Regular procedure

Author

Nikola Kovačević

General (scope, time limits)

The asylum procedure in Serbia is governed by the Asylum Act as lex specialis to GAPA which is applied in relation to questions that are not regulated by the Asylum Act.^[1] The provisions of the Asylum Act shall be interpreted in accordance with the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the generally recognised rules of international law.^[2] Additionally, the third instance procedure before the Administrative Court is also governed by the Administrative Disputes Act (ADA).

The Asylum Act provides that a decision on asylum applications in the regular procedure must be taken within a maximum period of 3 months from the date of the lodging of the asylum application or the admissible subsequent application.^[3]

In 2024, the average length of the asylum procedure was 13 months and the cases decided for the first time in the first instance ranged from 4,[4] 6[5] and 9[6] months (1 case each related either to national security grounds or prima facie uncredible cases) to 12,[7] 13,[8] 16[9] and even 20[10] and 24 months.[11]

In 2025, average length slightly increased to 13,4 months and with recoded cases which lasted 20,[12] 21,[13] 23,[14] 28[15]

It is possible to extend the time limit for the first instance decision by 3 months in case the application includes complex factual or legal issues or in case of a large number of foreigners lodging asylum applications at the same time.^[16] Exceptionally, beyond these reasons, the time limit for deciding on an asylum application may be extended by a further 3 months if necessary to ensure a proper and complete assessment thereof.^[17] The applicant shall be informed of the extension. In 2024 and 2025, and from the case files of all first instance decisions, it cannot be determined if this provision was applied.

The Asylum Act also envisages a situation where a decision on asylum application cannot be made within 9 months due to temporary insecurity in the country of origin of the applicant which needs to be verified every 3 months.^[18] Nevertheless, the decision must be taken no later than 12 months from the date of the application.^[19]

In other words, the first instance procedure still lasts unreasonably long (on average 13 months) which is one of the reasons discouraging asylum seekers from considering Serbia a country of destination.

In March 2022, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) recommended that Serbia ensures compliance with the statutory deadlines of the asylum procedure.^[20]

The first instance procedure before the Asylum Office may be completed by: (a) a decision to uphold the application and grant refugee status or subsidiary protection;^[21] (b) a decision to reject the asylum application;^[22] (c) a decision to discontinue the procedure;^[23] or (d) a decision to dismiss the application as inadmissible.^[24]

The Asylum Act contains detailed provisions regarding the grounds for persecution,^[25] sur place refugees,^[26] acts of persecution,^[27] actors of persecution,^[28] actors of protection in the country of origin,^[29] the internal flight alternative,^[30] and grounds for exclusion.^[31] This clearly indicates that the legislature was guided by the Common European Asylum System framework, namely the recast Qualification Directive. Still, there is plenty more room for improvement, especially with regard to the exclusion clause which lacks the clear procedural rules which would be in line with UNHCR Guidelines.^[32]

Even though the new Asylum Act does not explicitly set out the burden of proof required for being granted asylum, Article 32 provides that the applicant is obliged to cooperate with the Asylum Office, to deliver all available documentation and present true and accurate information regarding the reasons for lodging an asylum application. If an applicant fails to do so, the asylum officer has the possibility to issue a decision in an accelerated procedure.^[33] It is further prescribed that, in examining the substance of the asylum application, the Asylum Office shall collect and consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, particularly taking into consideration:

1. the relevant facts and evidence presented by the Applicant, including the information about whether he or she has been or could be exposed to persecution or a risk of suffering serious harm;
2. current reports about the situation in the Applicant’s country of origin or habitual residence, and, if necessary, the countries of transit, including the laws and regulations of these countries, and the manner in which they are applied – as contained in various sources provided by international organisations including UNHCR and the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA), and other human rights organisations;
3. the position and personal circumstances of the Applicant, including his or her sex and age, in order to assess on those bases whether the procedures and acts to which he or she has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm;
4. whether the Applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole purpose of creating the necessary conditions to be granted the right to asylum, so as to assess whether those activities would expose the Applicant to persecution or a risk of serious harm if returned to that country…’^[34]

In addition, the benefit of the doubt principle (in dubio pro reo) has not been explicitly defined as such, but it is prescribed that the applicant’s statements shall be considered credible where a certain fact or circumstance is not supported by evidence if:

1. the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his or her statements with evidence;
2. all relevant elements at his or her disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation have been given regarding any lack of other relevant facts;
3. the applicant’s statements are found to be consistent and acceptable, and that they are not in contradiction with the specific and general information relevant to the decision on the asylum application;
4. the applicant has expressed intention to seek asylum at the earliest possible time, unless he or she can demonstrate good reason for not having done so;
5. the general credibility of the Applicant’s statement has been established.

Overview of the practice of the Asylum Office for the period 2008-2025[35]

In the period from 1 April 2008 to 31 December 2024, the asylum authorities in Serbia rendered 179 decisions granting asylum (refugee status or subsidiary protection) to 250 persons from 29 different countries.^[36] A total of 82 decisions was rendered in relation to 126 applicants who received subsidiary protection, while 97 decisions were rendered in relation to 124 applicants who were granted refugee status.

The highest number of decisions was rendered in 2019 (26), and then in the following order: 2015 (25), 2016 (21), 2022 (20), 2020 (19), 2018 (16), 2021 (12), 2017 (7), 2024 (7), 2025 (7), 2023 (6), 2014 (4), 2009 (4), 2012 (3), 2013 (1) and 2010 (1). In 2008 and 2011, not a single positive decision was rendered. Top 5 nationalities which received international protection in Serbia are: Libya (47), Syria (46), Afghanistan (34), Iran (23) and Iraq (16).

Libya

The highest number of applicants who were granted international protection in Serbia originate from Libya – 47 persons through 19 decisions. A total of 4 decisions were issued granting refugee status to 8 Libyans. On the other hand, 15 decisions granting subsidiary protection were issued in relation to 39 applicants. Decisions on subsidiary protection were based on the state of general insecurity and widespread violence which implied the risk of suffering serious harm. The main source, in terms of the CoI, were different updates of UNHCR position papers on returns to Libya and a moratorium on returns which remains valid as of March 2022.^[37] The remaining 4 decisions referred to the risk of persecution on ethnic and political grounds for applicants belonging to the same tribe as Muammar Gaddafi^[38] or a 5-member family belonging to the ethnic group of Berbers which was particularly targeted during the civil war and in post-conflict period in Libya.^[39]

In the history of the Serbian asylum system, a total of 66 Libyans applied for asylum, even though 664 were issued a registration certificate, as most of them never applied for asylum. There were no instances known to the author of this report, in which the applicant from Libya was rejected up to the final decision of the Administrative Court, except in one case where a 5-member family then addressed the ECtHR and was later on granted subsidiary protection.^[40] This case, as well as another which was positively resolved in 2022, were initially rejected on the basis of negative security assessment from BIA.^[41] Still, it can be safely assumed that, if provided with adequate legal support, applicants from Libya used to have decent chances to obtain international protection in Serbia during the peak of the civil war.

Syria

A total of 45 Syrians were granted international protection in Serbia through 38 decisions. Eight were granted refugee status via 8 decisions while 38 were granted subsidiary protection through 31 decisions. However, a total of 321,137 Syrians was registered in Serbia since 2008, while only 605 lodged asylum application.

The vast majority of Syrians absconded before the first instance decision was issued, while at least several dozens were subjected to the automatic application of the safe third country concept (STCC), which plagued the Serbian asylum system in the period 2008-2018.^[42] The vast majority of the applicants whose asylum application were dismissed absconded the asylum procedure.

On 23 December 2025, the Asylum Office rejected a first asylum application in merits,[43] but this decision is still not final. There were two more cases which were rejected in the first instance, in 2021 and 2022, but author of this report was not able to obtain data of these two cases, but the practice of the Administrative Court and Asylum Commission from later years does not indicate that these decisions became final. So, the potential outcome in these cases is either that applicants absconded, or their cases were referred back to the Asylum Office after which they received subsidiary protection. Still, there were several more decisions in which Syrian were rejected in merits, but mostly on national security grounds and in 2023, 2024 and 2025.

Decisions in which Syrians were granted subsidiary protection in Serbia were based on the state of general insecurity and widespread violence which implied the risk of suffering serious harm. The main sources in terms of CoI which were cited in such decisions were UNHCR position papers on returns to Syria^[44] and EUAA reports on Syria.^[45] Decisions granting refugee status were mainly based on the risk of persecution due to political opinion or draft evasion.^[46] When it comes to draft evasion, the practice has been contradictory, meaning that some applicants were granted refugee status, others subsidiary protection. This practice continued in 2022. In 2023, the applications of 2 Syrian nationals were rejected, one of them on the basis of being considered as the national security risk.^[47] In 2024, 3 Syrians were granted subsidiary protection,[48] 3 were rejected on the basis of arbitrary national security assessment,[49] while in 1 case subsequent asylum application was dismissed.[50] In 2025, 3 Syrians were granted subsidiary protection, 3 were rejected on the national security grounds and 1 was rejected in merits.

Afghanistan

Persons in need of international protection from Afghanistan are the second biggest group of persons registered in Serbia (190,205) and the largest group that actually lodged asylum application (982). However, only 34 Afghans were granted asylum through 24 decisions. The vast majority of Afghan applicants absconded the asylum procedure, as it has been the case with Syrians and Iraqis.

The Asylum Office issued 17 decisions granting refugee status to 23 Afghanis on the basis of the risk of persecution which they faced as: interpreters,^[51] artists,^[52] members of police and other security forces,^[53] persons who worked for US companies,^[54] SGBV survivors who were subjected to harmful traditional practices (honour killing, consequences of having children out of wedlock)^[55] or persons who faced risks of Taliban recruitment.^[56]

Also, a total of 7 decisions granting subsidiary protection was issued in relation to 11 applicants. Subsidiary protection was granted to individuals who belonged to vulnerable categories such as UASC or families with young children who faced the state of general insecurity and arbitrary violence from Taliban.^[57]

The recognition rate of Afghan applicants varied throughout the years, but it is clear that the Taliban rule has not triggered higher recognition rates, which can be seen from the analysis of the practice bellow.  There was only 1 decision in 2021 in which the Taliban rule and general situation in Afghanistan was declared as grounds for subsidiary protection.^[58] In 2022, there were 3 such decisions issued in relation 3 three UASC (2 subsidiary protections and 1 refugee status), as well as two decisions granting refugee status to a three-member family from Afghanistan due to SGBV grounds and further risk of SGBV, but in which the Taliban rule was also taken into account.^[59] However, in 2023, three asylum applications were rejected in merits and no positive decisions were taken.^[60] The first applicant was rejected on the national security grounds, while the other two were rejected in merits. One applicant from Afghanistan was rejected on the merits in 2024,[61] while in 2025 2 applicants claiming Taliban persecution were rejected (1 person twice),[62] while 1 applicant and 1 UaSC were granted refugee status and subsidiary protection respectively.

Iraq

A total of 11 decisions granting international protection was rendered in relation to 16 Iraqi nationals. Through 5 decisions 8 persons were granted subsidiary protection as Sunni Muslims who faced arbitrary violence in post US invasion Iraq,^[63] during the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) control of area around Mosul^[64] and in post-ISIS period.^[65] Iraqis granted refugee status faced risk of forcible military recruitment,^[66] were directly targeted as Sunni Muslims^[67] or were victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).^[68]

It is noteworthy to say that 82,897 Iraqi were registered in Serbia since 2008 and that only 304 lodged an asylum application. As it was the case with Syrians, the vast majority of them absconded before the first instance decision was issued, or afterwards, after they were subjected to the practice of the STCC. In one instance, the STCC was applied through a final decision of the Administrative Court, and this person was later on granted humanitarian residency due to his integration into Serbian society. In this particular case, the legal representatives failed to challenge the automatic application of the STCC before the ECtHR which would potentially have provided a durable solution for the applicant.^[69] There were probably several more instances in which the STCC was confirmed with the final decision in relation to Iraqi applicants. The author of this Report is not aware of any decisions in which an Iraqi asylum application was rejected on the merits with the final decision.

Iran

Iranian asylum seekers were granted asylum through 17 decisions encompassing 23 persons. A total of 21 applicants received refugee status through 14 decisions and the grounds were mainly of religious nature – conversion from Islam to Christianity.^[70] There were instances in which victims of torture who opposed the Iranian political system received refugee status,^[71] as well as LGBTQI+ persons^[72] and social activists.^[73] One human rights activist^[74] and 1 UASC received subsidiary protection.^[75] Since 2008, a total of 14,788 Iranians were registered, while only 361 lodged an asylum application.

The vast majority of asylum applications based on religious reasons (conversion) were rejected on the merits and became final and executive. These decisions represent a shift in practice which from the outset was in almost all instances positive, but due to the increased number of applicants who converted from Islam to Christianity, the Asylum Office raised the bar of credibility which produced an inconsistent practice. In 2025, a two-member family with strong claim on political persecution which could lead to prison sentence and capital punishment was rejected in merits.[76]

Ukraine

Only 29 Ukrainians were registered in the period 2014-2025 and 28 of them lodged an asylum application and 16 were granted asylum. Eight Ukrainian applicants received subsidiary protection through 4 decisions, and 8 were granted refugee status through the same number of decisions. Most of their claims were based on their Russian ethnicity or pro-Russian orientation, or they had previous family or other connections with Serbia. See Annex on Temporary Protection.

In March 2022, 4 Ukrainian applicants lodged asylum applications with the Asylum Office (1 family of 3 and 1 journalist) and were all granted asylum – subsidiary protection to the family due to the state of general insecurity^[77] and 1 refugee status to the journalist who reported on war crimes allegedly committed by Ukrainian authorities.^[78] In 2023, only 1 Ukrainian national applied for asylum and he was rejected on the basis of the national security grounds.^[79] In 2024, 1 survivor of SGBV and trafficking in human beings was granted refugee status,[80] while one Ukrainian national was rejected on the basis of national security grounds.[81] In 2025, 1 Ukrainian national was rejected in merits.[82]

Burundi

A total of 1,225 Burundians were registered in line with the Asylum Act, and 314 of them lodged an asylum application in the period 2017-2025. The increase in the number of Burundian applicants can be connected with the free visa regime that Serbia has introduced for Burundian citizens, and which was cancelled in December 2022 after pressure from the EU

Still, only 12 Burundians were granted protection through 10 decisions. A total of 10 Burundians were granted refugee status through 8 decisions and 2 Burundian was granted subsidiary protection. Refugee status was granted to women victims of SGBV, LGBTQI+ persons, torture survivors and political opponents. All of them are ethnic Tutsi. Still, the inconsistent and flawed practice with regards to this population of asylum seekers remains a serious concern which is analysed in more details in the ensuing parts of the report.

