Since 2017, in principle and according to the internal instructions, a prioritised or accelerated procedure can occur in certain circumstances or for certain countries of origin. Here, the branch offices of the BAMF and the arrival centres decide independently whether they set any priority in dealing with caseloads, in particular dependent on availability of staff members with the necessary country expertise and availability of interpreters. This also applied during the outbreak of Covid-19. However, during the first wave and when in-person applications and hearing were suspended, BAMF branch offices focused on deciding cases which had been pending for a longer time and where the interview had already taken place.[1] Furthermore, according to the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, when interviews resumed the BAMF did not prioritise vulnerable applicants.[2] This information was not confirmed by the BAMF.
In 2023, the debate on prioritisation of applicants was reopened. In October 2023, the Conference of Federal State Prime Ministers demanded that the Federal government reduce the length of the application process for asylum applicants from countries of origins with low recognition rates to three months. According to their plans, the BAMF should then prioritise these applications to ensure that they are dealt with within the shortened time frame.[3] While the Federal government generally agrees to the importance of short proceedings, it has not included the idea of making the length of the procedure dependent on the countries of origin in its most recent legislative package on facilitated return from October 2023.[4] As of February 2025, the law only prescribes a differential treatment of those nationals which are from safe countries of origin,[5] other accelerated procedures based on nationality are dependent on regional specifications and practices of the BAMF branch offices.
However, according to PRO ASYL the German Federal Ministry of the Interior planned in fall of 2024 to implement significant tightening of asylum laws under the guise of adopting the Common European Asylum System (GEAS). These plans include an expansion of the list of “safe countries of origin” and “safe third countries.” According to the report, the ministry intends to utilize optional provisions within the EU regulations to enforce particularly restrictive measures in Germany until 2026. This approach could lead to increased limitations on the freedom of movement and detention of asylum seekers, including children. PRO ASYL criticises this strategy, arguing that it fails to use the available human rights scope to protect refugees and instead further restricts their rights.[6]
In 2024, the average duration of procedures was 8.7 months.[7] During the first six months those procedures that resulted in the rejection of an asylum application as “manifestly unfounded” were completed faster, averaging 6.2 months:[8] The following numbers are valid for the period January to December 2024:
- Albania: 2.4 months
- North Macedonia: 3.2 months
- 2.2 months
- Kosovo: 1.2 months
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2.2 months
- Serbia: 2.0 months
- Georgia: 4.8 months
- Moldova 1.3 months
Procedures for the accelerated processing of asylum applications from countries with a low recognition rate – under 5% – were completed significantly more quickly in the first half of 2024.[9] These accelerated procedures have been applied since December 2023 for asylum seekers from Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkan states, and since March 2024, they also apply to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The Federal Office aims to complete the accelerated procedures within three weeks. According to a response from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, this was achieved in 72 percent of cases for asylum seekers from Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkan states, and in 58 percent of cases for asylum seekers from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.[10]
Syria
Since a policy change in the first months of 2016, the BAMF has granted subsidiary protection instead of refugee protection in a high number of cases. This policy change affected Syrian nationals in particular, but also asylum applicants from Iraq or Eritrea. For instance, whereas 99.5% of Syrians had been granted refugee status in 2015, this rate dropped to 56.4% in 2016 and to 35% in 2017. In 2024, there were 79,433 asylum applications from Syrian nationals in Germany. By December 2024, the BAMF had made 43,808 decisions regarding Syrian nationals. 10,961 individuals were granted asylum or refugee status under Article 16a of the Basic Law (GG) and § 3 I of the Asylum Act (AsylG). A total of 70,431 individuals were granted subsidiary protection, while 341 received a deportation ban. Only 27 applications were rejected, and 15,937 cases were resolved under other procedures (e.g., when procedures are consolidated for multiple family members, when a lawsuit is not pursued further, or when a protection status is granted in agreement with the BAMF).[11] As of December 2024, 47,500 first time cases and 1,256 subsequent applications were still pending.[12] The 2024 numbers indicate a continued reliance on subsidiary protection as the dominant form of legal status granted to Syrians in Germany, with a relatively smaller proportion receiving refugee status and an even smaller proportion benefiting from a ban on deportation.
Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) announced a temporary suspension in the processing of asylum applications from Syrians,[13] affecting 47,270 applications according to media reports.[14] According to domestic German law, a residence permit can be revoked ((§ 51 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 AufenthG) or withdrawn (§ 51 Abs. 1 Nr. 4 AufenthG) by the immigration authority under certain legal provisions. Withdrawal applies when the permit was granted unlawfully from the outset, meaning the eligibility requirements were never met (false statements or forged documents). Revocation pertains to situations where the permit was originally issued lawfully. However, it can only occur if one of the specific grounds for revocation is met. In both cases, the authority must exercise discretion, considering individual circumstances such as the length of stay, integration efforts, and conditions in the home country, rather than making a blanket decision.[15] In this regard, it is important to distinguish between the revocation or withdrawal of a residence permit and that of protection status, which falls under the responsibility of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. A change in protection status may, however, lead the immigration authority to revoke a residence permit.[16]
For individuals from Syria living in Germany, residence permits are generally issued for a limited period. Until 2023, these permits were subject to routine reassessment upon expiration.[17] However, this review now only takes place under specific circumstances, such as when an application for permanent residence is submitted or if the BAMF becomes aware of new information that could justify revocation. In such cases, the BAMF must determine whether to initiate revocation proceedings concerning the protection status.
