As a response to the high numbers of asylum applications in Germany in 2015 and 2016, the BAMF prioritised applications from specific nationalities at different points in time. Prioritisation of applications from certain countries was revoked in the second quarter of 2016.[1] It was partially replaced by a system of ‘clustering’ applications with the aim of prioritising the caseloads from countries of origin with high and low protection rates. The clustering system was also abandoned in the first half of 2017.[2]
Since then, in principle and according to the internal instructions, a prioritised or accelerated procedure can occur in certain circumstances or for certain countries of origin. Here, the branch offices of the BAMF and the arrival centres decide independently whether they set any priority in dealing with caseloads, in particular dependent on availability of staff members with the necessary country expertise and availability of interpreters. This also applied during the outbreak of Covid-19. However, during the first wave and when in-person applications and hearing were suspended, BAMF branch offices focused on deciding cases which had been pending for a longer time and where the interview had already taken place.[3] Furthermore, according to the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, when interviews resumed the BAMF did not prioritise vulnerable applicants.[4] This information was not confirmed by the BAMF. In 2023, the debate on prioritisation of applicants resurfaced again. In October 2023, the Conference of Federal State Prime Ministers demanded that the Federal government reduce the length of the application process for asylum applicants from countries of origins with low recognition rates to three months. According to their plans, the BAMF should then prioritise these applications in order to ensure that they are dealt with within the shortened time frame.[5] While the Federal government generally agrees to the importance of short proceedings, it has not included the idea of making the length of the procedure dependent on the countries of origin in its most recent legislative package on facilitated return from October 2023.[6] As of February 2024, the law only prescribes a differential treatment of those nationals which are from safe countries of origin, [7] other accelerated procedures based on nationality are dependent on regional specifications and practices of the BAMF branch offices.
Until October 2023, the average duration of procedures was 6.7 months. The duration was significantly shorter for asylum seekers from some of the European ‘safe countries of origin’ and from Georgia:[8]
- Albania: 3.5 months
- North Macedonia: 3.4 months
- 2.3 months
- Kosovo: 3.9 months
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 3.1 months
- Serbia: 2.7 months
- Georgia: 3.9 months
- Moldova 2.5 months
This seems to imply that asylum applications from ‘safe countries of origin’ are fast-tracked as provided for by Section 30a Asylum Act, however this does not seem to be the case for all ‘safe countries of origin’ since procedures at the BAMF for asylum seekers from Ghana and Senegal were not faster than on average (12.8 months for Senegal, 8.9 months for Ghana).
On the other hand, the average duration of procedures was considerably above the average for asylum seekers from these countries of origin:
- Nigeria: 16.2 months
- Iran: 10.5 months
- Russia 9.8 months
- Somalia: 9.7months
- Afghanistan: 9.5 months
- Iraq: 9.5 months
- Ghana: 8.9 months
Syria
Since a policy change in the first months of 2016, the BAMF has granted subsidiary protection instead of refugee protection in a previously unrecorded number of cases. This policy change affected Syrian nationals in particular, but also asylum seekers from Iraq or Eritrea. For instance, whereas 99.5% of Syrians had been granted refugee status in 2015, this rate dropped to 56.4% in 2016 and to 35% in 2017. While the percentage rose again in the following years, 11.2% of Syrian applicants were granted asylum or refugee protection in 2023 (as opposed to 48.1% in 2020, 27.6% in 2021, 22.6% in 2022). Conversely, the rate of Syrians being granted subsidiary protection rose from 0.1% in 2015 to 41.2% in 2016, and 56% in 2017. Since then, it has decreased again in the years 2018-2021 (39.7% in 2018, 33.1% in 2019, 39.6% in 2020, 34.7% in 2021). The years 2022 and 2023 saw a considerable increase in the rate of subsidiary protection to 77% in 2022 and 75.8% in 2023.