Cuba

A total of 323 Cubans were registered in line with the Asylum Act, while 158 of them lodged an asylum application since the onset of the Serbian asylum system. Only 12 of them received refugee status through 7 decisions and on the basis of the political persecution which they faced as political activists opposed to the Government, while 1 Cuban LGBTQI+ applicant with serious medical condition received subsidiary protection in 2022.^[83] In 2023, two high profile political activists from Cuba, involved in the protests in the period November 2021 – 11 July 2022, were granted refugee status, one of them with the rest of his family.^[84] In 2024, a total of 19 Cubans were rejected on the merits through 15 decisions, while in 2025 17 decisions regarding 26 applicants were negative.

Somalia

A total of 66,489 Somalis were registered in line with the Asylum Act, while only 338 of them lodged asylum applications. Subsidiary protection was granted to 5 individuals, on the basis of the state of general insecurity in Somaliland.

Other nationalities

A total of 5 Sudanese from Darfur were granted refugee status in the period 2015-2016 (5 decisions), 4 Pakistanis were granted asylum out of which 3 subsidiary protection and 1 UASC refugee status and as a survivor of human trafficking. A total of 3 athletes from Ethiopia were granted subsidiary protection in 2009 due to political reasons, as well as 3 women from Chechnya-Russia, who had LGBT claims. An LGBT couple from Türkiye received refugee status in 2013. A woman from Cameroon and her daughter were granted refugee status as survivors of SGBV, as well as Cameroonian persons with a disability^[85] and UaSC girls who survived SGBV and trafficking in human beings.[86] One underage girl from Nigeria was granted refugee status as a survivor of human trafficking. Another Nigerian man with sever disability received subsidiary protection. Two Palestinians were recognised as refugees and victims of forced military recruitment in Syria. One applicant from Bangladesh who is quadriplegic was granted subsidiary protection. The same protection was granted to an applicant from Mali in 2020.^[87] Refugee status was granted to a Coptic Christians from Egypt on the basis of religious persecution, as well as to Chinese Uyghurs, Kazakh Christians and Tunisian Christians on the same grounds. A man from Lebanon escaped political persecution from Hezbollah and received refugee status, as well as a South Sudanese who belonged to the opposition. In 2022, a boy from Niger was granted subsidiary protection after he fled the state of general insecurity caused by the Boko Haram movement,^[88] as well as a mother and her daughter from DR Congo, who escaped the situation of arbitrary violence in her village and whose later born daughter (in Serbia), was also granted refugee status.^[89] In 2023, a survivor of trafficking in human beings belonging to the specific social groups Hijras in India, was granted refugee status in the decision, which also outlines her vulnerability as transgender woman and survivor of SGBV and this decision should be considered as landmark.^[90] In 2024, a survivor of SGBV and trafficking in human beings from Congo was granted refugee status.[91]

Breakdown of positive decisions, nationalities of applicants and type of protection for the period 2008-2025

Particular grounds for international protection, contradicting practices and different trends

On other hand, among 179 decisions, excellent examples of good practice can be observed. In the history of the Serbian asylum system, asylum authorities have granted asylum on almost all grounds envisaged in Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, there are numerous examples in which the practice of the Asylum Office has been inconsistent and especially in the following type of cases:

• LGBTQI+ applicants
• SGBV survivors
• UASCs
• draft evaders
• converts from Islam to Christianity

LGBTQI+

When it comes to LGBTQI+ applicants, the first ever-positive decision was granted to a Turkish gay couple in 2013.^[92] Several other decisions, which represent an example of good practice, ensued in the following years. Among those are decisions granting refugee status to two gay men from Iran^[93] and 3 lesbians from Chechnya.^[94]

However, in the same period, several contentious decisions highlight the inconsistency in assessing LGBTQI+ claims by asylum authorities in Serbia. One decision referred to a transgender man from Bosnia whose asylum application was also rejected in the Netherlands.^[95] In two other separate decisions, which related to a gay couple from Tunisia, the first instance authority outlined that the state of human rights of LGBTQI+ in Tunisia has been significantly improving throughout the years, highlighting the fact that even one of the presidential candidates openly declared to be gay. However, the Asylum Office disregarded the fact that the Tunisian legal framework still stipulates ‘forced anal examination’ of people ‘suspected to be gay’ and criminalises homosexuality in its Criminal Code, prescribing a prison sentence of up to 5 years.^[96] Another contentious decision referred to a transgender woman from Iran who was rejected even though the UNHCR office in Serbia eventually granted her the mandate status and resettled her to another country.^[97] In 2021, there were two decisions in which application from a gay men, respectively from Iran^[98] and Bangladesh,^[99]  were rejected as unfounded. The threshold set in these two cases represents a dangerous precedent when it comes to LGBTQI+ claims.^[100] In both decisions, the Asylum Office considered that the applicants would not have been subjected to persecution if they had acted discretely with regards to their sexual orientation. Also, the acts of violence and threats to which both applicants were subjected were not of sufficient level of seriousness according to the Asylum Office. In 2022, there were several more decisions rejecting LGBTQI+-related asylum claims applicants, whose cases continued from 2021 (applicants from Tunisia, Bangladesh and Iran) and 1 case in 2022 of an applicant from Morocco.^[101]

One Cuban citizen was granted subsidiary protection as an LGBTQI+ applicant in 2022, but the positive outcome was not solely based on the discrimination which he had encountered in Cuba, but also on the basis of his serious illness.^[102] However, 3 other applicants from Cuba who had identical claims and medical expert opinions on their deteriorating medical state were rejected, providing once again examples on different approaches that the Asylum Office takes in similar or identical cases.[103] All cases were related to a combination of circumstances which implied lack of medicine for HIV and discrimination of LGBTQI+ people committed at the hands of society and state institutions.

In 2023, the Asylum Office rendered the landmark decision on LGBTQI+, SGBV and survivor of trafficking in human beings on the member of the hijra movement from India.^[104] An example of good practice was recorded in 2024 when a bisexual man from Burundi was granted refugee status due to the persecution he was submitted to by his family.[105] In 2025, two LGBTQI+ applicants were rejected from China[106] and Russian Federation.[107]

Victims of SGBV

The practice of the asylum authorities when it comes to the survivors of SGBV, but also persons at risk of SGBV has also been inconsistent. The first notable case goes back to 2016, when a woman from Chechnya was rejected on the merits. Namely, during the interview, M.G. unequivocally expressed her well-founded fear of persecution by Chechens (including her family members), who threatened her because she ‘lost her virginity out of wedlock’ and because she was pregnant at the time of leaving Russia. In addition, the mere fact that the asylum seeker had left Russia and her family may be a reason for retaliation by her father and other Chechens. She specifically stated that she received threats from her father that he would kill her if she had sexual relations before marriage, and described how Chechens treat girls in such cases, i.e., that those girls are often victims of honour killing. The applicant stated that her mother once told her about a case where a brother killed a sister who had sex before marriage, then killing her mother because she did not take good care of her daughter.^[108]

Another contentious case was recorded in December 2017, when an application by a woman who was a victim of SGBV in Afghanistan was dismissed on the basis that Bulgaria was a safe third country. The Asylum Office disregarded the fact that Z.F. was also raped in Bulgaria, manifesting in that way the Office’s lack of capacity to establish a gender-sensitive approach in the admissibility procedure.^[109] The Asylum Office’s decision was also confirmed by the Asylum Commission and the woman eventually was resettled by UNHCR office in Serbia and received refugee status in France.^[110]

A case which represents an example of good practice is that of N., a woman with a young child from Cameroon who escaped an arranged marriage and whose asylum application was assessed as credible through individual circumstances which she put forward and relevant CoI.^[111] This was the first ever case in which an applicant was qualified as a member of a particular social group – persons at risk of SGBV, which manifested though the risk of forced marriage. On the contrary, a case of another women from Cameroon was not examined with the same rigorous scrutiny as the case of N., even though it referred to the practice of forced marriage when she was underage. Her case was dismissed even though she never had the opportunity to apply for asylum at one of the airports in Italy which Serbia considered as the safe third country.^[112]

A very high burden of proof for the risk of gender-based violence was established in the case of Ms. Y from Iran,^[113] and Ms. Z from Burundi in 2021.^[114] Ms. Y is a women rights activist whose asylum application was rejected on multiple occasions on the grounds that she allegedly failed to provide evidence that the threats that she has received would materialise. Even the 2022 events in Iran were disregarded by asylum authorities. On the other hand, a high quality decision was issued in relation to an Iraqi woman and her daughter who received refugee status as a SGBV survivor who was forcibly married to her cousin when she was only 15 years old.^[115] A very good decision was issued in 2022 to a survivor of SGBV from Burundi, in which the Asylum Office for the first time took into consideration the Istanbul Protocol Report lodged by legal representatives with the findings of the multidisciplinary team comprised of a forensic medical expert, a psychiatrist and a gynaecologist.^[116] Moreover, this woman eventually fled Serbia and was granted refugee status in Belgium. There were two more good decisions in 2024 where a combination of SGBV grounds and human trafficking resulted in decisions granting refugee status to women from Congo and Ukraine.[117]

In 2023, the practice with regards to SGBV survivors deteriorated to the extent that all female applicants who claimed sexual violence and provided medical documentation, forensic medical opinions drafted in line with the Istanbul protocol and other evidence which imply automatic application of the in dubio pro reo principle were rejected. All applicants were from Burundi.^[118] Several examples from 2024 corroborate this practice, including a survivor of incest who provided expert opinion from a certified psychologist for incest trauma, but also women who provided medical documentation (both from Burundi).[119] Her application was again rejected in 2025 after the case was referred back by the Asylum Commission.[120]

What can be concluded when it comes to the burden of proof in SGBV applications, but also many other types of cases, is that the Asylum Office has shifted its practice in 2023 and refuses to grant international protection to those individuals who had already survived acts of persecution (attacks, rape, detention, judicial persecution), which was not the case in the past. The practice remained unchanged in 2024 in several cases, but there were applicants who were forced to leave their countries of origin due to risks of persecution which had not materialised, where the requirements were set insurmountably high. In other words, it appears that the asylum authorities have raised the burden of proof to such a level that applicants who to experienced and survived the act of persecution in order to cannot prove the credibility of their claims even with medical and psychosocial evidence. What is also typical for these kinds of decisions is selective citations of the relevant CoI in which only parts of these sources which indicate positive developments (with for example gay people in Iran or women’s rights in other country) are outlined in the negative decision, while those sources which corroborate alleged risks are neglected. This also reflects the lack of capacity of the asylum authorities to apply the standard of in dubio pro reo.

UASC

Since the establishment of the Serbian asylum system, only 16 UASC received international protection in Serbia. The first child was a girl from Nigeria who was also recognised as a survivor of human trafficking which occurred in her country of origin and which was assessed as an act of persecution.^[121] The second UASC who received subsidiary protection was a boy from Afghanistan who fled forced recruitment by the Taliban.^[122] The same decision was issued in relation to a Kurdish boy who fled forcible military recruitment by Peshmergas in Iraq and who was granted refugee status in the same year (2019).^[123] In both of these cases the Asylum Office applied the standard of a ‘buffer age period,’ which is a remarkable example of good practice and which is related to children who turned 18 during the course of the asylum procedure.^[124]

An identical case of forced recruitment of UASC by Taliban forces was positively resolved at the end of 2019 in the case of an Afghan boy who was granted refugee status.^[125] A child soldier from Palestine (proclaimed as stateless), received refugee status after it was determined that he had been forcibly recruited in the conflict in Syria.^[126] A similar case was resolved for an UASC from Afghanistan who fled Taliban recruitment as well.^[127] A boy from Iran who converted from Islam to Christianity was granted subsidiary protection, even though all other Iranian converts were granted refugee status.^[128]

Another boy from Afghanistan who fled customary family disputes and revenge killing was granted subsidiary protection in 2020.^[129] An Afghan boy who suffered severe injuries in a car accident in Serbia and remained in an induced coma was granted subsidiary protection in 2021.^[130] And finally, the last UASC from 2021 who was granted a refugee status was a boy from Pakistan who was recognised as a victim of human trafficking and who was granted refugee status in 2021 on the basis of labour and sexual exploitation.^[131]

In 2022, 2 boys from Afghanistan were granted subsidiary protection^[132] due to the risks of arbitrary violence originating from the acts of the Taliban, while 1 boy from Afghanistan received refugee status for the same reasons.^[133] Siblings from Syria (brother and sister) were also granted subsidiary protection,^[134] as well as a boy from Niger who fled the situation of arbitrary violence connected to the operations conducted by the Boko Haram group.^[135]

Apart from these positive decisions, there have been a handful of cases in which UASC’s applications were rejected on the merits even though their asylum claims were similar or identical to the above-described. In all these cases, the boys, mainly from Afghanistan, had a positive best interest assessment decision issued by CSW which contained a recommendation for protection in Serbia. This indicates that practice in the field of UASC also varies, which can be also seen in the past AIDA reports.^[136]

In 2023 and 2024, there were no decisions related to UASC applicants, while in 2025, 1 UaSC from Afghanistan was granted subsidiary protection due to the risk of Taliban recruitment[137] and 1 Cameroonian girl who survived human trafficking and SGBV.

Draft evaders and forcible recruitment

A significant number of male Syrian applicants who received international protection outlined in their applications that one of the main reasons why they had to flee their country was the risk of being recruited by either fighting sides. The reasoning of the Asylum Office decisions always outlined such individual circumstances, but in the end granted different forms of international protection – mainly subsidiary protection and rarely refugee status. Moreover, draft evasions and rejection in general to take part in the armed conflict, was outlined by the UNHCR in its position papers as a reason for protection arising from 1951 Refugee Convention.^[138] Thus, there were instances in which draft evaders were granted refugee status^[139] and instances in which the same category received subsidiary protection.^[140] The same examples can be seen in the practice towards UASC who fled Taliban recruitments described above.

In 2023, there were two decisions^[141] related to Russian citizens whose claim was based on the risk of forcible recruitment and who were rejected in merits and through decisions which have completely failed to take into account relevant COI such as the one published by the EUAA.^[142] In 2024 and 2025, more of such decisions were issued, including in relation to the people who received official invitations to report to their local military headquarters.[143]

Converts from Islam to Christianity

The vast majority of Iranian claims were based on the alleged risk of religious persecution, frequently due to a conversion from Islam to Christianity. However, even before the mass arrival of Iranian citizens in 2017-2018,^[144] the fist refugee status was granted in 2015 to a man from Kazakhstan, who converted to Christianity.^[145] The second person was a man from Iran who was granted refugee status in 2016 for the same reasons.^[146] In the period 2018-2020, the Asylum Office granted refugee status on said ground on at least 7 occasions.^[147] There were no decisions related to Iranian converts in 2023, while in 2024 there was one such decision in which an Iranian man was granted refugee status.[148]

However, in the same period, dozens of other Iranian applicants who put forward the same claims with identical or similar evidence, were rejected on the merits. The number of persons who received international protection on these grounds slowly decreased and, in 2021 and 2022, not a single Iranian was granted refugee status on religious grounds. Thus, it is clear that the threshold for Iranian converts has significantly increased and that it is not reasonable to expect that in the future these claims will have prospect of success.^[149]

Since 2017, the Asylum Office has issued the following decisions:^[150]

Asylum Office practice in 2025

Protection was granted to citizens of the following countries in 2025:

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

In 2025, the Asylum Office rendered 172 decisions regarding 228 asylum seekers. Out of that number, 79 decisions regarding 118 asylum seekers were rejected in merits, while 7 decisions granting asylum to 7 asylum seekers were delivered in the same period. The asylum procedure was discontinued in 83 cases regarding 100 applicants, due to their absconding, while in 1 instance subsequent asylum application was declined in relation to 1 applicant. There was 1 inadmissibility decision.[155]

The first conclusion that can be drawn from these figures is that the total number of decisions in 2025 has increased in comparison to 2024. The total number of decisions increased by 12% in comparison to 2024.[156] Still, the trend from previous years has continued and the vast majority of applicants decided to abscond from the asylum procedure before the decision in the first instance was issued. This represents a total of 48% of all decisions rendered in 2025.

