Access to the territory and push backs

Arrival at the border and border controls

The law states that asylum seekers who apply for asylum at the border have to be referred to an initial reception centre for asylum seekers.^[1] However, entry into the territory has to be refused if a migrant reports at the border without the necessary documents for legal entry and if an immediate removal to the neighbouring country (as Safe Third Country) is possible.^[2]

Since 2013, asylum applicants should not be sent back to neighbouring countries without their applications for international protection having been registered. It is not clear, however, whether this practice is applied in all cases: even if migrants have crossed the border – which is defined as a 30 km strip on the basis of a legal fiction laid down in the Law on the Federal Police (based on the Schengen Borders Code)^[3] – they have not necessarily entered the territory,^[4] and it is possible that a removal to the neighbouring state (Zurückweisung) is still carried out at this point without an examination of which country is responsible for examining the asylum application.^[5] The legal concept of the 30km border area under the Federal Police Act primarily concerns the territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal Police and should not be conflated with the distinct legal categories of refusal of entry, return or removal under German and EU asylum and migration law.

Against this background, it should be noted that the 2025 figures reported by the Federal Police combine different categories of border-related measures within the Federal Police’s border jurisdiction and do not distinguish clearly between refusals of entry, returns at the border, and removals under asylum and migration law. In 2025, the Federal Police recorded around 62,500 “unauthorised entries” at Germany’s borders, marking a 25% decrease compared to the previous year.[6] The five most common nationalities among those apprehended in January–November 2025 were Ukrainian, Afghan, Syrian, Turkish and Algerian.[7] Most unauthorised entries in 2025 occurred via air travel, with approximately 11,000 cases, making the air route the most frequent pathway since November 2024.[8] In the same year, the Federal Police refused entry to or returned around 41,500 people at the borders, including approximately 24,400 since May 2025, when reinforced border controls were introduced. Among those affected were about 1,200 asylum seekers, while 242 individuals were nonetheless allowed to enter Germany due to particular vulnerabilities.[9]

By comparison, in 2024 the Federal Police recorded around 83,000 unauthorised entries.[10] Approximately 16,000 people crossed via the Polish border, about one third of them using the so-called Belarus route. Around 13,500 entries occurred via air travel, a similar number via the Austrian border, and approximately 11,400 via the Swiss border. The five most common nationalities in 2024 were Syrian, Ukrainian, Afghan, Turkish and Algerian. Notably, 7.8 per cent of those apprehended during irregular border crossings in 2024 were registered in the EURODAC system, meaning that, under the Dublin III Regulation, another EU Member State was responsible for examining their asylum application. Looking at a longer period, between August 2023 and December 2024, the largest groups among those attempting irregular entry were Syrians (around 41,900), Turks (20,700), Afghans (15,600), Ukrainians (around 12,700) and Indians (approximately 3,700).[11] As Mediendienst Integration warns, these figures should be interpreted with caution. Irregular entries are inherently difficult to quantify, as not all individuals crossing the border irregularly are intercepted by police. Moreover, many people who are pushed back or refused entry attempt to cross again at another location, which can result in multiple counting of the same individuals.[12]

In 2023, 35,618 persons were removed to neighbouring countries after a refusal of entry (Zurückweisung); out of these, 11,476 persons were removed to Austria.^[13] During the first six months of 2024, the number of refusals of entry stood at 21,661 individuals.[14] Between September 16, 2024, and November 30, 2025, deployed federal police officers recorded 63,935 unauthorized entries, with 43,575 persons being directly turned back at the border or in connection with illegal border crossings, and 2,344 persons being prevented from entry due to existing re-entry bans for Germany.[15] According to the Federal Polices,  during these operations, authorities provisionally arrested 1,834 smugglers, detained 10,751 persons with outstanding arrest warrants as collateral findings, and identified 1,651 individuals associated with left-wing, right-wing, foreign extremist, or Islamist backgrounds.[16] These border controls have faced widespread criticism in 2025 for being ineffective[17], with the Police Union (Gewerkschaft der Polizei) pointing to the substantial operational burden they impose, resulting in millions of overtime hours for officers while producing relatively few deportations in relation to the effort expended.[18] The enhanced controls have also strained diplomatic relations, notably drawing criticism from the Polish government over their implementation and impact.[19]