The policy change at the BAMF coincided with a legislative change in March 2016, according to which Family Reunification was suspended for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection until March 2018. Family reunification is again possible for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection since August 2018, but limited to a monthly quota of 1,000 visas for relatives of this group. Tens of thousands of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have appealed against the authorities’ decisions to gain refugee status (‘upgrade-appeals’), however only ca. 10% of such appeals were successful in 2020. [9]
A further increase in such ‘upgrade appeals’ and in subsequent applications occurred in 2021 following a decision by the CJEU according to which there is a ‘strong presumption’ that refusal to perform military service in the context of the Syrian civil war relates to one of the reasons to be granted refugee status.[10]
Subsequent applications were deemed inadmissible in most cases, however (see also Subsequent applications).[11] The majority of Higher Administrative Courts continued to decide that refusal as such is not enough to be granted refugee protection, and that the risk of persecution has to based on an established reason for persecution (e. g. political reasons, not just punishment for avoiding military service) and has to be stablished in each individual cases.[12] This line of reasoning was confirmed by the Federal Administrative Court in January 2023.[13] In 2023 and 2022, the number and share of subsequent applications by Syrian nationals decreased considerably, with 1,670 in 2022 and 1,631 in 2023 subsequent applications compared to 15,259 in 2021 (see also Error! Reference source not found.Subsequent applications). The number of ‘upgrade appeal’ cases and decisions remains high, however, likely as a result of long court procedures. Between January and the end of May 2023, courts decided on 5.736 such appeals, and in 806 cases (14%) granted asylum or refugee protection, while in 4,930 cases (86%) the appeal did not lead to an improvement in the protection status.[14] 9,525 such appeals of Syrian nationals were pending as of 31 May 2023, a similarly high number to the end of 2022 (9,458).[15]
The removal ban for Syria that had been in place since 2012 expired at the end of December 2020. The ban was based on a common decision of the Federal States and the Federal government, but could not be renewed due to disagreement regarding the possibility to remove criminals and ‘persons posing a risk’ related to terrorist activities (‘Gefährder’).This was heavily criticised by NGOs and organisations such as the German Institute for Human Rights, UNHCR and Caritas.[16] The removal statistics for the first half of 2023 indicate that 410 removals of Syrian nationals took place.[17] However, Syria is not listed as a country of destination for removals in the first half of 2023, meaning that the removals of Syrian nationals took place to other countries, for example to other EU Member States in the form of Dublin transfers or removals following a refusal of entry.[18] As of February 2023, the Federal Government declared that it currently sees no possibilities for removals to Syria.[19]
Afghanistan
Emergency evacuation since the Taliban takeover in 2021
With the takeover of the Taliban on 15 August 2021, the German government started an evacuation operation for German nationals in Afghanistan as well as Afghan nationals who had worked for German authorities, the military and ‘especially endangered persons’. Between 16 and 26 August 2021, a total of 5,300 persons were evacuated, out of which 4,400 Afghan nationals. The evacuated persons entered Germany via an emergency visa (based on Section 14 and 22 Residence Act).[20] Upon arrival, the BAMF then examined whether persons had already been granted permission for an admission from abroad (Section 22 Residence Act). If this was not the case, and if the Federal Ministry decided no such permission could be granted, persons were informed of this and of the possibility to apply for asylum in Germany. [21]
After the end of the evacuation, German authorities continued to receive and examine notifications of risk of former employees and of “especially endangered individuals” in exceptional circumstances. Sub-contractors and consultants who worked for German authorities only indirectly are considered on a case by case basis according to the Federal Government. [22] If the examination confirms that the persons are at risk due to their work for a German authority, admission permissions continue to be granted according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community.[23] Permissions are also included for close family members (spouses and minor siblings), other relatives are only considered in hardship cases.[24] Since travelling out of Afghanistan is difficult and costly, the Federal Government has provided 32 million Euros in funding to the GiZ (the German Development Agency) to support persons in leaving the country. It has been criticised that despite the acknowledgement that fleeing Afghanistan is difficult, there is no systematic evacuation scheme.[25] As a result, there have been reports that persons who managed to depart from Afghanistan have been pushed back by Bulgarian, Turkish and Greek border police.[26] Persons admitted to Germany mainly leave via Pakistan and Iran. [27] Germany has also concluded an agreement with the government of Pakistan to allow the concerned persons to enter Pakistan with a Tazkira K (ID card) instead of a passport as required by the Taliban to leave the country. However, in mid-September 2022 the Federal Government reported that a total of 34 former employees and family members are known to have died in Afghanistan.[28]
Admission schemes
Germany has been operating an admission scheme for local staff of German ministries in Afghanistan since 2013. The scheme is based on Art. 22 (2) Residence Act (Temporary residence permission to uphold the political interest of the Federal Republic of Germany). The eligibility criteria depend on the status of the former employee. Only former staff (and their close family members) directly employed by German entities are covered by the programme.[29]
From the takeover of the Taliban in 2021 to 17 October 2022, according to the Federal Government, 38,100 persons had been issued a permission for admission to Germany (out of which 24,500 were former employees and eligible family members, and 13,600 were especially vulnerable persons and their eligible family members). Around 26,000 of these (68.2%) persons had entered Germany up until that time. As of 10 December 2021, a total of 28,053 permissions for admission from abroad had been issued to Afghan nationals and 8,014 persons had entered Germany as of the same date.[30] The admission scheme for local staff continues in parallel to the new humanitarian admission scheme announced on 17 October 2022.