The shift away from automatic reassessments coincided with stricter requirements for obtaining permanent residence. When an application for permanent residency is submitted, the BAMF must evaluate whether the security situation in Syria has changed to the extent that protection is no longer necessary. As of December 2024, due to the conditions in Syria, it appeared unlikely that such assessments would lead to revocation, as the BAMF has indicated that the ongoing instability in Syria does not allow for a reliable evaluation of the situation necessary to justify a withdrawal of protection status.[18]
The policy change at the BAMF from refugee to subsidiary protection status coincided with a legislative change in March 2016, according to which Family Reunification was suspended for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection until March 2018. Family reunification is again possible for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection since August 2018 but limited to a monthly quota of 1,000 visas for relatives of this group.[19]
As of 2024, of the approximately one million Syrians living in Germany, around 669,000 have a temporary residence permit. These individuals must regularly renew their residence permits: refugees under the Geneva Refugee Convention every three years, individuals with subsidiary protection either annually or every three years, and those with a deportation ban annually.[20] Around one-third of Syrians with some form of protection in Germany hold subsidiary protection. As of 2024, this protection was primarily granted due to the risks of torture or inhuman treatment, rather than the ongoing armed conflict in Syria.[21] In the first quarter of 2024, only 39 Syrians received subsidiary protection under the “armed conflict” clause (§ 4 I No. 3 AsylG), a sharp decline compared to previous years. In contrast, 93% of decisions were based on the threat of torture or inhuman treatment under § 4 I No. 2 AsylG. Just 0.1% of Syrians received protection based on the “internal armed conflict” clause in the first quarter of 2024.[22]
Subsequent applications: In 2023 and 2022, the number and share of subsequent applications by Syrian nationals decreased considerably, with 1,670 in 2022 and 1,631 in 2023 subsequent applications compared to 15,259 in 2021 (see also Subsequent applications). The number of ‘upgrade appeal’ cases and decisions remained high, however, likely as a result of long court procedures. Between January and the end of May 2023, courts decided on 5,736 such appeals, and in 806 cases (14%) granted asylum or refugee protection, while in 4,930 cases (86%) the appeal did not lead to an improvement in the protection status.[23] 9,525 such appeals of Syrian nationals were pending as of 31 May 2023, a similarly high number to the end of 2022 (9,458).[24]
Removals: The removal ban for Syria that had been in place since 2012 expired at the end of December 2020. The ban was based on a common decision of the Federal States and the Federal government, but could not be renewed due to disagreement regarding the possibility to remove criminals and ‘persons posing a risk’ related to terrorist activities (‘Gefährder’).This was heavily criticised by NGOs and organisations such as the German Institute for Human Rights, UNHCR and Caritas.[25] The removal statistics for the first half of 2023 indicate that 410 removals of Syrian nationals took place.[26] However, Syria is not listed as a country of destination for removals in the first half of 2023, meaning that the removals of Syrian nationals took place to other countries, for example to other EU Member States in the form of Dublin transfers or removals following a refusal of entry.[27] As of February 2023, the Federal Government declared that it currently sees no possibilities for removals to Syria.[28] The same remains true for 2024 – even though the government announced in December 2024 that the situation in Syria will be re-evaluated following the Islamist HTS militia taking over power.[29] There have been no deportations to Syria since 2012. The German government had no relationship with the now overthrown regime of President Bashar Al-Assad.[30] In addition, numerous international reports on the security situation in the country have confirmed that – although there was no longer any fighting in parts of the country – the living situation and human rights situation remained catastrophic.[31]
During the Syrian civil war, support for voluntary returnees to Syria was not possible via the German national return programme REAG/GARP941. However, this has now changed. Syrians who wish to return permanently to Syria and who do not have the financial means to do so can now receive financial and organisational support via the programme. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) has reinstated Syria in the federal-state programme REAG/GARP 2.0 for supporting voluntary returns as of January 13, 2025. The programme offers support for travel expenses, a travel allowance, financial startup assistance, and, if necessary, medical costs. The level of financial support is consistent with that provided for individuals from other countries of origin.[32]
Nevertheless, the German federal states organise voluntary returns to Syria by their own programmes. Since 2017, BAMF can reimburse the federal states for some of the costs related to voluntary returns, analogous to REAG/GARP. This procedure is still possible as an additional possibility to organise voluntary returns to Syria.[33]
Afghanistan
Emergency evacuation since the Taliban takeover in 2021
See AIDA Country Report on Germany – 2023 Update.
Admission schemes
Germany has been operating an admission scheme for local staff of German ministries in Afghanistan since 2013. The scheme is based on Art. 22 (2) Residence Act (Temporary residence permission to uphold the political interest of the Federal Republic of Germany). The eligibility criteria depend on the status of the former employee. Only former staff (and their close family members) directly employed by German entities are covered by the programme.[34]
From the takeover of the Taliban in 2021 to 17 October 2022, according to the Federal Government, 38,100 persons had been issued a permission for admission to Germany (out of which 24,500 were former employees and eligible family members, and 13,600 were especially vulnerable persons and their eligible family members). Around 26,000 of these (68.2%) persons had entered Germany up until that time. As of 10 December 2021, a total of 28,053 permissions for admission from abroad had been issued to Afghan nationals and 8,014 persons had entered Germany as of the same date.[35] The admission scheme for local staff continues in parallel to the new humanitarian admission scheme announced on 17 October 2022.
On 17 October 2022, the Federal Government launched an additional federal admissions programme which had been announced in the coalition agreement of 2021.[36] The government describes the programme and procedure as follows: the programme is geared towards persons who ‘have exposed themselves to particular risk through their commitment to women’s and human rights or their work in the spheres of justice, politics, the media, education, culture, sport or academia and are thus vulnerable’ or ‘due to the special circumstances of their individual cases have experienced or are experiencing violence or persecution based on their gender, sexual orientation or gender identity or religion and are therefore at concrete and personal risk. In particular, these are victims of serious individual women’s rights violations, homo- or transphobic human rights violations or vulnerable representatives of religious groups/communities.’[37] The admission programme includes family members of those persons, which includes spouses or same sex partners, minor children and other family members who can prove a relation of dependency (beyond economic dependency) with the main person and find themselves in a situation of concrete and lasting danger due to the work or vulnerability of the main person.[38] The German government appoints agencies (including civil society organisations) who can put forward names of suitable persons, who must still be living in Afghanistan, via an IT application containing a questionnaire of a total of 41 pages.[39] The names of these organisations are not made public by the government, but according to a press report, PRO ASYL, Reporters without Borders, Mission Lifeline and Luftbrücke Kabul are taking part in the programme as of 20 December 2022.[40]
The Government then takes the admission decision based on selection criteria that include vulnerability (in line with the UNHCR catalogue of criteria), relation to Germany e. g. through language skills, family ties, previous stays or work for German authorities or projects, level of personal exposure of the person e. g. through a visible / exposed position or public statements, and a special political interest on the side of Germany to admit a person.[41] The visa procedure for Afghans only takes place in Pakistan.