Germany has regularly re-introduced border controls at its borders with Austria since 2015. On 16 October 2023, controls were also introduced at the border with Poland, the Czech Republic and Switzerland and were extended again in December 2023 and March 2024.^[20] In September 2024, Germany expanded its temporary internal border controls to all land borders, including France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark, in addition to existing controls with Austria, Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Poland.^[21] As of December 2025, the Federal Police conducts these controls at its land borders with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Switzerland.[22] The temporary imposition of border controls at the internal Schengen borders must follow the requirements of Articles 25 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code. These European legal provisions always require a serious threat to public order or internal security to allow the use of temporary internal border controls, which can in any case only be for a limited period and as a measure of last resort. Effective from 16 September 2024, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, these measures, approved for six months, aim to bolster internal security and reduce irregular migration, allowing German authorities to conduct checks and return individuals as per European and national law.

Former Federal Minister Nancy Faeser emphasised the controls as essential to safeguarding against threats from Islamist terrorism and serious cross-border crime, noting the over 30,000 rejections at the eastern and southern borders since October 2023. The Federal Police, supported by increased staffing and resources, has managed both fixed and mobile checks, adapting locations and timing to counter smuggling routes.^[23] The expanded internal border controls to all land borders have received extensive criticism by NGOs and academics. PRO ASYL, for example, has criticised Germany’s expanded border controls, arguing they risk violating existing laws and could lead to frequent rejections of asylum seekers who need protection.^[24] Legal scholars contend the measures are not only legally questionable but also ineffective, suggesting they serve more as a blanket approach to migration rather than a targeted security response as allowed under the Schengen Borders Code.^[25] Concerns are growing that Germany’s actions could undermine the European integration project by prompting other countries to reinstate internal borders, which could weaken mutual trust within the EU.^[26] The NGO, Flüchtlingsrat Niedersachsen e.V. (Lower Saxony Refugee Council) has criticized practices regarding access to territory and asylum procedures, particularly the handling of illegal border crossing cases at the end of 2024.[27] The organization reports that criminal investigations into illegal border crossings are not discontinued even when immigrants subsequently apply for asylum, resulting in fines of several hundred euros.[28] The Flüchtlingsrat further notes that adequate legal representation is typically unavailable due to the poor financial circumstances of the accused and the considerable distances between the courts hearing border crossing cases and the locations where refugees are distributed under the EASY allocation system.[29] According to the organization, refugees who cannot afford train travel to attend court proceedings or secure legal representation are left with no option but to accept fines that far exceed their available financial resources, creating a situation where access to legal remedies is effectively denied based on economic constraints.[30]

The humanitarian crisis at the Polish-Belarussian border had effects on border-crossing into Germany in 2021, with border crossings decreasing significantly since the start of 2022. In 2021, the Federal Police registered 11,231 border crossings ‘with a connection to Belarus’, with the highest number of crossings reported between September and November 2021.^[31] According to the Federal Police, the main nationalities of persons crossing into Germany were from Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Iran.^[32] Over the course of 2022, the number of unauthorised border crossings from Poland into Germany decreased, with 8,760 detected crossings,^[33] but rose again at the beginning of 2023 until the end of June to 7,962 unauthorised crossings.^[34] In the first six months of 2024 year, the German Federal Police registered 3,117 unauthorised entries via the “Belarus route,” compared to a total of 11,932 entries in all of 2023,^[35] according to government data. The primary nationalities recorded in the first half of 2024 were Afghan (1,140 cases), Syrian (725 cases), and Somali (243 cases), as stated in the government’s response (20/12457) to a parliamentary inquiry from the AfD (20/12297).^[36] For 2023, the main nationalities were Afghan (3,725 cases), Syrian (3,382 cases), and Indian (973 cases).^[37] Migration routes leading to Germany primarily affect its eastern and southern borders, with irregular migration focusing on internal borders with Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Switzerland.^[38]

In 2018, Germany introduced the “Seehofer Deal,” allowing the Federal Police to refuse entry and return individuals to Greece or Spain within 48 hours if they had previously sought asylum there, based on national regulations and bilateral, so called administrative agreements rather than the Dublin Regulation.^[39] Applied only at the German–Austrian border since 2019, the procedure affected very few people—50 returns between 2018 and 2021, and only a handful afterward.^[40]  Courts in Munich challenged its legality, ordering that Dublin rules be applied and cases examined by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.^[41] For more details, see the  AIDA country reports from 2028-2024 and earlier.

