the first of July 2024, a group could also qualify as a Vulnerable Group. This meant that the Dutch authorities accepted that there was an elevated risk of serious harm for members of this group in the country of origin. In theory, applicants being a member of a Vulnerable Group should have a lower burden of proof and it should be easier to qualify for subsidiary protection. In practice, the effect of being qualified as a Vulnerable group on the protection rate varies greatly. A Vulnerable Group can consist of an ethnicity (for example Yezidi in Iraq), a religious group (for example converted Christians in Afghanistan) or other groups (for example displaced (minor) women from Darfur, South Kordofan (including Abyei) and Blue Nile in Sudan). Just as with the ‘Groups at Risk’ set out above, the category of Vulnerable Groups has been replaced by ‘Risk Profiles’. Being part of a Risk Profile does not entail a lower burden of proof. Most groups that were categorised as Vulnerable Groups have been transposed to Risk Profiles.^[18]

Exceptional circumstances under Article 15(c) Qualification Directive

The Country-specific policy also includes the countries and areas for which the Dutch Authorities consider an armed conflict is considered to reach the Article 15c Qualification Directive standard.^[19] However, there were multiple developments regarding Article 15(c) Qualification Directive during 2024 and 2025. On 9 November 2023, the CJEU found that, to determine whether a case reaches the high threshold of ‘serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’ meriting subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) Qualification Directive, both the general situation in the area and the individual position and personal circumstances of each applicant need always be taken into account.^[20] Following this judgment, the Regional Court of Den Bosch classified as a ‘sliding scale’ this concept that the more it appears that the individual situation of an applicant can increase the risk of becoming a victim of such ‘indiscriminate violence’, the lower the general level of violence in the area needs to be in order to merit subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) Qualification Directive.^[21] Following this judgment, two policy changes were made with respect to how Article 15(c) Qualification Directive is assessed in The Netherlands. First, the Minister determines whether an ‘international or domestic armed conflict’ exists in a region or country. Second, the magnitude of the conflict was classified in one of three levels of severity: (a) a conflict that reaches the threshold of Article 15(c) Qualification Directive on its own (‘pure’ 15(c) situation); (b) a ‘high level of indiscriminate violence’; or (c) ‘no sufficient high degree of indiscriminate violence’. The Minister initially decided to only apply the ‘sliding scale’ in the second level, essentially refraining from applying the ‘sliding scale’ if the conflict was said to have ‘no sufficient high degree of indiscriminate violence’. However, the Council of State ruled on 17 July 2024 that this extra threshold was unlawful, and that the ‘sliding scale’ the CJEU judgment appears to establish must be applied in all situations, no matter the severity of the indiscriminate violence. In response to this judgment, the three levels of severity were adapted again: (a) a conflict that reaches the threshold of Article 15(c) Qualification Directive on its own (‘pure’ 15(c) situation) (unchanged); (b) relatively higher level of indiscriminate violence; or (c) relatively lower level of indiscriminate violence.^[22] Even though conflict situations are thus classified as one of three levels, these levels serve as an ‘indicative tool’ for IND employees, meaning that in every situation and case the level of indiscriminate violence differs and the need for additional individual elements to reach the threshold of Article 15(c) Qualification Directive is adjusted accordingly.^[23]

Another development was the need to include the so-called ‘humanitarian circumstances’ in the assessment of the level of indiscriminate violence in a country or region. The Council of State ruled on 16 July 2025 that all relevant circumstances must be included in the Article 15c QD-assessment, including humanitarian circumstances that are the direct or indirect cause of the acting – or lack thereof – of a party to a conflict.^[24] As a result, the situations in Yemen and Syria had to be reassessed. However, which circumstances and more specifically, those caused by which specific parties to a (former) conflict have to be taken into account, is still unclear. In response, the Regional Court of Roermond referred preliminary questions to the CJEU regarding the ‘actor requirement’.^[25]

At the time of writing, Cameroon (North-West and South-West),^[26] Congo DRC (North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Ituri),^[27] Gaza,^[28] Mali (Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Tombouctou),^[29] and Sudan (Khartoum, North-, South- and Central-Darfur, Kordofan and El Gezira),^[30] are designated as having a ‘most exceptional situation’ (severity level A).

Mali (Ménaka and Ségou),^[31] Yemen (provinces of Abyan, Aden, Al Bayda, Al Dhale, Al Hudayda, Al Jawf, Ibb, Lahj, Marib, Sa’da, Sana’a (city), Sana’a (province), Shabwa and Taiz),^[32] and Sudan (West-Darfur),^[33] are designated as having a ‘higher level of indiscriminate violence’ (severity level B).

