Access to the territory and push backs

Author

Nikola Kovačević

Legal access to the territory and effective access to means of legal entry at the border crossing points

As regards legal access to the territory, third country nationals cannot apply for a (humanitarian) visa, specifically with the intention to apply for international protection upon arrival, nor are there any resettlement or relocation operations in place.

Serbia has not designated official border crossing points as places where asylum applications can be lodged or registered. This means that persons in need of international protection who successfully access the territory or who are not subjected to pushbacks or any other form of informal and forcible expulsion, can in most of the cases access the asylum procedure regardless of the place of entry – official border crossing points or green border area.

Hindering of access through legal ways

Readmission agreements

As Serbia is neither an EU member state nor a party to the Dublin Regulation, there is nothing equivalent to a Dublin procedure in the country. However, Serbia has concluded Readmission Agreements with the European Union^[1] as well as North Macedonia,^[2] Albania,^[3] Montenegro^[4] and Bosnia and Herzegovina (‘Bosnia’).^[5]

As regards the Readmission Agreement with the EU, it has not been functioning properly since September 2015, and Hungary mostly expels foreigners to Serbia in an informal manner, amounting to a push-back policy. The same practice is applied by Croatia and Romania in the vast majority of cases. According to the MoI, in 2019, not a single foreigner was returned to Serbia under the Readmission Agreement, while in 2020, 84 readmission requests were accepted by Serbia. It is not clear from which States foreigners were returned as well as how many foreigners were included in these 84 requests.^[6] In 2023, a total of 744 foreigners were readmitted to Serbia from neighbouring countries,^[7] while the number in 2024 was 462 and in 2025 more than two times less – 210.

The same can be said for the functioning of the Readmission agreement with North Macedonia. The NPM outlined in its Report the following:

The NPM also wants to point out the difficult implementation of readmissions with North Macedonia. According to the data obtained during the visit, in 2020, 68 requests for readmission of same number of persons were submitted to North Macedonia and all requests were rejected, usually with the explanation that there was no evidence that a foreigner entered Serbia from North Macedonia, even though, according to officials’ statements, that was more than obvious, and all the necessary evidence was provided.^[8]

These findings remain valid as of December 2025, as can be seen from the outlined statistical data provided below, which shows that only 79 foreign nationals were officially readmitted from Serbia to neighbouring States, primarily to Bulgaria.

In April 2019, Serbia and Austria signed an agreement that would allow Austria to send back to Serbia asylum seekers whose asylum applications have been rejected on the merits and who had transited from Serbia. Upon their return, they are to be placed in an ‘adequate’ accommodation, for which Vienna will pay. This agreement is most likely the technical agreement between Serbia and Austria which should serve as foundation for the operationalisation of the Readmission Agreement which Serbia has signed with the European Union. At the time of writing, the agreement has not yet been applied in practice even though it triggered debates in both Austria and Serbia.^[9] In the opinion of the author of this report, the announcement of the signing of the agreement was more for domestic political purposes than informed by a realistic prospect for mass returns of irregular foreign nationals to Serbia.

In November 2022, the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić, Austria’s Chancellor Karl Nehammer and Hungarian President Viktor Orbán signed trilateral agreement with the aim to strengthen border security policies in Balkan countries.^[10] Even though it is not clear from this agreement which concrete measures will be undertaken and in line with what kind of procedures, it provides for deployments of Austrian and Hungarian border officers to Serbian border with North Macedonia, provision of additional equipment for monitoring of the borders, etc.^[11] As future measures, the heads of state of Austria, Serbia and Hungary aim at readmission of those persons who are not in need of international protection. Without disputing the sovereign right of these States to cooperate in managing the mixed migratory flows, the practice of systemic denial of access to territory based on ill-treatment, pushbacks or other forms of collective expulsions has been recorded as the most common practice applied at borders of Serbia and Hungary in 2025 (see Informal and forcible removals). The terminology used at the press conference completely disregarded the concepts of refugees and asylum seekers and was only based around the notions of ‘migrants’ and ‘illegal migration’.

For the purpose of this 2025 update of the AIDA report, the MoI delivered statistical data on the number of readmissions and returns from and to Serbia. Even though the numbers are quite low,^[12] they should be considered important for the comparative analysis with the number of pushbacks and other forms of collective or individual informal types of expulsions which took place in the same period (see  and forcible removals).

It is also important to highlight that persons readmitted from Serbia to neighbouring countries are primarily detained in one of the Immigration Detention Centres, mainly in the one located at the border with Bulgaria (Dimitrovgrad) and in line with the Article 87 of the Foreigners Act. The basis for detention is the forcible removal, so one of the additional preconditions for detention is the issuance and serving of the expulsion order to the foreign national and in line with the Article 77 of the Foreigners Act.

The expulsion order is served in Serbian language and in a procedure in which the acting police officer does not take into consideration potential risks of refoulement or chain-refoulement, where foreigners, especially those in need of international protection, are, in practice, effectively denied the possibility to access a remedy against this decision. In particular, expulsion orders, as well as refusal of entry decisions, are rendered in a bureaucratic manner, on the basis of a template drafted in Serbian Cyrillic.[13] In addition, these decisions are served to foreigners who rarely enjoy access to legal aid and who are not allowed to inform third persons of their whereabouts during the first hours of the arrest, which are also basic safeguards against ill-treatment, including safeguards against refoulement as enshrined in Article 83 of the Foreigners Act.^[14] They are not informed in a language they understand of their other rights, but also obligations and applicable procedures, which further undermine their capacity to challenge both detention and expulsion decisions.^[15] Finally, the appeal against an expulsion order does not have an automatic suspensive effect.^[16] In 2024, a total of 12,420 expulsion orders were issued in relation to foreign nationals,[17] Compared to 7,566 in 2025 .

The fact that many expulsion orders were issued to nationals of Afghanistan (1,591) and Syria (524), but also Palestine (326), Iran (46) and other individuals who might be in need of international protection, indicates that at least 50% of foreign nationals are theoretically introduced into the forcible removal regime despite risks that they might face in third countries or even countries of origin (e.g., Türkiye, see List of authorities that intervene in each stage of the procedure).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Readmissions from neighbouring countries to Serbia in 2025

There were no readmissions from North Macedonia to Serbia in 2025. The detailed breakdown by readmitting country and nationality is detailed in the following tables, while data on sex and age was not delivered this time.

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

In 2025, a total of 210 persons were subjected to the readmission procedure to Serbia, and most were readmitted to Serbia from Croatia (115). The most represented nationalities were China (69), followed by Syria (35) and Afghanistan (25).

Readmission from Serbia to neighbouring countries

There were no readmissions from Serbia to Hungary, Romania, Albania, Montenegro, in 2025. The detailed breakdown by readmitting country and nationality is detailed in the following tables, while data on sex and age was not delivered this time.

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Serbia readmitted only 79 foreign nationals, mostly to Bulgaria and who were mostly from Afghanistan (21) and Morocco (19).

The manner in which expulsion orders were rendered and served clearly indicates that these people were sent back without any assessment of the risk of refoulement or chain-refoulement. In addition, considering that only two persons were issued with a registration certificate at the three Immigration Detention Centres,^[18] it is clear that access to the asylum procedure for persons that are in need of international protection and who are detained for the purpose of forcible removal is highly questionable.

Given the very low numbers of readmissions compared to arrivals and pushbacks, the conclusion that is drawn by the author of this report is that formal cooperation on returns of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants between the States in the Western-Balkan region and countries which form the external borders of the EU is almost non-existing. Border policies are mainly based on unlawful forms of expulsions which are contrary to the safeguards against non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsions.

Refusal of entry under the Foreigners Act

Article 15 of the Foreigners Act foresees that the Border Police should refuse entry into the Republic of Serbia to a foreigner if that person:

• Does not have a valid travel document or visa, if required;
• Does not have sufficient means of subsistence for their stay in the Republic of Serbia, for return to their country of origin or transit to another country, or is not in other ways provided with subsistence during their stay in Serbia;
• Is in transit, but does not meet the criteria for entry into the next country of transit or country of final destination;
• Has been issued a protective measure of removal, security measure of expulsion, or a ban on entry into the Republic of Serbia, which is in effect;
• Does not have a certificate of vaccination or other proof of good health, if coming from areas affected by an epidemic of infectious diseases;
• Does not have travel medical insurance for the intended period of stay in Serbia.

Entry should be refused by issuing a decision on refusal of entry on a prescribed form,^[19] unless it is established that there are humanitarian reasons or interest for the Republic of Serbia to grant entry, or if the international commitments of the Republic of Serbia indicate otherwise.^[20] The foreigner can lodge an appeal to the MoI – Border Police Administration against the decision within 8 days.^[21

In practice, however, foreigners at Nikola Tesla airport are taken to the detention room and are cut off from the outside world. In other words, their treatment amounts to arbitrary detention in terms of the ECtHR jurisprudence established in the Amuur v. France judgment.^[22] They typically are not able to draft and send the appeal against the refusal of entry decisions as they do not know domestic legal provisions and often do not speak Serbian or English (the decision on refusal of entry is issued in Serbian and English).^[23] Moreover, they have to pay a fee of 15,670 dinars (approx. €133) before they can send the appeal to the Administrative Court.^[24] It remains unclear if foreign nationals are even provided with a pen and paper to draft an appeal, which then has to be translated for the MoI-BPD as the second instance body. There is no post office in the transit zone, nor any other way to access the second instance body. The appeal does not have automatic suspensive effect.^[25] This means that, even if the foreigner manages to lodge an appeal, they will have to wait for the decision on their appeal in the country to which they are expelled, which suggests that this remedy is theoretical and illusory.^[26] The refusal of entry decision is mainly applied at the airport, as discussed in the next section, but also at the official border crossing points. In 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025 the MoI provided a statistical overview of the refusal of entry decisions rendered on the land border crossing points, and which will be outlined in the ensuing parts of this chapter. However, they were mainly applied to foreigners who are not in need of international protection.