On October 15, 2024 the European Court of Human Rights found in the case H.T. v. Germany and Greece, regarding the agreement with Greece, that the automatic removal of the applicant from Germany to Greece was unlawful, due in part to the lack of protections in administrative agreements like the Seehofer deal, which bypass essential safeguards for asylum seekers.^[42] The Court underscored states’ obligations to ensure that asylum seekers are protected by legal safeguards before removal.^[43]

H.T., had filed a complaint against Germany and Greece in March 2019, arguing that his treatment and detention in Greece, along with his forced return by Germany, breached Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment), Article 5 (right to liberty), and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).^[44] The Court found Germany violated Article 3 by failing to inform H.T. about his removal’s destination, legal basis, or appeal options, while also denying him access to legal counsel and translation services. The administrative agreement with Greece lacked necessary guarantees, and Germany failed to confirm that H.T. would have effective access to asylum and not face human rights violations in Greece. H.T.’s detention conditions in Greece were also found to violate Article 3.^[45] Following the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment, Germany suspended border pushbacks under the “Seehofer Deal” in November 2024.[46] On March 19, 2025, the German government confirmed in response to a parliamentary inquiry that the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment of October 15, 2024, which had become final on January 15, 2025, was fully accepted by Germany.[47] The procedure, which had already been rarely applied and largely fallen into disuse due to serious legal concerns raised by German courts, is now formally prohibited.[48]

In 2025, access to the German territory for asylum seekers became increasingly contested. In May 2025, Federal Minister of the Interior Alexander Dobrindt issued an administrative instruction authorizing the rejection of asylum seekers at Germany’s borders.[49] Less than four weeks later, the Administrative Court of Berlin found this practice to be unlawful in a case brought by three Somali asylum seekers, ruling that they must be allowed to enter Germany and that the authorities were obliged to conduct an asylum procedure.[50] The court emphasized the binding nature of European asylum law, a position subsequently reaffirmed by the District Court of Pasewalk in two cases in which it rejected detention orders sought by the federal police for the purpose of removal, citing the primacy of the Dublin III Regulation once an asylum application has been made.[51] Despite these judicial decisions, the federal government maintained its policy of border rejections, arguing that these decisions have no broader implications beyond the individual cases, for which in turn, the government has been criticized[52]. According to official figures, more than 21,589 people have been turned back at Germany’s borders between May and 30 November 2025.[53] Civil society organization PRO ASYL reported that in many cases individuals were unable to lodge an asylum claim, that claims were disregarded, or that people were returned despite having formally expressed a wish to seek asylum.[54]

Border monitoring

There is no independent border monitoring mechanism in Germany.

Legal access to the territory

On top of family reunification, there are two main ways for asylum seekers to legally access the German territory: via the Government’s resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes and via relocation from other EU Member States. In addition, a specific admission programme for Afghan nationals was introduced in October 2022 (see Differential treatment of specific nationalities in the procedure).

Resettlement

Since 2016, the German resettlement programme is part of Germany’s contribution to the EU resettlement scheme.^[55] Next to the national quota, resettlement includes admissions of Syrian refugees from Türkiye in the context of the so-called EU-Turkey statement. In addition, the Federal Government can decide on humanitarian admission programmes on an ad hoc, temporary basis. Such a temporary humanitarian admission programme was in place for 20,000 Syrian refugees between 2013 and 2015.^[56] According to information provided by the BAMF in February 2026, the UNHCR resettlement procedures for the years 2024–2025 have been completed, and Germany has not participated in the current EU resettlement plan for 2026–2027.

In the resettlement programme, UNHCR proposes refugees for resettlement to Germany. The selection process is based on admission criteria defined in the admission regulation and selection interviews of the BAMF, security interviews carried out by the security institutions and the visa procedure in responsibility of the Foreign Office.[57] Once resettled refugees arrive in Germany, they first stay in a reception centre for up to two weeks. They are then allocated to a municipality, where they are issued a residence permit which is equivalent in rights to residence permits granted to recognised refugees.^[58]

In 2019, the German government introduced an additional private sponsorship programme in the form of a pilot scheme with 500 additional places. In the programme called “Neustart im Team (NesT)” groups of at least four persons commit to accompany and support resettled refugees for at least one year and to pay for their rent for two years. This was lowered to one year on 1 July 2022.^[59] The Federal government decided to make the programme permanent from 1 January 2023, with 200 places available per year. The conditions were slightly changed: groups of four people can apply to be sponsors; and in contrast to the pilot phase, they only need to pay rent (without electricity, water and heating) for one year.^[60] The NesT programme ended on December 31, 2025.

