Differential treatment of specific nationalities in the procedure

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Swiss Refugee Council Visit Website

Afghanistan

The largest group of asylum applicants in 2024 were Afghans, with a total of 8,627 applicants. 69% of Afghans that received a decision in 2024 were granted asylum at first instance, while 30% received temporary admission.[1]

On 15 February 2022, the SEM released a report on the potential risk profiles for being targeted by the Taliban.[2] Anyone who is persecuted in a way that is relevant under refugee law is granted asylum. Those who do not meet these requirements are usually granted temporary admission. If there is an application for re-examination or if the case is pending before the FAC, the SEM generally orders temporary admission.

In November 2022, the FAC issued a detailed judgment that assesses the current situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, concluding that they face heavy and pervasive discrimination based on their gender.[3] In mid-July 2023, the SEM adapted its practice regarding female asylum applicants from Afghanistan. Since then, they are entitled to asylum after a case-by-case examination of their request. Previously, Afghan women and girls generally received a negative asylum decision with temporary admission, as the execution of deportation was considered impracticable. This is a reason for the shift in status, in 2023 overall only 24% of Afghan asylum seekers were granted asylum status, compared to 69% in 2024. While the temporary admission rate was 75% in 2023 and at 30% in 2024. In 2024, 3,100 Afghan women and girls got asylum status. Most of them were already living in Switzerland before with a temporary admission or some other permit.[4]

Despite this change, the practice and jurisprudence on Afghani asylum applications remains quite restrictive. For instance, according to the administration and the FAC, there’s no risk of forced recruitment of underage soldiers by the Taliban, throughout the country.

Regarding reflex persecution in Afghanistan (i.e., a term used in Switzerland to designate the situation when a person is persecuted because of the persecution of another target, such as the husband or wife), the court clarified in January 2024[5] that the risk of it could not be denied simply because the person concerned had not suffered serious harm before leaving the country.

In January 2024, the FAC examined the probative value of the Afghan identity document Tazkira, and emphasised that relying on this document alone was not sufficient to assess the alleged minority or majority.[6]

While the ‘safety net’ of temporary admission allows the authorities to provide some protection to most of the Afghanis coming to Switzerland, this status is not as comprehensive and solid as the refugee status.[7]

In 2024, for the first time since 2019, the deportation of two persons to Afghanistan took place. The two persons had been convicted for criminal offences.[8]

In March 2025, the SEM announced it would alter its practice regarding men from Afghanistan from mid-April 2025 onwards: Although it continues to assume that removal is generally unreasonable, returning non-vulnerable men to Afghanistan is considered reasonable in exceptional cases if the circumstances are favourable. The person concerned must be residing in Switzerland without family, be over the age of 18 and in good health. They must also have a stable and sustainable network of relationships in their home country that enables them to reintegrate socially and find work. Women, families, minors and people with health problems are not affected by this change in the SEM’s practice.[9] The SRC has strongly criticised this change in practice.[10]

Türkiye

In 2024, with 4,107 applications lodged by Turkish nationals, they were the second largest group of asylum applicants in Switzerland. The recognition rate at first instance (asylum status) reached 38% (compared to 82% in 2023) of all the decisions rendered on the merits while 3% (compared to 6% in 2023) were given a temporary admission status. [11]

In a principle judgment regarding exclusion from asylum released on 25 September 2018,[12] the FAC excluded a Kurdish refugee from asylum status for supposed proximity to Komalen Ciwan, an organisation considered as affiliated to PKK. The presumption of proximity to that organisation was considered as sufficient by the FAC to suspect that the applicant endangered Switzerland’s internal or external security. The decision raises many questions notably concerning freedom of expression as well the standard of proof and the burden of proof in cases of suspected links to terrorist organisations or violent extremism. It calls into question the notion of refugee protection as such insofar as the latter aims precisely to protect persons persecuted for their political opinion.[13]

In a reference judgment[14] of March 2024, the FAC addressed the question of whether it would be reasonable to enforce a removal order to the provinces in Türkiye that are particularly affected by the earthquake of February 2023, with regard to housing, food supply, infrastructure, health care, the school system, the economic situation and employment. Based on the information available, according to the court it is not possible to assume that it is generally unreasonable to enforce removal to the areas mentioned, including to the most severely affected province of Hatay. Rather, the individual circumstances of those affected should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Due account should be taken of the situation of vulnerable persons – in particular, frail, disabled (or otherwise impaired) and chronically ill persons – especially in the case of persons who would have to return to the provinces of Hatay, Adiyaman, Kahramanmaras and Malatya. Otherwise, a reasonable alternative residence should be examined.