The Foreigners Act contains the entire set of principles which aim to guarantee the respect of non-refoulement in all forcible removal procedures, including regarding the decision on refusal of entry. Article 75 provides that the competent authority should take into consideration the specific situation of vulnerable persons, family and health status of the person being returned, as well as the best interests of a child,^[27] specific position of people with disabilities,^[28] family unity,^[29] etc. If necessary, during the return procedure, an interpreter should be provided for a language that the foreigner understands, or is reasonably assumed to understand.^[30] Additionally, the competent authority should, at the foreigner’s request, provide written translation of the provision of the decision on return, translation of the ban on entry if issued, and translation of the information on the right to lodge a legal remedy into a language that the foreigner understands or may be reasonably assumed to understand.^[31] Furthermore, Article 83 envisages that a foreigner may not be forcibly removed to a territory where they would be under threat of persecution on the grounds of their race, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity, religion, nationality, citizenship, membership of a particular social group or their political views, unless they represent a threat for national security or public order.^[32] Regardless of the existence of such exceptions, Article 83(3) strictly prohibits foreigners’ removal to a territory in which they would be at risk of the death penalty or torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Notwithstanding all the prescribed guarantees against refoulement, the introduction of the concept of refusal of entry into the new Foreigners Act still gives a lot of reasons for concern. This concern is derived from the current practice of the MoI at the airport transit zone and in the border areas with Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Montenegro, which is based on regular pushbacks which are being praised by the highest state officials, as discussed below. Thus, after the Foreigners Act came into force, the practice of denial of access to territory partially took a different shape, which is equally harmful as the one that existed before. In other words, denial of access to the territory is now based on pushbacks, but also on legal decisions that cannot be effectively challenged before the competent judicial authority since the appeal does not have automatic suspensive effect.^[33]

The guarantees against refoulement that are introduced in the Foreigners Act existed in the Serbian legal framework before this Act came into force.^[34] However, they were not applied properly, and there are plenty of documented cases where prima facie refugees were denied access to territory regardless of the risks in the receiving states (most notably in Bulgaria and North Macedonia).

 Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

 Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

 Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

The figures outlined above indicate that refusal of entry decisions are mainly rendered in relation to foreign nationals who are most likely not in need of international protection and especially in the land border area. Those who might be in need of protection are simply subjected to pushback practices. However, the nationalities of people refused entry at the Belgrade airport (Türkiye, but probably also Syrians, Afghanis and others)[36] give serious reasons for concern as several violations of refugees’ rights – and more generally of fundamental rights – are reported^[37] in the receiving states (mainly Türkiye, but also UAE, Lebanon or Qatar).^[38] In particular, the persons returned to these countries are exposed to both risk of refoulement and chain-refoulement.^[39] The data obtained by the MoI provides several interesting and contentious details:

• At least 196 persons of unknown nationality were returned to neighbouring countries, including from the airport and to Hungary which does not provide access to the international protection procedure to foreigners who have not applied through the embassy procedure,^[40]
• Refusal of entry from Serbian airports for Turkish nationals, in a manner which cannot be considered as adequate due to the lack of assessments of the risks of refoulement is also worrying, especially when taking into consideration the numerous instances in which people fleeing persecution (journalists, political activists and others) from Türkiye were treated in the transit zone (arbitrarily detained, asylum claims ignored, etc.).^[41]

Following are examples of flawed application of refusal of entry decisions in the period 2024-2025:^[42]

• On 12 February 2024, a woman, claiming to be a SGBV survivor from DRC, was removed to Türkiye even though she claimed that she survived rape and other forms of persecution in her country of origin. She tried to apply for asylum at the airport. IDEAS was contacted by the doctor from one of the hospitals in Belgrade, where she was allegedly taken for the purpose of verifying her allegation with the gynaecologist. Due to lack of information on individual data, the Rule 39 request to the ECtHR was declined. The BPSB ignored emails from IDEAS and put the woman back on a plane even before the ECtHR decided upon the Rule 39 request. This example perfectly illustrates the modus operandi of the BPSB, denying contract with the outside world to people who were (according to the doctors) clearly in distress, practices which eventually lead to denial of access to the territory and the asylum procedure.
• On 21 August 2024, the ECtHR granted IDEAS’ request for interim measures and prevented the forcible removal of N.Y., a Turkish citizen who fled political persecution and who was denied access to asylum, allegedly physically ill-treated and automatically refused entry. Only after the Rule 39 request was granted was Mr. N.Y. allowed to access the territory, and officers of border police administration were adamant that the applicant did not want to apply for asylum.
• On 25 September 2024, the ECtHR granted another interim measure lodged by IDEAS which was related to a mother and two children of Kurdish origin, who also fled political persecution in Türkiye. They were arbitrarily detained in the detention area of Nikola Tesla airport from 23 to 26 September 2024, being denied access to the territory and the asylum procedure. Moreover, when they addressed IDEAS, they provided pictures on which they were holding tissues on which it was written that they wanted asylum. BPSB ignored their request and only after the ECtHR granted the Rule 39 request where they allowed to access the territory;
• On 15 January 2025, an Indian citizen who claimed religious persecution was returned regardless of the fact that he expressed his intention to apply for asylum and BPSB was duly informed;
• On 24 July 2025, an Iranian national who claimed political and religious persecution and asked for asylum was returned to Türkiye before IDEAS was able to address the ECtHR;
• On 28 October 2025, a Russian political activist, with strong arguable claim, was denied access to asylum and was returned to Russian Federation after which the contact was lost and IDEAS was not able to obtain information on his fate. IDEAS attempted to lodge a Rule 39 request, but there was not enough time since the applicant reached out to the lawyer 60 minutes before the flight to Moscow;

In 2023 there were at least 20 interventions at the Belgrade airport performed by IDEAS.^[43] In 2024, IDEAS provided assistance to 10 persons arbitrarily detained at the airport transit zone, including two unaccompanied boys from Egypt who were refused entry automatically without the presence of the competent worker of the CSW. Legal aid was required via phone or through (a) family members or friends who contacted IDEAS directly, or (b) UNHCR and its other partners. In 2025, IDEAS provided assistance in 12 instances in relation to 16 persons who were mostly returned (9 persons), while 7 of them were registered in line with Article 35 of Asylum Act. This means that access to the asylum procedure at the airport remains a serious concern, even when there is an outside intervention.

The question that remains open is what the destiny of those persons in need of international protection who were not able to contact legal aid providers was, especially when it comes to nationals of Syria, Afghanistan, Türkiye, but also Cuba, Burundi, Iran, Palestinians or stateless people. It is also important to note that people who were highlighted as stateless in the MoI response were most likely not even assessed as such,^[44] as the MoI did not even attempt to identify them.^[45] In other words, these could have been people who destroyed their travel documents and who originated from countries where they could face persecution. All of these problems were briefly outlined in the EU Progress Report in 2022 and 2023,^[46] but the 2023 Report still does not reflect the seriousness of the clandestine and unpredictable practice of the BPSB based on the author’s field experience. In the 2024 and 2025 Progress Reports, the European Commission failed to underline the systemic issue of arbitrary detention and forcible removals without any risk assessment of refoulement, nor are there reports of Frontex or FRO on the issues continuously reported for more than a decade.

The UN Human Rights Committee published the following findings and issued very specific recommendations applicable to the flawed practice of BPSB:

’32. […] the Committee is concerned by reports failure to provide access to asylum procedures for persons refused entry at international airports and their subsequent de facto detention in airport transit zones […]

33. The State party should ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement by ensuring that:

(a) asylum-seekers and any persons in need of international protection are not […] expelled or to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that set out in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant;

(b) Asylum-seekers receive information about their right to seek asylum in a language they understand […]

(c) Asylum-seekers have effective access to an appeal process that is in line with international standards, including ensuring that the lodging of appeals has a suspensive effect on […] expulsion;

(d) All relevant officials, including border guards, receive adequate training on international standards, including the principle of non-refoulement […] ‘^[47]

Still, the number of refusals of entry decisions in 2023 significantly decreased after Serbia (starting from December 2022) re-introduced visa regimes for citizens of Burundi, Cuba, India, Tunisia and other countries from which asylum seekers were coming in previous years.^[48] The number of refusal of entries remained similar in 2024 (4,716). In 2025, a sharp drop (1,771) was recorded.[49] Thus, the decrease in numbers of decisions does not mean that the practice has improved, but that the number of arrivals from countries which were mainly exposed to arbitrary refusal of entry decreased.

In order for the Foreigners Act to be applied fully in line with the principle of non-refoulement, it is necessary to conduct a thorough training of all the border officials entitled to render a decision on refusal of entry, but also to develop standard operational procedures which would help border officers to recognise different vulnerable categories of persons on the move. Additionally, all the Regional Border Centres should have among their staff interpreters for Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Pashtu, Turkish, Kurdish, Kirundi and other languages that foreigners who might be in need of international protection understand. In practice, however, interpreters do not seem to be hired. Additionally, a person who is about to be denied access to the territory should be afforded adequate and free of charge legal assistance. Finally, the implementation of the Foreigners Act should be made transparent and border monitoring activities, as recommended by the CAT, should dispel any existing doubts on the flawed practices of border authorities. Relevant standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) include that the detaining authority should serve foreign nationals deprived of their liberty with multi-lingual forms which outlines their rights, obligations and applicable procedures in a language which the foreigner understands.^[50]

It is also worth mentioning that in light of the ECtHR judgment in M.A. v. Lithuania,^[51] the Foreigners Act should be amended to introduce the automatic suspensive effect of the appeal against the decision on refusing the entry. The recent Strasbourg Court jurisprudence in cases such as A.I. and Others v. Poland,^[52] or A.B. and Others v. Poland,^[53] further confirms the above-highlighted necessity. The findings in these judgments also indicate that the practice at Serbian airports can also amount to collective expulsion in terms of the Article 4 of Protocol 4 ECHR.