The Federal States also run admission programmes mainly for Syrian nationals, but these are mostly geared towards family members of beneficiaries of international protection residing in the respective Federal States (see Family Reunification). According to information provided by the BAMF, in principle, all Federal States except Bavaria had implemented state admission programs for Syrians with a family connection in the respective Federal States (LAP Extended Family Reunification). According to information provided by the BAMF in February 2026, the Federal Government had agreed to discontinue voluntary admission programmes as far as possible. In addition, the Länder admission programmes for Syrian nationals with family ties in Germany under Section 23(1) of the Residence Act all expired in 2024; consequently, no such state-level programmes were in place in 2025.

Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, ‘Resettlement und humanitäre Aufnahmen’, available in German at https://bit.ly/3H4rqhK. For the numbers for 2025, see Statista Anzahl der aufgenommenen Flüchtlinge im Rahmen von Resettlement in ausgewählten Ländern in den Jahren 2016 bis 2025, available in German here.

Note that the website www.resettlement.de provides more detailed statistics (under ‘current admissions’) on every arrival that was processed through the reception centre in Friedland since 2015 and until the end of 2021. However, the counting differs from the Ministry of Interior, since the national and state-level humanitarian admission / family reunification programmes are also included and since the statistics only refer to persons who passed through the reception centre in Friedland.

Numbers with an * come from information provided by the BAMF on 10 May 2024, 26 February 2025,28 May 2025 and 13 February 2026. Numbers refer to the quota of the corresponding year, not necessarily the actual year of arrival.

In early January 2026, the German government provided statistics on arrivals through various protection pathways for 2025 in response to a parliamentary question.[64] According to the Foreign Nationals Central Register, between 1 January and 30 November 2025, 51,075 persons who arrived during that period received their first residence permit under family reunification provisions.[65] Under the Federal Reception Programme for Afghanistan, 1,137 persons arrived in Germany during the full year 2025, while 1,093 persons were admitted through the resettlement procedure over the same period.[66]  These numbers are complemented by information provided by the BAMF. According to them, a total of 2,230 people entered Germany in 2025 under resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes pursuant to Section 23 of the Residence Act.[67] Of these, 1,093 persons were admitted through resettlement under Section 23(4), all counted against the 2024 quota. A further 1,137 individuals arrived under the Federal Admission Programme for Afghanistan pursuant to Section 23(2); all of these entries were based on admission commitments issued in 2024 or earlier. In addition, 153 persons entered through the Afghan locally employed staff procedure and 187 particularly vulnerable Afghan nationals were admitted under Section 22 sentence 2 of the Residence Act, with admission commitments in these cases also originating predominantly from the years 2022 to 2024.[68] Importantly, the Federal Government had agreed to discontinue voluntary admission programmes as far as possible. In addition, the Länder admission programmes for Syrian nationals with family ties in Germany under Section 23(1) of the Residence Act all expired in 2024; consequently, no such state-level programmes were in place in 2025.

In comparison, according to information provided by the BAMF in May 2026, a total of 2,664 individuals were admitted through resettlement procedures (§ 23 IV of the Residence Act (AufenthG) under the 2024 / 2025 programme. The primary countries of first admission for resettlement under the 2024 quota were Egypt (1020 persons), Jordan (440), Kenya (1,021) and Libya (132, via ETM Rwanda). Additionally, 51 individuals entered Germany under the “Unallocated Quota” from various countries.[69] Under the humanitarian admission procedure pursuant to § 23 II AufenthG, 2,277 individuals arrived from Türkiye, while 999 persons entered through the federal admission program from Pakistan. [70]