In a coordination judgment[15] dated 15 November 2024, the FAC made two momentous decisions for asylum applicants from Türkiye: firstly, the court concluded that individuals who are the subject of criminal proceedings in Türkiye for ‘insulting the president’ and/or ‘propaganda for a terrorist organisation’ are not generally subject to persecution in their home country that would entitle them to an asylum status. On the other hand, the FAC reversed the practice in place since 2013, according to which returns to the Turkish provinces of Hakkâri and Şırnak were generally excluded (BVGE 2013/2). Following a reassessment of the security situation, the FAC no longer considers deportations to these provinces to be generally unreasonable and has ruled that they should be examined on a case-by-case basis. The SRC criticised[16] the FAC for using this far-reaching coordination ruling to confirm the SEM’s increasingly restrictive practice regarding asylum applications from Turkish nationals. The SRC notes that the human rights situation in practice in place since 2013has remained poor for years and that the Turkish judiciary is under massive pressure, meaning that fair and independent criminal proceedings are not guaranteed, as confirmed by current analyses of the situation on the ground. From the point of view of the SRC, the fundamental change in practice regarding the expulsion of Turkish asylum applicants to the provinces of Hakkâri and Şırnak is incomprehensible. In view of the continuing insecurity in these border provinces with Iraq, the situation should be monitored continuously.

Algeria

The third largest group of asylum applicants in Switzerland in 2024 were persons from Algeria. There were 2,110 asylum applications, but only 8 persons were granted asylum, 1 person received a temporary admission. The rejection rate stayed very high at 97% (in-merit decisions).

Eritrea

In 2024, Eritrea was the fourth largest group of asylum applicants in Switzerland with 2,093 applications lodged. The recognition rate at first instance (asylum status) reached 69% of all the decisions rendered on the merits while 19% were granted a temporary admission status.[17]

Primary applications refer to applications lodged directly by Eritrean applicants in Switzerland, while secondary applications refer to applications lodged following family reunification procedure, subsequent applications as well as children born in Switzerland to refugee or asylum applicants’ parents. The above figures demonstrate that the number of new applications lodged by Eritreans is rather low, representing 11% of asylum applications in 2019, 10% in 2020, 19% in 2021, 7% in 2022, 35% in 2023 and 44% in 2024. The high proportion of such secondary applications clearly increases the protection rate in a way that is misleading. In fact, according to the statistics, the protection rate (asylum status) was 69% and the temporary admission rate was 19% in 2021 (see the statistical table at the beginning of this report), but few people have been granted protection upon a primary application (no detailed data available).

In June 2016, the SEM changed its policy regarding Eritrea. It stated that persons who left Eritrea illegally and had previously never been called to the military service, exempted from military service, or released from military service, would no longer be recognised as refugees. In January 2017, the FAC also changed its practice and ruled that the illegal exit of Eritrea could no longer, in itself, justify recognition of refugee status and that additional individual elements were required.[19] Confirming this more restrictive approach, the Court subsequently found in August 2017 that the return of Eritrean nationals could not be generally considered unreasonable. Stating that the situation in Eritrea had improved significantly since 2005, the Court considered that persons whose asylum request was rejected and who had already done their military service as well as those who had “settled” their situation with the Eritrean State or benefited from the status of so-called “diaspora member” were not under the threat of being convicted or recruited to the national service and that there was no obstacle to the execution of removal under national law (Article 83 al. 3 FNIA) and international law (Article 3 ECHR).[20]