Colombia (Antioquia, Arauca, Bolivar, Cauca, Choco, Magdalena Valle del Cauca, Nariño and Putumayo,^[34] Ethiopia (Amhara and Oromia),^[35] Iraq (Diyala, Dohuk, Erbil and Ninewa),^[36] Lebanon (South, Nabatiye and Baalbek-Hermel),^[37] Libya (North-West (including Tripoli and Sirte, and Benghazi),^[38] Mali (Koulikoro),^[39] and Pakistan (Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP),^[40] Somalia (Benadir (including Mogadishu), Galgaduud, Hiraan, Mudug, Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle),^[41] Sudan (Abyei, Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Northern, Nile, East-Darfur, Red Sea, Sennar and White Nile),^[42] Syria,^[43] Yemen (Al Mahwit, Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah and Raymah),^[44] and West Bank,^[45] are designated as having a severity level C.

Protection

Some country-specific policies contain a protection paragraph. This paragraph discusses the (im)possibility to receive protection from the authorities in that country or the (im)possibilities of an internal protection alternative. Sometimes the policies list the groups for which the Dutch authorities assume no protection from the authorities is possible, and sometimes it says that the authorities cannot protect anyone in the country, irrespective of the group they may belong to (this is the case for Sudan, for example),^[46] or no protection alternative can be said to exist (for example, Ahmadi’s in Pakistan).^[47] This means that members of these groups cannot be asked to return to another part of their country of origin (as is usually expected when an internal protection alternative is put forward by the Minister) nor can they be expected to request protection against persecution or serious harm from the authorities of their country of origin.

Adequate reception for unaccompanied minors

 In the country-specific policy it is also mentioned whether there is adequate reception for unaccompanied minors. Either the country-specific policy includes that: ‘general reception facilities are not available and/or not adequate, and the authorities do not take care of the reception’ (this is the case for example for applicants from Uganda and Syria), or it is included explicitly that there is adequate reception for unaccompanied minors (for example for applicants from Türkiye).

Syrian nationals

A Postponement of Decision and Departure was active regarding Syria between 14 December 2024 and 14 June 2025, due to the fall of the Assad-regime in that country. Before 14 December 2024, almost all applicants from Syria were eligible for a subsidiary protection status. The Dutch authorities assumed that a foreign national from Syria ran a real risk of serious harm upon or after returning from abroad. Two exceptions were formulated: applicants that are active supporters of the regime and applicants that have already returned to Syria without experiencing problems.^[48]

On 14 June 2025, the processing of applications of Syrian applicants resumed. The Minister published new country policy for Syria on 20 June 2025.^[49] Under the new policy, Alawites and members of the LGBTIQ+ community are considered ‘risk profiles’ (see above). Other groups in the country, such as Christians and other ethnic minorities, are not mentioned. In terms of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, the country policy states that there is a relatively low level of indiscriminate violence in Syria. The Dutch Council for Refugees reports that Syrian applications in first instance are now rejected more often than before the fall of the Assad regime. Due to the recentness of the new country policy, most of these rejections have not been subject to judicial review at the moment of writing. In the scarce case-law available at the moment, courts are debating whether the Minister’s qualification of the level of violence in the sense of Article 15 (c) is correct, with the Regional Court of Haarlem ruling, for example, that this has not been properly substantiated,^[50] while the Regional Court of Middelburg ruled that the Minister has not underestimated the level of violence.^[51] Just before the end of 2025, the Regional Court of Roermond made a request for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU regarding the relationship between Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive and humanitarian circumstances.^[52] In short, the Dutch Court asked whether humanitarian circumstances, such as a lack of food, shelter and medicine, that are the result of armed conflict, must be considered when determining the level of indiscriminate violence in the sense of Article 15 (c) and, if so, to what extent the conflict must have caused these humanitarian circumstances.

Afghan nationals

For information regarding the evacuation of Afghan nationals, see the section Legal access to the territory.

There used to be an elaborate country policy for Afghanistan including extensive lists with groups of risk and vulnerable groups. In 2024, many of these groups were removed from the country policy.