On 17 October 2022, the Federal Government launched an additional federal admissions programme which had been announced in the coalition agreement of 2021.[31] The government describes the programme and procedure as follows: the programme is geared towards persons who ‘have exposed themselves to particular risk through their commitment to women’s and human rights or their work in the spheres of justice, politics, the media, education, culture, sport or academia and are thus vulnerable’ or ‘due to the special circumstances of their individual cases have experienced or are experiencing violence or persecution based on their gender, sexual orientation or gender identity or religion and are therefore at concrete and personal risk. In particular, these are victims of serious individual women’s rights violations, homo- or transphobic human rights violations or vulnerable representatives of religious groups/communities.’[32] The admission programme includes family members of those persons, which includes spouses or same sex partners, minor children and other family members who can prove a relation of dependency (beyond economic dependency) with the main person and find themselves in a situation of concrete and lasting danger due to the work or vulnerability of the main person.[33] The German government appoints agencies (including civil society organisations) who can put forward names of suitable persons, who must still be living in Afghanistan, via an IT application containing a questionnaire of a total of 41 pages.[34] The names of these organisations are not made public by the government, but according to a press report, PRO ASYL, Reporters without Borders, Mission Lifeline and Luftbrücke Kabul are taking part in the programme as of 20 December 2022.[35]
The Government then takes the admission decision based on selection criteria that include vulnerability (in line with the UNHCR catalogue of criteria), relation to Germany e. g. through language skills, family ties, previous stays or work for German authorities or projects, level of personal exposure of the person e. g. through a visible / exposed position or public statements, and a special political interest on the side of Germany to admit a person.[36] As with the previous admission programme, selected persons first receive assistance to leave Afghanistan and enter a neighbouring country and are then issued a visa and travel assistance by the German embassy in that country. Persons who enter Germany under the programme receive a residence permit for three years. The Federal State responsible for reception of the persons is to be determined according to the quota system for the distribution of asylum seekers (see Registration of the asylum application), although family ties and other ‘criteria supporting integration’ are to be taken into account.[37]
When announcing the programme, the Federal Government declared that ‘the new programme is now to be implemented quickly’ and that it planned to approve around 1,000 requests per month, which is about the amount of permissions granted in the months preceding the announcement. The programme is planned to run until the end of the current government’s term in 2025.[38] As of 30 June 2023, 229 persons have been selected for admission.[39] As of October 2023, only 13 of them had been admitted, due to the pause of the admission procedure (see below).[40] According to a press report, the NGOs Mission Lifeline and Luftbrücke Kabul alone have received around 32,000 requests as of early November 2022.[41]
In March 2023, the Federal Foreign office declared that all admission programs would be put to a halt for an indefinite time due to alleged abuse. The German newspaper Cicer and Bild published that, according to information they received, the admission programs had been used to bring radical Islamists to Germany.[42] In April 2023, the Federal government rebutted these allegations. A speaker of the Foreigner’s Office declared that there were no evidence supporting a systemic misuse of the admission programs.[43] Only in one case a person who applied for admission has been identified as a possible ‘threat’ (‘Gefährder’). Nevertheless, the Foreigners Office along with the Minister of Interior decided to introduce additional screening mechanisms and to halt the admission program until the screening mechanism is in place.[44] The screening procedure involves an automatic data reconciliation with databases from the national security agencies and interviews with the German domestic intelligence service (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt), the Federal Police or BAMF officers acting on behalf of these national security services.[45] The admission programs were restarted from 26 June 2023. In the first months of the newly introduced screening procedure (26 June – 21 July 2023) 99 screening interviews took place, no security concerns have been identified among those.[46] The Federal government further states, that the capacities for the screening mechanism have been expanded since its start. Accordingly, as of August 2023 several hundreds of screenings can be conducted per month.[47]
The Left party and NGOs such as PRO ASYL welcomed the launch of the programme but criticised that 1,000 admissions per month was too low given the ‘real pressure of persecution’ for ‘people who have fought for democracy and human rights’. PRO ASYL further criticised that the relatively abstract selection criteria could lead to an ‘ethically highly ambivalent protection lottery’[48] especially in connection with the fact that only authorised agencies could put forward people and that the application is through an algorithm-based IT application with little room to put forward specific individual circumstances.[49] The NGO Kabul Luftbrücke reported problems with the IT application in October and November, leading to delays in sending the online forms to authorities. A further point of critique is that the programme does not extend to persons who have managed to flee Afghanistan.[50] Several NGOs also voiced concerns over the practical implementation, demanding a better staffing of the counselling and coordination centres for the programme and questioning the ‘organization and content’ of the procedure,[51] especially given that it is required to have a passport in order to leave the country while obtaining one is made extremely difficult by the Taliban government. One year after the official launch, in October 2023, several NGOs reflected on the development of the program. They demanded that the originally envisaged number of 1,000 admissions per months should be fulfilled, that the procedure should be more transparent and that in additional admission schemes are necessary to meet the needs for protection.[52]
