Since 2017, in principle and according to the internal instructions, a prioritised or accelerated procedure can occur in certain circumstances or for certain countries of origin. Here, the branch offices of the BAMF and the arrival centres decide independently whether they set any priority in dealing with caseloads, in particular dependent on availability of staff members with the necessary country expertise and availability of interpreters. This also applied during the outbreak of Covid-19. However, during the first wave and when in-person applications and hearing were suspended, BAMF branch offices focused on deciding cases which had been pending for a longer time and where the interview had already taken place.[1] Furthermore, according to the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, when interviews resumed the BAMF did not prioritise vulnerable applicants.[2] This information was not confirmed by the BAMF.
In 2023, the debate on prioritisation of applicants was reopened. In October 2023, the Conference of Federal State Prime Ministers demanded that the Federal government reduce the length of the application process for asylum applicants from countries of origins with low recognition rates to three months. According to their plans, the BAMF should then prioritise these applications to ensure that they are dealt with within the shortened time frame.[3]
The legal framework for differential treatment of asylum applicants based on nationality underwent significant changes in December 2025.[4] Previously, differential treatment was primarily prescribed by Section 30a Asylum Act for nationals of safe countries of origin for the right to asylum as defined under Article 16a(3) of the Basic Law, while other accelerated procedures were dependent on regional specifications and practices of BAMF branch offices. On 19 December 2025, the Bundestag and Bundesrat adopted a law introducing a new Section 29b into the Asylum Act, which allows the Federal Government to designate safe countries of origin for international protection by ordinance (Rechtsverordnung) without requiring Bundesrat approval (see Safe country of origin). This new provision refers to the EU Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) and, from 12 June 2026 onwards, to the new EU Asylum Procedures Regulation.
As a result, Germany now operates two parallel systems for designating safe countries of origin with corresponding differential treatment: one based on Article 16a(3) of the Basic Law (Section 30a Asylum Act) and another based on Section 29b Asylum Act. The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government has announced plans to designate Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and India as safe countries of origin under the new Section 29b, with ongoing review of further countries with recognition rates below 5% for at least five years. Applicants from countries designated as safe under either provision face accelerated procedures and are subject to legal restrictions including longer mandatory residence in initial reception centres, work prohibitions, and shorter timeframes for appealing negative decisions.
The introduction of the dual-list system has raised concerns about potential complexity in the application of differential treatment procedures. The German Bar Association has warned that the need to differentiate between the two lists and their respective scopes of application could slow down administrative and judicial proceedings.[5] The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) anticipates increased legal complexity.[6] How differential treatment will be applied in practice when the two lists diverge – particularly given that Section 29b designations affect refugee status and subsidiary protection while Section 29a designations only cover the constitutional right to asylum – remains to be clarified through administrative practice and potentially constitutional jurisprudence.
Additionally, Germany has entered the intensive implementation phase of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) reform, with the Federal Government working to transpose the CEAS package before the June 2026 deadline. Two government bills (GEAS-Anpassungsgesetz and GEAS-Anpassungsfolgegesetz) passed by both bodies of parliament (Bundestag and Bundesrat) amend the Asylum Act, Residence Act, and related statutes to implement new border-screening procedures, accelerated procedures, and solidarity mechanisms.
With the entry into force of the new EU Asylum Procedures Regulation on 12 June 2026, a binding EU-wide list of safe countries of origin will be introduced, initially including Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco, and Tunisia, along with EU candidate countries meeting certain conditions.[7] This EU-wide list aims to create greater uniformity in the application of differential treatment based on nationality across member states, addressing the previous inconsistency where a country could be classified as safe in one EU state while applicants from that country frequently received protection in another. Member states will retain the right to maintain their own national lists alongside the binding EU-wide list, but if a country is removed from the EU-wide list due to human rights or political developments, member states may not continue to classify it as safe nationally.
Duration of procedures by nationality
In 2025, the average duration of procedures was 12.2 months for all initial and subsequent applications combined across Germany.[8] The duration varied significantly by nationality with a duration of 20.4 months for Nigeria and 1.1 for Moldovia and Montenegro (with the latter two being subject to accelerated procedures).
Procedures for the accelerated processing of asylum applications at first instance from countries with a low recognition rate – under 5% – were completed significantly more quickly in 2025. These accelerated procedures have been applied since December 2023 for asylum applicants from Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkan states, and since March 2024 they also apply to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Since December 2024, Colombia was additionally included in the accelerated processing. In 2025, 78 percent of the accelerated procedures were decided within 21 days. However, it should be noted that the accelerated procedure under Section 30a of the Asylum Act plays only a minimal role in practice: in 2025, there were only 121 decisions under Section 30a AsylG, representing just 0.04 percent of all BAMF decisions.