For Afghanistan, there are several risk profiles that could qualify for refugee protection:^[53]

• women;
• human rights activists;
• journalists and people working in the media sector;
• non-Muslims, including converts, apostates, Christians, Bahai and Sikhs/Hindus

With regard to women, the Aliens Circular states that the IND will assess whether women are able to conform to the norms set out by the Taliban regime and whether this non-conformity will lead to persecution. The Dutch policy regarding ‘westernised’ women has changed pursuant to the CJEU rulings on 16 January 2024^[54] and 11 June 2024.^[55]. Before, as a rule, a Western lifestyle developed in the Netherlands could not, in itself, lead to refugee status or subsidiary protection. Adaptation to Afghanistan’s customs were in certain circumstances required. There were two exceptions to this: if the Western behaviour is an expression of a religious or political conviction, or if a woman has personal characteristics that are extremely difficult or virtually impossible to change and because of these characteristics she fears persecution or inhumane treatment in Afghanistan. This policy has been revoked pursuant to the aforementioned CJEU rulings. Women as a group, or sub-groups of women, can qualify as a social group in the sense of the Refugee Convention. It is no longer necessary for the behaviour of the woman to be an expression of a religious or political conviction. In line with CJEU case law, it is now merely required that the woman believes in the fundamental value of equality between men and women.

On 4 October 2024, the CJEU ruled that Afghan women face an accumulation of discriminatory measures, amounting to persecution (and some discriminatory measures, such as forced marriage, constitute acts of persecution in themselves).^[56] According to this ruling, Member States may limit their assessment to the fact that the applicant is a woman from Afghanistan in order to qualify for international protection. To this day, in the Netherlands, Afghan women are merely classified as a risk profile, meaning that they do not automatically qualify for international protection. The Aliens Circular specifies that Afghan women have to show that they cannot conform to the regulations and measures imposed by the Taliban regime.^[57] This poses questions as to the conformity with the CJEU ruling of 4 October 2024. In response to parliamentary questions, the Dutch Government responded that the ruling does not give reason to amend the national policy, as the ruling allows for discretion to individually decide on applications from Afghan women, and that applications from this group are usually granted.^[58] In 2025, the asylum applications of several Afghan women were rejected because the IND considered that they could conform to the Taliban rules. There is not much national case law regarding the legality of this practice at the moment of writing this report. The Regional Court of Middelburg ruled on 26 November 2025 that the Minister was wrong in rejecting asylum application of an Afghan woman.^[59] It relied on the CJEU ruling of 4 October 2024 (see above) to find that Afghan women automatically qualify for refugee status and that a further individual assessment is not permitted.

Because of the worrying security and human rights situation in Afghanistan, the IND stated in its Information Message 2022/71 of 21 July 2022 that many Afghans will receive the benefit of the doubt, leading to a high chance of the applications being accepted.^[60] This Information Message also states that due to the very worrying situation of women in Afghanistan, (alleged) westernised women will ‘sooner receive the benefit of the doubt’. This information message has since not been extended after October 2023. As stated above, the Minister has started to reject applications of certain Afghan women, so it seems that the benefit of the doubt does not extend to all women.

Asylum applications of Ukrainian nationals outside the scope of the TPD

In the Dutch context, displaced persons from Ukraine who do not fall within the scope of the temporary protection regime can apply for asylum at the application centre in Ter Apel. Their application is assessed in one of the asylum procedures (‘tracks’). While, since 28 February 2022, the Dutch authorities have applied a policy of temporarily suspending decisions on asylum applications lodged by Ukrainian nationals, as long as the security situation in Ukraine remains unstable and the temporary protection regime is in place,[61] the Dutch Council for Refugees has received signals indicating that in 2024 and 2025 the IND has started issuing substantive decisions and draft decisions (voornemens) in cases of Ukranian nationals. In most cases, the asylum applications were rejected or have the intention of being rejected. In the (intended) rejections observed by the Dutch Council for Refugees, the IND has assessed claims on the basis of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive and has, in several cases, relied on the existence of an internal protection alternative in western regions of Ukraine. In some cases, these assessments refer to publicly available country information, while in other cases the reasoning appears limited and not clearly linked to a publicly accessible or formally adopted country policy.

For more information about this topic, please refer to the TPD Annex.

^[1]           The official country report takes into account all types of information, also EUAA country guidance information. However, the EUAA guidance is not always followed in the actual country specific policy.

^[2]           Please see the following link: https://bit.ly/3SxpgOo.

^[3]           Please see the following link: https://bit.ly/3SxpgOo.

^[4]           KST 19637, nr. 3181, Letter to the Dutch Parliament, ‘Besluit- en vertrekmoratorium Palestijnse Gebieden’, 19 December 2023, available in Dutch: https://bit.ly/4aUs1lj, no. 701, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/3SS0GrC.

[5]           Dutch Council for Refugees, Oproep: IND behandel asielverzoeken van Palestijnen uit Gaza, 23 November 2023, avaialble in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/3uJ5Yh6. Dutch Council for Refugees, VluchtelingenWerk: erken Palestijnen die onder UNRWA vallen als vluchteling, 9 February 2024, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/3SS15dC.

[6]           Council of State, ECLI:NL:RVS:2024:1663, 24 April 2024, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/4gUdvN8.