In addition to the Federal Government, several Federal States (Thuringia, Berlin, Hessen and Bremen) have implemented admission programmes based on family ties to Afghans living in the respective Federal States (for more information see Family Reunification). However, the programs in Thuringia and Bremen expired in December 2023 and end of January 2024.[53] Afghan nationals can also benefit from funding and admission programmes for students and scholars at risk; however, access to such programmes is difficult in practice, especially for persons who are still in Afghanistan.[54]
Asylum applications of Afghan nationals in Germany
In 2023, the protection rate for Afghan nationals stayed at a high of 98.7% compared to 99.3 % in 2022.[55] Prior to the takeover of Taliban it more than doubled. It was 42.9% in 2021 and 36.6% in 2020.[56] Most Afghan nationals were given either humanitarian protection in the form of a national removal ban (50.3%) or 43.8% of applicants were given refugee status. As of mid-August 2021, the BAMF de-prioritised decisions on asylum applications from Afghanistan due to the uncertain situation in the country except for cases in which international protection can be granted according to the guidelines in place or where the situation in Afghanistan was irrelevant for the decision. The government further declared that decisions continued to be taken on an individual, case-by-case basis.[57] As a result, the number of pending applications by Afghan nationals rose considerably compared to 2020, to 27,846 at the end of 2021 (2020: 6,101).The BAMF resumed decisions concerning Afghan nationals in December 2021,[58] prioritising cases which involve several persons (as opposed to individual applications) and vulnerable applicants.[59] At the end of 2023, the number of pending cases was still high with 39,000 undecided cases (among which 37,566 first-time and 1,434 subsequent applications). 2023 also saw a relatively high number of decisions on subsequent applications from Afghan nationals (4,622), which in most cases led to the granting of some form of protection (see Subsequent applications).
The already high success rate of appeals before Administrative Courts against negative decisions in the asylum procedure increased considerably in 2023. From the start of 2023 until the end of August 2023, 618 Afghan nationals were granted a form of protection by courts, compared to 194 rejections of appeals. In total, 21.6% of appeals were successful in the first half of 2023 (the rate was 40.6% in 2022 and 45.2% in 2021). If only decisions on the merits are counted, 76.1% of appeals resulted in the granting of protection (2022: 94.8%, 2021: 77.8%).[60] Most of the cases were not decided on the merits but resolved in other ways such as completion (71.6%). In the first half of 2023, the appeal statistics show large differences between courts. Whereas the administrative court Greifswald (Mecklenburg – Western Pomerania) has a positive decision rate of 6.5%, the administrative court of Augsburg (Bavaria) has 0% positive decisions.[61] 20,496 appeals of Afghan nationals were pending at the court as of 31 May 2023. A considerable increase compared to the number of appeals in 2022 (7,546).[62]
Removals
In principle, Germany has enacted removals of Afghan nationals with no legal right to stay since at least 2008.[63] From December 2016 onwards, following the conclusion of the ‘Joint Way Forward’ between the EU and Afghanistan, Germany started using charter flights for removals to Afghanistan.[64] With the outbreak of Covid-19, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community stopped forced removals to Afghanistan on 27 March 2020, since the Afghan authorities refused to take back Afghan nationals in light of the pandemic.[65] Removals started again after the first wave however, with one charter flight departing from Germany on 16 December 2020.[66] In total, 137 persons were forcibly removed to Afghanistan in 2020;[67] and 167 were removed in 2021, with the last charter flight departing from Germany on 6 July 2021.[68] Since August 2021, Germany has halted removals to Afghanistan. [69] In the first half of 2023, 659 Afghan nationals were removed from Germany but no removal to Afghanistan took place in 2023.[70] Persons without a protection status regularly receive a toleration (Duldung).
Iran
Following the protests and violent repressions in Iran, several Federal States declared a removal ban for Iran in October 2022.[71] The Conference of Interior Ministers of the Federal States as well as the Federal level decided in December 2022 that no removals would take place to Iran, with exceptions for serious criminal offenders and persons posing a risk to security.[72] The nationwide removal ban was originally prolonged in summer 2023 but from the 1st of January 2024 it has been lifted. Only in Berlin is the local removal ban still in place at least until the end of February 2024.[73]
The overall protection rate for asylum applications from Iranian nationals was 45.5% in 2023. 37.8% were given refugee status, 3.3% subsidiary protection and 1.6% a removal ban based on national law; while 54.5% of all applications were rejected (see Statistics). 47 people with Iranian nationality have been removed from Germany in 2023. Despite the removal ban, four persons have been removed to Iran in the first half of 2023.
