As a response to the high numbers of asylum applications in Germany in 2015 and 2016, the BAMF prioritised applications from specific nationalities at different points in time. Prioritisation of applications from certain countries was revoked in the second quarter of 2016.[1] It was partially replaced by a system of ‘clustering’ applications with the aim of prioritising the caseloads from countries of origin with high and low protection rates. The clustering system was also abandoned in the first half of 2017.[2] Since then, the branch offices of the BAMF and the arrival centres decide on their own whether they set any priority in dealing with caseloads, in particular dependent on availability of staff members with the necessary country expertise and availability of interpreters. This also applied during the outbreak of Covid-19. However, during the first wave and when in-person applications and hearing were suspended, BAMF branch offices focused on deciding cases which had been pending for a longer time and where the interview had already taken place.[3] Furthermore, according to the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, when hearing resumed the BAMF did not prioritise vulnerable applicants.[4] This information was not confirmed by the BAMF, however.
Similarly to previous years, in 2022, the average duration of procedures was significantly below the average of 8.3 months for asylum seekers from some of the European ‘safe countries of origin’ and from Georgia:[5]
- Albania: 2.6 months
- North Macedonia: 2.7 months
- 1.8 months
- Kosovo: 4.0 months
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2.2 months
- Serbia: 2.6 months
- Georgia: 2.9 months
This seems to imply that asylum applications from ‘safe countries of origin’ are fast-tracked, however this does not seem to be the case for all ‘safe countries of origin’ since procedures at the BAMF for asylum seekers from Ghana and Senegal were not faster than on average (7.6 months for Senegal, 10.7 months for Ghana).
On the other hand, the average duration of procedures was considerably above the average for asylum seekers from these countries of origin:
- Iran: 9.1 months
- Afghanistan: 9.1 months
- Nigeria: 12.3 months
- Somalia: 11.1 months
- Ghana: 10.7 months
Syria
Since a policy change in the first months of 2016, the BAMF has granted subsidiary protection instead of refugee protection in a previously unrecorded number of cases. This policy change affected Syrian nationals in particular, but also asylum seekers from Iraq or Eritrea. For instance, whereas 99.5% of Syrians had been granted refugee status in 2015, this rate dropped to 56.4% in 2016 and to 35% in 2017. While the percentage rose again in the following years, 22.6% of Syrian applicants were granted asylum or refugee protection in 2022 (as opposed to 49.5% in 2019, 48.1% in 2020, 27.6% in 2021). Conversely, the rate of Syrians being granted subsidiary protection rose from 0.1% in 2015 to 41.2% in 2016, and 56% in 2017. Since then, it has decreased again in the years 2018-2021 (39.7% in 2018, 33.1% in 2019, 39.6% in 2020, 34.7% in 2021). The year 2022 saw a considerable increase in the rate of subsidiary protection to 77%.
The policy change at the BAMF coincided with a legislative change in March 2016, according to which Freedom of movement was suspended for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection until March 2018. Family reunification is again possible for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection since August 2018, but limited to a monthly quota of 1,000 visas for relatives of this group. Tens of thousands of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have appealed against the authorities’ decisions to gain refugee status (‘upgrade-appeals’), however only ca. 10% of such appeals were successful in 2020. [6]
A further increase in such ‘upgrade appeals’ and in subsequent applications occurred in 2021 following a decision by the CJEU according to which there is a ‘strong presumption’ that refusal to perform military service in the context of the Syrian civil war relates to one of the reasons to be granted refugee status.[7]
Subsequent applications were deemed inadmissible in most cases, however (see also Subsequent applications).[8] The majority of Higher Administrative Courts continued to decide that refusal as such is not enough to be granted refugee protection, and that the risk of persecution has to based on an established reason for persecution (e. g. political reasons, not just punishment for avoiding military service) and has to be stablished in each individual cases.[9] This line of reasoning was confirmed by the Federal Administrative Court in January 2023.[10] In 2022, the number and share of subsequent applications by Syrian nationals decreased considerably, with 1,670 subsequent applications compared to 15,259 in 2021 (see also Subsequent applications). The number of ‘upgrade appeal’ cases and decisions continues to be high, however, likely as a result of long court procedures. Between January and the end of November 2022, courts decided on 5,397 such appeals, and in 754 cases (14%) granted asylum or refugee protection, while in 4,643 cases (86%) the appeal did not lead to an improvement in the protection status.[11] 9,458 such appeals of Syrian nationals were pending as of 30 November 2022, a similarly high number to the end of 2020.[12]