In 2025, it can be said that 86 merits decisions, issued in relation to 118 asylum seekers can be considered as relevant for analysis and better understanding of the quality and effectiveness of the asylum procedure, the practice with regards to certain nationalities, the grounds for persecution and the origin of the applicants. These 86 decisions were rendered in relation to asylum seekers from: Cuba (26), Russian Federation (21), Türkiye (16) Burundi (11), Syria (7), Belarus (6), Romania (5), Afghanistan (4), Kyrgizstan (4), Pakistan (4), Nigeria (2), China (2), Croatia (2), Armenia (2) and 1 from Iran, Cameroon, Tunis, Iraq, Kazakhstan, BiH, Sweden, Egypt, Algeria, Slovakia, Ukraine and Ireland.[157]

When it comes to decisions issued on the merits, it can be concluded that the rejection rate in 2025 was 92%, while the recognition rate was 8%. This represents a 4% decrease in recognition in comparison to 2024.^[158] In total, international protection was granted through 7 decisions (12%) encompassing 7 persons. Of these, refugee status was granted through 4 decisions and to citizens of Congo, Burundi, Iran and Ukraine (1 each), while the remaining 3 decisions were related to subsidiary protection granted to citizens of Syria (3).[159]

Most of the decisions were issued in 2024 in relation to citizens of Cuba – 17 regarding 26 applicants and of the Russian Federation – 16 regarding 22 applicants. Not a single positive decision was issued in relation to these two nationalities, including several political dissident from Cuba, genuine draft evaders from Russian Federation and LGBTQI+ activist from the same country.

The third highest number of decisions was issued in relation to 11 citizens of Burundi who were rejected on the merits through 8 decisions, except for one who was granted subsidiary prtection on the basis of family reunification. The fourth highest number of decisions was issued to citizens of Türkiye – 8 decisions issued in relation to 16 applicants and they were all negative and most of them were connected to members of religious minority group Ahmadi named Peace and Light.

According to the assessment of the author of this report, what is common for almost all Burundian and Cuban applications is that they were mainly based on vague allegations on the risks arising from political turmoil in their respective States. However, many Cubans simply claimed poor economical situation and destitute, while some of them referred to the opposition to the Cuban Government and the 2021 protests. Still, one political activist with genuine claim was rejected as a national security threat. The vast majority of Burundians claimed ethnic persecution as Tutsi minority and affiliation with opposition parties, but there were also claims which were solely based on economic reasons. Russian applicants mostly claimed opposition to the war, while several of them claimed staged criminal prosecution for non-political criminal offences. In general, most of the Burundian, Cuban and Russian Federation applicants had claims with extremely low level of credibility. Stil, at least 2 decisions were related to Russian draft evaders who had highly credible claims and who provided relevant evidence on invitation to serve in the military or to return to combat where they used to take part and were wounded.

Another significant group of applicants were from Syria – 7 decisions in relation to 7 applicants. Three of them were granted subsidiary protection on the basis of general insecurity and wide-spread violence, 3 were declared as national security risk, while 1 was rejected in merits due to the assessment of the Asylum Office that Latakia is not unsafe anymore and that there is no risk of military recruitment due to the end of the civil war.

A total of 6 decisions was issued in relation to 5 applicants from Afghanistan who all claimed risk of persecution by theTaliban. One artist was granted refugee status, one UaSC subsidiary protection, while two applicants were rejected in merits (one of them twice) and 1 was rejected as a threat to national security.

As for other nationalities, all of them were rejected except for 1 UaSC survivors of SGBV and human trafficking from Cameroon. Thus, asylum applications were rejected in relation to prima facie non-credible applicants from Germany, Croatia, Algeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Romania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Tunisia, Egypt, Nigeria, etc.

In a total of 10 decisions, the Asylum Office arbitrarily applied the national security grounds as a reason to reject asylum application, including in 3 extradition cases.  A family of 6 from Belarus was rejected on these grounds, as well as 3 nationals of Syria, 2 applicants from Pakistan and 1 from Cuba, Russian Federation, Kyrgizstan and Afghanistan were rejected on national security grounds.[160]

Overview of the Asylum Office decisions in 2025

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Even though a significant number of the first instance decisions in 2025 were related to applicants with low credibility, the quality of the decision-making process still suffers from deficiencies which were reported in previous years, but with several examples of good practices.^[161] The major problem remains the excessive and unnecessary length of the first instance procedure, but also examples which manifest the contradicting practice in similar or identical cases. The Asylum Office rendered only 7 decisions in relation to 7 applicants, granting them asylum. Still, in those cases where the Asylum Office granted refugee status or subsidiary protection, the following can be observed:

• The Asylum Office was, in the reasoning of its decisions, clearly took into consideration the fact that legal representatives submitted written CoI submissions indicating individual and general risks of persecution or other serious harm in countries of origin or third countries. These submissions contained data on individual circumstances and facts, but also findings compiled in credible reports published by UNHCR, EUAA, UN Treaty bodies, UN Special Procedures, Amnesty International and others (CoI);
• The reasoning of decisions contains the citations of credible reports taken into consideration by the Asylum Office proprio motu and occasional reliance on the general principles of the ECtHR, and in some cases even more concrete cases which correspond to individual circumstances of the applicant;
• The safe third country concept was not applied in any of decisions rendered in 2025;
• It also took into account the decision of the Centre for the Protection of the Survivors of Trafficking (CHTV) in human beings on granting refugee status to a human trafficking survivor in one case.

What is common for most of the cases in which the Asylum Office granted refugee or subsidiary protection to the applicants is the fact that first instance procedure lasted more than 1 year on average. This is completely unacceptable for the most vulnerable applicants such as UASC, SGBV survivors and survivors of human trafficking. At the same time, the excessive length of the asylum procedure for applicants coming from Syria or Afghanistan also lacks proper justification, taking into consideration the clarity of the situation in these countries as well as the position of UNHCR on returns to these countries, or EUAA Guidelines. Still, one UaSC and SGBV and survivor of trafficking in human beings from Cameroon was granted refugee status within 3,5 months, which should be considered as positive.[162]  In this decision, the Asylum Office took into consideration the report of the CHTV which recognised that the applicant was a survivor of sexual exploitation which was also recognised as an act of persecution. In the same decision, the Asylum Office took into account BID from the CSW.

As outlined above, the Asylum Office granted subsidiary protection to three applicants from Syria on the basis of the state of general insecurity, which can be observed in the above Table. The reasoning of said decisions was more or less the same indicating the state of general insecurity and widespread violence around the country. On the other hand, as it was the case in 2023, three Syrian nationals were rejected on national security grounds and through decisions which did not contain a description of the facts leading to such a decision and which would allow the applicants to dispute this assessment.^[163]

Until 2021, all Syrian applicants examined on the merits were granted asylum, but this kind of practice stopped since then due to an arbitrary application of security assessments. In December 2025, the Asylum Office issued for the first time decision in which a Syrian applicant was rejected on the basis of the assessment that his return to Syria would be safe.[164] In all positive cases where mostly subsidiary protection was granted, it can be seen that the practice of the Asylum Office still largely reflects, for instance, UNHCR moratorium on returns to Syria,^[165] or the current stance of the ECtHR when it comes to the risks of treatment contrary to Article 2 and 3 of ECHR in case of removal to Syria.^[166] Nevertheless, the number of Syrian applicants in Serbia remains low. It remains to be seen if the December 2025 decision represents the new standing of the Asylum Office and with regards to safety in Syria.

The refugee status granted to an Afghani artist represents a good sign, recognizing the category of persons who disagree with strict interpterion of the Sharia laws imposed by Taliban,[167] as well as the decision on granting subsidiary protection to an Afghan UASC.[168] Still, other Afghani applicants were rejected despite the fact that they also expressed dissatisfaction with the Taliban regime, outline evidence on connection with prior State structures and proving that they were outside Afghanistan for more than 10 years, as it was the case in the ECtHR judgment D.M. v. Sweden.[169]

Regardless of the above stated examples of good practice, the 2025 practice indicates that the quality of the credibility assessment remained on more or less the same level as in 2024. Thus, there are many serious concerns which indicate that the Serbian asylum procedure should not be considered as fair and efficient, and in most of the cases with sufficient level of credibility for international protection from 2024, the following problems have been identified:

• the contradicting practice in similar or identical cases;
• reluctance to grant refugee status (but rather granting subsidiary protection status), even though from the reasoning of the decision it is clear that the first instance authority has acknowledged and accepted the facts which indicate the existence of one of the 5 grounds for persecution;
• extensive length of the first instance asylum procedure which has a discouraging effect on applicant’s will to remain in Serbia;
• the inconsistent quality of the decision-making process between different asylum officers;
• not all the facts and evidence (individual or general) submitted by the applicant and the legal representative are taken into consideration, and the substance of the decision lacks an explanation as why these arguments are not deemed as credible, especially in decisions on rejection.
• the burden of proof for certain applicants, especially those coming from Burundi and Russian Federation, but also SGBV survivors and LGBTQI+ applicants has been established too high, undermining the principle of in dubio pro reo;
• disregarding of psychosocial reports, medical evidence but also Istanbul Protocol reports drafted in some of the cases.
• the national security grounds were invoked on 10 occasions depriving applicants of the possibility to challenge the negative decisions due to the lack of access to the facts which allegedly indicate that their presence on the Serbian soil represents a security threat.

In 2025, the Asylum Office issued 79 decisions rejecting 118 persons on the merits. First of all, it is important to outline that each year the Asylum Office delivers decisions in relation to applicants whose claims are prima facie not founded. That was the case with at least 45 decisions which were analysed by the author of this report and which were mainly related to citizens of Cuba and Burundi, but also citizens of Germany, Romania, Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Tunis, Croatia, Slovakia, Sweden, and Ireland, and several applications lodged by the citizens of Russian Federation (see the Table above). Also, a total of 10 rejection decisions were based on the arbitrary and negative security assessment, which will be analysed separately.

Another category of decisions belonged to applicants who invoked risks which cannot be excluded as realistic, but their individual circumstances and lack of any evidence apart from their statement which in general way indicates to issues available in publicly available reports, was objectively not sufficient for granting of international protection. That was the case with several decisions in which applicants from the Russian Federation were rejected even though they claimed their disagreement with the ongoing aggression against Ukraine or vague risks of forced recruitment[170] or they lodged their asylum application during an extradition procedure even though the grounds were weak.[171]

There were more cases of Armenian citizens who fled Nagorno Karabagh and who claimed currently the non-existing risk of military mobilizations and dispatchment to this area to take part in armed conflict.[172]

In 2025, the practice with regards to Burundian applicants, who continued to be represent a significant number of decisions rendered on the merits, continue to indicate to serious problems related to the credibility assessment of the Asylum Office. It should be repeated that the free-visa regime has triggered mixed migration influx of Burundians, coming directly to Belgrade airport. This also means that a significant number of Burundian applicants made unfounded claims which were aimed at legalising their stay in Serbia. However, Burundi is a country which has an extremely poor human rights record and in which the Tutsi ethnic minority has been persecuted in numerous ways, including through enforced disappearances, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, arbitrary detentions, incommunicado, killings, different acts of sexual violence, etc.^[173] One of the vulnerable groups are also members of opposition parties, but also their family members, journalists, NGO workers, etc. The existence of risks of these categories has been determined in many positive decisions, first one dating back to 2017.^[174] The reasoning and evidence taken as credible in these decisions serves as an example of good practice, but in many other cases that was not the case and there was an almost completely contradictory interpretation of risks. For that reason, an overview of the practice for the period 2022-2025 can better reflect the author’s standing.

In January 2022, a family composed of five people (mother and 4 children) who did not have a legal representative was rejected on the merits. The claim was based on the mother’s risk of political persecution linked to the alleged disappearance of her husband. Her claims were assessed as not credible.^[175] In June 2022, Mr. E.X. was rejected one the merits even though he had provided an entire set of individual evidence to the Asylum Office which testified to his political and ethnic persecution (member of the opposition party and ethnic Tutsi). He submitted his opposition party membership card, letters from his former employer, letter from several members of political party to which he belonged, as well as a witness letter from his neighbour on problems that he has faced with the paramilitary group Imbonerakure and official authorities. Without trying to question any of the witnesses, and without providing substantive reasoning why this individual evidence was not declared as credible, the Asylum Office rejected E.X. on the merits.^[176] A similar case was reported in September 2022, when the Asylum Office rejected to take into consideration the possibility of testimony of distinguished human rights activist from Burundi who offered to corroborate allegations made by the applicants on the risks of persecution which arose from his actions as journalist.^[177] In both of these decisions the Asylum Office selectively cited CoI which outline positive developments in Burundi, while CoI lodged by legal representatives was summarily disregarded without any detailed reasoning. In other words, these two decisions are typical examples of the unacceptably high burden of proof set out by the Asylum Office, selective citation of relevant CoI and attitude which implies that asylum seekers from certain country will be assessed as credible only if they have suffered and survived serious act of persecution, while the genuine and substantiated risk of such act will be declared non-credible. This also represents an example of cases in which asylum officers have not correctly applied the principle of in-dubio pro reo.

A similar decision was issued in relation to a young woman from Burundi who was diagnosed with several psychological disorders which, according to her testimony, were results of serious forms of ill-treatment (including sexual) which prompted her fleeing her country of origin. The psychologist following her case did not exclude that the symptoms displayed could have arisen from such treatment. However, and due to unclear claims during the course of asylum interview, her application was rejected. Despite the lack of individual evidence to substantiate her claim, the applicant repeatedly provided specific details of the alleged ill-treatment. In other words, there was no physical evidence which could either prove or rebut the alleged ill-treatment, except for a psychological report indicating that such possibility was quite high. The described acts of ill-treatment correspond to numerous COI reports, but once again, the opportunity to grant international protection in cases where there is doubt was missed again.^[178] This also means that lack of in dubio pro reo application is dangerous and could have irreparable consequences on applicants who, due to circumstances of their case, cannot offer individual evidence. This woman was granted refugee status in Austria.[179]

If we compare the above-described decisions with several others, in which the Asylum Office granted asylum to citizens of Burundi, it can be easily seen that the practice has shifted and is inconsistent. In other instances, the Asylum Office granted refugee status to nationals from Burundi who had faced serious human rights violations or recognised there was a risk of persecution even if it had not materialised through concrete acts, based on available COI and on an assessment regarding the personal characteristics of the asylum seeker, even when evidence was lacking. This is not the case anymore.