There is no guarantee that a visa will be issued. All admissions are subject to a complete and successful visa procedure.[42] Persons who enter Germany under the programme receive a residence permit for three years. The Federal State responsible for reception of the persons is to be determined according to the quota system for the distribution of asylum seekers (see Registration of the asylum application), although family ties and other ‘criteria supporting integration’ are to be taken into account.[43]
When announcing the programme, the Federal Government declared that ‘the new programme is now to be implemented quickly’ and that it planned to approve around 1,000 requests per month, which is about the amount of permissions granted in the months preceding the announcement. The programme is planned to run until the end of the current government’s term in 2025.[44] As of 30 June 2023, 229 persons have been selected for admission.[45] As of October 2023, only 13 of them had been admitted, due to the pause of the admission procedure (see below).[46] According to a press report, the NGOs Mission Lifeline and Luftbrücke Kabul alone have received around 32,000 requests as of early November 2022.[47]
As of July 2024, a total of 3,071 individuals have received admission commitments, including 915 principal applicants and 2,156 family members. However, only 540 people have entered Germany—well short of the target of 21,000 admissions.[48] The International Rescue Committee explains that the program faces severe delays due to its complex and bureaucratic structure. According to the IRC, the lack of sufficient resources for key actors has caused avoidable backlogs, with the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and the German embassy’s visa section in Pakistan emerging as major bottlenecks.[49] The BAMF, in contrast, states that it was rather the “poor quality of cases suggested to the Government” holding up the process.[50]
In March 2023, the Federal Foreign office declared that all admission programs would be put to a halt for an indefinite time due to alleged abuse. The German newspaper Cicer and Bild published that, according to information they received, the admission programs had been used to bring radical Islamists to Germany.[51] In April 2023, the Federal government rebutted these allegations. A speaker of the Foreigner’s Office declared that there were no evidence supporting a systemic misuse of the admission programs.[52] Only in one case a person who applied for admission has been identified as a possible ‘threat’ (‘Gefährder’). Nevertheless, the Foreigners Office along with the Minister of Interior decided to introduce additional screening mechanisms and to halt the admission program until the screening mechanism is in place.[53] The admission programs were restarted from 26 June 2023.
In the first months of the newly introduced screening procedure (26 June – 21 July 2023) 99 screening interviews took place, no security concerns have been identified among those.[54] The Federal government further states, that the capacities for the screening mechanism have been expanded since its start. Accordingly, as of August 2023 several hundreds of screenings can be conducted per month.[55] In July 2024, reports showed that several Afghans who had previously been granted resettlement to Germany, saw their approvals abruptly withdrawn without clear explanations.[56] The German government cited new security interviews, introduced after the initial approvals, as grounds for the reversals. Since mid-2023, German police and intelligence agencies conduct these lengthy interviews at the Islamabad embassy, where applicants face months-long waits only to be rejected, though the Interior Ministry does not track how many have been denied.[57] Investigations by Panorama revealed that these screenings include intrusive and controversial questions, such as opinions on the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine and hypothetical personal scenarios unrelated to security. The Interior Ministry justifies the interviews as confidential security measures. Hans-Hermann Dube, an expert on Afghanistan policy, asserts that these rejections reflect a political shift to limit resettlement rather than genuine security concerns.[58] The BAMF rebuts these allegations.[59]
The Left party and NGOs such as PRO ASYL welcomed the launch of the programme but criticised that 1,000 admissions per month was too low given the ‘real pressure of persecution’ for ‘people who have fought for democracy and human rights’. PRO ASYL further criticised that the relatively abstract selection criteria could lead to an ‘ethically highly ambivalent protection lottery’[60] especially in connection with the fact that only authorised agencies could put forward people.[61] The NGO Kabul Luftbrücke reported problems with the IT application in October and November, leading to delays in sending the online forms to authorities. A further point of critique is that the programme does not extend to persons who have managed to flee Afghanistan.[62] Several NGOs also voiced concerns over the practical implementation, demanding a better staffing of the counselling and coordination centres for the programme and questioning the ‘organization and content’ of the procedure,[63] especially given that it is required to have a passport in order to leave the country while obtaining one is made extremely difficult by the Taliban government. One year after the official launch, in October 2023, several NGOs reflected on the development of the program. They demanded that the originally envisaged number of 1,000 admissions per months should be fulfilled, that the procedure should be more transparent and that in additional admission schemes are necessary to meet the needs for protection.[64] Humanitarian organizations criticise the German government’s decision to suspend new admissions for people from Afghanistan mid-July 2024.[65] According to the government, this suspension will remain in place until the end of the legislative term, since further funding of the programme was questionable. NGOs warn that the program is likely to be terminated entirely following the upcoming elections in February 2025, leaving vulnerable Afghans without crucial pathways to protection.[66]
In addition to the Federal Government, several Federal States (Thuringia, Berlin, Hessen and Bremen) have implemented admission programmes based on family ties to Afghans living in the respective Federal States (for more information see Family Reunification). However, the programs in Thuringia and Bremen expired in December 2023 and end of January 2024.[67] Afghan nationals can also benefit from funding and admission programmes for students and scholars at risk; however, access to such programmes is difficult in practice, especially for persons who are still in Afghanistan.[68]
Asylum applications of Afghan nationals in Germany
In 2024, asylum applications from Afghan nationals in Germany totalled 36,156, while the number of decisions reached 42,999, reflecting a reduction in the backlog, as more decisions were issued than new applications received.[69] Of these decisions, 36,135 resulted in protection status. A total of 2,321 applications were rejected, while 8,545 cases were closed through other procedures (sonstige Verfahrenserledigungen). At the end of 2024, 38,940 cases were still pending (36,553 first-time applications and 1,387 subsequent applications).[70]
The protection rate for Afghan nationals in 2024, excluding formal procedural closures, was approximately 93.9% (36,135 grants out of 38,456 substantive decisions). This marks a decline from previous years, though it remains exceptionally high, reflecting the continuing recognition of extreme risks under Taliban rule. In 2023, the protection rate for Afghan nationals stayed at a high of 98.7% compared to 99.3 % in 2022.[71] Prior to the takeover of Taliban it more than doubled. It was 42.9% in 2021 and 36.6% in 2020.[72] Most Afghan nationals were given either humanitarian protection in the form of a national removal ban (50.3%) or 43.8% of applicants were given refugee status.