Informal and forcible removals (pushbacks)

Informal and forcible removals from Serbia

Access to the territory for persons in need of international protection remained a serious concern in 2025. The pattern of multiple human rights violations which occur through the practice of pushbacks and other forms of arbitrary, very often collective and deprived of any risk assessment of refoulement, expulsions continued to include one, more or sometimes all the following violations:

1. short term unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty,^[54] according to both the subjective and objective criteria of the ECtHR and contrary to material and procedural norms of the Serbian Police Act;^[55]
2. arbitrary depravation of liberty without individual custody record which aims at hiding unlawful actions of border authorities;^[56]
3. denial of access to a lawyer, right to inform a third person on their situation and whereabouts and right to an independent medical examination;^[57]
4. failure to inform refugees and migrants on the reasons for deprivation of their liberty, as well as procedures which are applicable to them, and in a language they understand in writing and verbally;^[58]
5. denial of access to the asylum procedure or other residential procedure where risks of refoulement or chain refoulement would be assessed;^[59]
6. ill-treatment including kicks, slaps, punches, dropping off at locations where refugees and asylum seekers cannot fulfil their basic needs (food, water, medical assistance), destroying of cell phones, stripping, verbal abuse (threatening, swearing, etc), etc.;^[60]
7. forcible removal without examination of individual circumstances of each person or outside any legal procedure;^[61]
8. lack of assessment on any risks of refoulement and chain-refoulement^[62] in the receiving states and complete disregard of special needs e.g., age, mental or medical state, trauma caused by torture, human trafficking, sexual or gender-based violence (SGBV);
9. denial of access to effective legal remedy for the above-listed violations cumulatively and under Article 13 ECHR.^[63]

What is also important to add to this list is the fact that most of the testimonies or cases which were recoded and confirmed as a violation, include different forms of psychological or physical ill-treatment which implies: kicks, slaps, punches, hits with rubber truncheons, insults, threats, etc. All of these acts amount to different criminal offences which should be effectively and thoroughly investigated and perpetrators punished, which, according to the knowledge of the author of this report has never happened.[64] It is also important to note that both Constitutional Court and ECtHR have determined that the manner in which pushback operations are facilitated can also amount to inhumane and degrading treatment – e.g., dropping off at locations where people on the move cannot fulfil their basic needs (food, water, medical assistance, housing, medical care) and in life-threating conditions. In the landmark case O.H. and Others v. Serbia, both bodies have declared such practice as inhumane treatment. [65]

Arrivals

The number of arrivals has varied in the past decade and was influenced by different factors such as border policies of different countries (Bulgaria, Türkiye, North Macedonia, Greece, etc.), visa policies of Serbia, international agreements (e.g., EU- Türkiye statement) different methodologies to assess the number of arrivals, etc.[66] The most reliable way to determine the most accurate arrival numbers is recording by the MoI in the Afis, which cannot be expected in the near future due to lack of capacity of the Border Police Administration to process persons on the move at entry points from Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Thus, what has remained a constant is that it is impossible to determine the exact number of persons on the move who have arrived of transited through the territory of Serbia and for several reasons:

• The MoI, CRM and UNHCR, as most frequent sources of information, have applied different methods to collect and compile data on refugees and migrants entering and residing on Serbian soil;[67]
• A significant number of refugees and migrants are not registered (fingerprinted and photographed) by the MoI in line with the Foreigners or Asylum Act. Thus, they are not introduced into the database with fingerprints and pictures of foreigners – Afis. This is the only way to properly identify persons without any ID and which can further prevent the recording of one person several times using a different name or when their name is not properly typed into one of the databases.^[68]
• It is not clear if FRONTEX data on the number of irregular crossings to the EU from the Western-Balkan countries also includes those foreigners who were pushed-back several times;[69]
• A number of refugees and migrants simply transit through Serbia without being noticed and with the help of organized criminal groups involved in smuggling.

In 2024, the number of arrivals via the Western Balkan route decreased by 78% (21,520 detected irregular border crossings) and included mainly citizens of Türkiye, Syria and Afghanistan.[70] In 2025, FRONTEX recorded 12,525 irregular border crossings, which is a 42% drop.[71] According to the CRM, the number of arrivals to Serbia dropped for around 50% – 19,603 arrivals in 2024 and 9,567 arrivals in 2024.[72]

The number of arrivals per month was as follows:

Source: Data provided by the UNHCR office in Serbia and CRM.

The number of arrivals outlined in the table above is not related to people who were impacted by the armed conflict in Ukraine. In June 2023, it was reported that around 370,000 Russian citizens have resided in Serbia since February 2022, but this does not mean that all of them remained.^[73] In August 2023, it was reported that around 36,500 Ukrainian citizens resided in Serbia.^[74] In 2024, some media reported that around 200,000 citizens of the Russian Federation and Ukraine have entered Serbia.[75]

According to some sources from 2025, around 73,000 Russian Citizens applied for temporary residency and around 90% of these applications were granted.[76] Still, and due to the fact that many citizens of said countries can come to Serbia without visa, and are often entering and exiting Serbia, it is not possible to determine their exact number.

Presence of Frontex

The Status Agreement on border management cooperation between the European Union and Serbia entered into force in June 2021, and in June 2024 was followed by the Agreement on Operational Cooperation in border management.^[77] The agreement allows Frontex to carry out joint operations in Serbia, especially in the event of sudden border management challenges. The former European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration, Ylva Johansson, visited Serbia to launch the first Frontex joint operation at the Serbian border with Bulgaria.^[78] FRONTEX officers are dispatched at the border with Bulgaria. The new status agreement between the EU and Serbia entered into force on 1 April 2025 and renewal of the Ministry of Interior’s working arrangement with Frontex is ongoing and 159 standing corps officers are deployed at Serbia’s borders with North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the international airport in Belgrade, in addition to Hungary and Bulgaria.[79] As of June 2026, the author of this report is not aware of allegations of human rights violations made against FRONTEX officers.

Regardless of Frontex and European Commission findings, including from 2025 which does not provide any relevant data on arrivals, which are mostly obtained from Serbian authorities, the most striking deficiency in the data they publish is related to the lack of any information on harmful border practices committed by Serbian border authorities but also border forces of neighbouring States. According to the author of this report, the only explanation for the drop in the number of arrivals or irregular crossings is the so called ‘combat against smuggling’. Thus, the 2024 and 2025 Progress Reports do not contain a single information from which it can be determined to what extent Serbia has the capacity to maintain the rule of law at its borders and to safeguard access to the territory and the asylum procedure. Moreover, 2024 and 2025 Progress Reports have failed to reflect credible sources which indicate the involvement of some segments of Serbian security forces in smuggling operations.[80] All of these issues have significant impact on the effectiveness of Serbian asylum system and its legislative and practical alignment with the CEAS.

Chronology of arbitrary and forcible removals from Serbia to neighbouring countries

To reiterate, the so-called Western Balkan route represents a region in which refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are systematically subjected to arbitrary and forcible removals without any safeguards against arbitrary detention, refoulement, chain-refoulement and collective expulsions, and very often ill-treatment at the hands of border authorities which remain unpunished.

What is important to highlight is that instances of pushbacks are often portrayed by Serbian authorities as situations in which refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are deterred from attempting to cross the border after they realise that border patrols of Serbia are on the other side. However, the MoI’s argument that refugees and migrants are discouraged from irregular crossings when they encounter border police is misleading and is the long-standing position repeated since 2016, when mixed patrols of the army and police were introduced with the aim ‘to suppress illegal migration’.^[81]

This argument was publicly used for the first time by Mr. Jovan Krivokapić from the Ministry of Defence, who stated on national television that refugees and migrants are discouraged when they spot border patrol forces.^[82] A month before that statement, a group of 17 Afghan refugees were collectively expelled back to Bulgaria. This incident was declared as a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions and other human rights by the Constitutional Court in December 2020^[83] and the ECtHR in February 2026.[84] Three months before, a Kurdish family of 7 was left in the forest to freeze to death and only because of the CSO Info Park’s reaction, was a search and rescue mission carried out and the family saved.^[85] Accordingly, the credibility of such statements can be verified only if an independent border monitoring mechanism is established, as recommended by the Committee against Torture in 2015^[86] and 2021,^[87]  while the Human Rights Committee outlined that all pushback allegations should be promptly, thoroughly and independently investigated and perpetrators, if found guilty, punished appropriately.^[88]

Thus, the recorded cases of pushbacks imply that refugees and migrants are initially put under the effective control (deprived of their liberty) and then forcibly removed back to one of the neighbouring States. In particular, the description labelled as ‘discouragement’ is misleading as it does not correspond to reality and is aimed at avoiding the responsibility for the set of violations listed above. Still, it cannot be excluded that such instances exist, but the recorded cases and judicial and other findings of domestic and international bodies clearly corroborate the existence of arbitrary and forcible removals as a pattern of behaviour of Serbian border police..

All pushback allegations are further supported by Serbian officials who continuously publicly present ‘the positive results’ of Serbian border authorities as they successfully combat ‘illegal entries’ from neighbouring states.^[89] One such measure was also the erecting of the barbwire fence towards North Macedonia which has been clearly described in previous AIDA Reports and which remain valid to this day.[90] In June 2020, it was published in the media that up to June 2020, 532 migrants had been prevented from ‘illegally’ crossing the border.^[91] In a report by the Ombudsman, it was stated that in 2020, 14,390 people gave up trying to illegally enter Serbia from North Macedonia after they spotted border police forces.^[92]  On 15 December 2022, president of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic outlined that, in 2022, a total of 45,965 illegal entries from North Macedonia were prevented.^[93] The MoI stated that in 2023, a total of 37,403 ‘illegal entries’ were prevented.^[94] The number in 2024 reached 15,583,[95] while in 2025 this number was 10,802.[96] In its Report on the implementation of the Strategy for Combating Irregular Migration for the period 2018-2020, the MoI outlined the following:

‘During 2019, a total of 20,221 people were prevented from attempting to cross the state border illegally, of which 4,990 were caught trying to cross the state border illegally, while 15,231 people gave up after being spotted by the state border security authorities, while in 2020, a total of 38,226 persons were prevented, of which 22,572 were directly prevented from attempting to cross the state border illegally, while 15,654 were the results of preventive action by the state border security authorities.’^[97]

These numbers do not include foreign nationals who were refused entry or were readmitted to one of the neighbouring countries. Thus, according to the author of this report, it is safe to assume that many of these prevented illegal entries implied unlawful and in most of the cases collective expulsions to neighbouring States deprived of any risk assessment of refoulement. Lastly, the author does not exclude that significant number of refugees and migrants were deterred by very appearance of border police patrols.

Once again, it remains vague what the following terms mean: ‘prevented from attempting to cross the state border’, ‘were caught while trying to cross the state border’, ‘gave up after being spotted’, ‘directly prevented from attempting to cross’ and ‘results of preventive action.’ What is clear is that these people are not issued a decision on refusal of entry,^[98] which is the formal way to prevent someone from irregularly entering Serbia.