In a third leading decision, the FAC stated that there was no issue with non-refoulement (under Article 3 and/or 4 ECHR) nor any obstacle to the execution of removals in national law[21] for persons who have to serve in national service.[22] However, if the applicant succeeds in demonstrating that it is highly probable that they would personally be subjected to ill-treatment (contrary to Article 3 ECHR) or poor living conditions (contrary to Article 4 ECHR), during military service, then their removal would be unlawful.[23] Also, all this does not preclude the need to examine whether the asylum applicant left Eritrea illegally and if so, whether they have additional factors that could put them at risk of persecution if returned (as mentioned above).[24] Finally, according to the reference decision[25] of the Court, the enforcement of a removal to Eritrea is generally considered reasonable, except in the presence of particularly unfavourable individual circumstances in which an existential threat (or state of necessity) must be recognised. This has to be verified in each individual case and concerns in particular: single men who left Eritrea a long time ago and without a solid family network[26]  and single or unmarried women with an illegitimate child, without school education and work experience and without a solid family network.[27]

The UN-CAT has criticised Switzerland regarding removals procedures concerning Eritreans in several decisions.[28]

Syria

Syrians were the fifth largest group of asylum applicants in Switzerland in 2024, with a total of 1,438 applications for international protection lodged. The recognition rate at first instance (asylum status) was 53% and the temporary admission rate was 43% in 2024.

In February 2015, the FAC issued two leading cases regarding Syria. They are still valid today, in light of current jurisprudence and practice. In the first judgment, the Court stated that considering the current circumstances in Syria, army deserters and conscientious objectors can risk persecution, provided they have made themselves known as opponents to the regime. The Court also denied an internal flight alternative for the applicant (of Kurdish origin) in the Kurdish-controlled area, due to the instability of the region.[29] In a second judgment, the Court stated that even ordinary participants in demonstrations in Syria against the regime risk persecution if they have been identified by Syrian state security forces.[30] It must be added, though, that jurisprudence is very strict when it comes down to assessing whether the applicant could have really been identified by the security services. Regarding the forced recruiting of persons by the Kurdish group YPG, the Court stated that this did not amount to a justified fear of persecution.[31] The FAC does not consider removals to Syria always unlawful. In a case published in 2021, for instance, the judges considered that the applicant, who had been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for serious crimes, could return to Aleppo, given that the situation was ‘stable’ since 2016.[32]

In July 2022[33] the FAC reviewed its practice on the consequences of an illegal departure due to increasing documentation of the experiences of Syrian returnees. It considered that a re-entry into Syria requires a status settlement in a formal procedure to obtain a “security clearance”, which could be refused for various reasons (e.g. because of detained family members, oppositional statements on social media or a stay in an “unpopular” country). The Court explains that the status settlement is particularly necessary for persons who had left the country illegally, had refused military service or had applied for asylum abroad. If the Syrian state agreed to the status settlement, the persons concerned would be removed from the list of wanted persons. However, in individual cases, persons who had settled their status could also be arrested. Overall, however, the Court saw no justification for changing the current case law on illegal departure: Although the return after an illegal departure could prove problematic in individual cases despite status settlement and result in disadvantages, it did not conclude it to be a systematic, nationwide action against returnees from European countries. The requirement of “overwhelming probability” of future persecution was therefore lacking. Illegal departure alone would therefore still not lead to the assumption of refugee status.

In December 2024, the SEM announced that until further notice no decisions will be taken regarding asylum applications from individuals from Syria. This is due to the volatile situation in Syria following the overthrow of the Assad regime, which currently does not allow for a thorough examination of the reasons given for seeking asylum. However, people from Syria can still apply for asylum. The SRC criticised this decision, which places Syrian applicants in a limbo to no fault of their own.[34]

Other nationalities

Iraq (559 asylum applications in 2024): Since the Court’s position of December 2015 according to which there is no situation of generalised violence in the northern Kurdish provinces, persons can be returned there if they have a sustainable social or family network there.[35] Persons from central and southern Iraq usually receive a form of protection. As of 2024, the practice concerning Kurdish provinces remained the same.