In 2024, a total of 36,135 Afghan nationals received protection status in Germany through various legal grounds. Among them, 538 individuals were granted protection under Article 16a of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), i.e. constitutional asylum (see National forms of protection). The largest share, 13,891 applicants, obtained refugee status under §3 of the Asylum Act (Asylgesetz). Additionally, 775 individuals received subsidiary protection (§4 AsylG), which is granted when a person faces a real risk of serious harm, such as torture or inhumane treatment, but does not qualify for refugee status. Furthermore, 16,931 applicants were granted national removal bans (Abschiebungsverbote) under §60(5) or (7) of the Residence Act (AufenthG), which prevent deportation due to substantial threats to life, safety, or health in Afghanistan.[73]
As of mid-August 2021, the BAMF de-prioritised decisions on asylum applications from Afghanistan due to the uncertain situation in the country except for cases in which international protection can be granted according to the guidelines in place or where the situation in Afghanistan was irrelevant for the decision. The government further declared that decisions continued to be taken on an individual, case-by-case basis.[74] As a result, the number of pending applications by Afghan nationals rose considerably compared to 2020, to 27,846 at the end of 2021 (2020: 6,101).The BAMF resumed decisions concerning Afghan nationals in December 2021,[75] prioritising cases which involve several persons (as opposed to individual applications) and vulnerable applicants.[76] At the end of 2024, the number of pending asylum cases for Afghan nationals in Germany stood at 38,940, comprising 36,553 first-time applications and 1,387 subsequent applications.[77] This reflects a slight reduction compared to the end of 2023, when there were 39,000 pending cases (37,566 first-time and 1,434 subsequent applications).[78] The backlog decreased primarily due to a high number of decisions issued in 2024, outpacing the number of new applications received (see Subsequent applications).
The already high success rate of appeals before Administrative Courts against negative decisions in the asylum procedure increased considerably in 2023. For Afghans, the adjusted success rate in legal proceedings in 2023 was as high as 74.2 percent[79] (2022: 94.8%, 2021: 77.8%).[80] Most of the cases were not decided on the merits but resolved in other ways such as completion (71.6%). In the first half of 2023, the appeal statistics show large differences between courts. Whereas the administrative court Greifswald (Mecklenburg – Western Pomerania) has a positive decision rate of 6.5%, the administrative court of Augsburg (Bavaria) has 0% positive decisions.[81] 20,496 appeals of Afghan nationals were pending at the court as of 31 May 2023. A considerable increase compared to the number of appeals in 2022 (7,546).[82] Between January 1st and September 30th, 2024, there were 13 asylum decisions made following judicial reviews in Germany for individuals from Afghanistan, all of which resulted in the granting of subsidiary protection.[83]
According to a response of the parliament of December 2024, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) has given particular attention to the evolving situation of Afghan women and girls in the country of origin. Since the Taliban’s rise to power, the situation for these groups has been continuously worsening, according to the BAMF’s assessments. This development has been reflected in the ongoing review and updates of the Herkunftsländerleitlinien (Country of Origin Information Guidelines – HKL-LS), which inform asylum decision-making in Germany. The updated guidelines now acknowledge that Afghan women and girls are generally at high risk of persecution, and as a result, they typically meet the criteria for either refugee status or subsidiary protection under German asylum law.[84]
Removals
In principle, Germany has enacted removals of Afghan nationals with no legal right to stay since at least 2008.[85] From December 2016 onwards, following the conclusion of the ‘Joint Way Forward’ between the EU and Afghanistan, Germany started using charter flights for removals to Afghanistan.[86] With the outbreak of Covid-19, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community stopped forced removals to Afghanistan on 27 March 2020, since the Afghan authorities refused to take back Afghan nationals in light of the pandemic.[87] Removals started again after the first wave however, with one charter flight departing from Germany on 16 December 2020.[88] In total, 137 persons were forcibly removed to Afghanistan in 2020;[89] and 167 were removed in 2021, with the last charter flight departing from Germany on 6 July 2021.[90] Since August 2021, Germany has halted removals to Afghanistan. [91] In the first half of 2023, 659 Afghan nationals were removed from Germany but no removal to Afghanistan took place in 2023.[92] However, [93]Persons without a protection status regularly receive a toleration status (Duldung).
Iran
Following the protests and violent repressions in Iran, several Federal States declared a removal ban for Iran in October 2022.[94] The Conference of Interior Ministers of the Federal States as well as the Federal level decided in December 2022 that no removals would take place to Iran, with exceptions for serious criminal offenders and persons posing a risk to security.[95] The nationwide removal ban was originally prolonged in summer 2023 but was lifted from 1st January 2024 onwards.[96]
In 2024, asylum applications from Iranian nationals in Germany remained significant, with a total of 5,817 applications. The BAMF issued 7,914 decisions on Iranian asylum cases, resulting in 2,249 grants of protection status, 3,880 rejections, and 1,785 cases resolved through other means (anderweitige Erledigungen). Excluding formal decisions, the protection rate, i.e. the share of positive outcomes among substantive decisions, stood at approximately 36.7% (2,249 grants out of 6,129 substantive decisions).[97] This represents a sharp decline from 2023, when the overall protection rate for Iranian nationals was 45.5%, with 37.8% receiving refugee status, 3.3% subsidiary protection, and 1.6% a removal ban based on national law, while 54.5% of applications were rejected.[98] The 2024 protection rate dropped by 8.8 percentage points.
Russia
In 2024, asylum applications from Russian nationals in Germany remained significant, with a total of 5,625 applications, reflecting a continued impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, military conscriptions, and political repression. The BAMF issued 8,003 decisions on Russian cases during the year, of which 415 resulted in protection grants and 3,652 in rejections, while 3,936 cases were resolved through other means. Excluding formal decisions, the protection rate (the share of positive outcomes among substantive decisions) stood at approximately 10.2% (415 grants out of 4,067 substantive decisions). As of December 2024, 4,598 applications were still pending (3,915 first-time and 683 subsequent applications).[99]
Compared to previous years, the 2024 protection rate reflects a sharp decline from 29.0% in 2023,[100] which itself had risen from 24.0% in 2022 and 15.5% in 2021.[101] Additionally, the number of Russian asylum applications dropped from 9,028 in 2023 – of which 7,663 were first-time applications[102] – and from the peak observed immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
According to NGO PRO ASYL, the main obstacle for Russian nationals seeking protection in Germany is the lack of legal escape routes, as no flights from Russia to Germany are available and as countries along the EU’s external border no longer allow Russian citizens to enter with Schengen visas.[103] Germany has only ‘granted humanitarian visas in a few exceptional cases of people who have made public appearances, such as critical journalists’ according to PRO ASYL, while ‘German embassies and consulates generally reject such applications’.[104] PRO ASYL reports that in some cases, German embassies in countries other than Russia accept long-term visa applications from Russian nationals (e.g., for work, study or family reunification) for persons ‘who would be unreasonably endangered if they were to return to the responsible mission in Russia to apply. This may be the case for human rights defenders, journalists, dissidents and conscientious objectors.’