Number of persons prevented from ‘illegally crossing the border’ (data extracted from the statements of the state officials and official reports of the MoI)

In this year’s response, the MoI delivered the following data:

Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

In 2025, the presence of civil society organisations at the borders with North Macedonia, and Bulgaria continued to be limited.^[105] There is no effective border monitoring mechanism established in Serbia with an aim to closely and frequently observe the situation at entry borders. Still, apart from AIDA country reports on Serbia,[106] numerous national and international CSOs have been continuously reporting on pushback practices since 2015. The reports were also published by BVMN, Serbian Ombudsman, Amnesty International, etc. [107]The fact that that there are not many recent reports on harmful border practices committed by Serbian border authorities at the green border with North Macedonia, Bulgaria and Montenegro does not mean that arbitrary and forcible removals at borders are not facilitated daily.

Pushback reports throughout years

According to UNHCR, at least 773 refugees and migrants were pushed back to North Macedonia in 2019, 977 in 2020, 210 in 2021, 576 in 2022 and 59 in 2023. UNHCR has stopped reporting on such practices in their monthly statistical snapshots so the data on such practices does not exist for 2024 and 2025.

Source: UNHCR data portal.[110]

In 2020, a group of 16 persons from Morocco, Iran and Algeria were collectively expelled from the asylum centre (AC) in Tutin to North Macedonia. Allegedly, the police told them that they were being transferred to the reception centre (RC) in Preševo. Instead, they were dropped off near the Macedonian village of Lojane. They were crammed into the police van and after they had arrived at the drop off point, several of them were threatened, slapped and punched. Later on, the same group was arrested by Macedonian police and collectively expelled to Greece.^[111] The group addressed several NGOs, including BVMN and IDEAS.^[112] The Ombudsman issued an extremely contentious Recommendation, stating that the MoI and Commissariat for Refugees and Migration (CRM) had failed to prevent ‘uncontrolled movement’ of migrants who were, according to the report, left in front of the RC in Preševo and then went in an ‘unknown direction’. This finding implies that the Ombudsman rejected as not credible the allegations of collective expulsion, even though he was provided with the phone number and location of the victims.^[113] However, the body never tried to collect testimony from these people, even though they managed to return to Serbia after several weeks and the Ombudsman was aware of their whereabouts.^[114] This case displays a similar pattern as the case of collective expulsion reported by the APC in 2019.^[115]

BVMN described in detail four more pushbacks to North Macedonia in 2020, involving a total of 54 persons from Afghanistan, Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia and Syria. The first two incidents refer to April 2020, when 26 residents of RC in Preševo were taken from the camp and collectively expelled to North Macedonia close to the Serbian border village Miratovac.^[116] Two other reports were published in October 2020 outlining that refugees and migrants were taken respectively from AC Tutin,^[117] and the town Preševo,^[118] to the green border area with North Macedonia close to Miratovac village. APC reported pushbacks to North Macedonia in November 2020.^[119] All these cases included different forms of ill-treatment, such as: slapping, kicking, hitting with a rubber truncheon, use of police dogs, etc. These reports suggest that collective expulsions continued to take place, regardless of the COVID-19 pandemic, and that particularly vulnerable foreigners in that regard are those who are placed in RC Preševo and AC Tutin.

One of the reports published by a coalition of CSOs in April 2021 gives a detailed account of push backs of 4 persons to North Macedonia in the first four months. The report further outlines that pushbacks from Serbia and particularly from North Macedonia to Greece are likely to be happening on a much larger scale.^[120]

An encouraging sign in 2021 was a border initiative of the Ombudsman office. When it comes to pushbacks to North Macedonia committed by Serbian authorities, the Ombudsman recorded numerous testimonies.[121] Thus, 5 testimonies which encompass several dozen persons were collected in only 2-3 days in the border area with North Macedonia. This data clearly demonstrates the widespread or even systematic extent of the pushback practice. In 2021, the Ombudsman report outlined the following:

‘According to official data of the RBPCs, in 2020 […] 434 [persons/refugees and migrants] on the border with Bulgaria gave up trying to illegally enter the Republic of Serbia. According to police officers, these are foreigners who, after noticing the presence of border police patrols, gave up entering the country.’^[122]

These testimonies reflect others collected by the BVMN from 2020. Still, apart from BVMN in 2020 and APC in 2021, other CSOs present on a daily basis at reception centres in border areas have not published reports on border practices or testimonies collected by those who might have been informally expelled to one of the neighbouring states. The same can be said for CSOs in the neighbouring/receiving states, who so far have not disclosed any major findings or testimonies by refugees and asylum seekers on this issue in 2019, 2020, and 2021.^[123]

APC reported that in the first half of 2021, 410 pushbacks were documented by their field teams, and estimation of this CSO is that every day, at least 50 refugees and migrants are collectively expelled to North Macedonia.^[124]

Klikaktiv reported in October 2022 that ‘some of the refugees interviewed here [Serbia] stated they had been pushed back by the Serbian police back to North Macedonia, with no physical violence committed during the pushback‘.^[125]

The 2022 Progress Report from 2021 indicates that 14,806 foreign nationals were prevented from entering Serbia.^[126] The very fact that this data was included in Progress Report but without critical observation is concerning and should be criticised. Moreover, the fact that issues related to pushback operations on North Macedonian and Bulgarian border have never been critically reflected in the Progress Report clearly indicates that such practice, which clearly undermines access to territory and asylum procedure, is not of the European Commission’s concern. The 2021 data was obtained by the MoI, which keeps this kind of records but does not always disclose it publicly. In the past, these numbers were usually disclosed by State officials in the context of assuring the public that Serbia is successfully combating organised crime, smuggling, human trafficking and illegal migration.^[127]

In a 2022 report, Klikaktiv Reports emphasises that:

‘In the end of September, the Klikaktiv team spoke to a group of four men from Morocco who stated they had been pushed back to Bulgaria by the Serbian police on the green border near the city of Pirot: the police did not issue them with any documentation or provided information on asylum procedure, but allegedly had beat them, took away their personal belongings (3 mobile phones and 350 euros) and made them walk back to Bulgaria.’^[128]

Klikaktiv reported the following in 2023:

            ‘In December 2023, people on the move also reported that they were pushed-back from the   Serbian territory back to Bulgaria and that they were victims of police violence during these   actions. The cases of push-backs from the Serbian territory were also happening in the past but    they were rarely violent. Towards the end of December, Klikaktiv spoke to two men from Syria    who claimed to be pushed-back from Serbian territory back to Bulgaria. According to their       testimony, they crossed from Bulgaria to Serbia via river Timok (for the 15km of its run the River Timok is a natural border between two countries) in a rubber boat, but the Serbian police caught             them and confiscated the boat. The police officers then forced them into a freezing river and they     had to swim back to the Bulgarian shore’.^[129]

On 16 February 2024, IDEAS’s legal team was in contact with two men from Syria who were transported to the North Macedonian border. They called the IDEAS hotline and video call was established at the moment they were apprehended by Serbian border police – two officers in civilian clothes and two uniform police officer who arrived with the police van. They were talking in English asking for asylum, but the line was cut off and they were boarded to the back of the van. On the road from the vicinity of Preševo town where they were deprived of their liberty, to the green border area in Miratovac field, close to the North Macedonian village Lojane, they continuously sent GPS locations. Afterwards, they were ordered to leave towards North Macedonia and the police dogs were released at them. Contact was then lost.^[130]

On 22 February 2024, a group of stripped foreign nationals was video recorded while walking on the highway towards Reception Centre in Tabanovci in North Macedonia. According to their testimonies, as well as testimonies collected from foreign nationals who managed to enter Serbia, Serbian police arrested several dozens of nationals of Syria and Iraq. One group was taken to the police facility in the vicinity of border with North Macedonia where they were allegedly ill-treated: kicks, slaps, punches, hitting with belts and riffle buts. Others, who were captured right after they crossed the border were also ill-treated in similar manner, stripped and ordered to go back to North Macedonia. Several testimonies were collected by MYLA in North Macedonia and CSOs in Serbia and which contain pictures of bruised bodies.^[131]

BVMN reported one instance of pushback to Bulgaria in January 2024 when the Police took clothes, shoes and other belongings from a man from Morocco and smashed his phone. Afterwards, he and other people from his group were kicked, punched and pepper sprayed, and ultimately returned to Bulgaria.^[132] A similar case occurred in May 2024.[133] A collective expulsion, which corresponds to the pattern of behaviour of Serbian border police operating in the border area with Bulgaria and determined in the 2021 landmark judgment of the Constitutional Court (see below)[134] and confirmed by ECtHR, [135] was reported by BVMN in September 2024 when 31 Afghan men were expelled from Serbia to Bulgaria.[136] BVMN also reported a violent and forcible removal of an Afghan man from Serbia to North Macedonia in October 2024.[137]

In 2025, BVMN reported one pushback from August 2025 which involved 5 Iranian man who alleged physical ill-treatment, seizure and destroying of personal belongings and removal to North Macedonia.[138] In September 2025, IDEAS recorded forcible expulsion from deeper Serbian mainland of a group of Afghan refugees who attempted to enter RC in Bujanovac. One of the Afghans was severely beaten up and lost sight on his left eye. The case was taken by IDEAS lawyers to the Constitutional Court in Serbia after relevant evidence was collected though cross-border cooperation with CSO MYLA from North Macedonia and is currently pending. Klikaktiv in its quarterly reports did not report on additional individual cases related to pushbacks from Serbia to neighbouring countries in 2025.[139] Several allegations appeared in BVMN monthly reports but without more detailed description of time and place.

To conclude, it is clear that denial of access to the territory represents the State policy which has remained unchanged in 2025. This practice is most prominent at the borders with North Macedonia (8,741) and Bulgaria (1,914), but from the MoI response it can be seen that in addition to the refusal of entry practice as a form of forcible removal governed by the Foreigners Act, there is the practice of informal returns, outside the scope of Foreigners Act is applied at airports.

International and judicial reactions

Thus, although reports of collective expulsions to North Macedonia and Bulgaria have been decreasing in the past several years, data published by the highest state authorities (MoI, but also the Ombudsman) indicate that pushbacks are still a reality. This was confirmed in the decision of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, as well as in findings of the CAT in its latest Concluding Observations, but also findings of the HRC from the end of 2024.^[140] This data represents a continuation of the previous findings of relevant CSOs and international bodies for the protection of human rights and can be considered as evidence that collective expulsions are widespread and systematic.