The removal ban for Syria that had been in place since 2012 expired at the end of December 2020. The ban was based on a common decision of the Federal States and the Federal government, but could not be renewed due to disagreement regarding the possibility to remove criminals and ‘persons posing a risk’ related to terrorist activities (‘Gefährder’).This was heavily criticised by NGOs and organisations such as the German Institute for Human Rights, UNHCR and Caritas.[13] The removal statistics for 2022 indicate that 707 removals of Syrian nationals took place. However, Syria is not listed as a country of destination for removals in 2022, meaning that the removals of Syrian nationals took place to other countries, for example to other EU Member States in the form of Dublin transfers or removals following a refusal of entry.[14] As of March 2022, the Federal Government declared that it currently sees no possibilities for removals to Syria and that no such removals were taking place.[15]
Afghanistan
Evacuation and admissions since the Taliban takeover in 2021
Germany has been operating an admission scheme for local staff of German ministries in Afghanistan since 2013. The scheme is based on Art. 22 (2) Residence Act (Temporary residence permission to uphold the political interest of the Federal Republic of Germany). The eligibility criteria depend on the status of the former employee. Only former staff (and their close family members) directly employed by German entities are covered by the programme.[16] The admission scheme for local staff will continue in parallel to the new humanitarian admission scheme announced on 17 October 2022 (see below).
With the takeover of the Taliban on 15 August 2021, the German government started an evacuation operation for German nationals in Afghanistan as well as Afghan nationals who had worked for German authorities, the military and ‘especially endangered persons’. Between 16 and 26 August 2021, a total of 5,300 persons were evacuated, out of which 4,400 Afghan nationals. The evacuated persons have entered Germany via an emergency visa (based on Section 14 and 22 Residence Act).[17] Upon arrival, the BAMF then examined whether persons had already been granted permission for an admission from abroad (Section 22 Residence Act). If this was not the case, and if the Federal Ministry decided no such permission could be granted, persons were informed of this and of the possibility to apply for asylum in Germany. [18] After the end of the evacuation, German authorities continued to receive and examine notifications of risk of former employees and of “especially endangered individuals” in exceptional circumstances. Sub-contractors and consultants who worked for German authorities only indirectly are considered on a case by case basis according to the Federal Government. [19] If the examination confirms that the persons are at risk due to their work for a German authority, admission permissions continue to be granted according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior.[20] Permissions are also included for close family members (spouses and minor siblings), other relatives are only considered in hardship cases.[21] Since travelling out of Afghanistan is difficult and costly, the Federal Government has provided 32 million Euros in funding to the GiZ (the German Development Agency) to support persons in leaving the country. Persons admitted to Germany mainly leave via Pakistan and Iran. [22] Germany has also concluded an agreement with the government of Pakistan to allow the concerned persons to enter Pakistan with a Tazkira K (ID card) instead of a passport as required by the Taliban to leave the country. However, in mid-September 2022 the Federal Government reported that a total of 34 former employees and family members are known to have died in Afghanistan.[23]
As of 17 October 2022, according to the Federal Government 38,100 persons had been issued a permission for admission to Germany (out of which 24,500 were former employees and eligible family members, and 13,600 were especially vulnerable persons and their eligible family members). Around 26,000 of these (68.2%) persons had entered Germany up until that time. As of 10 December 2021, a total of 28,053 permissions for admission from abroad had been issued to Afghan nationals and 8,014 persons had entered Germany as of the same date.[24]
On 17 October 2022, the Federal Government launched an additional federal admissions programme which had been announced in the coalition agreement of 2021.[25] The government describes the programme and procedure as follows: the programme is geared towards persons who ‘have exposed themselves to particular risk through their commitment to women’s and human rights or their work in the spheres of justice, politics, the media, education, culture, sport or academia and are thus vulnerable’ or ‘due to the special circumstances of their individual cases have experienced or are experiencing violence or persecution based on their gender, sexual orientation or gender identity or religion and are therefore at concrete and personal risk. In particular, these are victims of serious individual women’s rights violations, homo- or transphobic human rights violations or vulnerable representatives of religious groups/communities.’[26] The admission programme includes family members of those persons, which includes spouses or same sex partners, minor children and other family members who can prove a relation of dependency (beyond economic dependency) with the main person and find themselves in a situation of concrete and lasting danger due to the work or vulnerability of the main person.[27] The German government appoints agencies (including civil society organisations) who can put forward names of suitable persons, who must still be living in Afghanistan, via an IT application containing a questionnaire of a total of 41 pages.[28] The names of these organisations are not made public by the government, but according to a press report, PRO ASYL, Reporters without Borders, Mission Lifeline and Luftbrücke Kabul are taking part in the programme as of 20 December 2022.[29]