During 2025, the following average durations applied for countries of origin subject to accelerated procedures:
- Albania: 3.5 months
- North Macedonia: 3.7 months
- Montenegro: 1.1 months
- Kosovo: 2.0 months
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2.8 months
- Serbia: 1.6 months
- Georgia: 4.4 months
- Moldova: 1.1 months
- Colombia: 6.7 months
- Morocco: 5.6 months
- Algeria: 4.3 months
- Tunisia: 7.8 months
The so-called “Jahresverfahrensdauer” (annual procedure duration) – which covers only procedures that were both initiated and decided within the previous twelve months – was 3.6 months in 2025. This shorter processing time for recent applications shows that the BAMF has been working to reduce processing times for newly submitted cases while addressing the backlog of older cases, which increases the overall average duration. For applications from countries with recognition rates below 5%, the administrative procedure duration ranged from 10.1 to 30.3 days in 2025.
Syria
Since a policy change in the first months of 2016, the BAMF has granted subsidiary protection instead of refugee protection in a high number of cases. This policy change affected Syrian nationals in particular, but also asylum applicants from Iraq or Eritrea. For instance, whereas 99.5% of Syrians had been granted refugee status in 2015, this rate dropped to 56.4% in 2016 and to 35% in 2017.
As of end-2025, approximately 940,000 Syrian nationals were living in Germany – a significant decrease compared to a year earlier, driven primarily by record naturalisations rather than departures.[9] 276,676 Syrians held recognised refugee status under § 3 AsylG (Geneva Convention), representing 39.1% of all recognised refugees in Germany, and a further 4,406 held asylum recognition under Art. 16a GG. Around one-third of Syrians with some form of protection in Germany hold subsidiary protection.[10] In 2024, this protection was primarily granted due to the risks of torture or inhuman treatment, rather than the ongoing armed conflict in Syria.[11] However, the number of new grants collapsed dramatically in 2025: out of 25,293 decisions on Syrian asylum cases in 2025, only 289 Syrians (1.1%) received subsidiary protection under § 4 I AsylG, only 151 (0.6%) were recognised as refugees, and only 92 (0.4%) received a deportation ban – giving an overall protection rate of just 2.1%, down from 44.4% in 2024 and close to 100% in prior years. The remaining decisions comprised 9,571 outright rejections (37.8%) and 15,190 formal closures (60.1%), the latter reflecting the BAMF’s processing freeze on Syrian cases following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the resumption of decisions under revised guidelines.[12] In revocation proceedings, by contrast, the BAMF reviewed 17,767 existing Syrian protection statuses in 2025 and confirmed the status in 17,108 cases (96.3%), revoking or withdrawing protection in only 659 cases (3.7%).[13]
Individuals with a temporary residence permit – the vast majority of Syrian nationals – must regularly renew their residence permits: refugees under the Geneva Refugee Convention every three years, individuals with subsidiary protection either annually or every three years, and those with a deportation ban annually.[14]
In June 2025, German courts ruled that BAMF must resume deciding Syrian asylum applications, as the situation in Syria was no longer considered “unclear” under Section 24(5) of the Asylum Act.[15] Following this ruling, BAMF began rejecting Syrian applications at an unprecedented rate. In October 2025 alone, BAMF rejected 1,906 first-time Syrian asylum applications – more than ten times the combined rejections from January to September 2025.[16]
In 2025, there were 23,256 first-time asylum applications from Syrian nationals in Germany, representing a 69.7% decrease compared to 2024.[17] Throughout the year, BAMF made 25,293 decisions regarding Syrian nationals: 151 individuals were granted refugee status, 289 received subsidiary protection, and 92 received a national deportation bar – giving an overall first instance protection rate of 2.1%, down from 44.4% in 2024. Of the remaining decisions, 9,571 (37.8%) were outright rejections on the merits, while 15,190 (60.1%) were formal closures, primarily reflecting procedural outcomes such as Dublin transfers and the inadmissibility of subsequent applications.[18]
The average administrative procedure duration for Syrians in 2025 was 14.1 months, with the overall procedure duration until a final decision in the first half of 2025 being 22.3 months.[19] As of December 2025, 48,270 Syrian asylum cases remained pending at BAMF, representing 47.5% of all pending asylum procedures in Germany.[20]
Following the regime change in Syria in December 2024, BAMF initiated thousands of revocation proceedings (Widerrufsverfahren) for Syrian protection status holders (17,767 in total).[21] In July 2025, Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) instructed BAMF to review the protection status of certain Syrian refugees, specifically Syrian criminals and so-called ‘Gefährder’ (individuals deemed a security risks), “insofar as a complete rejection appears justified based on the individual circumstances of each case.”[22]
The current German government also reversed the previous administration’s plans to allow “exploratory trips” to Syria without triggering revocation proceedings.[23] After thorough review, the Ministry of Interior decided against enabling short-term return visits for Syrians without consequences for their protection status. Under current law, travel to one’s country of origin generally creates a presumption that the conditions for protection status no longer exist, and BAMF is obligated to review whether granted protection should be revoked when it becomes aware of such trips. Exceptions are possible only in specific circumstances, such as when a family member is seriously ill.