Russia
Asylum applications of Russian nationals increased in 2023, likely still as a result of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing military conscriptions and political repression. In 2023, a total of 9,028 Russian nationals applied for asylum in Germany, 7,663 of which were first-time applicants. In 2023, Russia was among the top 10 countries of origin of asylum applicants. In comparison, 2022 saw 2,851 first-time applicants.[74] The overall protection rate (share of positive decisions when formal decisions are not considered) was 29.0% in 2023, up from 24.0% in 2022 and 15.5% in 2021.[75]
According to NGO PRO ASYL, the main obstacle for Russian nationals seeking protection in Germany is the lack of legal escape routes, as no flights from Russia to Germany are available and as countries along the EU’s external border no longer allow Russian citizens to enter with Schengen visas.[76] Germany has only ‘granted humanitarian visas in a few exceptional cases of people who have made public appearances, such as critical journalists’ according to PRO ASYL, while ‘German embassies and consulates generally reject such applications’.[77] PRO ASYL reports that in some cases, German embassies in countries other than Russia accept long-term visa applications from Russian nationals (e.g., for work, study or family reunification) for persons ‘who would be unreasonably endangered if they were to return to the responsible mission in Russia to apply. This may be the case for human rights defenders, journalists, dissidents and conscientious objectors.’
Deserters of the Russian army – those who flee from active military service – can be granted refugee status as they are threatened with persecution on political grounds, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community,[78] while more restrictive criteria apply to conscientious objectors. According to established jurisprudence, refusal to enter military service is, as such, not a ground for granting asylum. Conscientious objectors can only be granted refugee status in cases where the punishment for refusal to perform military service is disproportionately high, if the refusal triggers political persecution, or ‘if the asylum seeker would have been obliged to participate in war crimes, crimes against peace or crimes against humanity during military service and refuses military service for this reason’.[79] The BAMF decides on these applications on an individual basis. As of 18 February 2023, there were only two known BAMF decisions on applications from Russian nationals fleeing military service. In one of them, the person was granted protection but based on political activities. The other case concerned a person over the age of 40 and without prior military training, and the BAMF assumed that it was not sufficiently likely he would be forced to participate in the war. The decision was criticised by civil society organisations, who argue that the Russian recruiting practice is broader and more unpredictable than what was assumed by the BAMF.[80] Whereas the number of asylum applications from men eligible for military service continued to rise in 2023, according to several answers to requests from The Left to the Minister of Interior the recognition rate of men eligible for military services is still very low. Accordingly, only 55 out of 2,500 applications from men eligible for military services have been decided between 2022 and May 2023.[81] Only 11 of those have been decided positively in the first half of 2023.[82] According to Pro Asyl, the low recognition rate by the BAMF partly stems from outdated country of origin information on the prosecution of deserters and those who object to military service.[83] The BAMF rejects this view and states that available reports on military service have been revised in autumn 2023 and are regularly updated.
With a decree issued on 20 June 2022, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community granted special rights to Russian cultural and media workers who are critical of the regime to continue their work in Germany.[84] The government intends to use all possibilities under the residence law for this group of people, including using available discretion in granting residence permits or visas for the purpose of employment or self-employment. The decree also mentions that immigration authorities should issue residence permits directly without a preceding visa procedure for persons who are already in Germany in cases where a return to Russia would put applicants in danger.[85] For persons who do not fulfil the criteria for a residence title in Germany or for being granted international protection, PRO ASYL assumes that they should be issued a tolerated stay (Duldung) on the basis that removals to Russia are currently impossible.[86] Despite the decree in 2022 to grant special rights to Russian cultural and media workers, Russian journalists who fled to Germany report that they often only received tolerated stay (Duldung), which forces them to stay in Germany without possibilities to secure their livelihood and to continue their work as journalists.[87]
In the first half of 2023 no person was removed to Russia and no person with Russian nationality was removed involuntarily from Germany.[88]
Palestinian territories