The Government then takes the admission decision based on selection criteria that include vulnerability (in line with the UNHCR catalogue of criteria), relation to Germany e. g. through language skills, family ties, previous stays or work for German authorities or projects, level of personal exposure of the person e. g. through a visible / exposed position or public statements, and a special political interest on the side of Germany to admit a person.[30] As with the previous admission programme, selected persons first receive assistance to leave Afghanistan and enter a neighbouring country and are then issued a visa and travel assistance by the German embassy in that country. Persons who enter Germany under the programme receive a residence permit for three years. The Federal State responsible for reception of the persons is to be determined according to the quota system for the distribution of asylum seekers (see Registration of the asylum application), although family ties and other ‘criteria supporting integration’ are to be taken into account.[31]
When announcing the programme, the Federal Government declared that ‘the new programme is now to be implemented quickly’ and that it planned to approve around 1,000 requests per month, which is about the amount of permissions granted in the months preceding the announcement. The programme is planned to run until the end of the current government’s term in 2025.[32] As of January 2023, no information was available as to the number of persons selected for admission or admitted. The first round of selection was reported to have taken place just before Christmas in 2022.[33] According to a press report, the NGOs Mission Lifeline and Luftbrücke Kabul alone have received around 32,000 requests as of early November 2022.[34]
The Left party and NGOs such as PRO ASYL welcomed the launch of the programme but criticised that 1,000 admissions per month was too low given the ‘real pressure of persecution’ for ‘people who have fought for democracy and human rights’. PRO ASYL further criticised that the relatively abstract selection criteria could lead to an ‘ethically highly ambivalent protection lottery’[35] especially in connection with the fact that only authorised agencies could put forward people and that the application is through an algorithm-based IT application with little room to put forward specific individual circumstances.[36] The NGO Kabul Luftbrücke reported problems with the IT application in October and November, leading to delays in sending the online forms to authorities. A further point of critique is that the programme does not extend to persons who have managed to flee Afghanistan.[37] Several NGOs also voiced concerns over the practical implementation, demanding a better staffing of the counselling and coordination centres for the programme and questioning the ‘organization and content’ of the procedure,[38] especially given that it is required to have a passport in order to leave the country while obtaining one is made extremely difficult by the Taliban government.
In addition to the Federal Government, several Federal States have announced plans for admission programmes based on family ties to Afghans living in the respective Federal States (for more information see Family reunification). Afghan nationals can also benefit from funding and admission programmes for students and scholars at risk; however, access to such programmes is difficult in practice, especially for persons who are still in Afghanistan.[39]
Asylum applications of Afghan nationals in Germany
In 2022, the protection rate for Afghan nationals more than doubled, from 42.9% in 2021 to 99.3% in 2022 (it was at 36.6% in 2020).[40] Most Afghan nationals were given humanitarian protection in the form of a national removal ban (78.7%) while 23.0% of applicants were given refugee status. As of mid-August 2021, the BAMF de-prioritised decisions on asylum applications from Afghanistan due to the uncertain situation in the country except for cases in which international protection can be granted according to the guidelines in place or where the situation in Afghanistan was irrelevant for the decision. The government further declared that decisions continued to be taken on an individual, case-by-case basis.[41] As a result, the number of pending applications by Afghan nationals rose considerably compared to 2020, to 27,846 at the end of 2021 (2020: 6,101).The BAMF resumed decisions concerning Afghan nationals in December 2021,[42] prioritising cases which involve several persons (as opposed to individual applications) and vulnerable applicants.[43] At the end of 2022, the number of pending cases was still high with 27,594 undecided cases (among which 24,959 first-time and 2,635 subsequent applications). 2022 also saw a high number of decisions on subsequent applications from Afghan nationals (10,900), which in most cases led to the granting of some form of protection (see Subsequent applications).