Between August 2018 and July 2025, family reunification was possible for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection but limited to a monthly quota of 1,000 visas for relatives of this group. On July 24, 2025, the “Act on the Suspension of Family Reunification for Beneficiaries of Subsidiary Protection” came into force, suspending family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection for two years until July 23, 2027.[24] This measure particularly affects Syrian families, as approximately 351,400 individuals with subsidiary protection status resided in Germany at the time, predominantly from Syria. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) justified the suspension by stating that “the country’s ability to integrate had simply reached a breaking point.”[25]
Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Germany resumed deportations to Syria in December 2025 under a bilateral understanding with Syria’s transitional government, conducting at least four deportations by January 2026 targeting individuals convicted of serious crimes or deemed security risks (“Gefährder”), marking the end of a nearly 15-year suspension of Syrian removals.[26]
For more extensive information on Syria-related policies prior to 2025, see AIDA Country Report on Germany – 2024 Update.
Afghanistan
In 2025, there were 64,104 asylum applications from Afghan nationals in Germany (23,972 first-time applications and 40,132 subsequent applications), representing a 29.8% decrease in first-time applications compared to 2024.[27] The dramatic increase in subsequent applications – rising from 1,006 in 2024 to 40,132 in 2025 – reflects a surge of 1,899.6%, primarily driven by Afghan applicants seeking to challenge previous decisions or changed circumstances.
Throughout 2025, BAMF made 87,689 decisions regarding Afghan nationals, with 52,300 individuals granted refugee status, 310 receiving subsidiary protection, and 6,279 granted national removal bans, resulting in an overall protection rate of 67.2%.[28] This marks a dramatic decline from 2024, when the protection rate stood at approximately 93.9%, and represents the most significant drop in protection rates for any major nationality group.
As of December 2025, 21,272 Afghan asylum cases remained pending at BAMF, representing 20.9% of all pending asylum procedures in Germany.[29] This represents a substantial decrease from 38,940 pending cases at the end of 2024, primarily due to the high number of decisions issued throughout 2025.
The first instance protection rate for Afghan nationals declined sharply throughout 2025, with particularly pronounced drops for Afghan men. According to PRO ASYL’s analysis, while the protection rate for Afghan men stood at 91% in 2024, it fell to only 50% by mid-2025, with June 2025 figures showing only 34% of men receiving protection at first instance. PRO ASYL estimates that by the end of 2025, more than two-thirds of Afghan men were being rejected in asylum procedures at the BAMF.[30]
The organization documented and analyzed 30 negative decisions for Afghan asylum seekers, noting that rejections increased from approximately 3% at the beginning of 2024 to around 10% per month by September 2024 and onwards into 2025.[31] This shift represents a fundamental change in BAMF’s assessment of protection needs under Taliban rule, despite the continued deterioration of the human rights situation in Afghanistan.
In contrast, BAMF acknowledged that Afghan women and girls continue to face heightened persecution risks. According to a December 2024 parliamentary response, BAMF’s Country of Origin Information Guidelines (Herkunftsländerleitlinien) were updated to reflect that Afghan women and girls are generally at high risk of persecution and typically meet the criteria for either refugee status or subsidiary protection under German asylum law. This gender-differentiated approach has resulted in vastly different outcomes for men and women from the same country of origin.[32]
While the December 2025 BAMF statistics do not provide Afghanistan-specific revocation data, the overall revocation review proceedings in 2025 affected 44,272 cases across all nationalities, with 3,215 actual revocations (7.3% revocation rate). As of December 2025, 53,774 revocation review proceedings remained pending for all nationalities. Given the sharp drop in protection rates for new Afghan applicants, existing Afghan protection status holders face potential increased scrutiny in revocation proceedings.
Germany has implemented various admission schemes for Afghan nationals. Under these schemes, more than 38,400 Afghan nationals arrived in Germany between May 2021 and 2025. Germany’s federal humanitarian admission programme for at-risk Afghans, based on Article 23 (2) Residence Act, launched in October 2022 with a target of 1,000 admissions per month, admitted over 2,300 persons by the end of 2025. Since mid-July 2024 no new admission declarations are being issued amid funding concerns.[33]
The programme, alongside all other admission programmes, was formally paused in May 2025 by the new Merz government, leaving approximately 2,100 Afghan nationals – many of whom had already left Afghanistan for Pakistan with a conditional acceptance of admission – stranded there. In November 2025, the Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI), citing a Pakistani deadline requiring all individuals in the multiple admission procedures to leave Pakistan by year-end, sent letters to around 650 of especially vulnerable individuals and their eligible family members waiting, offering logistical support and financial payments of several thousand euros (up to approximately €14,250 for a family of four) in exchange for voluntarily renouncing their admission pledges and returning to Afghanistan or a third country.[34] The offer attracted very limited uptake: by the time the deadline expired on 17 November 2025, only 62 individuals had accepted.[35] By the end of April 2026, 320 individuals have accepted the offer and over 240 of them have already returned to Afghanistan.[36] The suspension also prompted legal challenges: in a ruling of 4 December 2025 (2 BvR 1511/25), the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) partially upheld a constitutional complaint brought by an Afghan judge and his family, finding that the failure to process their visa applications violated the right to effective judicial protection under Art. 19(4) of the Basic Law, and ordering the Federal Government to decide on their visa applications without further delay.[37] The Court did not, however, recognise a direct constitutional right to visa issuance, limiting the ruling’s broader effect. So fa, the Higher Regional Court of Berlin-Brandenburg upheld the German Government’s decision to declare admission invalid if the political interest for admission ceases to exist.On August 30, 2024, Germany conducted its first deportation of Afghan nationals since the Taliban takeover, deporting 28 individuals, followed by a second flight with 81 deportees in July 2025, while simultaneously negotiating a new agreement with the Taliban to establish regular, structured deportation mechanisms.[38]
For more extensive information on Afghanistan-related policies prior to 2025, see AIDA Country Report on Germany – 2024 Update.