The attack by the Hamas on Israel on the 7 October 2023 and the following escalating conflict has led to political discussions and rifts in the public perception. Following the attack, chancellor Scholz declared the security of Israel as a reason of state for Germany. He claimed that Germany’s place is on the side of Israel and that Germany stands in full solidarity and supports Israel.[89] The German government continues to position itself in favour for Israel, e.g., by its abstention to the UN resolution and its rejection of an EU resolution on ceasefire. Only very wary and situational criticism to the Israelian government and its reaction to the attack by the German government have been voiced by the German government. At a press conference of the Foreigners Office on 9 October 2023, the speaker of the Foreigners Office mentioned that in the past the German government has voiced criticism to the Israelian handling of the middle-east conflict and generally envisages a two-state solution but that at the current moment the focus should be the support of Israel’s defence.[90] Since then, the Minister of Foreign Affairs increasingly raises criticism to specific actions of the Israelian government, e.g., calling for humanitarian corridors and support, demanding the protection of civil society and the adherence to International Humanitarian Law.[91] Nevertheless, the German government has announced to support Israel in the case pending before the International Criminal Court.[92] The public perception is rifted. In the aftermaths of the attack, an increase in antisemitic attacks has been reported and at some pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the attacks of the Hamas have been celebrated. At the same time, it has been reported that pro-Palestinian demonstrations have been prohibited per se without any distinction to the cause they were protesting for, which amounted to a violation of the equal freedom of assembly. Additionally, the police have been criticised for its brutal reactions against pro-Palestinian demonstrations being in parts racially motivated.[93] Some associations like Jews and Palestinians for Peace and Combatants for Peace try to lead the public debate back to the facts and a constructive exchange in providing information and workshops for schools and other associations.[94]
What impact the situation in the Palestinian territories and the political climate here in Germany have on Palestinian refugees in Germany is currently difficult to evaluate. The number of 743 asylum applicants in 2023 from Palestinian territories has significantly increased compared to 35 in 2022.[95] This could be a result of the escalating conflict. Another contributing factor to the increase of asylum applicants might have been the court rulings of the Administrative Court in Oldenburg and of the Court of Justice of the EU. The Administrative Court in Oldenburg decided already in June 2023, prior to the escalation, that the current situation in the West Bank amounts to a danger to the health and life of those living there and that therefore persons present in Germany are eligible for toleration (‘Duldung’) under national law.[96] The European Court of Human Rights affirmed that UNRWA does no longer guarantee protection for Palestinians, making them eligible for national protection.[97] Looking at the political debate, it seems that there is a harsh climate not only with regard to the middle-east conflict but also vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees. The Christian Democrats (CDU) affirmed that while humanitarian aid will be provided, migration flows to Germany should be prevented. The Social Democrats stated that the right to claim asylum applies to everyone equally and that possible security threats are checked for Palestinians as for every other asylum applicant.[98]
[1] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 18/9415, 17 August 2016, available in German at: https://bit.ly/41upZEe, 23.
[2] Information provided by the BAMF, 23 January 2018.
[3] Information provided by the BAMF, 10 March 2022.
[4] FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency), ‘Migration: Key Fundamental Rights Concerns’, Quarterly Bulletin 1.7.2020 – 30.9.2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3NuoiiC, 31.
[5] Spiegel.de, Länderchefs wollen schnellere Asylverfahren, 13 October 2023, avialable in German at: https://bit.ly/49eHxqw; Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz (MPK), Flüchtlingspolitik von Bund und Ländern – gemeinsame Kostentragung, 13. October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3OnRp9m.
[6] Federal Government, Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Rückführung, 24. October 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/42oQUBV.
[7] Section 30a Asylum Act.
[8] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8787, 11 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/48WSr4w, 4.
[9] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/28109, 30 March 2021, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3LJmTGw, 42-44.
[10] CJEU, Case C‑238/19, Judgment of 19 November 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/4aF5yZs.
[11] See also BAMF, Migrationsbericht 2020 der Bundesregierung, December 2021, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3nTDv1J, 37.
[12] Asyl.net, BVerwG hebt Urteile auf, in denen Wehrdienstentziehern aus Syrien Flüchtlingsschutz gewährt worden war, 23 January 2023, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3Dw8c4H.
[13] Federal Administrative Court, Case 1 C 1.22, 19 January 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3RxN8AP.
[14] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 43.
[15] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8222, 5 September 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SklJCR and 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 41.
[16] FRA (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency), ‘Migration: Key Fundamental Rights Concerns’, Quarterly Bulletin 01.01.2021-30.06.2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3qB3RHk.
[17] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U, 4.
[18] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U, 4.
[19] tagesschau.de, Warum Abschiebungen wieder Thema sind, 16 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/47Vyxpe.
[20] BAMF, ‘Aufnahme ehemaliger Ortskräfte und gefährdeter Personen aus Afghanistan’, 29 November 2021, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3nv6sjZ.
[21] BAMF, Migrationsbericht 2020 der Bundesregierung, December 2021, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3nTDv1J, 38.
[22] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/3430, 15 September 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/477WMjm, 3.
[23] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Reply to written question by Canan Bayram (The Greens), 20/5046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3NvUljF, 81-121.