The practice of pushbacks has been criticised by the UN Human Rights Committee already back in 2017 when it expressed its concerns related to ‘collective and violent’ denial of access to territory.^[141] These concerns have also been shared by the CAT^[142] and Amnesty International,^[143] while UNHCR had reported this problem for the first time in 2012.^[144] In 2015, the CAT recommended that Serbia establish ‘formalised border monitoring mechanisms, in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and civil society organisations.’^[145] To date, Serbia has failed to establish an independent border monitoring mechanism. The CAT reiterated its recommendation in 2021 and urged Serbia to:

‘Introduce a border monitoring mechanism that includes representatives of independent entities, such as international Organisations and civil society with expertise in international refugee law and international human rights law, to ensure that border authorities are acting in line with the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsion, as well as for the purpose of collecting accurate data’.^[146]

Similar findings were outlined in 2024 Concluding observations of the HCR:

‘[…] 32. […] the Committee is concerned by reports of failures to ensure effective access to asylum procedures, including: alleged pushbacks and ill-treatment at land borders; failure to provide access to asylum procedures for persons refused entry at international airports and their subsequent de facto detention in airport transit zones;

[…] (d) All relevant officials, including border guards, receive adequate training on international standards, including the principle of non-refoulement, and that all allegations of pushbacks and ill-treatment are promptly, thoroughly and independently investigated and perpetrators, if found guilty, are punished appropriately;’^[147]

In 2021, the Constitutional Court (CC) confirmed that illegal border practices have been a state practice.^[148] This decision is the first official recognition that relevant State authorities denied access to the territory and asylum procedure and carried out collective expulsions.^[149] On 29 December 2020, the CC adopted the constitutional appeal submitted by 17 refugees from Afghanistan who complained to have been collectively expelled to Bulgaria in February 2017.^[150] The case concerned the forcible removal of 25 Afghan refugees (including 9 children) who entered Serbia from Bulgaria. The group was arrested by the border police officers and was detained for 12 hours in the basement of the Border Police Station Gradina in inhumane and degrading conditions.^[151] Later on, they were taken to the misdemeanour court to face trial for illegal entry on Serbian territory. An acting judge dropped the charges stating that the defendants were in need of international protection, that they should not be removed to Bulgaria due to poor living conditions in reception centres and because ‘they might be victims of human trafficking.’ The judge ordered the police to issue the applicants with registration certificates and to take them to asylum centres. Right after the trial, and upon being issued asylum certificates, the applicants were put in a truck and, instead of being taken to the camp, were taken to the green border area and collectively expelled to Bulgaria.

The Constitutional Court found that Gradina officers had violated the applicants’ right to liberty and security (Article 27 (3) and Article 29 (1) of the Constitution)^[152] by denying them the possibility to challenge the lawfulness of their detention with the assistance of a competent legal representative. The Court dismissed the applicants’ claim that the material conditions in the basement amounted to inhumane and degrading treatment, stating that a period of 12 hours is not lengthy enough to reach the threshold of Article 25 of the Constitution (Article 3 of ECHR).^[153] The Court further found that it is an undisputable fact that the applicants were expelled to Bulgaria. By applying the standards established in the ECtHR jurisprudence in Čonka,^[154] Hirsi Jamaa^[155] and Georgia v. Russia,^[156] the Court determined that the applicants were expelled to Bulgaria outside any legal procedure, without examining the individual circumstances of every applicant and without the possibility for them to provide arguments against their expulsion. The Court also awarded EUR 1,000 to each of the applicants.^[157]

This case was further appealed to the ECtHR. On 12 July 2021, the ECtHR communicated the case to the Government of Serbia so it could answer on the issues raised by the Court in its questions, related to Article 3, Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol 4, Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 4, Article 5, Article 5 (2) and Article 5 (4).^[158] The communication phase was concluded at the end of 2022, and the judgment of the Court was issued on 3 February 2026 finding multiple violations:

1. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty described as ‘deceptive detention’ aimed at facilitating pushback and in the back of the police vehicle which transported applicants to the green border area with Bulgaria;
2. Inhumane treatment which implied the manner in which forcible removal was performed and which implied leaving of applicants in the forest in cold and life-threatening conditions;
3. removal without risk assessment of refoulement which violated procedural limb of the Article 3;
4. violation of prohibition of collective expulsion.[159]

On 14 June 2021, another case referring to informal expulsions to North Macedonia and then further to Greece was communicated to the Governments of Serbia and North Macedonia (A.H. v. Serbia and North Macedonia, and A.H. v. Serbia). The case concerns a Sudanese applicant who attempted to seek international protection in Serbia. Instead of being registered, he was allegedly subject to several summary removals to North Macedonia by the authorities of Serbia and to Greece by the authorities of North Macedonia, respectively. A formal removal decision was never issued. The case refers to Article 3 and Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3 in terms of the risk assessment of refoulement and chain-refoulement.^[160]

Pushbacks towards Serbia and their consequences

Pushbacks towards Serbia have been documented along the green border between Bosnia, Croatia,[161] Hungary and Romania[162] since 2015, where refugees and asylum seekers, at one point, were almost systematically denied access to the territory and the asylum procedure, and are often subjected to various forms of ill-treatment, some of which might amount to torture.^[163] In 2025, pushbacks were mostly facilitated from Hungary.

This state of affairs indicates that Serbia’s geographical position puts the country in a difficult situation. Namely, the Serbian asylum system cannot be considered as fair and effective, and thus, it is not attractive to refugees and asylum seekers.^[164] For that reason, most persons in need of international protection who arrive to Serbia strive to leave to one of the three neighbouring States which form the so-called external borders of the EU – Romania, Hungary and Croatia. One of the exit routes is also towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The will to reach an EU country implied in the past that refugees, asylum seekers and migrants were staying in border areas, in one of six Reception Centres or in one of the over 20 informal settlements which used established in abandoned facilities or tent settlements formed in forests and fields.^[165] Apart from food, water and a roof over their heads, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in reception centres were faced with conditions that can only be described as inhumane and degrading due to overcrowding, lack of privacy, poor hygiene, insecurity and others. Even more appalling conditions were registered in the informal settlements where there is no access to the most basic needs, especially during the hot summer or cold winter days.[166]

One of the consequences of illegal border polices, very often explained as a ‘necessity’ in the combat against organised crime, irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling, was the increased number of operations from organised smuggling groups.^[167]  In the period from 2022 to the end of 2023, dozens of incidents involving organized criminal groups facilitating smuggling have been reported by CSOs, independent media and investigative journalists, often outlining the link between these groups and some hierarchies within Serbian MoI.[168] This has led to police raids, excessive use of force, arbitrary deprivation of liberty and de facto detention in reception facilities.[169] This also implied armed clashes between the smuggling groups, but also clashes between such groups and police, the latest one being recorded in May 2025 in the vicinity of the town of Šid close to Croatian border.[170]

In 2024, the situation significantly changed due to the fact that almost all reception facilities located on north were closed at the end of 2023, meaning that persons pushed back from EU countries to Serbia have not been able to find official shelters (see more in Reception Conditions). The situation has remained unchanged in 2025, and there are no indications that any of these facilities will be open in the near future.

Such change of context occurred after the October 2023 shootings, when the police facilitated actions in which hundreds of refugees and migrants were deprived of their liberty and persecuted for the misdemeanour of illegal entry or illegal stay on Serbian soil.^[171] Most of them were sentenced to short terms prison sentences (between 10 and 30 days) and transferred to penitentiary institutions all around Serbia. Also, all reception facilities were closed for several weeks, depriving in that way all foreign nationals who were not asylum seekers of their liberty.^[172] The regime to which they were subjected is reminiscent of the regime introduced during the COVID-19 lockdown when people were deprived of their liberty without individual and reasoned decision against which they can lodge remedy to the judicial body and where they were deprived of the possibility to access legal aid.^[173] CSOs in Serbia have received higher number of distress calls from families of people who were apprehended and were missing from several days to several weeks – serving their prison sentence or being detained in one of the reception facilities.^[174] This form of behaviour can only be described as arbitrary and contrary to the right to liberty and security.^[175] Eventually, Adaševci, Kikinda, Sombor and Subotica were closed, and they remained closed as of May 2026.

At the end of 2025, Klikaktiv reported the following:

‘The beginning of autumn and the arrival of colder weather affected the dynamics of movement of people on the move on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. During the summer months, there is traditionally an increase in the number of people transiting toward European Union countries, while favorable weather conditions allow people to stay outdoors, which results in greater visibility of migrants’ presence. Although a decrease in the number of people on the move staying in or transiting through Serbia was recorded during the last quarter of 2025, their presence did not disappear completely. As noted in the previous subsection, intensified police activities aimed at preventing irregular migration and migrant smuggling, combined with worsening weather conditions, contributed to people on the move becoming significantly less visible in the public space than in the previous period. During the fourth quarter of 2025, no significant presence of people was recorded in squats along the Serbian–Hungarian border, although many of the people with whom Klikaktiv communicated    stated that their primary goal remained crossing into Hungary.’[176]

All of the above-described actions have led to the situation in which people on the move take more dangerous ways to cross borders to neighbouring countries, being crammed in back of the vans or trucks or crossing the rivers during the night. There were two serious traffic accidents recorded in February and July 2024. In the first one, 3 people died,[177] while in the other one many passengers were seriously injured.[178] The most tragic incident occurred in August 2024 when at least 10 unaccompanied boys drowned in Drina river trying to cross to Bosnia and Herzegovina.[179] In 2025, there was another incident in which 1 Chinese national drowned in the river while trying to cross from Serbia to Croatia.[180]

Additional information on push-back practices to Serbia can be found in the other AIDA country reports on Croatia, Hungary and Romania.