Iran
In 2025, there were 2,873 asylum applications from Iranian nationals in Germany (2,271 first-time applications and 602 subsequent applications). Throughout the year, BAMF made 11,626 first instance decisions regarding Iranian nationals, with 2,356 individuals granted refugee status, 201 receiving subsidiary protection, and 93 granted national removal bans, resulting in an overall protection rate of 22.8%.[39]
This represents a dramatic decline from 2024, when the first instance protection rate stood at 36.7%, marking a drop of 13.9%.[40] The decline continued a trend that began in 2023, when the first instance protection rate was 45.5%, with 37.8% receiving refugee status, 3.3% subsidiary protection, and 1.6% a removal ban.[41]
Following the protests and violent repressions in Iran, several Federal States declared a removal ban for Iran in October 2022.[42] The Conference of Interior Ministers of the Federal States as well as the Federal level decided in December 2022 that no removals would take place to Iran, with exceptions for serious criminal offenders and persons posing a risk to security.[43] The nationwide removal ban was originally prolonged in summer 2023 but was lifted from 1st January 2024 onwards.[44]
Despite the lifting of the formal nationwide ban, several Federal States maintained their own regional deportation bans to Iran throughout 2025, citing ongoing human rights violations, arbitrary arrests, torture, and mass executions by the Iranian regime. As of January 2026, the situation remained fluid, with deportation policy varying significantly by Federal State.[45]
Russia
In 2025, asylum applications from Russian nationals in Germany totalled 3,943 applications (3,100 first-time and 843 subsequent applications), reflecting a continued decline from 5,625 in 2024 and 9,028 in 2023. The BAMF issued 11,106 first instance decisions on Russian cases during the year, of which 528 resulted in protection grants and 7,117 in rejections, while 3,461 cases were resolved through formal decisions. Excluding formal decisions, the first instance protection rate (the share of positive outcomes among substantive decisions) stood at approximately 4.8% (528 grants out of 7,645 substantive decisions). As of December 2025, 3,461 applications were still pending.[46]
The 2025 protection rate represents a dramatic decline from 10.2% in 2024, 29.0% in 2023, 24.0% in 2022, and 15.5% in 2021. This sharp drop of 24.2 percentage points from 2023 to 2025 reflects an increasingly restrictive decision-making practice toward Russian asylum seekers, despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, military conscription, and political repression in Russia. According to data from Germany’s Interior Ministry provided in response to a parliamentary inquiry by the Left Party, between early 2022 and April 2025, Germany rejected approximately 95% of asylum requests from draft-eligible Russian men aged 18-45, granting protection to just 349 out of 6,374 applicants in this demographic.[47]
According to PRO ASYL, the main obstacle for Russian nationals seeking protection in Germany is the lack of legal escape routes, as no flights from Russia to Germany are available and as countries along the EU’s external border no longer allow Russian citizens to enter with Schengen visas.[48] Germany has only ‘granted humanitarian visas in a few exceptional cases of people who have made public appearances, such as critical journalists’ according to PRO ASYL, while ‘German embassies and consulates generally reject such applications’.[49] PRO ASYL reports that in some cases, German embassies in countries other than Russia accept long-term visa applications from Russian nationals (e.g., for work, study or family reunification) for persons ‘who would be unreasonably endangered if they were to return to the responsible mission in Russia to apply. This may be the case for human rights defenders, journalists, dissidents and conscientious objectors.’