Deserters of the Russian army – those who flee from active military service – can be granted refugee status as they are threatened with persecution on political grounds, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community,[105] while more restrictive criteria apply to conscientious objectors. According to established jurisprudence, refusal to enter military service is, as such, not a ground for granting asylum. Conscientious objectors can only be granted refugee status in cases where the punishment for refusal to perform military service is disproportionately high, if the refusal triggers political persecution, or ‘if the asylum seeker would have been obliged to participate in war crimes, crimes against peace or crimes against humanity during military service and refuses military service for this reason’.[106] The BAMF decides on these applications on an individual basis. As of 18 February 2023, there were only two known BAMF decisions on applications from Russian nationals fleeing military service. In one of them, the person was granted protection but based on political activities. The other case concerned a person over the age of 40 and without prior military training, and the BAMF assumed that it was not sufficiently likely he would be forced to participate in the war. The decision was criticised by civil society organisations, who argue that the Russian recruiting practice is broader and more unpredictable than what was assumed by the BAMF.[107]
In 2024, the practice of denying protection to Russians fleeing military service continued according to NGOs that speak of more than a dozen of denials.[108] According to research by the Connection association, numerous asylum decisions contain text modules with a calculation that the statistical risk of conscription is “less than two or less than six percent” in view of the millions of reservists.[109] According to the BAMF, this is too low to grant asylum.[110] In the nearly three years since Russia invaded Ukraine, Russian men of conscription age have rarely received asylum in Germany. A formal reason is that Russians cannot enter Germany without a visa and must pass through other EU countries, which become responsible for their asylum claims under the Dublin III Regulation. As a result, more than half of all decisions since February 24, 2022, were classified as “other closures” (e.g., transfers or withdrawals).[111] When excluding these procedural closures, the protection rate was 16%. However, Germany’s decision-making practice has become significantly stricter recently: until mid-2023, 37% of Russian men of conscription age received protection, whereas from September 2023 to September 2024, only 11% were granted protection. During this second period, more asylum claims received substantive decisions than before, meaning the absolute number of rejections was also much higher than in the period up to mid-2023.[112]
According to Pro Asyl, the low recognition rate by the BAMF partly stems from outdated country of origin information on the prosecution of deserters and those who object to military service.[113] The BAMF rejects this view and states that available reports on military service have been revised in autumn 2023 and are regularly updated. Recent rulings of 2024 and 2025 on the matter do not offer full clarity either. There is diverging jurisprudence regarding asylum claims of Russian conscientious objectors, as reflected in the conflicting rulings of the Administrative Court Berlin and the Higher Administrative Court (OVG) Berlin-Brandenburg. While the Administrative Court granted the applicants, Russian men of conscription age, subsidiary protection status in early 2025,[114] the OVG reached the opposite conclusion in two decisions dated August 22, 2024.[115] The OVG argued that young, inexperienced men, including those of Chechen ethnicity, were not at risk of forced recruitment into so-called volunteer battalions outside regular conscription. Additionally, the OVG found no risk of serious harm from performing mandatory military service in the Russian Federation or from sanctions related to draft evasion. By contrast, the Administrative Court, relying on the latest available evidence of January 2025, determined that the applicants faced a high likelihood of being conscripted upon return and deployed in Russia’s unlawful war of aggression against Ukraine.[116] The court emphasised the risk that conscripts could be coerced into signing contracts with the Russian armed forces and subsequently sent to the frontlines or subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment near the Russian-Ukrainian border (e.g., Kursk region). The stark divergence between these rulings highlights the ongoing legal controversy over the risks faced by Russian conscientious objectors in the context of the war in Ukraine.
With a decree issued on 20 June 2022, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community granted special rights to Russian cultural and media workers who are critical of the regime to continue their work in Germany.[117] The government intends to use all possibilities under the residence law for this group of people, including using available discretion in granting residence permits or visas for the purpose of employment or self-employment. The decree also mentions that immigration authorities should issue residence permits directly without a preceding visa procedure for persons who are already in Germany in cases where a return to Russia would put applicants in danger.[118] For persons who do not fulfil the criteria for a residence title in Germany or for being granted international protection, PRO ASYL assumes that they should be issued a tolerated stay (Duldung) on the basis that removals to Russia are currently impossible.[119] Despite the decree in 2022 to grant special rights to Russian cultural and media workers, Russian journalists who fled to Germany report that they often only received tolerated stay (Duldung), which forces them to stay in Germany without possibilities to secure their livelihood and to continue their work as journalists.[120]
Since the beginning of the war against Ukraine, deportations to Russia have only been carried out in serious individual cases, via third countries such as Georgia or Serbia.[121] In the first half of 2023 no person was removed to Russia and no person with Russian nationality was removed involuntarily from Germany.[122] According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 66 people were deported back to Russia in 2024.[123]
Palestinian territories
The attack by the Hamas on Israel on the 7 October 2023 and the following escalating conflict has led to political discussions and rifts in the public perception. Following the attack, chancellor Scholz declared the security of Israel as a reason of state for Germany. He claimed that Germany’s place is on the side of Israel and that Germany stands in full solidarity and supports Israel.[124] The German government continues to position itself in favour for Israel, e.g., by its abstention to the UN resolution and its rejection of an EU resolution on ceasefire. Only very wary and situational criticism to the Israelian government and its reaction to the attack by the German government have been voiced by the German government. At a press conference of the Foreigners Office on 9 October 2023, the speaker of the Foreigners Office mentioned that in the past the German government has voiced criticism to the Israelian handling of the middle-east conflict and generally envisages a two-state solution but that at the current moment the focus should be the support of Israel’s defence.[125] Since then, the Minister of Foreign Affairs increasingly criticised specific actions of the Israelian government, e.g., calling for humanitarian corridors and support, demanding the protection of civil society and the adherence to International Humanitarian Law.[126] Nevertheless, the German government has announced to support Israel in the case pending before the International Criminal Court.[127] The public perception is rifted. In the aftermaths of the attack, an increase in antisemitic attacks has been reported and at some pro-Palestinian demonstrations, and Hamas’ attacks have been celebrated. At the same time, it has been reported that pro-Palestinian demonstrations have been prohibited per se without any distinction to the cause they were protesting for, which amounted to a violation of the equal freedom of assembly. Additionally, the police has been criticised for its brutal reactions against pro-Palestinian demonstrations being in parts racially motivated.[128] Some associations like Jews and Palestinians for Peace and Combatants for Peace try to lead the public debate back to the facts and a constructive exchange in providing information and workshops for schools and other associations.[129]
What impact the situation in the Palestinian territories and the political climate here in Germany have on Palestinian refugees in Germany is currently difficult to evaluate. The number of asylum applicants in 2023 from Palestinian territories – 743 – is a significant increase compared to 35 in 2022.[130] In 2024, the numbers likewise stood significantly higher than in 2022 at 634 applications. In 2024, 634 asylum applications were lodged by persons from Palestinian territories;[131] the protection rate for individuals from the Palestinian territories in Germany, based on decisions by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), was approximately 82%.[132] Out of a total of 478 decisions, 127 people received protection, 28 applications were denied after examination of the substance. The remaining cases likely fall under categories such as “other closures” (e.g., withdrawals, Dublin transfers, or administrative terminations). This could be a result of the escalating conflict.