The already high success rate of appeals before Administrative Courts against negative decisions in the asylum procedure increased considerably in 2022. From the start of 2022 until the end of November 2022, 6,009 Afghan nationals were granted a form of protection by courts, compared to 331 rejections of appeals. In total, 40.6% of appeals were successful (the rate was 45.2% during the same period in 2021). If only decisions on the merits are counted, 94.8% of appeals resulted in the granting of protection (2021: 77.8%).[44] However, appeal statistics show large differences between courts. By way of example, the administrative court of Augsburg Würzburg (Bavaria) only had a 0.8% share of positive decisions for Afghan nationals among all decisions (including formal ones) until the end of November.[45] The success rate in both 2022 and 2021 is higher compared to previous years: in 2020, 39.1% of all court decisions ended in the granting of some form of protection. If only decisions on the merits are counted, 60% resulted in a form of protection. 7,564 appeals of Afghan nationals were pending at the court at the end of 2022, a considerable reduction from the end of 2020 (27,002).[46]
Removals
In principle, Germany has enacted removals of Afghan nationals with no legal right to stay since at least 2008.[47] From December 2016 onwards, following the conclusion of the ‘Joint Way Forward’ between the EU and Afghanistan, Germany started using charter flights for removals to Afghanistan.[48] With the outbreak of Covid-19, the Federal Ministry of the Interior stopped forced removals to Afghanistan on 27 March 2020, since the Afghan authorities refused to take back Afghan nationals in light of the pandemic.[49] Removals started again after the first wave however, with one charter flight departing from Germany on 16 December 2020.[50] In total, 137 persons were forcibly removed to Afghanistan in 2020;[51] and 167 were removed in 2021, with the last charter flight departing from Germany on 6 July 2021.[52] Since August 2021, Germany has halted removals to Afghanistan, and thus no removal to Afghanistan took place in 2022.[53] Persons without a protection status receive a toleration (Duldung).
Iran
Following the protests and violent repressions in Iran, several Federal States declared a removal ban for Iran in October 2022.[54] The Conference of Interior Ministers of the Federal States as well as the Federal level decided in December 2022 that no removals would take place to Iran, with exceptions for serious criminal offenders and persons posing a risk to security.[55]
The overall protection rate for asylum applications from Iranian nationals in was 44.9% in 2022. 39.1% were given refugee status, 4.1% subsidiary protection and 1.7% a removal ban based on national law; while 55.1% of all applications were rejected (see Statistics). The protection rate was 46.2% for decision taken between January and August of 2022, indicating that no significant increase can be detected after the outbreak of the protests.[56]
Russia
Asylum applications of Russian nationals increased in 2022, likely as a result of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing military conscriptions and political repression. In 2022, a total of 3,862 Russian nationals applied for asylum in Germany, among which 2,851 were first-time applicants. In comparison, 2021 saw 1,438 first-time applicants among a total of 2,314 applicants.[57] According to PRO ASYL, the number of applications has risen in the last months of 2022, likely as a result of the partial mobilisation in Russia in September 2022.[58] In December 2022, Russia was among the top 10 countries of origin of asylum applicants for that month, with a total of 529 first-time applications.[59] The protection rate (share of positive decisions when formal decisions are not considered) was 24.0% in 2022, up from 15.5% in 2021.[60]
According to NGO PRO ASYL, the main obstacle for Russian nationals seeking protection in Germany is the lack of legal escape routes, as no flights from Russia to Germany are available and as countries along the EU’s external border no longer allow Russian citizens to enter with Schengen visas.[61] Germany has only ‘granted humanitarian visas in a few exceptional cases of people who have made public appearances, such as critical journalists’ according to PRO ASYL, while ‘German embassies and consulates generally reject such applications’.[62] PRO ASYL reports that in some cases, German embassies in countries other than Russia accept long-term visa applications from Russian nationals (e. g. for work, study or family reunification) for persons ‘who would be unreasonably endangered if they were to return to the responsible mission in Russia to apply. This may be the case for human rights defenders, journalists, dissidents and conscientious objectors.’