In 2023, 14 decisions rejecting asylum applications concerning 22 applicants originating from Burundi were delivered. What is important to note is that credibility assessment in these decisions was conducted to a very limited extent. All these decisions cited identical COI such as UNHCR factsheets on repatriation to Burundi which are not CoI. This kind of approach indicates the clear pattern of complete disregarding of the responsibility to individually assess each and every asylum claim. Such decisions continued to be rendered in 2024, and were related to members of civil society,[180] FNL opposition party,[181] MSD opposition party[182] and individuals who were allegedly persecuted due to political activities of their family members.[183] In none of the said cases the Asylum Office was simply not able to dispute allegations of the applicants who provided membership cards, witness statements, pictures and other individual evidence. In combination with available CoI and the previous practice in later years, it was hardly possible to reject these applications if the principle of the benefit of the doubt was properly applied.

It is important to reiterate that the practice with regards to SGBV survivors from Burundi where the Asylum Office flagrantly failed apply the principle in dubio pro reo: 1) a rape survivor who arrived with her family to Serbia and who was rejected twice even though she provided medical evidence from Burundi;^[184] 2) a rape survivor who provided medical documentation from her country of origin, together with a psychological and Istanbul Protocol report which corroborated her claim (she was later on granted refugee status in Belgium);^[185] 3) a rape survivor who provided medical documentation from Burundi and whose lawyers also provided psychiatric and psychological reports which also corroborated her claim.^[186] Another woman from Burundi also claimed SGBV and provided evidence of imprisonment. The most striking circumstance in this case was the fact that she gave a birth to a baby boy who was granted refugee status on the basis of his father’s status, but she was not included in this decision. This represents the flagrant violation of the principle of family unity.^[187] Regardless, by citing the above-outlined UNHCR factsheets, Asylum Office resorted to unusual practice which implies citation of the Home Office Guidance which is related to UK travellers to Burundi and instruction what they should do if they become victims of rape or sexual assault.^[188] This source describes the legal framework of Burundi but does not provide any information on its effectiveness, which is the fact that must be taken into account in line with Article 30 and 32 of the Asylum Act. This source cannot be considered as CoI and the fact that Asylum Office simply cites this source indicate the aspiration of this body to reject Burundian applicants at any cost. On the other hand, the latest CoI on Burundi contained in three credible UN sources published in 2023 are simply disregarded – Human Rights Committee,^[189] Committee against Torture^[190] and the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation in Burundi.^[191] Thus, these 5 decisions represent extremely bad examples of practice which clearly indicates the poor credibility assessment of the Asylum Office and poor work of the CoI department within this body.

In 2024, and with regards to two SGBV applicants from Burundi, the Asylum Office continued with the above-described practice rejecting applications of women who provided an entire set of individual evidence, including in one case expert opinion of a psychosocial expert on incest (who was rejected again in 2025 after the case was referred back by the Asylum Commission),[192] but also women who provided medical documentation which describes therapy and treatment which is universally provided to rape survivors.[193] Alongside a copy paste citation of UNHCR factsheets on repatriation to Burundi and the Home Office Guidance (disregarding the above enlisted CoI provided by legal representatives), these two decisions continue to indicate the automatic approach towards Burundian applicants, lack of individualized assessment of evidence provided and practice which represents more of a pattern of behaviour with identical formulations, then rigorous and genuine assessment of individual facts of the case.[194] Two more Burundian women who claimed milder forms of SGBV were rejected in 2025.[195]

While discussing the evaluation of cases of SGBV survivors, it is important to also mention relevant cases from previous years and in order to depict the continuation of the negative practice. In April 2022, for the second time, the Asylum Office rejected a social activist for women rights from Iran.^[196] In her application, she explained, inter alia, that she refused to wear the hijab, that she wanted to work in the modelling business and that she was arrested on several occasions. Even if the 2021 decisions can be taken as justified due to the insufficient lack of individual evidence, although highly unlikely in this case, the recent events which took place in Iran undoubtedly qualify these kind of applications as founded.^[197] This decision represents a negative continuation of the practice regarding SGBV cases from Iran. In January 2020, the Asylum Office rejected an application on the merits concerning a mother and daughter from Iran, who were obvious victims of gender-based violence and whose serious psychological state, confirmed in PIN’s report, accompanied by other evidence compiled in CoI submissions created a strong and credible asylum claim.^[198] Before this decision, the Asylum Office applied on two occasions the safe third country concept in relation to Türkiye. After both decisions were overturned by the Asylum Commission, the Asylum Office decided to reject application on the merits. The mother and daughter eventually decided to leave Serbia. This case lasted for more than two years, several hearings took place, and several lawyers changed. Without any doubt, this case was permeated with acts which caused secondary traumatisation. Even though the mother had visible injuries and scars from the alleged violence, forensic medical examination was never conducted by either the Asylum Office or one of several legal representatives.

One decision from the end of 2020 which concerned an SGBV survivor and her two children from Türkiye also goes in favour of the general assessment that practice with regards to SGBV applicants varies and is unpredictable.^[199] What represents an additional aggravating circumstance is the fact that the lawyer in the case of Somali applicant failed to lodge a complaint within the 15-day deadline. This has led to the dismissal of the lawyer’s appeal by the Asylum Commission and the applicant is now facing potentially several years of procedural struggle to have her case re-examined in merits.^[200]

Several more decisions related to applicants from Burundi deserve special attention. In one of the cases, the applicant provided clear and individual evidence on his involvement in the CSO Focode who started the campaign Ndondenza dealing with enforced disappearances, several witness statements and relevant reports, but was rejected alongside the rest of his family and despite CoI which went into his favour.^[201] Similar cases were recorded with regards to the members of opposition parties CNL and MSD, but also activists and journalists.^[202]

When it comes nationals of the Russian Federation, two cases deserve special attention and not necessarily because the applicants have highly credible claims, but mainly due to the fact that the CoI assessment has been inadequate. Namely, in both cases, applicants claimed risk of military recruitment. The most credible CoI report was published by the EUAA, but the Asylum Office failed to even mention the report in its reasoning, citing only several media reports which do not even discuss the legal framework, but also the practice of military recruitment.^[203] Still, one case deserves a special attention because it is related to a man who fled with his family after he received an invitation to report to military headquarters in the area where he lived.  The applicant’s fear is based on the fact that Russian Federation made amendments to its legal framework in order to increase penalties for draft evasion. During his interview, the applicant provided a detailed statement of the risks to which people who received a summon such as his face in terms of recruitment and his legal representatives provided detailed CoI which also reflects EUAA report. Still, their asylum application was rejected in the same manner as 2023 applications without any reflection on EUAA report which recognises the applicants as a persons eligible for mobilisation.[204] This decisions again highlights high evidentiary threshold.

In 2022, apart from one LGBTQI+ applicant from Cuba who received subsidiary protection, but who also has a serious medical condition, all other LGBTQI+ applicants were rejected on the merits. Thus, and even though the Asylum Office rendered positive decisions in relation to LGBTQI applicants in the past, the past five years have shown that LGBTQI+ asylum seekers fleeing from a country in which they are criminalised or discriminated against have no prospect of success, unless they survived serious acts of persecution. In other words, the risk of persecution is solely assessed from the perspective of past experience which, if it is not based on actual physical attack, arrest, detention or any other harmful practice, would most likely lead to negative decisions.

The case of Mr. X. from Bangladesh, who left his country of origin because of his sexual orientation, but also religious beliefs (atheist) was rejected again in February 2022.^[205] The case was referred back from the Administrative Court to the first instance authority. The applicant was targeted by an extremist student organisation, which further led to him being forced to quit his studies. He was not able to address the Bangladeshi authorities for protection due to a discriminatory legal framework which penalises LGBTQI+ people. He was also raped, and his boyfriend committed suicide,^[206] but it is not clear from the available sources if he was subjected to expert assessments for the purpose of the asylum procedure. Another decision is related to another long-lasting case of a gay man from Burundi, whose asylum claim was initially dismissed on the basis that Uganda was the first asylum country.^[207] After his case was referred back to the first instance, his asylum application was rejected in merits.^[208] It is important to note that Burundi also criminalises same sex partnerships.^[209] And finally, in December 2022, a Moroccan gay man was rejected on the merits, but since the author of the report did not have access to a copy of the decision, it is not possible to elaborate more on its reasoning. What can be safely said is that same-sex sexual activity is prohibited under the Moroccan Penal Code of 1962, which criminalises ‘lewd or unnatural acts’.^[210]

It is also worth mentioning again the case of the gay man from Congo who escaped his former partner’s family who wanted to kill him, but also abuse from his own family. His boyfriend was killed, and his mother provided a letter of testimony confirming said incidents.^[211] This, as well as numerous CoI reports were declined as relevant evidence by the Asylum Office. The case of a gay man from Iran who was raped, abused and who was questioned by the police as a suspect for committing a criminal offence which implies sexual acts between men is also noteworthy, especially because his asylum claim was rejected with a final decision of the Administrative Court in 2023.^[212] The applicant, in his procedure, provided an entire set of evidence, including the court summon which ensued after the arrest during which he was questioned about his sexual orientation. The reasoning of the Asylum Office from 2021 gives serious reasons for concern taking into consideration the Criminal Code of Iran, individual problems that the applicants faced and relevant CoI. This decision is still a perfect example of how the first instance authority in some cases can cite CoI which goes in favour of negative decisions but completely disregards CoI which clearly indicates the risks of persecution of LGBTQI+ applicants from Iran. Moreover, even though the Asylum Office failed to take relevant CoI into consideration proprio motu, the applicant’s legal representatives provided an entire set of relevant reports which confirm the existence of the events and incidents which were experienced by the applicant.^[213]

In two other, separate decisions from 2020,^[214] which concerned a gay couple from Tunisia, the first instance authority rejected their applications as unfounded, considering that the state of human rights of LGBTQI+ in Tunisia has been significantly improving throughout the years, emphasising the fact that even one of the presidential candidates openly declared to be gay. However, the Asylum Office disregarded the fact that the Tunisian legal framework still allows ‘forced anal examination’ of people ‘suspected to be gay’ and criminalises homosexuality in its Criminal Code, prescribing a prison sentence of up to 5 years. The fact that both applicants were detained by the Tunisian police on several occasions on suspicion that they were gay was not disputed by the Asylum Office but was assessed as ‘not serious enough’ since both applicants avoided anal examination and were afforded lawyers. This interpretation gives serious reasons for concern since the threshold for persecution was set too high, and the Asylum Office failed to acknowledge that the very fact that someone who is suspected to be a gay can be taken in police custody, in combination with the risk of anal examination and criminal charges, undoubtedly amounts to persecution. Both of these cases were taken to the Strasbourg Court by applicant’s legal representatives and they are yet to be communicated.^[215]

In 2024, the Asylum Office decided to deviate from its practice established in the case of a Cuban gay man who had serious medical conditions and who was granted subsidiary protection in 2022.[216] In three identical cases, but which contained expert opinions of medica specialist for immunology Asylum Office, without providing why it has changed its standing, rejected in merits all three applications.[217] These three decisions contradict the well-established practice which implied that persons with serious medical conditions who cannot receive treatment in their countries of origin and which can lead to lead to a severe, rapid and irreversible deterioration of health[218] and would further cause intense suffering, significantly shorten life expectancy and lead to death that would occur under horrific circumstances.[219]

Finally, in 2024, there were two contradicting decisions with regards to Burundian LGBTQI+ applicants. In one case described above, the applicant was granted refugee status and his family was marked as actor of persecution which could not have been prevented due to Burundian legal framework which criminalises same sex partnerships.[220] An almost identical case resulted in rejection, highlighting once again the lack of consistency and predictability of the practice.[221]

In 2025, the Asylum Office rejected a gay activist from the Russian Federation who also criticized the aggression against Ukraine and other segments of work of the current Government. He was posting poems and texts online and distributed widely his views, falling in that way under several provision of the Criminal Code which are incriminating LGBQTI+ persons and views, as well as criticism of the Government and of the war in Ukraine.[222] Another LGBQTI+ Chinese applicant was rejected in 2025.[223]

Thus, the decisions issued in 2020, 2021, 2022,.2023, 2024 and 2025 indicated that the Asylum Office has been departing from a very decent practice with regards to LGBTIQI+ applicants established back in 2013, when a Turkish gay couple was granted refugee status due to systemic discrimination and violence faced in different places of residency.^[224] The Turkish legal framework is far more favourable than the Tunisian, Iranian, Russian or Bangladeshi, but the interpretation of the Asylum Office from 8 years ago appears to be much more progressive than in several more recent decisions. In combination with another contentious decision regarding a transgender applicant from Iran rendered in 2019,^[225] the practice of the first instance authority regarding LGBTQI+ claims appear to have seriously deteriorated in the past few years. Thus, the recognition rate of LGBTQI+ applicants in 2022 was 25%, and one positive decision is primarily based on medical grounds (serious illness) and then on LGBTQI+ part of the claim which was taken into consideration.

It is also important to note that rejection rate of Afghan nationals who claimed that they were working or were affiliated with family members who used to work for State authorities before Taliban return to power was of 100% in 2023, but also 2025.[226] Two applications were rejected due to lack of credibility indicating that Asylum Office deterred from previous practice but also from the UNHCR moratorium on returns to Afghanistan.^[227] In 2024, for the third time, an Afghan UASC (at the moment of applying for asylum), was rejected on the grounds that Pakistan was country of habitual residence, even though he has spent most of his life without ID, access to social and economic human rights and in constant risk of expulsion to Afghanistan where he could be recruited by the Taliban.[228]

In 2025, an Afghan man, who left his country of origin as an unaccompanied boy in 2015 was rejected in merits. He left his country because of the Taliban and is afraid to go back because he disagrees with the way of life which is carved by stricket interpretations of Shari Law.[229]

In 2023, national security grounds were invoked in the cases of 2 Syrian nationals,^[230] 1 Afghan applicant^[231] and applicant from Ukraine,^[232] as well as applicants from Brazil.^[233] The common feature of all decisions is that reasoning of such decisions does not contain any elements of facts which could potentially indicate reasons why the BIA declared the applicants to be a national security threat. When it comes to applicants from Ukraine and Brazil, they were both in extradition procedure as well. In 2024, the number of such decisions increased to 9 (see the above Table). This practice is concerning, as it undermines the possibility to access an effective remedy for applicants who receive a negative security assessment, while the number of decisions (5) in comparison to previous years has increased. In 2025, 10 applications were rejected in relation to citizen of Belarus (6), Syria (3), Pakistan (2), Afghanistan (1), Cuba (1), Russian Federation (1), Kirgizstan (1) and Kazakhstan (1). Particularly worrying are cases of a Cuban political activist who has a similar profile as his compatriots who were granted international protection in 2023,[234] and a Belarus family which has clear political stand against the current regime in their country or origin.