Pushbacks from Hungary to Serbia and Embassy Procedure

Since the contentious changes in the Hungarian legal framework in the period 2015-2025,^[181] including the legalisation of a practice which is considered to be in violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions, the Hungarian authorities have reported that 400,046 refugees, asylum seekers and migrants were expelled back to Serbia. Due to such practice, but also Hungary’s failure to comply with a judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),^[182] FRONTEX suspended its operational activities in Hungary.^[183] Moreover and due to the failure to comply with the judgment, Hungary was ordered to pay a lump sum of 200 million euros and a penalty payment of 1 million euros per day of delay for failure to comply with the CJEU judgment.^[184]

In 2020, BVMN published 3 testimonies encompassing 30 people who were pushed back from Hungary to Serbia.^[185] This number significantly increased in 2021 amounting to 30 documented pushback cases encompassing 347 persons. Only in 5 out of 30 cases allegations of violence were not reported, while in the other 25 cases the following forms of ill-treatment by the Hungarian authorities were outlined: kicks, slaps, punches, hitting with police buttons, forcing to undress, handcuffing in painful positions, arbitrary detention, pushing to the ground, forcing to lie or sit on the ground, dog attacks, insulting, threating, pepper spraying, etc.^[186] The same trend continued in 2022, when BVMN compiled 77 reports encompassing 1,337 persons who were pushed back from Hungary.^[187] In 2023, BVMB compiled 36 reports containing testimonies related to violent pushbacks of 613 persons on the move.^[188] In 2024, BVMN collected 4 testimonies which were related to 64 persons from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and other countries, and which implied different forms of physical ill-treatment.[189] There were no BVMN reports on pushbacks from Hungary in 2025 which indicates the lack of presence of CSOs in this border regions. In its quarterly reports, Klikaktiv describes pushback operations committed by the hands of Hungarian border authorities as a rule, but without providing individual testimonies.[190]

Particularly worrying examples of push-back practices from Hungary to Serbia are related to individuals who had never been in Serbia beforehand. There are probably dozens of cases of foreigners subjected to such practice. The first such case was recorded in 2016.^[191] In April 2021, an SGBV survivor who arrived from Senegal to Budapest airport was expelled to Serbia.^[192] In September 2021, an Afghan student in Hungary was expelled to Serbia.^[193] On 31 December 2021, a woman from Cameroon who was traveling from Romania towards Austria was apprehended by Hungarian immigration authorities and expelled to Serbia. In February 2022, she obtained the status of victim of human trafficking in Serbia.^[194] One such case resulted in Hungary being found responsible by the Strasbourg Court for expelling to Serbia a Kurdish UASC who was expelled from Austria to Hungary and then by Hungarian authorities to Serbia, even though he had never been in Serbia before.^[195]

It is worth to note that, since  2020, access to the territory and the asylum procedure in Hungary was made possible only through a consulate in Belgrade.^[196] The new procedure in practice implies that persons in need of international protection have to send an email and schedule an appointment at the Consulate and wait to be summoned in order to submit the Declaration of Intent for Lodging an Application on Asylum (‘DoI’). The new procedure is described in detail in the AIDA report on Hungary. According to the data obtained by IDEAS, several hundred applicants (individuals and families) have sent an email to the Consulate asking for an appointment. Only few received the response stating that they are included on the list, and even less were invited to the Consulate premises to lodge the DoI. So far, only 3 families from Iran (12 persons in total) have entered Hungary.[197] IDEAS and InfoPark have been providing technical assistance to the foreigners interested in applying for asylum in Hungary. The problems that were detected are the following:

1. DoI forms are in English, which represents a serious obstacle for most of the applicants
2. filling out of the DoI forms requires at least basic knowledge of refugee and asylum law
3. many of the applicants do not know how to use emails and how to communicate with the Consulate in order to schedule the DoI appointment or to lodge the DoI submission
4. the communication with the Consulate is in English and most of the applicants do not understand this language
5. several applicants have failed to appear at the scheduled meeting since they did not understand the message received via email from Consulate or because they did not know how to use an email
6. there is no clear criterion on the basis of which an applicant will be invited to submit the DoI as opposed to another, which creates distress and conflicts among applicants who are aware of each other’s applications
7. persons who are informed that they are rejected are not advised that they are entitled to lodge an appeal and are not familiar with the Hungarian legal framework governing the appeal stage, neither are Serbian lawyers
8. applicants who are rejected are not legally competent to legally challenge the negative decision/response of the Consulate

Additional issues on the new procedure are documented in the AIDA report on Hungary. To conclude, persons interested in submitting the DoI at the Hungarian consulate do not have effective access to the asylum procedure, and it is clear that this mechanism has showed to be close to impossible to activate in practice, as attested by the fact that only three families from Iran who were allowed to access Hungarian territory. Many people who sent an email to the Consulate are without any legal status but are allowed to reside in the asylum or reception centres. They are in the same situation as thousands of other foreigners who do not enjoy any legal status and whose stay in Serbia is tolerated.

In June 2025, the ECtHR issued a judgment in which it declared the above-described Embassy Procedure as a non-effective means of legal entry, and concluded that the expulsion of three citizens of Afghanistan to Serbia constituted a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions. The ECtHR also found that the failure to examine the access to adequate asylum procedure in Serbia constituted violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 ECHR.[198]

Finally, it is important to outline that the above-described practice of automatic expulsions to Serbia was declared contrary to Article 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR in the case of Shahzad v. Hungary.^[199] The ECtHR outlined that the Hungarian authorities removed the applicant without identifying him and examining his situation and that he was denied effective access to means of legal entry, which amounted to an expulsion of collective nature contrary to Article 4 of Protocol 4.^[200] An identical Judgment as Shahzad was rendered in the case of H.K. v. Hungary.^[201] Also, three more applications lodged against Hungary were upheld by the court in the case of W.A. and Others v. Hungary, where three Syrian refugees were expelled back to Serbia on the basis of the automatic application of the safe third country.^[202] In October 2023, another judgment of the Strasbourg Court found a violation of the Article 4 of Protocol 4, but also of the procedural limb of Article 3 of ECHR,^[203] while in September 2024, the Court again found violation of Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR.[204] In January 2026, the case H.M v. Hungary was communicated against Hungary dealing with issues under the Article 4 of Protocol 4 and procedural limb of the Article 3.[205]

Source: Hungarian Ministry of Interior official data and official statistics from the Hungarian Police website.[206]

As showcased by the table above, the Hungarian immigration authorities have been transparent about the number of persons expelled back to Serbia under their domestic framework, outside of any readmission procedure, and without the knowledge of Serbian border authorities. According to the data delivered by the Serbian MoI, only 6 foreigners were officially readmitted from Hungary to Serbia in 2023, 5 in 2024 and 2025 respectively (see Hindering of access through legal ways – Readmission). In the past 10 years, 400,046 persons were informally, forcibly and in most of the cases collectively expelled back to Serbia.

For information about pushback from Romania and Croatia, which has been a serious issue in previous years but for which no new information was available to the author in 2025, see previous updates of the present report.[207]

Access to the territory at the Nikola Tesla Airport in Belgrade

The contentious work of the Border Police Station Belgrade (BPSB) at the Nikola Tesla Airport remained unchanged in 2025.^[208] In the period between 2021 and 2022, an increasing number of ill-treatment allegations were made by people who were refused entry at the airport and addressed CSOs in Serbia upon their return to their country of origin, or after their admission into Serbia which ensued after CSOs interventions. Allegations of ill-treatment were particularly worrying in the last quarter of 2022, when free visa regimes with Tunisia and India were cancelled and when BPSB was issuing hundreds of refusal of entry decisions per week, which was the reason why NPM conducted the visit.^[209] The use of violence towards persons who might be in need of international protection was recorded on numerous occasions by CSOs in Serbia. Violent incidents reportedly include punches, slaps, kicks, hits with rubber truncheons and handcuffing in painful position. Ill-treatment occurred in situations where refugees and asylum seekers were forced to go to the detention premises at the airport or forced to board the plane (see Refusal of entry under the Foreigners Act). The number of reported incidents dropped in 2023, 2024 and 2025 likely due to the decrease in the number of arrivals from countries for which the visa regime was changed (Burundi, Cuba, Tunisia, etc.).

In 2021, BPSB issued 146 certificates of intention to submit an asylum application (‘registration certificate’). In 2022, a total of 689 asylum certificates were issued at Serbian airports. In 2023, this number reached 519, while in 2024 this number sharply dropped to 27. In 2025, the total number of issued certificates was 53.

Even though the number of issued certificates in 2024 and 2025 has been the lowest in the past 5 years, the practice of BPSB remained unpredictable, inconsistent and deprived of any clear criteria.^[210] In fact, BPSB continued with contentious practices including one consisting of the following steps and in relation to certain nationalities who arrive mainly from Türkiye, which was manifested through two Rule 39 requests granted in the second half of 2024,^[211] and several IDEAS intervention in 2025:

• the police wait at the exit of the plane with decisions on refusal of entry forms already filled out with all the available details (flight details, arrival time in Serbia, reasons for refusal of entry, etc.) except for the personal details of the travellers which are later on taken from their passports;
• Foreigners, including persons that might be in need of international protection, are then apprehended right after they leave the plane and are invited to sign the forms, without knowing what they contain;
• their cell phones and passports are frequently taken away and the personal details from the passport are filled out on the decisions on refusal of entry;
• if the flight immediately flies back to Istanbul or other destination, foreigners can be boarded back onto the plane, threatened with the use of force;
• if individuals manage to decline to board this immediate boarding or there is no immediate return flight, they are taken to detention premises at the transit zone with the use of force or the threat of the use of force (except for the women and young children);
• their arbitrary detention can then last from several hours to several days, as long as a seat on a return flight to Istanbul does not become available:
• when a seat on a return flight becomes available, detainees are forcibly taken to the side exit, forced into police cars and driven across the runway to the plane which is already boarded with regular travellers.
• decisions on refusal of entry in English and Serbian are served to detained individuals prior to their forced boarding onto the plane, regardless of whether they have been signed or not by detainees.

Regardless of the number of persons recognised by airport border authorities as individuals who might be refugees, the most concerning issues which remain are the following:

• unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty at the transit zone;
• the manner in which decisions on refusal of entry are being issued;^[212]
• lack of capacity of BPSB officers to recognise persons who might be in need of international protection and those who are not (in line with Article 35 of Asylum Act and Article 83 of Foreigners Act).