[24] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/3430, 15 September 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/477WMjm, 11.
[25] Taz.de, Die Mauern werden höher, 27 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/48d59Ln.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/3430, 15 September 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/477WMjm, 2.
[28] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/3430, 15 September 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/477WMjm, 16.
[29] ECRE, Afghans Seeking Protection in Europe, December 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3krGfED, 11.
[30] Deutscher Bundestag, parliamentary question by The Left, 20/791, 22 February 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3RPrRUC, 1.
[31] AIDA, Country Report Germany – Update on the year 2021, April 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3XnN7RS, 11.
[32] Federal Foreign Office, Joint press release by the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Community on the federal admission programme for people from Afghanistan who are at particular risk, 17 October 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3J47ZJA.
[33] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at: http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx.
[34] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[35] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[36] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at: http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx.
[37] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, Anordnung des Bundesministeriums des Innern und für Heimat gemäß § 23 Absatz 2, Absatz 3 i. V. m. § 24 Aufenthaltsgesetz (AufenthG) zur Aufnahme von besonders gefährdeten afghanischen Staatsangehörigen aus Afghanistan, 19 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3GW7jmJ.
[38] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, FAQs on the humanitarian federal admission programme for Afghanistan, available at: http://bit.ly/3iVp3Xx.
[39] Federal Government, Plenary protocol 20/114, 5 July 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SqBvvZ, question 28.
[40] International Rescue Committee (IRC), Ein Jahr Bundesaufnahmeprogramm für Afghanistan: Gemeinsamer Aufruf von 7 NGOs zur Zwischenbilanz und Umsetzung der Verpflichtungen, 16 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/486jadA.
[41] rbb.de, Aufnahmeprogramm für Afghanen startet schleppend, 20 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3iVdBva.
[42] Cicero, Bundesregierung holt Scharia-Richter nach Deutschland, 3 March 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/42kTV6d.
[43] Foreigners Office, Erklärungen des Auswärtigen Amts in der Regierungspressekonferenz vom 05.04.2023, 5 April 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/42mPUOo.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary request 20/8154, 29 August 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/49hjvuR, 5.
[46] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary request 20/8154, 29 August 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/49hjvuR, 4.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Infomigrants, ‘Germany’s new admission program for Afghans suffers mixed reviews’ 19 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3GNuRKs.
[49] PRO ASYL, Bundesaufnahmeprogramm Afghanistan: Enttäuschung nach langem Warten, 21 October 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3GNA5WA.
[50] Infomigrants, ‘Germany’s new admission program for Afghans suffers mixed reviews’ 19 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3GNuRKs.
[51] Infomigrants, Germany’s Afghan refugee program ‘extremely questionable,’ aid groups warn, 19 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3HjJCX9.
[52] International Rescue Committee (IRC), Ein Jahr Bundesaufnahmeprogramm für Afghanistan: Gemeinsamer Aufruf von 7 NGOs zur Zwischenbilanz und Umsetzung der Verpflichtungen, 16 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/486jadA.
[53] Pro Asyl, Afghanistan – Landesaufnahmeprogramme, 30 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/47Y7c5H.
[54] For an overview of such existing programmes see Hammed Hakimi, Higher Education in Europe: A Pathway to Protection for Afghans?, ECRE Working Paper 17, November 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/42igPuu.
[55] BAMF, Antrags-, Entscheidungs- und Bestandsstatistik, 8 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3UjFWf0.
[56] For more information about decision making in previous years, see AIDA, Country Report Germany – Update on the year 2021, April 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3XnN7RS, 91-92.
[57] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/32678, 14 October 2021, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3RQINtZ, 18-19.
[58] See PRO ASYL, ‘Steigende Asylzahlen? Ein Blick hinter die Schlagzeilen‘, 14 January 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3GMuoqI.
[59] Federal Government, Response to written question by Clara Bünger (The Left), 20/765, available in German at: https://bit.ly/483S5bW, 18.
[60] Federal Government, Responses to parliamentary questions by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 36.
[61] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8222, 5 September 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SklJCR, 70.
[62] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8222, 5 September 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SklJCR, 34 and Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/5709, 17 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3K3w3MX, 36.
[63] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 16/12568, 06 April 2009.
[64] EMN / BAMF, Migration, Integration, Asylum. Political Developments in Germany 2016, available at https://bit.ly/3WvSz44, 62.
[65] PRO ASYL, ‘Newsticker Coronavirus: Informationen für Geflüchtete und Unterstützer*innen‘, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3n5bqEe.
[66] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/27007, 25 February 2021, 28
[67] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 19/27007, 25 February 2021, 3.