A particularly worrying decision concerns a Ukrainian-Russian Federation couple with two children who were rejected in merits. The reasoning of the decision is impossible to explain, since it provides that the husband, who is Ukrainian, will not face any risks in his country or origin (despite Serbia granting temporary protection to thousands of Ukrainians), but also in the Russian Federation where he used to live with his family, even though he is against the war and belongs to the category of able-bodied man. This decision clearly indicates that Russian Federation citizens cannot obtain international protection at any cost in Serbia, even if they meet the requirements for family reunification with a Ukrainian citizen. In other words, asylum authorities of Serbia would rather reject a Ukrainian applicant, then grant international protection to a Russian citizen.[235] Two more decisions related to Russian Federation applicants who fall under the category of draft evaders corroborate this standing. The first one received an invitation to register for military conscription and fled his country with family,[236] while the other one was recruited, took part in the war, was wounded and fled when he was supposed to go back.[237] The later one provided complete military and medical documentation, but of no avail. If all these decisions, in combination with the LGBTQI+ applicant from Russia (see above), are observed cumulatively, it is clear that Russian asylum applicants do not have any prospect of obtaining international protection in Serbia and this stance is rather political than based on refugee and asylum framework.

In 2022, the Asylum Office rejected 3 Turkish applicants on the merits, confirming that it is basically impossible to obtain international protection for nationals fleeing this country. However, a decision issued in February related to a person who wanted to avoid extradition for a petty crime, as opposed to a political offence or other reasons which could indicate the risk of persecution. Thus, according to the author of this report, it is safe to say that one of these three decisions is justified and that the conclusion of the Asylum Office was correct – avoiding or procrastinating extradition.^[238] One of the cases was related to the member of the Gulenist movement, while the other one on the case of Ecevit Piroglu. Both cases resulted in procedures before CAT and both applicants are facing extradition to Türkiye.^[239] In 2023, Asylum Office rejected the asylum application of a member of HDP party, contributing further to the practice which indicates that Turkish nationals who claim asylum for reasons of political persecution cannot obtain international protection in Serbia.^[240] In 2025, all Turkish asylum applications were rejected, mostly in relation to members of the religious minority group Ahmadi. Thus, recognition rate for Turkish citizens remains 0%.

Prioritised examination and fast-track processing

No caseloads are prioritised as a matter of law or practice.

Personal interview

The interview in the regular procedure is regulated by Article 37 of the Asylum Act. The interview should take place at the earliest time possible. More specifically, the interview must be conducted within the period of 3 months during which the Asylum Office has to issue and deliver to the applicant and their legal representatives the first instance decision. The applicant is interviewed about all the facts and circumstances relevant to deciding on their application and particularly to establish their identity, the grounds for their asylum application, and their travel routes after leaving the country of origin or habitual residence, and whether the asylum seeker had previously sought asylum in any other country.^[241]

An authorised officer of the Asylum Office may interview the applicant on more than one occasion in order to establish the facts.^[242] In the situation where a large number of asylum applications has been lodged to the extent that the authorised officers of the Asylum Office are not able to interview all the applicants in due time, the Asylum Act provides that the Government may, at the request of the competent authority, decide on temporary involvement in the interviewing process of officers from other departments of the competent authority or officers from other authorities.^[243] However, although prescribed that they must undergo the necessary training before engaging in the process, it remains unclear whether this training can provide such officers with the sufficient level of knowledge as required for interviewing applicants given the specific characteristics of the asylum procedure. This possibility has never been applied in practice.

All interviews are conducted individually (especially in cases of families) by a person of same the gender as the applicant, and excluding young children who are formally included in their parents’ applications. During the interviews with UASC, social workers or temporary guardians are always present.

In practice, asylum officers are rarely prepared for the interviews, including in relation to relevant CoI (which is later on displayed in the reasoning of decisions), failing first of all to properly identify and address vulnerabilities. This means that legal representation at first instance is still crucial, as lawyers usually inform asylum officers of existing vulnerabilities and of potential traumatic reactions during the interview are announced. There were also instances in which asylum interviews were postponed due to poor mental health state affecting some of the most vulnerable applicants.^[244]

The Asylum Act also specifies three situations in which the asylum interview may be omitted:^[245]

1. A decision may be adopted upholding the application and granting the right to asylum on the basis of the available evidence;
2. The applicant is unable to give a statement due to circumstances of non-temporary nature beyond their control. In this case, it is possible for the applicant or a member of their family to adduce evidence and give statements relevant to deciding on their asylum application.^[246] This option was applied for the first time in 2021 in relation to an Afghan UASC who was not able to take part in the interview procedure due to his health condition which implies that he is immobile and not able to talk.^[247] He was granted subsidiary protection;
3. The admissibility of a Subsequent Application is being

As previously mentioned, an applicant is entitled to request that an interview be conducted by a person of a specific gender. The same rule applies to interpreters.^[248] In practice, asylum seekers often wait from several weeks to several months following the lodging of their application for an interview to be scheduled. A 4-member Afghan family who lodged their asylum applications on 30 August 2021 had their asylum interview in 7 July 2022. A single mother with two children from Syria lodged their asylum application in August 2021, and were interviewed in February 2022. There were also examples of good practice in which Burundian SGBV survivor lodged an asylum application on 15 March, was interviewed on 27 April and was granted refugee status 29 June 2022.^[249] In 2023, asylum interviews rarely took place before the expiry of three-months deadline, unless it is clear that asylum application is prima facie not credible (see the Table above on the overview of the Asylum Office practice in 2023). In 2024, the extensive length between the interview and the asylum application remained the rule. For instance, a Russian family was questioned on 17 November 2023, and they lodged asylum application on 29 March 2023.[250] A Burundian SGBV survivor had lodged her asylum application on 26 April 2023, and had her asylum interview on 3 April 2024, almost a year after.[251] The examples in which the interview took place soon after the asylum application was made was mostly in relation to national security cases. For instance, a Turkish political activist lodged his asylum application on 10 July 2024, had his asylum interview on 31 July 2024 and was rejected on the basis of the national security grounds on 16 September 2024.

In 2025, Asylum Office facilitated  the record 152 asylum interviews: Russian Federation (26), Türkiye (22), Cuba (18), Pakistan (13), Syria (11), Burundi (9), Belarus (7), Iraq (6), Palestine (3), Siera Leona (3), Egypt (3), China (3), Armenia (3), Ukraine (2), Germany (2), Gambia (2), Iran (2), Jamaica (2) and 1 from Bulgaria, India, Ireland, Cameroon, Kyrgizstan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, DR Congo, Nigeria, Slovakia, Swaziland and Sweden.

There were no instances in which asylum interviews were conducted through video conferencing, including during the COVID-19 preventive measures in 2020. There were at least two instances in which witnesses of applicants in the asylum procedure were interviewed via the Skype application, in line with Article 111 of GAPA which provides for such a possibility. One case has been concluded due to the applicant’s absconding,^[252] while the other one resulted in a positive decision regarding a UASC from Iran.^[253] No major problems were recorded with regards to video conferencing, but it is clear that this practice is rarely applied and it is yet to be seen whether problems will arise in the future. As outlined, there were no video questioning in 2024.

The total number of asylum interviews in the period 2020-2025

Interpretation

An applicant who does not understand the official language of the asylum procedure shall be provided free interpretation services into their native language, or a language that they can understand, including the use of sign language and Braille materials.^[254]

The costs of interpretation are covered by UNHCR, and the interpreters are hired from their list which covers the following languages: English (19), Farsi (10), French (10), Arabic (8), Russian (7), Turkish (5), Spanish (4), Kurdish (3),  Bulgarian (2), Chinese (2), Urdu (2), German (2), Greek (2), Georgian (2), Bulgarian (2) and Kirundi (2) and Ukrainian (2). One interpreter is also available for each of the following languages: Armenian, Hindu, Hungarian, Italian, Macedonian, Portuguese, Pashto, Polish, Romanian and Swahili.

When it comes to the practice, there were several instances in which CSO lawyers decided to halt the interview because of the interpreters’ incompetence and inability to establish effective communication with the applicants. Afterwards, the CSO requested their removal from the list, which was done by the UNHCR. There were several other instances in which lawyers failed to react and which had damaging consequences for the applicant. Such was the case of an Afghan boy who, according to his testimony given to his legal guardian, did not understand an interpreter for Farsi. His asylum application was rejected in the first instance,^[255] and the decision was upheld by the Asylum Commission.^[256] It remains to be seen if flaws in interpretation will be taken into consideration by the Administrative Court. One interpreter for Kirundi was removed from the list because of his affiliation with the Burundian Government. In 2022, an incompetent interpreter for Spanish was removed after a series of inadequate and imprecise interpretations in Cuban applications.^[257] There were no instances in which interpreters were removed from the list in 2024 and 2025, even though there were complaints by asylum seekers that they were not able to communicate properly or to understand them.

Recording and report

At the end of the interview, the records are signed by the asylum seeker, their legal representative, the interpreter and the official leading the interview.^[258] The asylum seekers’ legal representatives are entitled to ask additional questions to ensure comprehensive establishment of the facts of the case.

The minutes are read by the legal representative and asylum seeker before they are printed out and signed jointly with the acting asylum officer. It is also possible to make clarifications and corrections, but also to raise issues of disagreement and complaint on the acting asylum officer.

The original copies of the minutes are surrendered to the applicant and their legal representative upon conclusion of the interview. There were no instances in which it was reported that minutes from the asylum interview were inconsistent with the content of the interview.

The interview is not electronically recorded by either audio or video means.

Appeal

Appeal before the Asylum Commission

Appeals against Asylum Office decisions are reviewed by the Asylum Commission, a body comprising nine members appointed to four-year terms in office by the Government.^[259] Asylum Commission members must be a citizen of the Republic of Serbia, have a university degree in law, a minimum of five years of work experience, and must have an ‘understanding’ of human rights law.^[260] The last requirement gives a lot of reasons for concern, since none of the members fulfil this criterion. The only person who met this criterion was a professor of International Human Rights Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Belgrade who resigned in 2019 and was later replaced by the professor of Constitutional Law from the Criminal-Police Academy for whom it can be assumed that he possesses knowledge on human rights. Still, it is clear, and the practice of this body since the beginning of the asylum system in Serbia has shown, that members of the Asylum Commission are simply not qualified to apply international refugee law and international human rights law and that their knowledge mainly lies in the field of Administrative Law. Although the asylum procedure is administrative by nature, it requires the capacity of decision makers to conduct assessments of the risks of refoulement ex nunc, proprio motu and with rigorous scrutiny, to conduct interviews with vulnerable applicants and to apply the principle of in dubio pro reo. None of these features have been reflected in the 15 year-practice of the Asylum Commission.

An appeal to the Asylum Commission automatically suspends the enforcement of the first instance decision and it must be submitted within 15 days from the delivery of the decision.^[261] The first instance decision may be challenged for the following reasons which are relevant for the asylum procedure:

• lack or flawed application of the Law, other regulation or general act in the first instance decision;
• incompetent authority in charge of the first instance decision;
• incorrectly or incompletely established factual grounds;
• flawed conclusion derived from the established factual grounds;
• violation of the rules of the administrative procedure.^[262]

New facts and evidence may be presented in the appeal, but the appellant is obliged to explain why they did not present them in the first instance procedure.^[263] This provision is often relied on in second instance decisions when applicants, mainly due to poor quality work by their legal representatives, invoke or provide new evidence which they had failed to provide in the course of the first instance procedure. The Asylum Commission appears to be very rigorous in examining new facts and evidence in the appeal stage and limits the scope of its work to the framework established in the asylum application and during the asylum interview before the Asylum Office. This is especially unfavourable for legally incompetent applicants who initiate the asylum procedure by themselves. However, it is important to note that many evidence and facts should be gathered by the asylum authorities proprio motu, especially CoI reports and other general circumstances, and regardless of the efforts of legal representatives and the quality of their work. The practice has shown that this is rarely the case.

The appeal must be submitted to the Asylum Office in a sufficient number of copies for the Asylum Commission and the opposing party.^[264] The Asylum Office then examines if an appeal is timely, allowed in accordance with the GAPA rules of procedure and if it is lodged by an authorised person. If the Asylum Office determines any of the above-enlisted deficiencies, an appeal will be dismissed.^[265] Against such decision, appeal is also possible, but the practice has shown little prospect of success.

According to the author’s knowledge, there were two instances in which appeal against the first instance decisions were not timely lodged, which was the reason why the appeal was dismissed by the Asylum Office. Later on, legal representatives tried to justify their untimely lodging of the appeal before the Asylum Commission,^[266] and also Administrative Court,^[267] but without a success. Both decisions became final and the SGBV survivor from Somalia and the applicant from Burundi were denied the possibility to have their cases examined on the merits.

Also, the GAPA envisages that the Asylum Office might uphold the appeal without referring the case to the Asylum Commission if it determines that arguments from the appeal are founded^[268] and issue a new decision which annuls the initial decisions and contains a new one. It is also possible that the Asylum Office supplements the procedure with additional asylum interviews or other evidentiary activity which it deems necessary.^[269] However, there was not a single case in the practice of the Asylum Office in which this legal avenue has been used.

If an appeal is not dismissed, the Asylum Office will refer the case files to the second instance body within 15 days from the receipt of the appeal and will also provide its response to the arguments, facts and evidence outlined in the appeal.^[270] What is important to note is that the response of the Asylum Office is not delivered to the applicant and/or his legal representatives, but the summary of response is only outlined in the reasoning of the Asylum Commission. In this way, the applicant is not able to provide additional views and arguments vis-à-vis the Asylum Office’s response.

The Asylum Act does not specify the duration of the second instance procedure. However, the GAPA stipulates that the second instance decision must be issued within 60 days.^[271] Under the Administrative Disputes Act, a claim against ‘administrative silence’ may be filed with the Administrative Court in the event the Asylum Commission fails to issue a decision on the appeal within 60 days of the day of its receipt, upon the expiry of 8 days from the day a reminder was sent to the second-instance authority.^[272] In other words, the time limit for the second instance decision and its delivery to the applicant is two months after the appeal was lodged. In practice, however, it takes at least three to four months for the Asylum Commission to issue and deliver the second instance decision.