In its response to a parliamentary request by the Left Party in March 2025, the Federal Government stated that the BAMF had not been deciding on asylum applications from individuals from the Gaza Strip for over a year, invoking § 24(5) of the Asylum Act (AsylG), which allows for the deferral of asylum decisions in cases of temporarily uncertain situations.[133] Because of this halt, as of February 28, 2025, a total of 1,218 asylum procedures concerning “persons from Palestinian territories (not recognized as a state)” were pending before the BAMF, including 147 involving minors and 1,071 involving adults.[134] Despite this prolonged deferral practice, several administrative courts ruled in 2024 that such uncertainty can no longer be assumed in light of the “dramatic situation and widespread destruction in the Gaza Strip.” These include, inter alia, the Administrative Court (VG) of Dresden (judgment of April 16, 2024, case no. 11 K 357/24.A), the VG Sigmaringen (judgment of March 7, 2024, case no. A 5 K 1560/22), and the VG Hamburg (judgment of June 3, 2024, case no. 14 A 789/24).[135]
Another contributing factor to the increase of asylum applicants might have been the court rulings of the Administrative Court in Oldenburg and of the Court of Justice of the EU. The Administrative Court in Oldenburg decided already in June 2023, prior to the escalation, that the current situation in the West Bank amounts to a danger to the health and life of those living there and that therefore persons present in Germany are eligible for toleration (‘Duldung’) under national law.[136] The European Court of Human Rights affirmed that UNRWA does no longer guarantee protection for Palestinians, making them eligible for national protection.[137] Looking at the political debate, it seems that there is a harsh climate not only with regard to the middle-east conflict but also vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees. The Christian Democrats (CDU) affirmed that while humanitarian aid will be provided, migration flows to Germany should be prevented. The Social Democrats stated that the right to claim asylum applies to everyone equally and that possible security threats are checked for Palestinians as for every other asylum applicant.[138]
[1] Information provided by the BAMF, 10 March 2022.
[2] FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency), ‘Migration: Key Fundamental Rights Concerns’, Quarterly Bulletin 1.7.2020 – 30.9.2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3NuoiiC, 31.
[3] Spiegel.de, Länderchefs wollen schnellere Asylverfahren, 13 October 2023, avialable in German at: https://bit.ly/49eHxqw; Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz (MPK), Flüchtlingspolitik von Bund und Ländern – gemeinsame Kostentragung, 13. October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3OnRp9m.
[4] Federal Government, Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Rückführung, 24. October 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/42oQUBV.
[5] Section 30a Asylum Act.
[6] Pro Asyl, ‚Innenministerium plant unter Deckmantel der GEAS-Umsetzung massive Verschärfungen im Asylrecht‘, 24 October 2024, available in German here.
[7] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/15083, 3 March 2025, available in German here,3.
[8] Tagesschau, Dauer der Asylverfahren 2024 gestiegen, 28 September 2024, available in German here.
[9] ZDF, ‚Asylverfahren dauern 2024 länger‘, 29 September 2024, available in German here.
[10] ZDF, ‚Asylverfahren dauern 2024 länger‘, 29 September 2024, available in German here.
[11] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/14882, 5 February 2025, available in German here, 1.
[12] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[13] BAMF, ‘Lage in Syrien: Temporärer Verfahrensaufschub für Asylanträge [Situation in Syria: Temporary postponement of asylum applications], 20 December 2024, available in German here.
[14] Mediendienst Integration, ‚Syrische flüchtlinge in Deutschland: Aufenthaltsstatus‘, available in German here.
[15] Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration, Rücknahme oder Widerruf des Aufenthaltstitels, available in German here.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Tanja Podolski, Es drohen keine Abschiebungen nach Syrien, LTO, 12 December 2024, available in German here.
[18] Ibid.
[19] For detailed information, see previous updates to this country report, available here.
[20] Mediendinest Integration, ‘Kein subsidiärer Schutz mehr für Syrer?’, 25 July 2024, available in German here.
[21] Mediendinest Integration, ‘Kein subsidiärer Schutz mehr für Syrer?’, 25 July 2024, available in German here.
[22] Mediendinest Integration, ‘Kein subsidiärer Schutz mehr für Syrer?’, 25 July 2024, available in German here.
[23] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 43.
[24] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8222, 5 September 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SklJCR and 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 41.
[25] FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency), ‘Migration: Key Fundamental Rights Concerns’, Quarterly Bulletin 01.01.2021-30.06.2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3qB3RHk.
[26] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U, 4.
[27] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U, 4.
[28] tagesschau.de, Warum Abschiebungen wieder Thema sind, 16 February 2023, available in German here.
[29] Mediendienst Integration ‚Abschiebungen nach Syrien‘, available in German here.
[30] Mediendienst Integration ‚Abschiebungen nach Syrien‘, available in German here.
[31] Mediendienst Integration ‚Abschiebungen nach Syrien‘, available in German here.
[32] BAMF, ‘REAG/GARP 2.0’, 16 January 2025, available here. Also based on information provided by the BAMF on 28 Maz 2025.
[33] BAMF, ‘REAG/GARP 2.0’, 16 January 2025, available here. Also based on information provided by the BAMF on 28 Maz 2025.
[34] ECRE, Afghans Seeking Protection in Europe, December 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3krGfED, 11.
[35] Deutscher Bundestag, parliamentary question by The Left, 20/791, 22 February 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3RPrRUC, 1.
[36] AIDA, Country Report Germany – Update on the year 2021, April 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3XnN7RS, 11.
[37] Federal Foreign Office, Joint press release by the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Community on the federal admission programme for people from Afghanistan who are at particular risk, 17 October 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3J47ZJA.