[7]           See paragraph C7/28.2 Aliens Circular.

^[8]           See paragraph C7/2.2 (Afghanistan) and C7/16.2 (Iraq) Aliens Circular.

^[9]           See C7/2.3.1 Aliens Circular.

[10]          See C9/ 9.3.1 Aliens Circular.

^[11]          See C7/9.3.1 Aliens Circular.

^[12]          See C7/16.3.1 Aliens Circular.

^[13]          See C7/17.3.1 Aliens Circular.

^[14]          See C7/28.3.1 Aliens Circular.

[15]          See C7/ 32.3.1 Aliens Circular.

[16]          See section C7 Aliens Circular for a list of all the Groups at Risk per country.

[17]          For the policy in question, see WBV 2024/12, 13

[18]          Ibid.

^[19]          In court cases, there is often discussion about whether the level of conflict in a certain country or area reaches the standard for Article 15C, this was for example the case for Libya. When the highest court in the Netherlands decides there is a 15c policy in a country, it is usually included in the country policy.

[20]          CJEU, judgment in case C-125/22 Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, of 9 November 2023; available here.

[21]          Regional Court Den Bosch, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2023:20195, 20 December 2023, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/3W9BQWR.

[22]          Paragraph C2/3.3.3.3 Aliens Circular.

[23]          Besluit van de Minister van Asiel en Migratie van 30 januari 2025, nummer WBV 2025/2, houdende wijziging van de Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000, 5 February 2025, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/3L4Xv07.

[24]          Council of State, ECLI:NL:RVS:2025:3153, 16 July 2025, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/49b0CwC.

[25]          Regional Court of Roermond, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:25445, 29 December 2025, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/4sD8kYb.

[26]          See paragraph C7/20.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[27]          See paragraph C7/11.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[28]          See paragraph C7/28.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[29]          See paragraph C7/23.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[30]          See paragraph C7/32.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[31]          See paragraph C7/23.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[32]          See paragraph C7/19.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[33]          See paragraph C7/32.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[34]          See paragraph C7/10.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[35]          See paragraph C7/14.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[36]          See paragraph C7/16.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[37]          See paragraph C7/21.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[38]          See paragraph C7/22.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[39]          See paragraph C7/23.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[40]          See paragraph C7/27.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[41]          See paragraph C7/30.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[42]          See paragraph C7/32.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[43]          See paragraph C7/33.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[44]          See paragraph C7/19.4.2 Aliens Circular.

[45]          See paragraph C7/28.4.2 Aliens Circular.

^[46]          See paragraph C7/32.5.1 Aliens Circular.

^[47]          See paragraph C7/27.5.2 Aliens Circular.

^[48]          See paragraph C7/33.4.4 Aliens Circular (old).

[49]          See paragraph C7/33 Aliens Circular.

[50]          Regional Court Haarlem, 11 December 2025, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:23822, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/4aICq5X.

[51]          Regional Court Middelburg, 1 December 2025, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:22984, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/4qelRnk.

[52]          Regional Court Roermond, 29 December 2025, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:25445, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/4bmxROU.

[53]          See paragraph C7/ 2.3.2 Aliens Circular. The Aliens Circular includes risk profiles that could qualify for either refugee protection or subsidiary protection. For Afghanistan, there are currently only risk profiles in the refugee protection category.

[54]          CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2024:47, 16 January 2024, available in English at: https://bit.ly/4ahuVjZ.

[55]          CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2024:487, 11 June 2024, available in English at: https://bit.ly/40cJ11E.

[56]          CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2024:828, 4 October 2024, available in English at: https://bit.ly/41DtSaq.

[57]          See Aliens Circular paragraph C7/ 2.3.2.1.

[58]          Kamervragen, nr. 5834388, Over de gevolgen van de recente uitspraak van het Europese Hof van Justitie op het asielbeleid, 26 november 2024, available in Dutch with a Vluchtweb account at: https://bit.ly/4iz8ydv

[59]          Regional Court of Middelburg, 26 November 2025, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:22308, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/3Yt2ydK.

[60]          IND, Information Message 2022/71, Beslissen op Afghaanse asielaanvragen, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/3Cx3L9d.

[61]          The Secretary of State of Justice & Security, Staatscourant 2023, number 9340, ‘Besluit van de Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid van 9 maart 2023, nr. 4509940, tot het verlengen van het besluitmoratorium voor vreemdelingen afkomstig uit Oekraïne’, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/3lYeODh; IND, ‘War in Ukraine’, available  at: https://bit.ly/3WrmRVh; see also Parliament, Kamerstuk 19637, number 3163, ‘Situatie in Oekraïne, 4 September 2023, available in Dutch at: https://bit.ly/44kkclU.