During the state of emergency in 2020, the Asylum Commission delivered more decisions than in 2019. The main reason for this is because the Asylum Commission did not hold hearings in order to directly determine the facts during this period.^[273] However, it is welcome that, in the vast majority of cases, the Commission issued its decisions within two to three months in 2021 and 2022.  It was not possible to make an accurate assessment of the average length of the procedure before the Commission in 2023 due to the anonymisation of delivered decisions, but in many cases in which IDEAS lawyers acted as legal representatives the decision was rendered within 2 to 3 months. In 2024, it was possible to determine from the case files the length of each and every procedure – 45 decisions in total. An average length was 3 months, which is reasonable and acceptable. In 2025, it was not possible to determine such data since in copies of decisions where IDEAS lawyers were not representatives, it was not possible to determine the date when the appeal was lodged.

When the Asylum Commission receives the appeal, it may issue a different decision on the matter and substitute the impugned ruling with a new one, should it find the appeal well-founded and that it is unnecessary to conduct the procedure again.^[274] Should the Asylum Office find that the procedure it had implemented was incomplete, it may perform the requisite supplementary actions and render a new decision, which is also subject to appeal by the asylum applicant.^[275] In the event it does not reject the appeal,^[276] the Asylum Commission may itself decide on the administrative matter.^[277] It may also set aside the impugned ruling and order the first instance authority to re-examine the matter, when it finds that the shortcomings of the first instance procedure will be eliminated more rapidly and economically by the Asylum Office.^[278] The last possibility is the usual scenario, and since the establishment of the Serbian asylum system, the second instance body has rendered only three decisions granting asylum to applicants from Somalia,^[279] Libya,^[280] and Iran.^[281]

Statistical Overview of Asylum Commission practice 2009-2025

Asylum Commission Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 01/26, 29 January 2026, delivered on 10 April 2026.

Asylum Commission Practice in 2025                 

Asylum Commission Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 01/26, 29 January 2026, delivered on 10 April 2026.

In 2025, Asylum Commission rendered 68 decisions in relation to 94 persons from: Cuba (21), Russian Federation (18), Burundi (15), Türkiye (8), Belarus (6), Afghanistan (3), Syria (3), China (3), Kyrgizstan (2), Croatia (2), Iran (2), Pakistan (2) and 1 from Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Iraq, Sweden, Moldova, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Armenia, Ukraine and India. Still, the number of decisions in comparison to 2024 increased. As was the case in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024, the Asylum Commission did not issue any positive decisions in 2024, i.e., it did not grant international protection.

In 2024, the Asylum Commission rendered 45 decisions in relation to 59 persons originating from: Burundi (16), Cuba (12), Russian Federation (10), Syria (5), Iran (4), Armenia (3), Türkiye (2), Ukraine (1), Sweden (1), Egypt (1), Germany (1), Kazakhstan (1), Afghanistan (1) and Croatia (1). Only 2 appeals were upheld and in relation to the 2 SGBV survivors from Burundi,[282] while two more cases were referred back to the Asylum Office after the complaints lodged to the Administrative Court (third instance) were upheld but not on substantive,   on procedural grounds. All other appeals were rejected (41 in total). In 2023 the Asylum Commission took 36 decisions regarding 43 persons: Burundi (15),^[283] Cuba (6), Unknown (4), Afghanistan (3), Iraq (2), Iran (2), Syria (2), Russia (1), Morocco (1), Tunisia (1), Germany (1), North Macedonia (1), Pakistan (1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1), Bangladesh (1) and Ukraine (1).

One of the major concerns regarding the Asylum Commission’s practice relates to the failure to individually and separately assess all allegations included in the applicant’s appeal. In many of the analysed decisions, the Commission summarily rejected the applicant’s arguments, but also failed to examine the applicants’ cases in line with the Asylum Office’s positions which were taken in previous cases of identical or similar nature.^[284] There are no traces of CoI assessment in second instance decisions. Instead, the Asylum Commission relies on the CoI assessment of the Asylum Office, which has proved to be contentious in many cases, especially in relation to nationals of Burundi. Moreover, reasonings of Asylum Commission decisions mostly do not contain clear reflection of each and every argument and grounds outlined in the appeal, but simple reference in bullet points and then summary and cumulative rejection of all arguments.

Out of 69 decisions, 2 were related to dismissal due to the failure of applicants to timely lodge an appeal (1 Russian Federation and 1 Burundi). Also, in two instances, cases were discontinued (Kyrgizstan and Cuba). Also, in three decisions the issue was discontinuation of the asylum procedure in first instance due to the absence from the camp and failure to report to the Asylum Office, and the cases were not related to the merits of the claim (Syria, Russian Federation and Pakistan). For that reason, these decisions are irrelevant for the analysis in this report. Also, it is safe to say that rejection of the appeals of the citizens of Croatia (2), India (1), Armenia (1), Bosnia and Hercegovina (1), Nigeria (1), Moldova (1) and Sweden (1) were also justified.

Only 2 appeals were upheld in relation to 1 Afghan national who claimed persecution by the Taliban and 1 Russian applicant who fled from his country of origin with his family due to the risk of forced recruitment. The Asylum Office rejected both applications again and the cases are currently pending before the Asylum Commission for the second time.

A total of 16 decisions were related to prima facie uncredible claims of citizens of Cuba mainly alleging vague arguments on political persecution but also economic or other struggles which do not represent grounds for international protection. Another 9 decisions related to citizens of Burundi are also related to applicants whose credibility of the claim is low.

In 2024, there were two decisions in which the appeals were upheld by the Asylum Commission. Both cases were related to SGBV survivors who were rejected on the merits despite a range of evidence provided to the Asylum Office, as well as CoI submissions which completely reflected the individual circumstances of the applicants. [285] Unfortunately, one of the applicants absconded, while the other case was again rejected by the Asylum Office and this time, the Asylum Commission confirmed that the mother and child (survivor of incest) do not meet the requirements for international protection.[286] In the decision from 2024 the Asylum Commission indicated to the Asylum Office that they should take into account relevant and up to date CoI and to provide explanation why the CoI cited as grounds for rejection should have advantage over the CoI which clearly goes in favour of the applicants (CAT, CCPR and SR on human rights in Burundi findings from 2023 and 2024). Moreover, the Asylum Commission has asked the Asylum Office to provide the data which is not related to the legal framework which should provide protection to SGBV survivors, but which indicates that such legal framework is effectively applied. The Asylum Office failed to provide such data, and it remains unclear why the second instance body has confirmed identical decision instead of resolving the matter in merits.

This outcome further corroborates the analysis from 2024 which is worth of reiterating. Namely, on the same day and probably on the same meeting of the members of the Commission, on 12 February 2024, the Asylum Commission rendered a completely opposite decision in a case of another SGBV survivor from Burundi, whose credibility was even higher than the above-described cases. She provided the Istanbul Protocol Report issued by three medical specialists: forensic doctor, gynaecologist and psychiatrist. The findings from the Report indicate that the applicant survived rape and attempted murder, and the reasoning of the Asylum Office again implied citation of CoI which is related to the repatriation of Burundians from Uganda and the description of the legal framework which was outlined of the website on the UK Foreign Office (cannot be considered as CoI), but without providing a single data on how the framework is applied in practice. Thus, it is impossible to explain why this appeal was not upheld as well, and the case, at least, referred to the Asylum Office. Two more SGBV survivors were rejected by the Asylum Commission in May[287] and October 2024.[288]

This practice depicts the contradicting practice of the Asylum Commission and lack of capacity of this body to have a corrective influence over the Asylum Office. It also corroborates the findings which indicate the pattern of automatic rejection of Burundian applicants. For that reason, it should be reiterated that in 2023 there were many cases related to Burundian applicants who suffered the same flawed practice and that practice continued in 2024 and 2025 in which 1 highly credible case of political persecution from Burundi was rejected.[289] This case adds to other such as the one related to the family which based their asylum claim on an act of SGBV to which the mother was subjected, and provided evidence to the Asylum Office, but the reason why the appeal was upheld was because another child was born in Serbia after the family lodged asylum application. After the newborn child was included in another but identical decision of the Asylum Office, Asylum Commission rejected the appeal.^[290] In February and March 2024,[291] the appeals of two more Burundian nationals were rejected by the Asylum Commission, contributing to the impression that the practice of the Asylum Office in relation to Burundian citizens, and which was described above as inadequate and lacking individualised assessment, has been supported by the Asylum Commission, including in highly credible cases of political activists, CSO workers and members of the opposition parties.^[292]

The Asylum Commission unfortunately confirmed the Asylum Office decision related to a draft evader from the Russian Federation who fled after he was injured in Ukraine during the armed clashes.[293] It also confirmed a decision in which a Ukrainian national married to a Russian citizen was rejected.[294] This corroborated the opinion of the author of this report that Russian citizens simply cannot obtain international protection in Serbia. It is important to highlight again two decisions of the Commission from 2024 which were related to alleged Russian draft evaders and in which it can be seen that the second instance body confirmed the practice of the Asylum Office in which poor CoI assessment has been performed, leaving out for instance EUAA report on Russian draft evaders and the risks they might face.[295] Despite of the fact that these two applications cannot be considered as highly credible, the corrective influence of the Asylum Commission also implies the responsibility to influence the thoroughness of the assessment of both individual and general circumstances by the Asylum Office, which also implies reflection on the credible CoI. Several more decisions with lower level of credibility were issued in 2025 and were confirmed by the Asylum Commission. This influence has been a longstanding problem of the second instance body.

In 2024, the Asylum Commission confirmed two negative decisions of the Asylum Office in which applicants from Cuba and Burundi who had LGBTQI+ claims were rejected. In the case of Cuban applicants, the Commission failed to at least indicate to the Asylum Office why it deviated from the previously established practice in which Cuban LGBTQI+ applicants who are HIV+ were granted subsidiary protection.[296] As for the Burundian gay man whose appeal was rejected,[297] it can be safely said that such decisions simply contributes to the continuation of the negative practice towards this category of vulnerable applicants. These two decisions justify the reflection on the practice of the Asylum Commission in previous years made above. In 2025, the appeal of an LGBTQI+ activist from the Russian Federation was also rejected by the Asylum Commission contributing to already recorded negative practice with regards to this social group, but also further confirming that Russian citizens cannot obtain international protection in Serbia.

A LGBTQI+ applicant’s appeal was rejected in 2023 and with regards to the risk of persecution in Morocco. This represents a continuation of the practice from previous years. On 8 March 2021, the Asylum Commission rejected the appeal of gay man from Congo whose case was rejected in merits by the Asylum Office which took a standing that applicant failed to prove the risk of persecution as a member of a particular social group. A letter from the applicant’s mother, as well as relevant CoI were not found to be sufficient for granting of asylum.^[298] In 2021, the Commission rejected the appeal of the transgender applicant from Iran, whose asylum application was rejected in November 2019,^[299] and confirmed the stance of the first instance authority that the fact that Iranian state authorities formally acknowledged her gender transition implies that she would be safe in Iran.^[300] However, the Asylum Commission, in the same manner as the Asylum Office, disregarded the threats and attacks she received from her family, but also from members of Iranian society and her former employer. The applicant was granted mandate status by UNHCR and was resettled to another country.[301]

In 2025, a total of 6 decisions in which the appeal was rejected were related to the arbitrary application of national security grounds. The common feature, as it is the case with decisions of the Asylum Office, is that not a single Asylum Commission decisions contain facts on why someone was declared as the national security risk. Thus, the Asylum Commission simply confirmed the standing of the Asylum Office and confirmed the flawed manner in which security assessments are performed, depriving applicants of any possibility to challenge such assessments.

The Asylum Commission rejected an appeal of a Turkish political activist who is a member of HDP, confirming once again that Turkish political activists and in general Turkish people who have fled political persecution, stand no chance to obtain international protection in Serbia.[302] This was confirmed by the additional three decisions from 2025 in which applicants who claimed religious persecution were rejected by the second instance body.

Onward appeal (‘complaint’) before the Administrative Court

The Administrative Court does not have a department or panel specialised in reviewing asylum cases and it rules on the lawfulness of a final administrative act in three-member judicial panels. Moreover, only a few judges are tasked to decide upon asylum complaints, but the case files have shown that all judges of the Administrative Court can find themselves seized of asylum cases.

At several conferences and roundtables that took place in in the past several years, judges from the Administrative Court have been highlighting the problem of understaffing, lack of knowledge of international refugee law and international human rights law (mainly the relevant jurisprudence of the ECtHR) and have repeatedly outlined the need for relevant national and international organisations (NGOs and UNHCR) to facilitate more training and workshops regarding asylum and migration law.^[303] The first training was facilitated by the UNHCR in 2019, but the training planned for 2020 was postponed due to COVID-19. In December 2021, the UNHCR facilitated a training on credibility assessment which included judges from the Administrative Court, while in 2022 judges were taken for study visits to Italy. It is also reasonable to assume that judges are also invited to take part in trainings organised under the auspices of EU accession. In 2023, there were several trainings organised by the UNHCR in the second half of the year.

The lawfulness of an administrative act may be challenged by a claim in an administrative dispute:

• In the event it was adopted by an authority lacking jurisdiction;
• At the authority’s discretion, in the event the authority had exceeded its legal powers or the decision had not been adopted in accordance with the objective for which the authority had been granted specific powers;
• In the event the law or another general act had not been enforced properly;
• In the event the procedural rules have been violated during the procedure;
• In the event the facts were established in a manner that was incomplete or inaccurate, or an incorrect conclusion was drawn from the facts.

According to the Asylum Act, the initiation of an administrative dispute has an automatic suspensive effect.^[304]

In practice, the Administrative Court has not itself held any hearings on asylum claims to date. Its decisions so far have merely confirmed the lawfulness of the asylum authorities’ practice of automatically applying the safe third country concept despite the fact that it had not first been established that the third countries were actually safe for the asylum seekers in casu. Also, to this date, the Administrative Court has never decided on a complaint on the merits.

It can be concluded with certainty that the corrective role of the Administrative Court in relation to the first and second instance authorities is basically non-existing. In 2024, as it was the case in 2023, and 2022, the Court failed to deliver a judgment which could have positively affected the practice of lower instances (see below).

Statistical Overview of the Administrative Court Practice 2009-2025

Administrative Court Practice in 2025

Source: Administrative Court, response to the request for the information of public importance no. 4726 of 13 March 2026.

In 2024, the Administrative Court delivered 16 decisions regarding 19 persons from the following countries: Iran (7), Unknown (3), Afghanistan (3), Burundi (2), Türkiye (1), Cuba (1), Syria (1) and Ghana (1).  Only three complaints were upheld, but two of them for procedural reasons related to family unity and inclusion of a newborn baby in the procedure and silence of administration. Only one complaint was upheld on the basis of substantive grounds, and in relation to the applicant who claimed religious persecution and who was also in extradition procedure. Still, and due to excessive anonymisation, it was not possible to determine the country of origin of the applicant.[305]

In 2025, the Administrative Court delivered 22 decisions regarding 28 persons most of which were of unknown nationality due to once again excessive anonymization: Unknown (13), Burundi (3) Iran (4), and 1 from Syria, Iraq, Cuba and Croatia. Out of these, 6 decisions related to dismissal due to procedural reasons, and 4 were discontinued. In relation to 12 decisions on rejection of complaint, the author has managed to determine nationality in only two – Iraq and Croatia – both cases seeming to be of low credibility. For the rest, it is impossible to provide more a detailed analysis except in one case where arbitrary application of national security grounds was confirmed, meaning that the Administrative Court has validated such practice.[306] Thus, it is clear that the resolution of this flawed practice will have to be addressed before the Constitutional Court and international bodies for the protection of human rights since this is the second decision in the past two years.[307]

It was also possible to determine the length of cases decided in merits which is still extremely long and averaging in 2025 36,6 months.