In a reference judgment,[36] the FAC addressed the current security situation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). According to its landmark judgment ATAF 2008/4, the security authorities in northern Iraq are generally able and willing to protect the inhabitants of the three Northern provinces from possible persecution. Regarding the current situation, the court stated that the relationship between the Iranian-backed federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdish forces in the north remains very fragile. The Kurdish parties have lost influence as they can no longer count on full US support, and external actors such as Türkiye and Iran are increasingly gaining traction. Northern Iraq is predominantly ruled by two parties, the Partiya Demokrata Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP) and Yekêtiy Nîştimaniy Kurdistan (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK). The region’s existence and stability mainly depend on the relationship between these two parties. The population’s trust in the police is low. In principle, the KRI has a comprehensive judicial system, but the number of judges does not appear to be sufficient. Tribal justice continues to be practiced. The court addressed the ongoing human rights crisis in northern Iraq.

Based on this analysis of the situation, the FAC concluded that the KRI still provides a sufficient level of protection. Reservations would still have to be made if the alleged assaults were carried out by the two majority parties, their organs or members. Furthermore, a lack of willingness to protect could not be ruled out in the case of media professionals, dissidents or in the prosecution of honour crimes. Gender-based violence is on the rise.

With regard to the execution of the expulsion order, the court stated that there was no situation of generalised violence. With regard to Turkish military operations, individuals from rural mountain regions near the border should have their cases examined on an individual basis regarding an alternative residence. The FAC also took a closer look at the socio-economic situation in the KRI. It found that although the situation could be described as tense in certain areas, access to electricity, water, education and basic medical care could generally be assumed to be sufficient. The removal order therefore appears to be reasonable in general for single and healthy Kurdish men or couples who have been living in the KRI for a long time. However, a detailed examination is required for families with children, elderly or single women, in view of the tense economic situation and the various social and political tensions. It is necessary to examine whether certain favourable factors, such as previous professional integration, good education or a stable relationship network, enable reintegration and the securing of economic livelihood. For persons with serious health problems, particularly if there is a need for specialised knowledge or special medication, it must be examined whether necessary treatment is guaranteed, and livelihood security can be achieved.

Iran (389 asylum applications in 2024): The FAC recognised in its jurisprudence that people who express themselves critically of the regime, especially in social media, are increasingly subject to mass reprisals. Nevertheless, Swiss practice grants asylum only to those whose engagement goes beyond typical mass activities and who are therefore perceived by the regime as serious and dangerous opponents. With regard to conversion to Christianity, Swiss practice considers that only those who are active in their church or who engage in proselytism face an increased risk of persecution. In October 2022, the Court confirmed its jurisprudence that the Bahai in Iran are subject to collective persecution: The faith is not recognised as a religion and its followers are systematically persecuted.[37] In other cases, it is accepted that Iranian nationals may exercise their Christian faith privately.[38] Regarding domestic violence, case law has significantly improved since 2021, when the FAC recognised that state authorities are not willing to provide effective protection for women who are victims of violence.[39] Upon request regarding the current situation in Iran since September 2022, the SEM stated that they are collecting information from various sources in order to examine whether the practice needs to be adjusted.[40]

Morocco: in 2024 the FAC confirmed its case law on the eligibility and willingness of the state to provide protection in the event of persecution by third parties, in particular in the case of violence against women.[41]

Nigeria: In the appeal proceedings of a Nigerian woman, the court confirmed the Nigerian authorities’ ability and willingness to protect victims of human trafficking.[42]

Georgia: Regarding a married couple from Georgia who applied for asylum in Switzerland stating that the husband had cancer and needed medical treatment that was not sufficiently available in Georgia, the FAC ruled[43] that, despite lower standards than in Switzerland, medical care in Georgia was adequate and that the chemotherapy drugs they needed were also available in Georgia. The husband could continue the chemotherapy in his home country, as it had already been started in Georgia. There was also state support for people with limited financial means.

Further worth mentioning is a research report from the University of Basel that concludes, after extensive interviews, that Uyghur and Tibetan minorities in Switzerland are being spied on, monitored, and pressured. The Swiss authorities have so far remained passive in addressing these issues.[44]

[1] SEM, asylum statistics (7-20), available here.