In April 2025, Germany suspended its participation in the United Nations refugee resettlement programme, temporarily halting new commitments and admissions for particularly vulnerable refugees while ongoing coalition negotiations continued between the former government parties CDU/CSU and SPD.[71] During the pause, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and UNHCR agreed that only cases already far advanced would still be processed, but no new resettlement applications were accepted until a new government decides on the programme’s future.[72] According to the NGO ProAsyl, in May 2025, a scheduled resettlement flight from Kenya to Germany carrying refugees from African conflict zones was cancelled at the last minute shortly before the new German government took office, despite passengers having already been taken to Nairobi to prepare for departure.[73] Two South Sudanese families affected by the cancellation challenged the decision in court; in late October 2025 the Higher Administrative Court of Berlin‑Brandenburg ruled that the German government must allow one family to enter.[74] In response to a parliamentary question in early January 2026, Parliamentary State Secretary Daniela Ludwig stated that following the court’s decision, the resettlement procedure for the 183 resettlement refugees affected by the suspension of the flight scheduled for May 2025 from Kenya had been resumed, with the majority of affected persons having already entered Germany or expected to arrive in early 2026.[75] She reported that during the 2024 to 2025 federal resettlement admissions, a total of 5,099 particularly vulnerable persons had arrived in Germany, comprising 2,664 persons through the resettlement procedure, 2,277 persons under the Humanitarian Admission Programme Türkiye, and 158 persons under a state reception programme of the state of Brandenburg.[76] Ludwig emphasized that the governing coalition parties had agreed in their coalition agreement to end voluntary federal reception programmes as far as possible, and that the court ruling on the specific situation had no impact on this decision, with voluntary admission programmes being or to be ended as far as possible.[77]

Parliamentary State Secretary Daniela Ludwig further confirmed that Germany had not submitted any contribution to the European Union Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Plan due to the ongoing suspension of resettlement and noted that the governing coalition parties had agreed in their coalition agreement to end voluntary federal reception programmes “as far as possible”.[78]

Besides that, in 2025, the German government had revoked nearly every second admission commitment made under the Federal Reception Programme for Afghanistan.[79] According to a parliamentary response from Parliamentary State Secretary Daniela Ludwig, as of 22 December 2025, revocation proceedings had been initiated in 49 cases, with revocation decisions issued in 33 cases.[80] In 27 cases, lawsuits had been filed before the Administrative Court of Ansbach challenging the respective revocation decisions, with applications made to restore suspensive effect.[81] The Administrative Court of Ansbach had decided on 19 of these interim relief applications by ruling: in 13 cases the court granted the application in whole or in part, while in six cases the application was rejected.[82]

For humanitarian admission programmes for Afghanistan, see Differential treatment of specific nationalities in the procedure.

Relocations

Germany has relocated a (small) number of asylum seekers from other EU Member states based on temporary and ad hoc agreements over the last years. In 2024, Germany continued its participation in the EU voluntary solidarity mechanism for relocating asylum seekers from other Member States. A total of 584 individuals were transferred to Germany, including 567 from Cyprus and 17 from Spain. During the same year, 853 asylum decisions were issued for individuals who had arrived under this mechanism, including some transferred in previous years.  For earlier years and broader context on Germany’s ad hoc relocations, see AIDA country reports 2020–2024. According to information provided by the BAMF in February 2026, Germany admitted in 2025 331 persons under the solidarity mechanism of the European Union, with all transfers taking place from Cyprus. The majority of those relocated were Afghan nationals (285), alongside smaller numbers from Iraq (15), Somalia (10), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (9), Guinea (5), Iran (5), Cameroon (1), and Rwanda (1). No unaccompanied minors were transferred to Germany under this mechanism during the year.[83] In 2025, 994 asylum decisions were issued for individuals who had arrived under this mechanism, including some transferred in previous years.[84]

In December 2025, Germany made the largest pledge within the EU’s annual newly established solidarity pool, which is part of the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, committing to 4,555 “relocation” places out of a total 8,921 pledged by eight member states across the EU for 2026.[85] This pledge occurred against a backdrop in which the EU’s overall relocation ambition had been progressively reduced from an initial 30,000 people per year to just over 20,000, then to under 5,000.[86] However, Germany’s interior ministry confirmed that none of its pledged 4,555 places constitute actual relocations from states such as Italy or Greece; instead, they take the form of alternative support.[87] Specifically, Germany has agreed with Greece and Italy to assume responsibility for processing the asylum claims of 4,555 people who first entered those countries but later travelled on to Germany, offsetting what the German Interior Ministry describes as its burden from past secondary movements under the Dublin system.[88] While EU rules formally prioritise relocations over other forms of solidarity, Germany was permitted in December 2025 to switch this priority as part of broader political compromises to operationalise the EU’s first annual solidarity mechanism, which aims to ensure “burden-sharing among member states facing high migratory pressure”.[89]