Thus, the foreigners who, according to the assessment of BPSB, do not meet the requirements to enter Serbia are deprived of their liberty in the transit zone in an unlawful and arbitrary manner. They remain in that status for as long as the air carrier with which they travelled secures a place for their flight back to the departing destination, regardless of it being the country of origin or a third country.^[213] Detention can last from several hours to several weeks. However, BPSB does not consider them as persons deprived of their liberty since there are no legal grounds in the current legal framework which governs foreigners’ stay in the transit zone. Thus, BPSB denies them all the rights they should be entitled to, such as: right to a lawyer, right to inform a third person of their whereabouts, the right to an independent medical examination, the right to be served with the decision on deprivation of liberty and the right to lodge an appeal against such decision. Moreover, police officers do not have at their disposal interpreters for the languages which foreigners who might be in need of international protection usually understand, which means that they cannot properly inform them on said rights, including the right to apply for asylum.^[214]

The critical consequence of this practice is that people who might be in need of international protection could be denied access to the territory and sent back to third countries or countries of origin where they could face persecution or torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. In other words, they are denied access to the territory and the asylum procedure in an arbitrary manner and without examining the risks of refoulement.^[215] More precisely, since the new Foreigners Act entered into force in October 2018, foreigners are issued a decision on refusal of entry in a procedure that lacks any guarantees against refoulement,^[216] without the possibility to use services of a lawyer and an interpreter, and to lodge an appeal with a suspensive effect.^[217]

In June 2019, the Constitutional Court (CC) dismissed as manifestly unfounded constitutional appeal submitted on behalf of Iranian refugee H.G.D.^[218] In November 2016, H.G.D. was detained at the airport transit zone for 28 days, in the manner described above. The CC’s reasoning gives serious reason for concern and indicates the lack of capacity of this body to examine violations of Article 5 of ECHR,^[219] in line with the criteria established in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.^[220] Namely, the Court outlined that the legal framework that had been in force at the time of the applicant’s stay at the airport did not envisage the procedure in which a foreigner can be deprived of liberty in the transit zone. For that reason, H.G.D.’s claims about unlawful and arbitrary detention could not be considered as well founded. In other words, the Court failed to conduct an independent test on the existence of a deprivation of liberty in the applicant’s case,^[221] using the subjective and objective criteria,^[222] such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.^[223] It disregarded completely the fact that H.G.D. had been locked in premises at the airport transit zone for 28 days, with limited access to the outside world, without interpretation services and the possibility to hire a lawyer, inform his family on his whereabouts and understand the procedures that was being been applied to him. H.G.D. was also denied access to the asylum procedure. The applicant faced refoulement to Türkiye, and further [chain-refoulement] to Iran. Eventually, the ECtHR granted the Rule 39 request.^[224] The case was communicated to the Government of Serbia on 12 July 2021 and the Court issued the judgment on 7 October 2025 finding violations of Article 5-1, 5-4 and 5-5 due to the fact that there was no legal framework which was governing deprivation of liberty of the applicant in the transit zone. The Court outlined its inability to ‘identify any provision or any reference to the possibility of detention in the transit zone nor any indication of the maximum duration of detention in the zone.’[225]

In 2022, the BPSB issued the record of 8,682 refusal of entry decisions, while Border Police Station at Niš airport issued 229 decisions. In 2023, BPSB issued 1,498 refusal of entry decisions mainly in relation to Turkish citizens, but also nationals of Iran (34), stateless persons (28), Syria (27) and Afghanistan (13). In 2024, this number was 1,757, while in 2025,  this number was almost identical – 1,771. Most of 2025 nationalities refused entry were Turkish (386), Bangkadesh (156) and Nepal (139),

 Source: Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

During 2025, CSOs (APC, BCHR, IDEAS or Klikaktiv) lawyers were not granted permissions to enter the transit zone as was the case from previous years.[227] In practice, this changed little, since there were no recorded entries into the transit zone by lawyers in the past several years.[228]

Thus, and regardless of that fact that CSO’s lawyers used to have transit zone permissions, none of them were allowed to physically access potential asylum seekers. They were contacted via email or cell phone by foreigners detained at the airport. Formally, the main condition for access to the transit zone used to be that lawyers had to know the exact name of the person detained, their passport number and arrival flight details. This means that the BPSB has never allowed unimpeded access to a person who claimed to be in need of international protection and who were not able to directly contact CSOs. However, most of the asylum seekers who contacted CSOs were allowed to enter Serbia after the phone call or an email sent by CSOs’ lawyers.

At the same time, not all persons who have been denied access to the territory at the airport are provided with legal counselling since not all of them speak English, nor do they all have access to phones or internet. Accordingly, very often, the people receiving counsel from CSOs at the airport state that there are dozens of others who are detained and wish to apply for asylum or receive additional information on their legal possibilities in Serbia. The European Commission highlighted this problem.^[229]

Thus, it cannot be claimed with certainty that asylum seekers are actually allowed to enter Serbia nor that the lawyers in general are able to stay touch with these people to ensure that they entered Serbia and to challenge their arbitrary detention at the transit zone. Deeper communication is only established with foreigners who decide to submit an asylum application.

In 2021, the CAT recommended that Serbia should:

‘Ensure access to territory and sufficient and effective protection from refoulement at the Belgrade International Airport by ensuring that persons detained in the transit zone of the airport receive information about their right to seek asylum, including effective access to asylum procedure, immediately and in language they understand’

It is important to reiterate that the only way to secure the respect for human rights of all the foreigners who arrive at Nikola Tesla Airport and who claim to be in need of international protection would be to grant APC, IDEAS, KlikAktiv or other CSOs or independent lawyers unhindered access to the entire transit zone, including the detention premises. Additionally, BPSB should start providing multi-lingual information leaflets containing the list of rights and obligations that foreigners have in Serbia. These leaflets should also include a short description of the procedures that could be possibly applied to them, including the expulsion procedure. By combining these two, BPSB would guarantee the respect for the principle of non-refoulement, maintain control of entry and stay on Serbian territory,^[230] and establish a partnership with the qualified lawyers who could assist them in making the right decision in every individual case.

To conclude, it is clear that there is an obvious need to establish a border monitoring mechanism at the airport, which should be managed jointly by UNHCR, CSOs and representatives of the MoI.

^[1] Official Gazette no. 103/2007

^[2] Radio Free Europe, Srbija i Makedonija potpisale sporazum o readmisiji, 4 October 2010, available at: http://bit.ly/3kI8Od3 [accessed on 26 February 2021].

^[3] Official Gazette no. 7/2011.

^[4] Official Gazette no. 13/2013.

^[5] Radio Free Europe, Srbija i BiH potpisale Sporazum o readmisiji, 5 July 2013, available at; http://bit.ly/3dSKJ1F [accessed on 26 February 2021].

^[6] MoI, Извештај о спровођењу Стратегије супротстављања ирегуларним миграцијама за период 2018-2020. година, June 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3Dtss4r, p. 24.

^[7] MoI, Response on the request for the information of public importance of the MoI no. 07-34/24 of 15 April 2024.

^[8] Ombudsman, Serbia: National Report on the situation of human rights of migrants at the borders, ENNHRI, July 2021, available here, p. 21.

^[9] Taz, Einfach weitergeschoben: Abgelehnte Geflüchtete will Österreich in serbischen Abschiebezentren unterbringen – und für sie zahlen, 17 April 2020, available (in German) at: https://bit.ly/2SY8U3c; Der Standard, Grüne lehnen Abschiebung abgelehnter Flüchtlinge nach Serbien ab, 16 April 2020, available (in German) at: https://bit.ly/2T0LzOv.

^[10] Euronews, Austria, Serbia and Hungary strike migration deal, saying EU measures have failed, 17 November 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3T1LWGk.

^[11] RTS, Vučić, Orban i Nehamer potpisali Memorandum o borbi protiv ilegalnih migracija, 16 November 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3T0VzVG.

^[12] Especially in comparison to the number of pushbacks from and to Serbia.

[13] Refusal of entry decision in bilingual – English and Serbian Cyrillic.

^[14] CPT, Immigration Factsheet, CPT/Inf(2017)3, available at: https://bit.ly/3zntMUA, pp 2-3.

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] Article 80, Foreigners Act.

[17] MoI-Border Police Administration, responses to the information of public importance nos. 07-34/24, 30 August 2024 (delivered on 20 September 2024) and 07-2/25, 11 February 2025 (delivered on 17 February 2025).

^[18] UNHCR Office in Serbia and Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia – Border Police Department – Asylum Office.

^[19]  Article 15(2) Foreigners Act.

^[20] Article 15(3) Foreigners Act.

^[21] Article 15(6) Foreigners Act.

^[22] Application no 19776/92, Judgment of 25 June 1996, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2TayPpz.

^[23] Practice based observation by IDEAS, January 2024.

^[24] Annex 1 to the Rulebook on Refusal of Entry available at: https://bit.ly/3zaq6KS and Law on Republic Administrative Fee, Fee No. 37 (5), available in Serbian here.

^[25] Annex 1 Regulation on the Refusal of Entry.

^[26] ECtHR, Čonka v. Belgium, Application No 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February 2002, EDAL, available at: https://bit.ly/2STSScH; Muminov v. Russia, Application No 42502/06, Judgment of 11 December 2008, para 10, available at: https://bit.ly/3R270gH.

^[27] Article 75(1) Foreigners Act.

^[28] Article 75(2) Foreigners Act.

^[29] Article 75(3) Foreigners Act.

^[30]  Article 75(5) Foreigners Act.

^[31] Article 75(6) Foreigners Act.

^[32] Article 83(2) Foreigners Act.

^[33] ECtHR, M.A. v. Lithuania, Application No. 59793/17, 11 December 2018, paras 83-84, available at: https://bit.ly/40Kz3Er.

^[34] See e.g., the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and legally binding case law of the ECtHR.

[35] The data received from the MoI on the refusal on entry practice at Serbian airports did not provide.

[36] The data received from the MoI on the refusal on entry practice at Serbian airports did not provide all nationalities, but only the top 10.

^[37] None of these three countries are parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Regarding the UAE’s treatment of Afghan refugees awaiting resettlement: BBC, UAE arbitrarily detaining 2,400 Afghan asylum seekers – report, 16 March 2023 available here and Infomigrants, Thousands of Afghans ‘in limbo’ in United Arab Emirates: Human Rights Watch, 15 March 2023, available here.

           Regarding Lebanon, see Mixed Migration Centre, Selective and Strategic indifference: Lebanon’s migration and refugee landscape’, 25 January 2024, available here; UNHCR, Protection Monitoring Findings – Lebanon – 4th Quarter 2023, 22 March 2024, available here; Amnesty International, Lebanon: Authorities must halt unlawful deportations of Syrian refugees, 24 April 2024, available here.

           Regarding Qatar, both the situation of refugees and the overall human rights situation, especially for women, migrants and LBGTQIA+, see: US Department of State, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar, available here; Human Rights Watch, Qatar, 2019, available here; Amnesty International, ‘Qatar: 2023’, available here.

^[38] Practice-informed observation of IDEAS, January 2024.

^[39] MoI, Response on the request for the information of public importance of the MoI no. 07-34/24 of 15 April 2024.