Deserters of the Russian army – those who flee from active military service – can be granted refugee status as they are threatened with persecution on political grounds, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior,[63] while more restrictive criteria apply to conscientious objectors. According to established jurisprudence, refusal to enter military service is, as such, not a ground for granting asylum. Conscientious objectors can only be granted refugee status in cases where the punishment for refusal to perform military service is disproportionately high, if the refusal triggers political persecution, or ‘if the asylum seeker would have been obliged to participate in war crimes, crimes against peace or crimes against humanity during military service and refuses military service for this reason’.[64] The BAMF decides on these applications on an individual basis. As of 18 February 2023, there were only two known BAMF decisions on applications from Russian nationals fleeing military service. In one of them, the person was granted protection but based on political activities. The other case concerned a person over the age of 40 and without prior military training, and the BAMF assumed that it was not sufficiently likely he would be forced to participate in the war. The decision was criticised by civil society organisations, who argue that the Russian recruiting practice is broader and more unpredictable than what was assumed by the BAMF. [65]
With a decree issued on 20 June 2022, the Federal Ministry of the Interior granted special rights to Russian cultural and media workers who are critical of the regime to continue their work in Germany.[66] The government intends to use all possibilities under the residence law for this group of people, including using available discretion in granting residence permits or visas for the purpose of employment or self-employment. The decree also mentions that immigration authorities should issue residence permits directly without a preceding visa procedure for persons who are already in Germany in cases where a return to Russia would put applicants in danger.[67] For persons who do not fulfil the criteria for a residence title in Germany or for being granted international protection, PRO ASYL assumes that they should be issued a tolerated stay (Duldung) on the basis that removals to Russia are currently impossible.[68] A total of 46 persons were forcibly removed to Russia in 2022, out of which 40 were removed with deportation flights on 26 January and 17 February 2022, before the outbreak of the war.[69]
[1] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 18/9415, 17 August 2016, 23.
[2] Information provided by the BAMF, 23 January 2018.
[3] Information provided by the BAMF, 10 March 2022.
[4] FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency), ‘Migration: Key Fundamental Rights Concerns’, Quarterly Bulletin 1.7.2020 – 30.9.2020, 31, available at: https://bit.ly/3NuoiiC.
[5] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/30711, 15 June 2021, 3.
[6] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/28109, 30 March 2021, 42-44.
[7] CJEU, Case C‑238/19, Judgment of 19 November 2020.
[8] See also BAMF, Migrationsbericht 2020 der Bundesregierung, December 2021, 37, available in German at https://bit.ly/3nTDv1J
[9] Asyl.net, BVerwG hebt Urteile auf, in denen Wehrdienstentziehern aus Syrien Flüchtlingsschutz gewährt worden war, 23 January 2023, available in German at http://bit.ly/3Dw8c4H.
[10] Federal Administrative Court, Case 1 C 1.22, 19 January 2023.
[11] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 43.
[12] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 41, and 19/28109, 30 March 2021, 42.
[13] FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency), ‘Migration: Key Fundamental Rights Concerns’, Quarterly Bulletin 01.01.2021-30.06.2021, available at https://bit.ly/3qB3RHk.
[14] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5795, 24 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3nGxgRt, 7, 12, 14.
[15] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by the AfD, 20/1225, 25 march 2022, 12
[16] ECRE, Afghans Seeking Protection in Europe, December 2021, 11, available at https://bit.ly/3krGfED
[17] BAMF, ‘Aufnahme ehemaliger Ortskräfte und gefährdeter Personen aus Afghanistan’, 29 November 2021, available in German at https://bit.ly/3nv6sjZ.
[18] BAMF, Migrationsbericht 2020 der Bundesregierung, December 2021, 38, available in German at https://bit.ly/3nTDv1J.
[19] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/3430, 15 September 2022, 3.
[20] Federal Ministry of the interior, Reply to written question by Canan Bayram (The Greens), 20/5046, 81-21.
[21] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/3430, 15 September 2022, 11.
[22] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/3430, 15 September 2022, 2.
[23] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/3430, 15 September 2022, 16.
[24] Deutscher Bundestag, parliamentary question by The Left, 20/791, 22 February 2022, 1.
[25] AIDA, Country Report Germany – Update on the year 2021, April 2022, 11, available at https://bit.ly/3XnN7RS.
[26] Federal Foreign Office, Joint press release by the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community on the federal admission programme for people from Afghanistan who are at particular risk, 17 October 2022, available at http://bit.ly/3J47ZJA.
[27] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx.
[28] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[29] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[30] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx.
[31] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Federal Foreign Office, Anordnung des Bundesministeriums des Innern und für Heimat gemäß § 23 Absatz 2, Absatz 3 i. V. m. § 24 Aufenthaltsgesetz (AufenthG) zur Aufnahme von besonders gefährdeten afghanischen Staatsangehörigen aus Afghanistan, 19 December 2022, available in German at http://bit.ly/3GW7jmJ.
[32] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx
[33] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[34] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[35] Infomigrants, ‘Germany’s new admission program for Afghans suffers mixed reviews’ 19 October 2022, available at https://bit.ly/3GNuRKs.