[2] Available in German here.

[3] FAC, D-4386/2022, 22 November 2023.

[4] Data and information provided by the SEM, April 2025.

[5] FAC E-1749/2023, 26 January 2024, available here.

[6] FAC E-2771/2023, 19 January 2024, available here.

[7] For an overview of the current practice, we refer to the website of the SRC, here.

[8] Swissinfo.ch, ‘Schweiz schafft zwei straffällige Afghanen nach Afghanistan aus’, 13 October 2024, available in German.

[9] More information on this can be found here (English).

[10] SRC, media release of 2 April 2025 in German and French.

[11] SEM, asylum statistics (7-20), available here.

[12] FAC, Decision E-2412/2014, 25 September 2018.

[13] For further information, see SRC, L’arrêt sur les Kurdes ébranle les fondements du droit d’asil’, 5 October 2018, available (in French) here.

[14] FAC, E-1308/2023, 19 March 2024.

[15] FAC, E-4103/2024, 15 November 2024.

[16] SRC, media release, 15 November 2024, L’OSAR critique le tour de vis à l’égard des demandes d’asile de personnes turques.

[17] SEM, asylum statistics (7-20), available here.

[18] SEM, asylum statistics (7-21), available here.

[19] FAC, Decision D-7898/2015, 30 January 2017.

[20] FAC, Decision D-2311/2016, 29 August 2017.

[21] FAC, Decision D-2311/2016, 29 August 2017.

[22] FAC, Decision E-5022/2017, 10 July 2018. This practice change has been criticised by the SRC and others, as it does not seem justified by the current country of origin information (COI) or the difficulty to obtain reliable COI. For further information, see SRC, Décision du Tribunal administratif concernant le renvoi d’une Erythréenne – Le jugement est incomprehensible, 31 August 2017, available in French here ‘La Confédération mise sur l’intimidation plutôt que sur des solutions’, 3 September 2018, available (in French) here.

[23] ATAF 2018 VI/4.

[24] This is still in force, FAC, Decision D-7898/2015, 30 January 2017.

[25] FAC, Reference Decision D-2311/2016, 17 August 2017.

[26] FAC, D-8182/2015, 13 December 2019.

[27] FAC, Decisions E-686/2018, 18 March 2022 and E-2117/2017, 17 December 2019.

[28] UN Committee against Torture, CAT/C/76/D/983/2020, 9 May 2023, available here; CAT/C/74/D/887/2018, 22 July 2022, available here. CAT/C/73/D/914/2019, 28 April 2022, available here. CAT/C/73/D/872/2018, 28 April 2022, available here; CAT/C/72/D/916/2019, 12 November 2021, available here; CAT/C/71/D/900/2018, 22 July 2021, available here; CAT/C/65/D/811/2017, 7 December 2018, available here.

[29] FAC, Decision D-5553/2013, 18 February 2015.

[30] FAC, Decision D-5779/2013, 25 February 2015.

[31] FAC, Decision D-5329/2014, 23 June 2016.

[32] FAC, Decision E-1876/2019, 8 March 2021. See also: E-6023/2017, 26 June 2019; D-1105/2017, 31 May 2017; and E-3152/2018, 22 June 2018.

[33] FAC, Decision E-2943/2019, 6 July 2022

[34] See the website of the SRC, available in German here, and in French here.

[35] FAC, Decision E-3737/2015, 14 December 2015, confirmed in Decision E-86/2017, 7 November 2018.

[36] FAC, D-913/2021, 19 March 2024, available here.  

[37] FAC, D-1197/2020, 25 October 2022.

[38] See for example FAC, D-2344/2020, 9 February 2022, para 6.3.3.

[39] FAC, E-2470/2020, 26 January 2021, para 6.7.1.

[40] Information provided by the SEM, January 2023.

[41] FAC D-2382/2021, 22 January 2024, available here.

[42] FAC, D-3116/2021, 29 February 2024,  available here.

[43] FAC, D-5768/2024, 3 October 2024, available here.

[44] See Tibetans and Uyghurs in Switzerland fear long arm of China, 17 February 2025.