[68] Federal Government, Reply to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/890, 2 March 2022, available in German: https://bit.ly/3v51e5s, 3, 47.
[69] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Rückführungen nach Afghanistan zunächst ausgesetzt, 11 August 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3ZTXjDw and Federal Government, Responses to parliamentary questions by The Left, 20/5795, 24 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3nGxgRt, 2.
[70] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U, 4.
[71] Asyl.net, Mehrere Bundesländer setzen Abschiebungen in den Iran aus, 12 October 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3jo9PdK.
[72] Tagesschau.de, Vorerst keine Abschiebungen in den Iran, 2 December 2022, available in German at: http://bit.ly/3kXPNr2.
[73] Taz.de, Abschiebestopp aufgehoben, 2 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Ow2PYO.
[74] BAMF, Antrags-, Entscheidungs- und Bestandsstatistik (01-12/23), 8 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3UjFWf0; Antrags-, Entscheidungs und Bestandsstatistik (01-12/22), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3lCA29E.
[75] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik (01-12/22), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3lCA29E and Asylgeschäftsstatistik (01-12/21), available in German at: https://bit.ly/3fvkrSI.
[76] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[77] Ibidem.
[78] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beantwortung von offenen Fragen zu Top 1 („Bericht des Bundesministeriums des Innern und für Heimat über die aktuelle Lage im Ukraine-Konflikt sowie die damit verbundenen innenpolitischen Auswirkungen“) der Sitzung des Ausschusses für Inneres und Heimat vom 11. Mai 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Lwoe3q, 3.
[79] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[80] PRO ASYL, Bundesamt für Migration lehnt Asyl für russischen Verweigerer ab, 18 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Jp9d0z.
[81] Tagesschau.de, Wenige russische Kriegsdienstverweigerer erhalten Asyl, 24 May 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SLX9MW.
[82] Dr. Thomas Hohlfeld, Vermerk zur Nachbeantwortung des BMI vom 10. Oktober zur Entscheidungspraxis des BAMF bei russischen Kriegsdienstverweigerern, newsletter of 26 October 2023.
[83] Pro Asyl, Bundesamt für Migration lehnt Asyl für russischen Verweigerer ab, 18 February 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/491fzyH.
[84] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beschäftigung von regimekritischen Kultur- und Medienschaffenden aus der Russischen Föderation in Deutschland; Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Interesse im Sinne von § 19c Absatz 3 AufenthG, 20 June 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3LsAAt9.
[85] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, Beschäftigung von regimekritischen Kultur- und Medienschaffenden aus der Russischen Föderation in Deutschland; Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Interesse im Sinne von § 19c Absatz 3 AufenthG, 20 June 2022, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3LsAAt9.
[86] PRO ASYL, Flucht aus Russland: Was wir aktuell sagen können, 21 December 2022, available in English and German at: http://bit.ly/3LyoDm0.
[87] Tagesspiegel.de, Warten aufs Visum : Seit sieben Monaten geduldet, 2 May 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Ouvr4I.
[88] Federal Government, Response to parliamentary question by The Left, 20/8046, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3SHPe2U.
[89] German government, Olaf Scholz: Deutschland hat nur einen Platz, den Platz an der Seite Israels, 12 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/494xUv0.
[90] Foreigner’s Office, Erklärungen des Auswärtigen Amts in der Regierungs und Pressekonferenz vom 09.10.2023, 9 October 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/49jCXHw.
[91] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Baerbock verschärft die Kritik an Israel, 26 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Oxpkwi; tagesspiegel.de, Die leeren Worte von Annalena Baerbock: Was die Außenministerin zu Israel sagt – und was nicht, 9 January 2024, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3Sve6d5.
[92] LTO.de, Deutschland will Israel als Drittpartei beistehen, 15 January 2024 available in German at: https://bit.ly/42oMqep.
[93] Clara Neumann, Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Staatsräson und Grundrechten, 8 December 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3St683X.
[94] Tagesschau.de, Die Hoffnung auf Frieden, 16 December 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3w1d0ye; WDR.de, Jüdin und Palästinenserin: “Ohne Dialog geht es nicht”, 19 November 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3unv70F.
[95] BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik (statistics on applications, decisions and pending procedures), 1-12/2023, available at: htps://bit.ly/3UjFWf0 1-12/2022 available at: https://bit.ly/3Z7UIUM.
[96] Administrative Court Oldenburg, Decision 3 A 3611/21, 7 June 2023, available in German at: https://bit.ly/3waRhDM.
[97] CJEU, Decision C-294/22, 5 October 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49noIBC.
[98] Rheinische Post.de, Union will keine palästinensischen Flüchtlinge, 18 October 2023, available in Germany at: https://bit.ly/3up1I6n.