What can be safely reiterated is that there is still no adequate corrective influence of the Administrative Court in relation to the poor credibility assessment conducted by the Asylum Office and the Asylum Commission.[308]

Legal assistance

On 1 October 2019, the Free Legal Aid Act (FLA) came into force. The right to free legal aid is explicitly guaranteed to asylum seekers,^[309] refugees and persons granted subsidiary protection.^[310] However, the Free Legal Aid Fee Schedule Regulation (FLA Regulation)^[311] envisages free legal aid only for administrative dispute procedures conducted before the Administrative Court. This means that asylum seekers could apply for the State funded free legal aid only if they reach the third instance authority. So far, not a single asylum seeker has used State funded free legal aid,^[312] but in the course of 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025 several attorneys at law provided legal representation to asylum seekers who had their own financial means. In total 25 out of 87 first instance procedures which resulted in the decision of the Asylum Office, asylum seekers had private lawyers. They were mostly from Cuba and were represented by two lawyers practising in Belgrade and Novi Sad.  Also, in 20 out of 68 cases before the Asylum Commission, applicants had private lawyers. It was impossible to determine how many private lawyers acted before the Administrative Court.

The fact that free legal aid is only guaranteed in the third instance can be considered as an extremely bad solution, taking into account the level of development of the Serbian asylum system in general, but also the quality of the decision-making process of the first and the second instance authority. In more than 90% of the cases which reached the Administrative Court, the negative decision will most likely be confirmed.

Additionally, the quality of legal aid provided by CSOs who are recognised through the Asylum Act is also highly questionable, taking in consideration the fluctuation of lawyers in different CSOs, lack of clear recruitment criteria, lack of experience and necessary training. However, it is fair to say that asylum seekers who enjoy CSO’s legal support from the beginning of the asylum procedure have more chance for a positive outcome, than those who do not have such support. Still, it is clear that a migration lawyer profile does not exist in Serbia as it is the case in EU countries in which asylum systems have been established several decades ago. This means that most of the expertise comes from persons who act as legal representatives on behalf of CSOs, while attorneys at law are rarely interested to provide legal assistance in asylum procedure. Unfortunately, there are no signs that such profile will be established in the near future taking in consideration that practising other branches of law is more lucrative and attractive to attorneys at law.

The right to free legal aid is also guaranteed by the Asylum Act, as well as the right to receive information concerning asylum.^[313] The Asylum Act further provides that an asylum seeker shall have access to free legal aid and representation by UNHCR and CSO whose objectives and activities are aimed at providing free legal aid to refugees. In practice, the vast majority of persons who submit an asylum application in Serbia use the services of CSO lawyers before both national and international bodies. Their work and assistance is not a public service, but project funded and the main donors are UNHCR, EU and other donors. CSOs represent asylum seekers in all three instances, and in front of the Constitutional Court.

It is important to highlight that not all persons who wish to apply for asylum have the possibility to have effective legal representation. The first reason is that in 2025 only 3 civil society organisations (CSO) were providing legal aid in Serbia: APC, BCHR, and IDEAS. The total number of active lawyers in these CSOs is between 5and 10 out of which many are also tasked with other project activities or are hired part-time.^[314] Other, non-CSOs lawyers, occasionally provide legal aid. All of these CSOs are based in Belgrade. Thus, their presence in asylum and reception centres located outside Belgrade is rare,^[315] and refugees and asylum seekers are not only forced to wait longer to have assistance in lodging of asylum applications, but also to wait for initial legal advice by a competent lawyer.

Given that, in 2024, the approximate number of persons likely in need of international protection was at least 65% of the total foreign national population who entered Serbia and received registration certificates (a total of 850), it is clear that current number of CSOs is still not sufficient. CSOs still deny legal assistance to applicants whose asylum claim has less prospect of success due to the lack of capacity to handle higher number of cases. Still, from the total number of applications (219), it can be safely said that IDEAS assisted 111, while other CSOs probably assisted several dozen more. With the decrease in arrivals in general, it can be said that the ratio of asylum seekers who received at least basic support (drafting and lodging of asylum applications) improved in comparison to previous years.

However, most legal representatives from respective CSOs have between 1 to 3 years of experience,^[316] which is usually the period after which many of them decide to leave the field of asylum and migration. This trend continued in 2024 and 2025 and one of the reason was also funding cuts.[317] Still, it is positive to outline that there were not major flaws in the work of legal representatives observed by the author.[318]

Still, the improvement of the quality of the work of legal representatives employed in different CSOs and private lawyers remain a priority. Furthermore, it is also important to facilitate training on CoE and UN standards regarding International Refugee and International Human Rights Law. The recruitment procedures should be designed, but also volunteer and internship systems should be established so all potential asylum seekers can have at least technical assistance when lodging asylum applications. And finally, the system of free legal aid must be reformed so that it allows attorneys at law to provide legal assistance from the first instance procedure. This would mean that FLA and FLA Regulation have to be amended, and that extensive trainings of attorneys at law should be facilitated so that each person who expresses the wish to apply for asylum is provided with assistance.

^[1] Article 3 (1), Asylum Act.

^[2] Article 3 (3), Asylum Act.

^[3] Article 39(1) Asylum Act.

[4] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1152/24, 9 August 2024.

[5] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26- 3065/23, 26 June 2024.

[6] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26- 26-1217/23, 13 July 2024

[7] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1459/23, 26.08.2024.

[8] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-537/23, 17 April 2024.

[9] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-41/23, 22 July 2024.

[10] Asylum Office, Decision. No. 26-1222/22, 9 January 2024.

[11] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26- 2126/22, 23 August 2024.

[12] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-193/25, 21 August 2025.

[13] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26- 2791/23, 28 April 2025.

[14] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-3054/23, 1 December 2025.

[15] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1-24/24, 28 April 2025

^[16] Article 39(2) Asylum Act.

^[17] Article 39(3) Asylum Act.

^[18] Article 39(5) Asylum Act.

^[19] Article 39(6) Asylum Act.

^[20] CESCR, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Serbia, 4 March 2022, E/C.12/SRB/CO/3, available at: https://bit.ly/47AhcCo, paras. 32-33.

^[21]  Article 34(1)(1)-(2) Asylum Act.

^[22] Article 38(1)(3)-(5) Asylum Act.

^[23] Article 47 Asylum Act.

^[24] Article 42 Asylum Act.

^[25] Article 26 Asylum Act.

^[26] Article 27 Asylum Act.

^[27] Article 28 Asylum Act.

^[28] Article 29 Asylum Act.

^[29] Article 30 Asylum Act.

^[30]  Article 31 Asylum Act.

^[31]  Articles 33 and 34 Asylum Act.

^[32] UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 September 2003, HCR/GIP/03/05, https://bit.ly/3plP7es.

^[33] Article 40 Asylum Act.

^[34] Article 32 Asylum Act.

[35] IDEAS database (formed throughout the years for advocacy and reporting purposes and consisted of files collected from lawyers, NGOs, IDEAS’s practice and FoI requests).

^[36]  The author of this Report has collected 155 out of 165 decisions. The number of decisions and applicants was counted by the author of this Report and on the basis of a unique database which is established in IDEAS. Namely, official number of persons who received international protection in Serbia is 245 or even more according to some CSOs. However, this number includes the cases which were not final in the given year. For instance, there is at least 7 asylum procedures in which legal representatives appealed the decision on subsidiary protection claiming that their clients deserve refugee status. Asylum Commission or Administrative Court upheld appeals and onward appeals respectively and sent the case back to the Asylum Office. However, Asylum Office rendered the same decision (subsidiary protection) with regards to the same person again. The lawyers were then complaining again. There were instances in which 1 person received 3 decisions on subsidiary protection in the period of 7 years and was granted refugee status in the end. However, it is possible that the statistics provided by the author of this Report are not 100% accurate. Still, the author believes that this is the most accurate statistics which can be provided for now and potential variations cannot be higher than maximum 5 decisions regarding 5 applicants. 

^[37]  E.g., UNHCR, UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya – Update II, September 2018, available at: http://bit.ly/39VMQNz.

^[38] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-2324/11, 19 December 2012 and 26-2326/11, 20 December 2012.

^[39] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-812/16, 29 September 2016.

^[40] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-222/15, 16 June 2018; ECtHR, A. and Others v. Serbia, Application No 37478/16, Communicated on 12 December 2017.

^[41] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26–1389/17, February 2022.

^[42] AIDA, Country Report Serbia, Update March 2018, 41-53.

[43] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-353/24, 23 December 2025.

^[44] E.g., UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI, March 2021, HCR/PC/SYR/2021/06, available at: https://bit.ly/3HO7C1B.

^[45]  E.g., EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Syria Security situation (July 2021), available at: https://bit.ly/3HKwasb.

^[46] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-5413/15, 2 March 2016.

^[47] Asylum Office, Decision No. 1441/17, 20 March 2024.

[48] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-334/23, 9 January 2024; 26-238/23, 5 October 2023 and 26-853/24, 15 October 2023.

[49] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-295/23, 24 February 2024; 26-2996/23, 11 July 2024 and 26-172/23, 12 July 2024.

[50] Asylum Office, Decisions No. 26-2984/22, 18 January 2024.

^[51] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-77/17, 1 August 2017.

^[52] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-78/17, 10 January 2018 and 26-1546/24, 30 June 2025.

^[53] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-81/17, 16 April 2018.

^[54] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1239/17, 10 January 2018.

^[55] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1635/21, 17 August 2022.

^[56] Asylum Office Decisions Nos. 26-784/18, 20 November 2019 and 26-1403/19, 11 December 2019.

^[57] Asylum Office Decisions Nos. 26-652/16, 17 June 2016, 26-2643/17, 30 January 2019, 26-2474/19, 15 October 2020,26-1084/20, 7 June 2021, 26-277/21, 13 July 2022,26-730/22, 31 August 2022 and 26-281/11, 10 November 2022 and 26-854/24, 1 July 2025.

^[58] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1084/20, 7 June 2021.

^[59]  Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-277/21, 13 July 2022,26-730/22, 31 August 2022 and 26-281/11, 10 November 2022 and 26-1635/21, 17 August 2022.

^[60] Asylum Office, Decision Nos. 26-2276/21, 27 January 2023, 26–50/22, 3 February 2023 and 26-1922/21, 8 February 2023.

[61] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2349/19, 22 July 2024.

[62] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-584/24, 30 April 2025 and 18 December 2025, and 26-3435/24, 20 November 2025.

^[63]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-766/08, 4 February 2009.

^[64] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-2879/15, 11 September 2015 and 26-2149/16, 26 December 2016.

^[65]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2047/17, 21 March 2019.

^[66] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2348/17, 28 January 2019.

^[67] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-5266/15, 26 March 2015.

^[68] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1601/20, 30 August 2021.

^[69] Administrative Court, Judgment U 6060/18, 4 October 2018.

^[70] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1051/16, 13 September 2016, 26-1083/18, 26 January 2018, 26-430/17, 23 April 2018, 26-1081/17, 4 July 2018, 26-1395/18, 5 February 2019 and 26-2126/22, 23 August 2024.

^[71] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-108/20, 27 August 2021.

^[72]  Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1605/18, 15 March 2019 and 26-2467/17, 15 January 2020.

^[73] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1607/18, 14 August 2022.

^[74]  Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 16/19, 2. September 2019.

^[75]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1271/19, 15 October 2020.

[76] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1519/24, 5 August 2025.

^[77]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-462/22, 15 June 2022.

^[78] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-463/22, 22 August 2022.

^[79] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2736/22, 29 June 2023.

[80] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-296/24, 29 October 2024.

[81] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1830/22, 22 March 2024.

[82] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2628/23, 30 June 2025.

^[83] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-688/22, 15 September 2022.

^[84] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1043/22, 6 February 2023 and 26-132/22, 20 February 2023.

^[85] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-346/21, 29 June 2022.

[86] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-614/25, 23 July 2025.

^[87] Child-soldier case.

^[88] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26–1437/21, 31 March 2022.

^[89] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-532/21, 15 August 2022 and 26-532/21, 5 July 2023.

^[90] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1562/22, 14 December 2023.

[91] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1969/24, 10 October 2024.

^[92]  Asylum Office, Decision No.26-1280/13, 25 December 2013.

^[93] Asylum Office, Decisions No. 26-1605-18, 15 March 2019 and 26-2467/17, 15 January 2020.

^[94] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1216/18, 26-1217/18 and 26-1218/18, 12 February 2019.

^[95] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2347/19, 8 June 2020.

^[96] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2038/19, 30 July 2020 and 26-2039/19, 17 August 2020.

^[97] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1592/18, 20 November 2019 and see also, AIDA, Country Report Serbia, Update March 2019, 37.

^[98]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1284/20, 1 December 2021.

^[99] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-404/12, 4 November 2021.

^[100] See more in the Chapter on the 2021 practice of the Asylum Office.

^[101] The author did not manage to see the copy of this decision.

^[102] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-688/22, 15 September 2022.

[103 Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1222/22, 9 January 2024; 26-1223/22, 10 January 2024 and 26-3283/22, 18 April 2024.

^[104]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1562/22, 14 December 2023.

[105] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-10-24/23, 26 August 2024.

[106]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-352/24, 29 May 2025.

[107] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2506/24, 6 August 2025.

^[108]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-286/16, 26 October 2016.

^[109] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1667/17, 25 December 2017.

^[110] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 2/18, 25 January 2018.

^[111] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-536/16, 16 December 2016.

^[112] Asylum Office, Decision No. 3109/16, 18 December 2017.

^[113] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1672/19, 29 January 2021.

^[114] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-3136/19, 26 November 2020.

^[115] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1601/20, 30 August 2021

^[116]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2296/22, 29 June 2022.

[117] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1969/24, 10 October 2024 and 26-296/24, 29 October 2024.

^[118] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1632/22, 13 April 2023 and 14 July 2024 (rejected twice), 26-1119/22, 10 August 2023, 26-1682/21 2 August 2023 and 26-2985/22, 19 December 2023.

[119] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2028/22, 2 February 2024 and 26-2985/24, 23 April 2024.

[120] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2028/22, 28 April 2025.

^[121] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-329/18, 28 December 2018.

^[122] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2643/17, 30 January 2019.