In October 2025, Germany dramatically scaled back its humanitarian visa programme for Russians and Belarusians, suspending the fast-track procedure for issuing visas to those actively opposing their governments. The programme, which had helped approximately 2,490 Russian and 410 Belarusian activists, politicians, and journalists safely relocate to Germany since March 2021, was initially frozen in late July 2025 before being partially restored in August with more restrictive criteria.[50]
Deserters of the Russian army – those who flee from active military service – can be granted refugee status as they are threatened with persecution on political grounds, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community,[51] while more restrictive criteria apply to conscientious objectors. According to established jurisprudence, refusal to enter military service is, as such, not a ground for granting asylum. Conscientious objectors can only be granted refugee status in cases where the punishment for refusal to perform military service is disproportionately high, if the refusal triggers political persecution, or ‘if the asylum seeker would have been obliged to participate in war crimes, crimes against peace or crimes against humanity during military service and refuses military service for this reason’.[52] The BAMF decides on these applications on an individual basis. As of 18 February 2023, there were only two known BAMF decisions on applications from Russian nationals fleeing military service. In one of them, the person was granted protection but based on political activities. The other case concerned a person over the age of 40 and without prior military training, and the BAMF assumed that it was not sufficiently likely he would be forced to participate in the war. The decision was criticised by civil society organisations, who argue that the Russian recruiting practice is broader and more unpredictable than what was assumed by the BAMF.[53]
In 2025, the practice of denying protection to Russians fleeing military service continued and intensified.[54] In 2024, the practice of denying protection to Russians fleeing military service continued according to NGOs that speak of more than a dozen of denials.[55] According to research by the Connection association, numerous asylum decisions contain text modules with a calculation that the statistical risk of conscription is “less than two or less than six percent” in view of the millions of reservists.[56] According to the BAMF, this is too low to grant asylum.[57] In the three years since Russia invaded Ukraine, Russian men of conscription age have rarely received asylum in Germany. A formal reason is that Russians cannot enter Germany without a visa and must pass through other EU countries, which become responsible for their asylum claims under the Dublin III Regulation. As a result, more than half of all decisions since February 24, 2022, were classified as “other closures” (e.g., transfers or withdrawals).[58]
When excluding these procedural closures, the protection rate was 16%. However, Germany’s decision-making practice has become significantly stricter recently: until mid-2023, 37% of Russian men of conscription age received protection, whereas from September 2023 to September 2024, only 11% were granted protection, with the rate dropping further to approximately 5% by 2025.[59] During this later period, more asylum claims received substantive decisions than before, meaning the absolute number of rejections was also much higher than in the period up to mid-2023.[60]
According to PRO ASYL, the low recognition rate by the BAMF partly stems from outdated country of origin information on the prosecution of deserters and those who object to military service.[61] The BAMF rejects this view and states that available reports on military service have been revised in autumn 2023 and are regularly updated.
Recent rulings of 2024 and 2025 on the matter do not offer full clarity either. There is diverging jurisprudence regarding asylum claims of Russian conscientious objectors, as reflected in the conflicting rulings of the Administrative Court Berlin and the Higher Administrative Court (OVG) Berlin-Brandenburg. While the Administrative Court granted the applicants, Russian men of conscription age, subsidiary protection status in early 2025,[62] the OVG reached the opposite conclusion in two decisions dated August 22, 2024.[63] The OVG argued that young, inexperienced men, including those of Chechen ethnicity, were not at risk of forced recruitment into so-called volunteer battalions outside regular conscription. Additionally, the OVG found no risk of serious harm from performing mandatory military service in the Russian Federation or from sanctions related to draft evasion. By contrast, the Administrative Court, relying on the latest available evidence of January 2025, determined that the applicants faced a high likelihood of being conscripted upon return and deployed in Russia’s unlawful war of aggression against Ukraine.[64] The court emphasised the risk that conscripts could be coerced into signing contracts with the Russian armed forces and subsequently sent to the frontlines or subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment near the Russian-Ukrainian border (e.g., Kursk region). The stark divergence between these rulings highlights the ongoing legal controversy over the risks faced by Russian conscientious objectors in the context of the war in Ukraine.
With a decree issued on 20 June 2022, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community granted special rights to Russian cultural and media workers who are critical of the regime to continue their work in Germany.[65] The government intends to use all possibilities under the residence law for this group of people, including using available discretion in granting residence permits or visas for the purpose of employment or self-employment. The decree also mentions that immigration authorities should issue residence permits directly without a preceding visa procedure for persons who are already in Germany in cases where a return to Russia would put applicants in danger.[66]
For persons who do not fulfil the criteria for a residence title in Germany or for being granted international protection, PRO ASYL assumes that they should be issued a tolerated stay (Duldung) on the basis that removals to Russia are currently impossible.[67] Despite the decree in 2022 to grant special rights to Russian cultural and media workers, Russian journalists who fled to Germany report that they often only received tolerated stay (Duldung), which forces them to stay in Germany without possibilities to secure their livelihood and to continue their work as journalists.[68]
Since the beginning of the war against Ukraine, deportations to Russia have only been carried out in serious individual cases, via third countries such as Georgia or Serbia.[69] In the first half of 2023 no person was removed to Russia and no person with Russian nationality was removed involuntarily from Germany.[70] According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 66 people were deported back to Russia in 2024.[71] While there is no data available for the total of 2025, 111 individuals were deported to Russia between January and October 2025.[72]
Palestinian territories
The attack by the Hamas on Israel on the 7 October 2023 and the following war in Gaza has led to political discussions and rifts in the public perception. Following the attack, former chancellor Scholz declared the security of Israel as a reason of state for Germany. He claimed that Germany’s place is on the side of Israel and that Germany stands in full solidarity and supports Israel.[73] The German government continues to support Israel, e.g., by its abstention to the UN resolution and its rejection of an EU resolution on ceasefire. Only very wary and situational criticism to the Israelian government and its reaction to the attack by the German government have been voiced by the German government.