[38] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at: http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx.
[39] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[40] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[41] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at: http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx.
[42] Information provided by the BAMF on 28 May 2025.
[43] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, Anordnung des Bundesministeriums des Innern und für Heimat gemäß § 23 Absatz 2, Absatz 3 i. V. m. § 24 Aufenthaltsgesetz (AufenthG) zur Aufnahme von besonders gefährdeten afghanischen Staatsangehörigen aus Afghanistan, 19 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3GW7jmJ.
[44] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at: http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx.
[45] Federal Government, Plenary protocol 20/114, 5 July 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SqBvvZ, question 28.
[46] International Rescue Committee (IRC), Ein Jahr Bundesaufnahmeprogramm für Afghanistan: Gemeinsamer Aufruf von 7 NGOs zur Zwischenbilanz und Umsetzung der Verpflichtungen, 16 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/486jadA.
[47] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[48] The BAMF stresses that ‚No specific target for the number of arrivals under the federal admission programme for Afghanistan was set. The administrative order allowed for up to 1.000 declarations of admission. A declaration of admission is not equivalent to the actual entry of persons. The exit procedures depend on several factors, including whether the persons are able to get passport and visas to travel from Afghanistan to Pakistan‘. Information provided on 28 May 2025.
[49] International Rescue Committee, ‚Bundesaufnahmeprogramm (BAP) für Afghanistan‘, last udpated 6 August 2024, available in German here.
[50] Information provided by the BAMF on 28 May 2025.
[51] Cicero, Bundesregierung holt Scharia-Richter nach Deutschland, 3 March 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/42kTV6d.
[52] Foreigners Office, Erklärungen des Auswärtigen Amts in der Regierungspressekonferenz vom 05.04.2023, 5 April 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/42mPUOo.
[53] Foreigners Office, Erklärungen des Auswärtigen Amts in der Regierungspressekonferenz vom 05.04.2023, 5 April 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/42mPUOo.
[54] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary request 20/8154, 29 August 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/49hjvuR, 4.
[55] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary request 20/8154, 29 August 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/49hjvuR, 4.
[56] Tagesschau, ‚Gefährdeten Afghanen werden Zusagen entzogen‘, 4 July 2024, available in German here.
[57] Tagesschau, ‚Gefährdeten Afghanen werden Zusagen entzogen‘, 4 July 2024, available in German here.
[58] NDR Panorama, ‚Rettung von Afghanen: Wieder ein gebrochenes Versprechen‘, 4 July 2024, available in German here.
[59] Information provided by the BAMF on 28 May 2025.
[60] Infomigrants, ‘Germany’s new admission program for Afghans suffers mixed reviews’ 19 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3GNuRKs.
[61] PRO ASYL, Bundesaufnahmeprogramm Afghanistan: Enttäuschung nach langem Warten, 21 October 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3GNA5WA.
[62] Infomigrants, ‘Germany’s new admission program for Afghans suffers mixed reviews’ 19 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3GNuRKs.
[63] Infomigrants, Germany’s Afghan refugee program ‘extremely questionable,’ aid groups warn, 19 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3HjJCX9.
[64] International Rescue Committee (IRC), Ein Jahr Bundesaufnahmeprogramm für Afghanistan: Gemeinsamer Aufruf von 7 NGOs zur Zwischenbilanz und Umsetzung der Verpflichtungen, 16 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/486jadA.
[65] Frederik Eikmanns, ‚Scheitern, Schande oder letzte Rettung‘, (TAZ, 7 December 2024), available in German here.
[66] Frederik Eikmanns, ‚Scheitern, Schande oder letzte Rettung‘, (TAZ, 7 December 2024), available in German here.
[67] Pro Asyl, Afghanistan – Landesaufnahmeprogramme, 30 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/47Y7c5H.
[68] For an overview of such existing programmes see Hammed Hakimi, Higher Education in Europe: A Pathway to Protection for Afghans?, ECRE Working Paper 17, November 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/42igPuu.
[69] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[70] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[71] BAMF, Antrags-, Entscheidungs- und Bestandsstatistik, 8 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3UjFWf0.
[72] For more information about decision making in previous years, see AIDA, Country Report Germany – Update on the year 2021, April 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3XnN7RS, 91-92.
[73] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[74] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/32678, 14 October 2021, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3RQINtZ, 18-19.
[75] See PRO ASYL, ‘Steigende Asylzahlen? Ein Blick hinter die Schlagzeilen‘, 14 January 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3GMuoqI.
[76] Federal Government, Response to written question by Clara Bünger (The Left), 20/765, available in German at: https://bit.ly/483S5bW, 18.
[77] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[78] Ibid and compare with numbers of 2023 in AIDA, Country Report: Germany – Update on the year 2023, June 2024, available here, 121.
[79] Federal Government, Reply by the Federal Government to the minor interpellation by Clara Bünger, Dr. André Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, other MPs and the Die Linke group, 20/13752, 13 December 2024, available in German here.
[80] Federal Government, Responses to parliamentary questions by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 36.
[81] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8222, 5 September 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SklJCR, 70.
[82] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8222, 5 September 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SklJCR, 34 and Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 36.
[83] Federal Government, Reply by the Federal Government to the minor interpellation by Clara Bünger, Dr. André Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, other MPs and the Die Linke group, 20/13752, 13 December 2024, available in German here, 13.
[84] Federal Government, Reply by the Federal Government to the minor interpellation by Clara Bünger, Dr. André Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, other MPs and the Die Linke group, 20/13752, 13 December 2024, available in German here.
[85] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 16/12568, 06 April 2009.
[86] EMN / BAMF, Migration, Integration, Asylum. Political Developments in Germany 2016, available at https://bit.ly/3WvSz44, 62.
[87] PRO ASYL, ‘Newsticker Coronavirus: Informationen für Geflüchtete und Unterstützer*innen‘, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3n5bqEe.
[88] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/27007, 25 February 2021, 28
[89] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/27007, 25 February 2021, 3.
[90] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/890, 2 March 2022, available in German: https://bit.ly/3v51e5s, 3, 47.
[91] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Rückführungen nach Afghanistan zunächst ausgesetzt, 11 August 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3ZTXjDw and Federal Government, Responses to parliamentary questions by The Left, 20/5795, 24 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3nGxgRt, 2.
[92] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U, 4.
[93] Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (BPA) , ‘Repatriations from Germany to Afghanistan’, press release 208, 30 August 2024, available in German here.