Humanitarian visas

According to the EU Visa Code, a visa with limited territorial validity can be issued by Member States when they consider it necessary on humanitarian grounds, for reasons of national interest or because of international obligations even if the conditions for issuing a uniform Schengen visa are not fulfilled (Article 25 paragraph 1a of the Visa Code). Germany however does not issue humanitarian visas in the context of asylum applications. For visas issued in the context of evacuations from Afghanistan see Differential treatment of specific nationalities in the procedure.

^[1] Section 18 (1) Asylum Act.

^[2] Section 18(2) Asylum Act and Sections 14 and 15 Residence Act.

^[3] Section 2(2) Federal Police Act.

^[4] Section 13(2) Residence Act.

^[5] PRO ASYL, Fortgesetzte Grenzkontrollen: rechtswidrige Zurückweisung von Geflüchteten, 28 April 2022, available in German here.

[6] Mediendienst Integration,  Wie viele irreguläre Einreisen gibt es nach Deutschland?, 6 January 2026, available in German here.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

^[13] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/12827, 05 September 2024, available in German here.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Federal police, Press Release, 01 December 2025, available in German here, 2.

[16] Ibid.

[17] InfoMigrants, Germany considers border checks a ‘success’ despite low rate of asylum rejections, 26 August 2025, available here.

[18] Tagesschau, Kritik an Grenzkontrollen reißt nicht ab, 08 July 2025, available in German here.

[19] Ibid.

^[20] Dw.de, Innenministerin Faeser verlängert Grenzüberwachung, 8 December 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/48iodYA; European Commission, ‘Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control’, available at: https://bit.ly/3HLwSGd.

^[21] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, ‘Binnengrenzkontrollen an allen deutschen Landgrenzen angeordnet’, 16 September 2024, available in German here.

[22] Federal police, Press Release, 01 December 2025, available in German here, 2.

^[23] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, ‘Binnengrenzkontrollen an allen deutschen Landgrenzen angeordnet’, 16 September 2024, available in German here.

^[24] Deutschlandfunk, ‚Unionspolitiker beharren auf Zurückweisung von Migranten an deutschen Grenzen – Kritik von PRO ASYL‘, 4 September 2024, available in German here.   

^[25] Evangelia Tsourdi and Eva Maria Bredler, ‘Not only legally dubious but also ineffective’, (Verfassungsblog, 27 September 2024), available here.

^[26] Ibid.

[27] Flüchtlingsrat Niedersachsen e.V., Input by civil society organisations to the Asylum Report 2025 EUAA, available here.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

^[31] Federal Police, Illegale Migration aus Belarus über Polen nach Deutschland konstant auf niedrigem Niveau: 361 Feststellungen durch die Bundespolizei seit Jahresbeginn, 2 February 2022, available in German here.

^[32] Deutschlandfunk Kultur, ‘Die neue Belarus-Route’, 4 November 2021, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Ilgb4R.

^[33] Information provided by the Federal Police, 14 March 2023.

^[34] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8274, 07 September 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/49GtKZX.

^[35] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Alternative for Germany, 20/12457, 1 August 2024, available in German here, 2.

^[36] Ibid., 2-3.

^[37] Ibid., 2.

^[38] Ibid., 4.

^[39] The text of the German-Spanish Administrative Arrangement is available at: http://bit.ly/2G2lZ7E. The text of the German-Greek Administrative Arrangement is available at: https://bit.ly/3HkJ4Nx.

^[40] Information provided by the Federal Police, 14 March 2024 and 14 March 2023.

^[41] Administrative Court Munich, Decision M 22 E 21.30294, 4 May 2021 – see Asylmagazin 7-8/2021, 292, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3ID8I13; Decision M 18 E 19.32238, 8 August 2019 – see Asylmagazin 10-11/2019, 371; available in German at: https://www.asyl.net/rsdb/m27488/.

^[42] ECtHR, Application No 13337/19, H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 15 October 2024, available here.

^[43] Ibid., paras 141-151.

^[44] Ibid., paras. 1-4.

^[45] Ibid., para. 162.