What impact the situation in the Palestinian territories and the political climate in Germany have on Palestinian refugees in Germany is currently difficult to evaluate. The number of asylum applicants in 2023 from Palestinian territories – 743 – is a significant increase compared to 35 in 2022.[74] In 2024, the numbers likewise stood significantly higher than in 2022 at 634 applications. In 2024, 634 asylum applications were lodged by persons from Palestinian territories;[75] the protection rate for individuals from the Palestinian territories in Germany, based on decisions by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), was approximately 82%.[76] Out of a total of 478 decisions, 127 people received protection, 28 applications were denied after examination of the substance. In the first two months of 2025, 87 asylum applications from Palestinian territories were registered (38 in January, 44 in February). Palestinian asylum seekers thus represented a small fraction of Germany’s total asylum applications, which numbered 168,543 in 2025—a 32.8% decrease from the previous year—and did not rank among the top ten nationalities.[77]
In its response to a parliamentary request by the Left Party in March 2025, the Federal Government stated that the BAMF had not been deciding on asylum applications from individuals from the Gaza Strip for over a year, invoking § 24(5) of the Asylum Act (AsylG), which allows for the deferral of asylum decisions in cases of temporarily uncertain situations.[78] Because of this halt, as of February 28, 2025, a total of 1,218 asylum procedures concerning “persons from Palestinian territories (not recognized as a state)” were pending before the BAMF, including 147 involving minors and 1,071 involving adults.[79]
In response to a parliamentary inquiry dated 18 July 2025, the Federal Government confirmed that the BAMF had resumed decisions on asylum applications from Gaza.[80] The BAMF stated that it had continuously monitored the situation in the Gaza Strip and concluded that, due to the duration of the conflict, the failure of multiple ceasefire agreements, and the expansion of combat operations across the entire Gaza Strip, the situation could no longer be considered a “temporarily uncertain situation” within the meaning of § 24(5) of the Asylum Act (AsylG). This marked the end of a suspension period that had lasted over one year, during which 1,218 procedures remained pending as of February 28, 2025.[81]
Despite this prolonged deferral practice, several administrative courts ruled in 2024 that such uncertainty can no longer be assumed in light of the “dramatic situation and widespread destruction in the Gaza Strip.” These include, inter alia, the Administrative Court (VG) of Dresden (judgment of April 16, 2024, case no. 11 K 357/24.A), the VG Sigmaringen (judgment of March 7, 2024, case no. A 5 K 1560/22), and the VG Hamburg (judgment of June 3, 2024, case no. 14 A 789/24).[82]
PRO ASYL had strongly criticized the suspension of asylum procedures already in April 2024, arguing that the situation in Gaza was not “temporarily uncertain” as required by law.[83] Of 238 inactivity complaints filed between 7 October 2023 and 30 April 2025, courts ordered the BAMF to decide in 187 cases, granted subsidiary protection in three cases themselves, and issued other types of decisions in 48 cases.[84]
Another contributing factor to the increase of asylum applicants might have been the court rulings of the Administrative Court in Oldenburg and of the Court of Justice of the EU. The Administrative Court in Oldenburg decided already in June 2023, prior to the escalation, that the current situation in the West Bank amounts to a danger to the health and life of those living there and that therefore persons present in Germany are eligible for toleration (‘Duldung’) under national law.[85] The European Court of Human Rights affirmed that UNRWA does no longer guarantee protection for Palestinians, making them eligible for national protection.[86]
In such cases, affected persons are to be recognized as ipso-facto refugees. “Ipso facto” means “by law” and in this context signifies that there is no need to demonstrate an individually grounded fear of persecution.[87] Rather, prior UNRWA registration establishes conclusively that affected persons are refugees in need of protection within the meaning of the Geneva Refugee Convention. The BAMF must therefore limit its examination to establishing this registration, the loss of UNRWA protection, and the absence of exclusion grounds. For those who did not have UNRWA status before fleeing Gaza (approximately 700,000 people), subsidiary protection under § 4 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 AsylG must be granted at minimum. Multiple administrative courts have ruled that the situation in Gaza constitutes an armed conflict in which every civilian faces a serious individual threat to life or physical integrity merely by being present in the affected area.
Political debate and positions taken regarding the situation in Israel and Palestine and vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees is hardening. The Christian Democrats (CDU) affirmed that while humanitarian aid will be provided, migration to Germany should be prevented. The Social Democrats stated that the right to claim asylum applies to everyone equally and that possible security threats are checked for Palestinians as for every other asylum applicant.[88]
[1] Information provided by the BAMF, 10 March 2022.
[2] FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency), ‘Migration: Key Fundamental Rights Concerns’, Quarterly Bulletin 1.7.2020 – 30.9.2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3NuoiiC, 31.
[3] Spiegel.de, Länderchefs wollen schnellere Asylverfahren, 13 October 2023, avialable in German at: https://bit.ly/49eHxqw; Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz (MPK), Flüchtlingspolitik von Bund und Ländern – gemeinsame Kostentragung, 13. October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3OnRp9m.