[94] Asyl.net, Mehrere Bundesländer setzen Abschiebungen in den Iran aus, 12 October 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3jo9PdK.
[95] Tagesschau.de, Vorerst keine Abschiebungen in den Iran, 2 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3kXPNr2.
[96] GGUA Flüchtlingshilfe, ‚Abschiebungsstopp in den Iran ist seit 1.1.2024 aufgehoben‘, 5 January 2024, available in German here.
[97] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[98] See AIDA, Country Report: Germany – Update on the year 2023, June 2024, available here, 126.
[99] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[100] BAMF, Antrags-, Entscheidungs- und Bestandsstatistik (01-12/23), 8 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3UjFWf0; BAMF, Antrags-, Entscheidungs und Bestandsstatistik (01-12/22), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3lCA29E.
[101] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik (01-12/22), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3lCA29E and Asylgeschäftsstatistik (01-12/21), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3fvkrSI.
[102] BAMF, Antrags-, Entscheidungs- und Bestandsstatistik (01-12/23), 8 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3UjFWf0; Antrags-, Entscheidungs und Bestandsstatistik (01-12/22), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3lCA29E.
[103] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[104] Ibidem.
[105] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beantwortung von offenen Fragen zu Top 1 („Bericht des Bundesministeriums des Innern und für Heimat über die aktuelle Lage im Ukraine-Konflikt sowie die damit verbundenen innenpolitischen Auswirkungen“) der Sitzung des Ausschusses für Inneres und Heimat vom 11. Mai 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Lwoe3q, 3.
[106] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[107] PRO ASYL, Bundesamt für Migration lehnt Asyl für russischen Verweigerer ab, 18 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Jp9d0z.
[108] Flüchtlingsrat Niedersachen, ‚Zwei Jahre nach Teilmobilmachung: Weiter kein Asyl für russische Kriegsdienstverweiger*innen‘, 20 September 2024, available in German here.
[109] Connection e.V., ‚Klare Forderung auf Asyl bei Verweigerung eines Angriffskrieges‘, 18 November 2024, available in German here.
[110] Connection e.V., ‚Klare Forderung auf Asyl bei Verweigerung eines Angriffskrieges‘, 18 November 2024, available in German here.
[111] Valentin Feneberg, ‚Asyl für russische Kriegsdienstverweigerer: Lebensgefährlicher Kriegseinsatz und die erzwungene Beteiligung an Kriegsverbrechen führen zu subsidiärem Schutz‘, (VerfBlog, 5 February 2025), available in German here.
[112] Valentin Feneberg, ‚Asyl für russische Kriegsdienstverweigerer: Lebensgefährlicher Kriegseinsatz und die erzwungene Beteiligung an Kriegsverbrechen führen zu subsidiärem Schutz‘, (VerfBlog, 5 February 2025), available in German here.
[113] Pro Asyl, Bundesamt für Migration lehnt Asyl für russischen Verweigerer ab, 18 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/491fzyH.
[114] Administrative Court Berlin, 33rd Chamber, VG 33 K 504/24 A and VG 33 K 519/24, 20 January, 2025, press release available in German here.
[115] Higher Administrative Court Berlin-Brandenburg, 12 B 17/23 and 12 B 18/23, 22 August 2024, available in German here.
[116] Administrative Court Berlin, 33rd Chamber, VG 33 K 504/24 A and VG 33 K 519/24, 20 January, 2025, press release available in German here.
[117] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beschäftigung von regimekritischen Kultur- und Medienschaffenden aus der Russischen Föderation in Deutschland; Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Interesse im Sinne von § 19c Absatz 3 AufenthG, 20 June 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3LsAAt9.
[118] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beschäftigung von regimekritischen Kultur- und Medienschaffenden aus der Russischen Föderation in Deutschland; Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Interesse im Sinne von § 19c Absatz 3 AufenthG, 20 June 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3LsAAt9.
[119] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[120] Tagesspiegel.de, Warten aufs Visum : Seit sieben Monaten geduldet, 2 May 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Ouvr4I.
[121] Olaf Sundermeyer, ‚Woran Abschiebungen scheitern‘, (Tagesschau, 10 February 2025), available in German here.
[122] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U.
[123] Olaf Sundermeyer, ‚Woran Abschiebungen scheitern‘, (Tagesschau, 10 February 2025), available in German here.
[124] German government, Olaf Scholz: Deutschland hat nur einen Platz, den Platz an der Seite Israels, 12 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/494xUv0.
[125] Foreigner’s Office, Erklärungen des Auswärtigen Amts in der Regierungs und Pressekonferenz vom 09.10.2023, 9 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/49jCXHw.
[126] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Baerbock verschärft die Kritik an Israel, 26 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Oxpkwi; tagesspiegel.de, Die leeren Worte von Annalena Baerbock: Was die Außenministerin zu Israel sagt – und was nicht, 9 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Sve6d5.
[127] LTO.de, Deutschland will Israel als Drittpartei beistehen, 15 January 2024 available in German at: https://bit.ly/42oMqep.
[128] Clara Neumann, Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Staatsräson und Grundrechten, 8 December 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3St683X.
[129] Tagesschau.de, Die Hoffnung auf Frieden, 16 December 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3w1d0ye; WDR.de, Jüdin und Palästinenserin: “Ohne Dialog geht es nicht”, 19 November 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3unv70F.
[130] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik (statistics on applications, decisions and pending procedures), 1-12/2023, available at: htps://bit.ly/3UjFWf0 1-12/2022 available at: https://bit.ly/3Z7UIUM.
[131] Federal Government Response to a Parliamentary Request by The Left, 20/15139 31 March 2025, available in German here, 2.
[132] The author calculated the rate by dividing the number of positive decisions by the total number of substantive decisions, i.e., granted or denied, for the numbers see: BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 2024, available in German here.
[133] Federal Government Response to a Parliamentary Request by The Left, 20/15139 31 March 2025, available in German here, 2.
[134] Federal Government Response to a Parliamentary Request by The Left, 20/15139 31 March 2025, available in German here, 2, 3.
[135] Federal Government Response to a Parliamentary Request by The Left, 20/15139 31 March 2025, available in German here, 2, 3.
[136] Administrative Court Oldenburg, Decision 3 A 3611/21, 7 June 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3waRhDM.
[137] CJEU, Decision C-294/22, 5 October 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49noIBC.
[138] Rheinische Post.de, Union will keine palästinensischen Flüchtlinge, 18 October 2023, available in Germany at: https://bit.ly/3up1I6n.