^[123] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26- 2348/17, 28 January 2019.

^[124] UNGA, Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, 24 February 2010, A/RES/64/142, para. 28.

^[125] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-784/18, 20 November 2019.

^[126] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-218/19, 20 February 2020.

^[127] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2573/19, 15 October 2020.

^[128] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1271/19, 15 October 2020.

^[129] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2474/19, 15 October 2020.

^[130] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1084/20, 7 June 2021.

^[131]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26–3064/19, 14 September 2019.

^[132]  Asylum Office, Decision Nos. 26-277/21, 13 July 2022 and 26-730/22, 31 August 2022.

^[133] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-281/11, 10 November 2022.

^[134] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1177/22, 1 December 2022.

^[135] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26–1437/21, 31 March 2022.

^[136] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-378/19, 11 February 2020 and 26-1437/18, 13 February 2020, and see also: AIDA, Country Report Serbia, Update March 2020, p.43.

[137] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-854/24, 1 July 2025.

^[138] UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI, March 2021, HCR/PC/SYR/2021/06, available at: https://bit.ly/3HO7C1B.

^[139] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-5413/15, 2 March 2016.

^[140] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-4062/15, 8 January 2016, 26-2489/17, 1 June 2018 and 26-1731/18, 16 September 2019.

^[141] Asylum Office, Decision Nos. 26-2862/22, 4 December 2023 and 26-2882/22, 28 November 2023.

^[142] EUAA, The Russian Federation-Military Service, December 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3Y7E7nb.

[143] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-624/23, 18 April 2024.

^[144] See more in AIDA, Country Report Serbia, Update March 2018, p. 18.

^[145] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-4906/5, 9 December 2015.

^[146] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1051/16, 13 September 2016.

^[147] Asylum Office, Decision Nos. 26-1083/18, 26 January 2018, 26-430/17, 23 April 2018, 26-1081/17, 4 July 2018, 26-187/18, 1 November 2018, 26-1395/18, 5 February 2019, 26-1435/18, 16 June 2020.

[148] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2126/22, 23 August 2024.

^[149] See more in AIDA, Country Report Serbia, Update March 2020, p. 44.

^[150] The statistical data in the table reflect the number of people granted international protection, not the number of positive decisions. One decision can cover more than one person. 

^[151] It is important to note that this number is not 100% accurate because of the way in which the Asylum Office keeps the statistics. Namely, available data shows that there were 100 decisions discontinuing the asylum procedure of 100 applicants. This is simply not possible because one decision, and especially in relation to Burundian applicants who arrived to Serbia as families, encompasses 2, 3, 4 or even 5 persons. The method that the author of this report applied is the deduction of 30% of the total number of applicants and in relation to decisions. Thus, this number should be observed as the highest possible, even though it is most likely lower.

[152] Ibid.

[153 Ibid.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

[156] See AIDA, Country Report Serbia, 2024 Update, p. 109, available here.

[157] Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

^[158] AIDA, Country Report Serbia, 2024 Update, pp. 109-110, available here.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

^[161] See more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – 2024 Update, available here, pp. 115-116..

[162] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1969/24, 23 July 2025.

^[163] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-2655/23, 27 May 2025, 26-3134/23, 24 June 2025 and 26-843/24, 3 November 2025.

[164] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-353/24, 23 December 2025.

^[165 UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update V, 3 November 2017, available at: http://bit.ly/3or74Vq, p. 70.

^[166] ECtHR, L.M. and Others v. Russia, Application Nos. 40081/14 40088/14 40127/14, Judgment of 15 December 2015, EDAL available at: http://bit.ly/3psdOE7 and S.K. v. Russia, Application No. 52722/15, Judgment of 14 February 2017, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/3oqsouq.

[167] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1546/24, 30 June 2025.

[168] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-854/24, 1 July 2025.

[169] Application No. 32694/23, Judgment of 26 March 2026, available here.

[170]  Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-867/23, 30 October 2025 and 26-2924/24, 21 August 2025.

[171] Asylum Office, Decision Nos. 26-185/25, 28 April 2025 and 26-1183/25, 18 July 2025.

[172] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1134/23, 26-1133/23, 26 August 2024 and 26-3055/24, 24 December 2025.

^[173] See for example: Human Rights Watch, We Will Beat You to Correct You – Abuses Ahead of Burundi’s Constitutional Referendum, 18 May 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3yxa4bT or OHCHR, Oral briefing of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, 23 September 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3QLcNUs.

^[174] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-2434/16, 20 September 2017; 26-218/19, 20 February 2020; 26-1615/19, 18 June 2022 and 26-536/19, 14 May 2022.

^[175] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-896/21, 14 January 2022.

^[176] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1197/2021, 7 June 2022.

^[177] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26–73/22, 29 September 2022.

^[178]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-75/22, 22 November 2022.

[179] Legal representatives of IDEAS remained in touch with the applicant.

[180] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-3102/22, 13 February 2024.

[181] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-504/23, 17 July 2023.

[182] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-266/23, 20 August 2024.

[183] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1531/23, 8 November 2024.

^[184] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1632/22, 13 April 2023 and 14 July 2023.

^[185] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1119/22, 10 August 2023

^[186]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2985/22, 19 December 2023.

^[187] Asylum Office, Decision No. 1682/21, 2 August 2023.

^[188] UK Home Office, Burundi: information for victims of rape and sexual assault, 23 November 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3zLdrOQ.

^[189] HRC, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Burundi*, CCPR/C/BDI/CO/3, 29 August 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/46hLFpC.

^[190]  CAT, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Burundi*, CAT/C/BDI/CO/3, 11 December 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3LwYtPa.

^[191] Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi, Situation of human rights in Burundi – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi, Fortuné Gaetan Zongo, A/HRC/54/56, 11 August 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/4d76bv9.

[192] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2028/22, 2 February 2024 and again rejected on 28 April 2025.

[193] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2985/22, 22 April 2024.

[194] See also, Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-828/23, 26 July 2024.

[195 Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1183/24, 24 June 2025 and 26-1730/24, 4 August 2025.

^[196]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 1672/19, 1 April 2023.

^[197] Olga Korobova, Žene u Iranu-Kada marama postane oružije, available at: http://bit.ly/40kSGSx.

^[198] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-148/18, 27 December 2019.

^[199] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1073/20, 1 December 2020.

^[200]  Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 51/20, 24 December 2020.

^[201]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1245/22, 17 February 2023.

^[202] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1245/22, 17 February 2023; 26-546/22, 8 December 2023 and 26-2165/22, 13 December 2023.

^[203] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-2862/22, 4 December 2023 and 26-2882/22, 28 November 2023.

[204] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-624/23, 18 April 2024.

^[205] AIDA, Country Report: Serbia, 2021 Update, p. 82.

^[206] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26- 26–404/21, 4 November 2021.

^[207]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26–1515/19, 13 August 2020.

^[208] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26–1515/19, 25 May 2022.

^[209] Human Dignity Trust, Burundi, available at: http://bit.ly/40Aydc4.

^[210]  Human Dignity Trust, Morocco, available at: http://bit.ly/40oPKUK.

^[211]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-81/20, 13 January 2021.

^[212] Administrative Court Judgment U 16351/22, 11 May 2023.

^[213] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1284/20, 1 December 2021.

^[214] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2038/19, 30 July 2020 and 26-2039/19, 17 August 2020.

^[215] BCHR, Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3F4yJXE, pp. 64-66.

[216] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-699, 15 September 2022.

[217] Asylum Office, Decisions Nos. 26-1222/22, 9 January 2024; 26-1223/22, 10 January 2024 and 26-3283/22, 18 April 2024.

[218] ECtHR, Paposhvili v. Belgium, Application No. 41738/10, Judgment of 13 December 2016, EDAL, available here

[219] ECtHR, D. v. UK, D, Application No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May 1997, EDAL, available here.

[220] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-10-24/23, 26 August 2024.

[221] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-41/23, 22 July 2024.

[222]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2506/24, 6 August 2025.

[223] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-352/24, 29 May 2025.

^[224 Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1280/13, 25 December 2013.

^[225] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1592/18, 20 November 2019.

[226] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-584/24, 30 April 2025 and rejected again on 18 December 2025.

^[227] Asylum Office, Decision Nos. 26-1922/21, 8 February 2023 and 26-50/22, 25 January 2023.

[228] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2349/19, 22 July 2024.

[229] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-3435/24, 20 November 2025.

^[230] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1441/17, 20 March 2023, while the other decision related to Syrian national is the only one which was not delivered.

^[231]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 2276/21, 27 January 2023.

^[232] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-2736/22, 29 June 2023.

^[233]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1045/23, 5 October 2023.

[234] See the above Chapter on applicants from Cuba.

[235] The strong wording in this paragraph is derived from the fact that author is also the representative of the family who rejected to apply for temporary residency and decided to apply for asylum, against the advice of asylum authorities, which led to Decision No. 26-2628/23, 30 June 2025.

[236] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-624/23, 30 April 2025.

[237] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1181/24, 11 August 2025.

^[238] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1359/21, 4 February 2022.

^[239] See more in the following parts of the Report.

^[240]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-545/22, 7 November 2023.

^[241]  Article 37(1) Asylum Act.

^[242] Article 37(2) Asylum Act.

^[243]  Article 37(12) Asylum Act.

^[244] Information provided by IDEAS.

^[245] Article 37(10) Asylum Act.

^[246] Article 37(11) Asylum Act.

^[247]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1084-20, 7 June 2021.

^[248]  Article 16 (2) Asylum Act.

^[249] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-246/21, 29 June 2022.

[250] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-624/23, 18 April 2024

[251]  Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-828/23, 26 July 2024.

^[252] Asylum Office, Case File No. 26-2534/17, 7 May 2021.

^[253] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1271/19, 15 October 2020.

^[254] Article 13 Asylum Act.

^[255] Asylum Office, Decision No. 932/19, 30 September 2019.

^[256] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 38/19, 3 December 2019.

^[257]  Asylum hearing in the case 26-688/22, 24 June 2022.

^[258] Article 63 GAPA.

^[259] Article 21(1)-(2) Asylum Act.

^[260] Article 21(3) Asylum Act.

^[261] Article 95 Asylum Act and Articles 151 and 153 GAPA.

^[262] Article 158 GAPA.

^[263]  Article 159 (2).

^[264] Article 160 GAPA.

^[265] This was the case with the application of an alleged SGBV survivor from Somalia who claimed that she had been subjected to the practice of genital mutilation. The legal representative in this case failed to lodge an appeal in time. Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1599/19, 13 October 2020.

^[266] Asylum Commission, Decisions Nos. AŽ 51/20, 24 December 2020 and AŽ 32/21, 7 February 2022.

^[267] Administrative Court, Judgments Nos. U 3775/21, 3 March 2022 and U 19541/22, 14 October 2022.

^[268] Article 165 (1) GAPA.

^[269] Article 165 (2) GAPA.

^[270] Article 166 GAPA.

^[271] Article 174 GAPA.

[272] Article 19 Administrative Disputes Act.

^[273] IDEAS, Hod po žici – uticaj epidemije zarazne bolesti COVID-19 na sistem azila u Republici Srbiji – U susret „drugom talasu’ –  preliminiarni nalazi, March 2020, available in Serbian at: https://bit.ly/46kqDF3, p. 53.

^[274] Article 165 GAPA.

^[275] Article 165(2)-(3) GAPA.

^[276] Article 170 GAPA.

^[277] Article 171(5) GAPA.

^[278]  Article 173(3) GAPA.

^[279] Asylum Commission, Decision AŽ 25/09, 23 April 2010.

^[280] Asylum Commission, Decision AŽ 06/16, 12 April 2016.

^[281] Asylum Commission, Decision AŽ X, 2 September 2019.

[282]  Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ, 06/24, 12 February 2024 and  AŽ 15/25, 7 October 2024.

^[283] Officially, the number of persons from Burundi whose case was decided in 2023 is 20, but Asylum Commission decided twice in relation to a 5-members family (AŽ 15/23, upheld on 10 July 2023, and then rejected on 17 November 2023).

^[284] Article 5 (3) GAPA.

[285]  Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ, 06/24, 12 February 2024 and AŽ 15/25, 7 October 2024.

[286] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 15/24, 25 July 2025.

[287] Asylum Commission, AŽ 26/23, 27 May 2024.

[288] Asylum Commission, AŽ 41/24, 21 October 2024.

[289] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 03/24, 27 January 2025.

^[290] Asylum Commission, Decisions Nos AŽ 15/23, upheld on 10 July 2023, and then rejected on 17 November 2023.

[291] Asylum Commission, Decisions Nos. AŽ 01/23, 29 February 2024 and AŽ 05/24, 8 March 2024.

^[292] Asylum Commission, Decision Nos. AŽ 11/23, 5 May 2023 and AŽ 11/23, 5 May 2023.

[293] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 35/25, 1 December 2025.

[294] Asylum Commission, Decision No. 24/25, 9 September 2025.

[295]  Asylum Commission, Decision Nos. AŽ 38/23, 19 February 2024 and AŽ 02/24, 29 February 2024.

[296] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 26/24, 8 October 2024.

[297] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 42/44, 23 October 2024.

^[298] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 04/21, 8 March 2021.

^[299] Asylum Office, Decision No. 26-1592/18, 20 November 2019.

^[300] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 44/19, 30 January 2020. 

[301 Ibid.

[302] Asylum Commission, Decision No. AŽ 31/23, 12 Febryar 2024.

^[303] Roundtables were organised through the project ‘Novelties in the Asylum and Migration System in the Republic of Serbia and Challenges in their Application’, implemented by the AIRE Centre, IOM and the British Embassy in Serbia.

^[304] Article 96 Asylum Act.

[305] Administrative Court, Judgment U 7899/20, 22 February 2024.

[306 Administrative Court, Judgment, U U 3951/23, 25 April 2025.

[307] Administrative Court, Judgment U U 6662/24 30 October 2024

[308] Detailed analysis of the Administartive Court practive is available in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia, 2024 update, available here, pp. 137-139.

^[309] Article 4 (2-6) FLA.

^[310] Article 4 (2-7) FLA.

^[311] Free Legal Aid Fee Schedule Regulation (Uredba o tarifi za pružanje besplatne pravne pomoći), Official Gazette of the RS No. 74/2019.

^[312] This conclusion is drawn from the fact that legal representatives in all Administrative Court judgments were CSOs.

[313] Article 56(3)-(4) Asylum Act.

^[314] IDEAS had 4, APC had at least 3 and BCHR at least 3 lawyers who were solely providing legal aid to asylum seekers. Klikaktiv has at least 1, but who is also tasked with other activities.

^[315] IDEAS visits all facilities at least two times per month.

^[316] Some of them less than a year and without previous training and experience in the field of asylum and migration.

[317] For instance, IDEAS had to reduce legal team from 6 to 3 lawyers at the end of 2025,

[318] For flaws in work of lawyers, see more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia, 2024 update, available here, pp. 139-142.