[36] PRO ASYL, Bundesaufnahmeprogramm Afghanistan: Enttäuschung nach langem Warten, 21 October 2022, available in German at https://bit.ly/3GNA5WA
[37] Infomigrants, ‘Germany’s new admission program for Afghans suffers mixed reviews’ 19 October 2022, available at https://bit.ly/3GNuRKs.
[38] Infomigrants, Germany’s Afghan refugee program ‘extremely questionable,’ aid groups warn, 19 October 2022, available at https://bit.ly/3HjJCX9.
[39] For an overview of such existing programmes see Hammed Hakimi, Higher Education in Europe: A Pathway to Protection for Afghans?, ECRE Working Paper 17, November 2022, available at https://bit.ly/42igPuu.
[40] For more information about decision making in previous years, see AIDA, Country Report Germany – Update on the year 2021, April 2022, available at https://bit.ly/3XnN7RS, 91-92.
[41] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/32678, 14 October 2021, 18-19.
[42] See PRO ASYL, ‘Steigende Asylzahlen? Ein Blick hinter die Schlagzeilen‘, 14 January 2022, available in German at https://bit.ly/3GMuoqI.
[43] Federal Government, Response to written question by Clara Bünger (The Left), 20/765, 18.
[44] Federal Government, Responses to parliamentary questions by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 36.
[45] Federal Government, Responses to parliamentary questions by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 53.
[46] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 36, and 19/18498, 2 April 2020, 45.
[47] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 16/12568, 06 April 2009.
[48] EMN / BAMF, Migration, Integration, Asylum. Political Developments in Germany 2016, 62. Available at https://bit.ly/3WvSz44
[49] PRO ASYL, ‘Newsticker Coronavirus: Informationen für Geflüchtete und Unterstützer*innen‘, available in German at https://bit.ly/3n5bqEe.
[50] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/27007, 25 February 2021, 28
[51] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/27007, 25 February 2021, 3.
[52] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/890, 2 March 2022, 3, 47.
[53] Federal Ministry of the interior, Rückführungen nach Afghanistan zunächst ausgesetzt, 11 August 2022, available in German at http://bit.ly/3ZTXjDw and Federal Government, Responses to parliamentary questions by The Left, 20/5795, 24 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3nGxgRt, 2.
[54] Asyl.net, Mehrere Bundesländer setzen Abschiebungen in den Iran aus, 12 October 2022, available in German at http://bit.ly/3jo9PdK.
[55] Tagesschau.de, Vorerst keine Abschiebungen in den Iran, 2 December 2022, available in German at http://bit.ly/3kXPNr2.
[56] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/4019, 12 October 2022, 3.
[57] Asylgeschäftsstatistik (01-12/22), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3lCA29E.
[58] PRO ASYL, Bundesamt für Migration lehnt Asyl für russischen Verweigerer ab, 18 February 2023, available in German at https://bit.ly/3Jp9d0z.
[59] BAMF, Aktuelle Zahlen (12/2022), 9, available in German at https://bit.ly/3yK56qT.
[60] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik (01-12/22), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3lCA29E and Asylgeschäftsstatistik (01-12/21), available in German at https://bit.ly/3fvkrSI.
[61] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[62] Ibidem.
[63] Federal Ministry of the Interior, Beantwortung von offenen Fragen zu Top 1 („Bericht des Bundesministeriums des Innern und für Heimat über die aktuelle Lage im Ukraine-Konflikt sowie die damit verbundenen innenpolitischen Auswirkungen“) der Sitzung des Ausschusses für Inneres und Heimat vom 11. Mai 2022, available in German at https://bit.ly/3Lwoe3q, 3.
[64] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[65] PRO ASYL, Bundesamt für Migration lehnt Asyl für russischen Verweigerer ab, 18 February 2023, available in German at https://bit.ly/3Jp9d0z.
[66] Federal Ministry of the Interior, Beschäftigung von regimekritischen Kultur- und Medienschaffenden aus der Russischen Föderation in Deutschland; Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Interesse im Sinne von § 19c Absatz 3 AufenthG, 20 June 2022, available in German at https://bit.ly/3LsAAt9.
[67] Federal Ministry of the Interior, Beschäftigung von regimekritischen Kultur- und Medienschaffenden aus der Russischen Föderation in Deutschland; Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Interesse im Sinne von § 19c Absatz 3 AufenthG, 20 June 2022, available in German at https://bit.ly/3LsAAt9.
[68] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[69] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5795, 24 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3nGxgRt, 4; 40-41.