[4] Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Neuregelung zu sicheren Herkunftsstaaten beschlossen’, 5 December 2025, available here.
[5] Deutscher Anwaltverein, ‘Sichere Herkunftsstaaten: Gesetzentwurf macht Asylverfahren langsamer’, 4 June 2025, available here.
[6] Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration, ‘Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bestimmung sicherer Herkunftsstaaten durch Rechtsverordnung’, 2 October 2025, available here.
[7] Council of the European Union, ‘Asylum policy: Council and European Parliament agree on EU list of safe countries of origin’, 18 December 2025, available here.
[8] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 21/3999, 4 February 2026, available in German here.
[9] VisaHQ, ‘Number of Syrian nationals in Germany falls below one million – thanks to naturalisation, not returns’, 18 January 2026, available here.
[10] BAMF, ‘Bundesamt in Zahlen 2025‘, 02 March 2026, available in German here.
[11] Mediendienst Integration, ‘Kein subsidiärer Schutz mehr für Syrer?’, 25 July 2024, available in German here.
[12] BAMF, ‘Lage in Syrien: Temporärer Verfahrensaufschub für Asylanträge [Situation in Syria: Temporary postponement of asylum applications], 20 December 2024, available in German here.
[13] BAMF, ‘Bundesamt in Zahlen 2025‘, 02 March 2026, available in German here.
[14] Mediendienst Integration, ‘Kein subsidiärer Schutz mehr für Syrer?’, 25 July 2024, available in German here.
[15] migrando, ‘BAMF must decide on asylum for Syrian refugees’, 20 May 2025, available here.
[16] VisaHQ, ‘Germany Rejects Record Number of Syrian Asylum Applications in October’, 9 November 2025, available here.
[17] BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen, December 2025, available in German here.
[18] BAMF, ‘Bundesamt in Zahlen 2025‘, 02 March 2026, available in German here.
[19] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 21/3999, 4 February 2026, available in German here.
[20] BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen, December 2025, available in German here.
[21] DIE ZEIT, ‘Asylpolitik: Keine Erkundungsreisen für Syrer – Bamf prüft Widerruf’, 4 July 2025, available in German here.; BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen, December 2025, available in German here.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany suspends refugees family reunification’, 27 June 2025, available in German here.
[25] ETIAS UK, ‘Germany halts refugee family reunifications’, 4 July 2025, available here.
[26] VisaHQ, ‘Germany carries out fourth post-war deportation to Syria, signalling tougher removal policy’, 21 January 2026, available here.
[27] BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen, December 2025, available in German here.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] PRO ASYL, ‘Deutschland gewährt immer seltener Schutz: Das Bundesamt droht zur Ablehnungsmaschine zu werden’, 15 January 2026, available in German here.
[31] PRO ASYL, ‘Wie der Flüchtlingsschutz 2024 weiter demontiert wurde und was für 2025 droht’, 23 December 2024, available in German here.
[32] Federal Government, Reply by the Federal Government to the minor interpellation by Clara Bünger, Dr. André Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, other MPs and the Die Linke group, 20/13752, 13 December 2024, available in German here
[33] Information provided by BAMF on 22 May 2026.
[34] Zeit Online, ‘Regierung will Afghanen Geld bieten, wenn sie auf Aufnahme verzichten’, 4 November 2025, available in German here.
[35] Tagesschau, ’62 Menschen aus Afghanistan verzichten auf Aufnahmezusage’, 19 November 2025, available in German here.
[36] Information provided by BAMF on 22 May 2026.
[37] Bundesverfassungsgericht, Press Release No. 110/2025, 4 December 2025, available in German here.
[38] Al Jazeera, ‘Germany deports 28 Afghans for first time since 2021 Taliban takeover’, 30 August 2024, available here.
[39] BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen, December 2025, available in German here.
[40] BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen, December 2024, available in German here.
[41] BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen, December 2023, available in German here.
[42] Asyl.net, Mehrere Bundesländer setzen Abschiebungen in den Iran aus, 12 October 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3jo9PdK.
[43] Tagesschau.de, Vorerst keine Abschiebungen in den Iran, 2 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3kXPNr2.
[44] GGUA Flüchtlingshilfe, ‚Abschiebungsstopp in den Iran ist seit 1.1.2024 aufgehoben‘, 5 January 2024, available in German here.
[45] migrando, ‘Abschiebungen in den Iran: Welche Bundesländer einen Abschiebestopp verhängt haben und was das bedeutet’, 22 January 2026, available here.
[46] BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen, December 2025, available in German here.
[47] Berliner Morgenpost, ‘Flucht vor Putins Krieg: Russen haben kaum Chancen auf Asyl’, 13 May 2025, available in German here.
[48] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[49] Ibidem.
[50] Deutsche Welle, ‘German suspends humanitarian visa program leaving Russian dissidents stranded’, 17 May 2025, available here.
[51] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beantwortung von offenen Fragen zu Top 1 („Bericht des Bundesministeriums des Innern und für Heimat über die aktuelle Lage im Ukraine-Konflikt sowie die damit verbundenen innenpolitischen Auswirkungen“) der Sitzung des Ausschusses für Inneres und Heimat vom 11. Mai 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Lwoe3q, 3.