[46] Informationasverbund Asyl & Migration, Nach Urteil des EGMR: Zurückweisungen an Grenzen auf Basis des “Seehofer-Deals” ausgesetzt, 04 April 2025, available in German here.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49]  On May 7, 2025, the newly elected Minister of the Interior, Alexander Dobrindt, instructed the federal police to refuse entry to persons seeking protection at internal border controls on the basis of Section 18 (2) No. 1 of the Asylum Act (and to return them to the respective neighboring state). See, Legal Tribune Online,  Dobrindt verteidigt Zurückweisungen an deutschen Grenzen “Das ist natio­nales Recht”, 14 May 2025, available in German here.

[50] Administrative Court Berlin, VG 6 L 191/25, 2 June 2026, available in German here. For a legal assessments of this instruction to effuse entry, see also, Constantin Hruschka,  Dobrindts Rechtsbruch

Warum die aktuellen Kontrollen an den deutschen Binnengrenzen rechtswidrig sind, Verfassungsblog, 15 May 2025, available in German here. 

[51] Administrative Court Pasewalk, 305 XIV 84-87/25, 29 July 2025, available in German here and Administrative Court Pasewalk, 305 XIV 99/25, 01 August 2025, available in German here.  

[52] Maximilian Pichl, Zurückweisungen vor Gericht Über den Beschluss (VG 6 L 191/25 u.a.) des VG Berlin, Verfassungsblog, 3 June 2025, available in German here.

[53] Federal Police, Press Release, 01 December 2025, available in German here, 3.

[54] PRO ASYL, Bittere Bilanz für den Flüchtlingsschutz, 05 January 2026, available in German here.  

^[55] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Resettlement und humanitäre Aufnahmen, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3H4rqhK.

^[56] resettlement.de, ‘Humanitarian admission programmes’, available at: https://bit.ly/3fSx62o.

[57] Information provided by the BAMF on 28 May 2025.

^[58] resettlement.de, ‘Resettlement, available at: https://bit.ly/3qVMD7P.

^[59] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Pilotprogramm NesT wird reguläres Aufnahmeprogramm für Flüchtlinge, 01 July 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3zapdi5.

^[60] NeustartimTeam.de, available in German at: https://bit.ly/49l65P8.

^[61] BAMF, Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3vVK0I6.

[62] Information provided by the BAMF on 22 May 2026.

[63] Ibid

[64] German Bundestag, Response of Parliamentary State Secretary Daniela Ludwig of 7 January 2026, 21/3520, 7 January 2026, available at https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/035/2103520.pdf, 32.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Information provided by the BAMF on 13 February 2026.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Information provided by the BAMF on 22 May 2026.

[70] Information provided by the BAMF on 26 February 2025.

[71] Tagesschau, Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen aus UN-Programm gestoppt, 08 April 2025, available in German here.

[72] Ibid.

[73] PRO ASYL, ‘Bittere Bilanz für den Flüchtlingsschutz’ 05 January 2026, availabel in German at https://www.proasyl.de/news/bittere-bilanz-fuer-den-fluechtlingsschutz/

[74] Ibid.

[75] German Bundestag, Response of Parliamentary State Secretary Daniela Ludwig of 6 January 2026, Printed Paper 21/3520, 9 January 2026, p. 21, available here p. 22.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] German Bundestag, Response of Parliamentary State Secretary Daniela Ludwig of 7 January 2026, 21/3520, 9 January 2026, available at https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/035/2103520.pdf.

[79] Die Zeit, ‘Bundesregierung widerruft jede zweite Aufnahmezusage für Afghanen’, 15 January 2026, available in German at https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-01/bundesregierung-widerruft-jede-zweite-aufnahmezusage-afghanen.

[80] German Bundestag, ‘Response of Parliamentary State Secretary Daniela Ludwig of 5 January 2026, 21/3520, 5 January 2026, available at https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/035/2103520.pdf, 20, 21.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Information provided by the BAMF on 13 February 2026.

[84] Information provided by the BAMF on 22 May 2026.

[85] Nikolaj Nielsen, ‘Behind EU’s December asylum relocation pledges: More deal-making, fewer transfers’ EUobserver (30 January 2026) https://euobserver.com/200919/behind-eus-december-asylum-relocation-pledges-more-deal-making-fewer-transfers/.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

[88]  Ibid.

[89] Ibid.