[52] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[53] PRO ASYL, Bundesamt für Migration lehnt Asyl für russischen Verweigerer ab, 18 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Jp9d0z.
[54] Berliner Morgenpost, ‘Flucht vor Putins Krieg: Russen haben kaum Chancen auf Asyl’, 13 May 2025, available in German here.
[56] Connection e.V., ‚Klare Forderung auf Asyl bei Verweigerung eines Angriffskrieges‘, 18 November 2024, available in German here.
[57] Connection e.V., ‚Klare Forderung auf Asyl bei Verweigerung eines Angriffskrieges‘, 18 November 2024, available in German here.
[58] Valentin Feneberg, ‚Asyl für russische Kriegsdienstverweigerer: Lebensgefährlicher Kriegseinsatz und die erzwungene Beteiligung an Kriegsverbrechen führen zu subsidiärem Schutz‘, (VerfBlog, 5 February 2025), available in German here.
[59] Berliner Morgenpost, ‘Flucht vor Putins Krieg: Russen haben kaum Chancen auf Asyl’, 13 May 2025, available in German here.
[60] Valentin Feneberg, ‚Asyl für russische Kriegsdienstverweigerer: Lebensgefährlicher Kriegseinsatz und die erzwungene Beteiligung an Kriegsverbrechen führen zu subsidiärem Schutz‘, (VerfBlog, 5 February 2025), available in German here.
[61] PRO ASYL, Bundesamt für Migration lehnt Asyl für russischen Verweigerer ab, 18 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/491fzyH.
[62] Administrative Court Berlin, 33rd Chamber, VG 33 K 504/24 A and VG 33 K 519/24, 20 January, 2025, press release available in German here.
[63] Higher Administrative Court Berlin-Brandenburg, 12 B 17/23 and 12 B 18/23, 22 August 2024, available in German here.
[64] Administrative Court Berlin, 33rd Chamber, VG 33 K 504/24 A and VG 33 K 519/24, 20 January, 2025, press release available in German here.
[65] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beschäftigung von regimekritischen Kultur- und Medienschaffenden aus der Russischen Föderation in Deutschland; Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Interesse im Sinne von § 19c Absatz 3 AufenthG, 20 June 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3LsAAt9.
[66] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beschäftigung von regimekritischen Kultur- und Medienschaffenden aus der Russischen Föderation in Deutschland; Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Interesse im Sinne von § 19c Absatz 3 AufenthG, 20 June 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3LsAAt9.
[67] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[68] Tagesspiegel.de, Warten aufs Visum : Seit sieben Monaten geduldet, 2 May 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Ouvr4I.
[69] Olaf Sundermeyer, ‚Woran Abschiebungen scheitern‘, (Tagesschau, 10 February 2025), available in German here.
[70] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U.
[71] Olaf Sundermeyer, ‚Woran Abschiebungen scheitern‘, (Tagesschau, 10 February 2025), available in German here.
[72] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 21/3168, 13 January 2026, available in German here.
[73] German government, Olaf Scholz: Deutschland hat nur einen Platz, den Platz an der Seite Israels, 12 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/494xUv0.
[74] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik (statistics on applications, decisions and pending procedures), 1-12/2023, available at: htps://bit.ly/3UjFWf0 1-12/2022 available at: https://bit.ly/3Z7UIUM.
[75] Federal Government Response to a Parliamentary Request by The Left, 20/15139 31 March 2025, available in German here, 2.
[76] The author calculated the rate by dividing the number of positive decisions by the total number of substantive decisions, i.e., granted or denied, for the numbers see: BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[77] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/15139, 31 March 2025, available in German here.
[78] Federal Government Response to a Parliamentary Request by The Left, 20/15139 31 March 2025, available in German here, 2.
[79] Federal Government Response to a Parliamentary Request by The Left, 20/15139 31 March 2025, available in German here, 2, 3.
[80] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 21/918, 18 July 2025, available in German here.
[81] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/15139, 31 March 2025, available in German here.
[82] Federal Government Response to a Parliamentary Request by The Left, 20/15139 31 March 2025, available in German here, 2, 3.
[83] PRO ASYL, ‘Völlig unbegründet: Bundesamt legt Asylverfahren palästinensischer Flüchtlinge aus Gaza auf Eis’, 4 April 2024, available in German here.
[84] PRO ASYL, ‘Schutzsuchende aus Gaza müssen als Flüchtlinge anerkannt werden’, 28 August 2025, available in German here.
[85] Administrative Court Oldenburg, Decision 3 A 3611/21, 7 June 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3waRhDM.
[86] CJEU, Decision C-294/22, 5 October 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49noIBC.
[87] PRO ASYL, ‘Schutzsuchende aus Gaza müssen als Flüchtlinge anerkannt werden’, 28 August 2025, available in German here.
[88] Rheinische Post.de, Union will keine palästinensischen Flüchtlinge, 18 October 2023, available in Germany at: https://bit.ly/3up1I6n.