^[40] See AIDA, Country Report: Hungary – 2023 Update, July 2024, available here.

^[41] See the bellow examples and practice-informed observation by IDEAS and author of this Report.

^[42] For individual cases from previous years please see AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2022, May 2023, available here, pp 44-45, AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2023, August 2023, available here, pp. 46-48 and AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2024, August 2025, available here, pp. 47-50

^[43] A total of 11 interventions in relation to 14 persons originating from Cuba, Pakistan and India, Practice-informed observation by IDEAS.

^[44] Serbia does not have a law according to which stateless people are treated through specially designed procedures.

^[45] MoI, Response on the request for the information of public importance of the MoI no. 07-34/24 of 15 April 2024.

^[46] European Commission, Serbia: Progress Report, SWD(2022) 338 final 12 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3LedaYB, p. 63 and see also European Commission, Serbia: Progress Report, SWD (2023) 695 final, 8 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/4bRUaJU, p. 68.

^[47] HRC, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Serbia*, 3 May 2024, CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4, available at: https://bit.ly/3W1s0qn, paras. 32-33.

^[48] European Commission, Serbia: Progress Report, SWD (2023) 695 final, 8 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/4bRUaJU, pp. 69-70.

[49] Ministry of Interior – Border Police Department’s Response to the request for the information of public importance no. 07-25/26-2, 10 March 2026 (received on 23 March 2026).

^[50] CPT, Immigration detention, CPT/Inf (2017)3, March 2017, available at: https://bit.ly/3sL4rWK.

^[51] ECtHR, M.A. v. Lithuania, Application No 59793/17, Judgment of 11 December 2018, EDAL, available at: https://bit.ly/2txDq72, paras 83-84.

^[52] ECtHR, A.I. and Others v. Poland, Application No. 39028/17, Judgment of 14 November 2022, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/3l67o0m.

^[53] ECtHR, A.B. and Others v. Poland, Application No. 42907/17, Judgment of 14 November 2022, EDAL, available at: https://bit.ly/3l67o0m.

^[54] ECtHR, Creangă v. Romania, Application No. 29226/03, Judgment of 23 February 2012, available at: https://bit.ly/3BjU8bI, para. 84.

^[55] ECtHR, Guzzardi v. Italy, Application No 7367/76, Judgment of 6 November 1980, available at: https://bit.ly/3tS73Al, para. 95; Z.A. and Others v. Russia, Application Nos. 61411/15, 61420/15, 61427/15 and 3028/16, Judgment of 21 November 2019 [GC], EDAL, available at: https://bit.ly/3JB0Hdu, para. 138, but see also, CPT, Report to the Croatian Government on the visit to Croatia carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 10 to 14 August 2020, CPT/Inf (2021) 29 , 3 December 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3978tyQ, para. 10; ECtHR, A.R.E. v. Greece, Application No. 15783/21, Judgment of 7 January 2025, available here, para. 290 and O.H. and Others v. Serbia, Application No. 57185/17, Judgment of 3 February 2026, available here, para. 176.

^[56] CPT, The prevention of ill-treatment of foreign nationals deprived of their liberty in the context of forced removals at borders, Extract from the 32nd General report of the CPT Published on 30 March 2023, CPT/Inf (2023) 7 – part, available at: https://rm.coe.int/1680aabe68, para. 26.

^[57] CPT, Extract from the 2nd General Report [CPT/Inf (92) 3], p. 6, para. 36, available at: https://bit.ly/3GVD4KU.

^[58] ECtHR, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, App. Nos. 16483/12, Judgment of 15 December 2016, EDAL, available at: https://bit.ly/2Bojevu, para. 92.

^[59] ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application no 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012 [GC], EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2R5G6Em, paras. 156, 157 and 185.

^[60] ECHR, Article 3.

^[61] ECtHR, Čonka v. Belgium, Application no 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February 2002, available at: http://bit.ly/2YJEZ1y, para. 59.

^[62] ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application no 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012 [GC], EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2R5G6Em.

^[63]  The issue of pushbacks and various forms and layers of human rights violations was addressed by different bodies for the protection of human rights. See, inter alia, CPT, The prevention of ill-treatment of foreign nationals deprived of their liberty in the context of forced removals at borders, available at: https://bit.ly/3QKc4oq, paras. 69-107 and Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Human rights violations at international borders: trends, prevention and accountability, A/HRC/50/31, 26 April 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3JzQgtu. https://bit.ly/46kqDF3

[64] See for example ECtHR, Shahzad v. Hungary (No. 2), Application No. 37967/18, Judgment of 5 October 2023, available here.

[65] ECtHR, O.H. and Others v. Serbia, Application No. 57185/17, Judgment of 3 February 2026, available here, paras 128-134.

[66] See more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2024, August 2025, available here, pp. 53-55.

[67] See more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2024, August 2025, available here, pp. 53-55.

^[68] Precisely, this might lead to a situation in which CRM registers one person in different camps under different names, including persons who were introduced in Afis because CRM workers do not have access to this database in reception facilities.

[69] See more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2024, August 2025, available here, pp. 53-57.

[70] ECRE, Balkan Route: NGO warning about Frontex data showing major fall in irregular crossings, available here.

[71] Frontex, Frontex: Irregular border crossings down 26% in 2025, Europe must stay prepared, 15 january 2025, avaialble here.

[72] Radio Free Europe, Manje od 10 hiljada migranata evidentirano u Srbiji tokom 2025, 2 January 2026, available here.

^[73] Bloomberg Adria, Deset najzastupljenijih biznisa Rusa u Srbiji, 26 June 2024, available here.

^[74] 021 Portal, U Srbiji se trenutno nalazi više od 43.000 Ukrajinaca, 31 August 2023, https://bit.ly/3L0Mb1e.

[75] Vreme, Da li Rusi napuštaju ili naseljavaju Srbiju?, 30 September 2024, available here.

[76]BBC na srpskom, Rusi u Srbiji: Kako žive danas, tri godine od početka rata u Ukrajini, 2 March 2025, available here.

^[77] European Commission, EU signs agreement with Serbia to strengthen migration and border management cooperation, 25 June 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/4cyPYyA.

^[78] Frontex, Frontex expands presence in Western Balkans with operation in Serbia, 16 June 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3H2aG9X.

[79] European Commission, Serbia: Progress Report, SWD(2025) 755 final, 4 November 2025, available here, p. 96.

[80] See for example BIRN, Serbian Police Translator, Named in BIRN Report, Held for People-Smuggling, 16 January 2024, available here.

^[81] AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2016, February 2017, available here, 15 and 19.

^[82] RTS, Migrantsko proleće, 29 March 2017, 12:40, available at: https://bit.ly/3sQtUdq.

^[83] Constitutional Court, Decision No. UŽ 1823/2017, Decision of 29 December 2020, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2YJXJhi.

[84] O.H. and Others v. Serbia, Application No. 57185/17, Judgment of 3 February 2026, available here.

^[85]  N1, Patrola vojske i policije ostavila migrante da umru u šumi, 19 December 2016, available in Serbian here.

^[86] CAT, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Serbia, 3 June 2015, CAT/C/SRB/CO/2*, para 15, available at: https://bit.ly/3ujDBFX.

^[87] CAT, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Serbia*, 20 December 2021, CAT/C/SRB/CO/3, para. 34(e), available at: https://bit.ly/3MLqTGh.

^[88] HRC, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Serbia*, 3 May 2024, CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4, available at: https://bit.ly/3W1s0qn, para. 33.

^[89] AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2018, March 2019, available here, 16-18 and AIDA, Country Report: Serbia, Update on the year 2019, May 2020, available here, pp 20-21.

[90] AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – 2024 Update, available here, pp. 60-61.

^[91]  Blic, Migranti i među lubenicama: carinici otkrili 532 “ilegalca”, samo juče sprečeno 45 da uđe u srbiju, 18 June 2020, available in Serbian at: https://bit.ly/3hIly1f.

^[92] Ombudsman, Serbia: National Report on the situation of human rights of migrants at the borders, ENNHRI, July 2021, available here, p. 21.

^[93] YouTube, Вучић: Предузимамо важне мере за сигурност наших грађана, 15 December 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3l6xtwi.

^[94] MoI, Response on the request for the information of public importance of the MoI no. 07-34/24 of 15 April 2024.

[95] Ministry of Interior – Border Police Administration-Department for Readmission, responses to the information of public importance nos. 07-34/24, 30 August 2024 (delivered on 20 September 2024) and 07-2/25, 11 February 2025 (delivered on 17 February 2025).

[96] See the Table bellow.

^[97] MoI, Извештај о спровођењу Стратегије супротстављања ирегуларним миграцијама за период 2018-2020. година, June 2021, available in Serbian at: https://bit.ly/3Dtss4r, p. 10.

^[98] Article 15 Foreigners Act.

^[99] Danas, Migrants unhappy with conditions of life, 27 December 2016, available in Serbian at: http://bit.ly/2koDcN7.

^[100] Alo, Da nije vojske i policije – Vulin: Sad bi bilo u Srbiji 20.000 migranata, zamislite to!,22 July 2017, available in Serbian at: http://bit.ly/2DGDgRx.

^[101] Serbian Army, Престанак ангажовања Заједничких снага Војске Србије и МУП, 2 April 2018, available in Serbian at: https://bit.ly/2EolHoI.

^[102]  BETA, MUP: Na dnevnom nivou spreči se ilegalni ulazak 2’0 do 50 ilegalnih migranata, 26 November 2019, available (in Serbian) here.

^[103] Danas, Vučić: There are currently 3,977 migrants in Serbia, last year we prevented more than 38,000 illegal crossings, 17 June 2021, available (in Serbian) at: https://bit.ly/3koFNV0 and Ministry of Interior, Извештај о спровођењу Стратегије супротстављања ирегуларним миграцијама за период 2018-2020. година, available at: https://bit.ly/3Dtss4r, p. 10.

^[104] European Commission, Serbia: Progress Report, SWD(2022) 338 final 12 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3LedaYB, p. 61.

^[105] More than 95% of persons in need of international protection are entering Serbia from these three countries.

[106] See Chapter of Access to Territory in all previous AIDA reports on Serbia available here:

[107] All sources will be enlisted in the ensuing parts of this Chapter.

^[108] UNHCR data portal, available at: https://bit.ly/3rYbS9O.

^[109]  Ibid.

[110] UNHCR data portal, available at: https://bit.ly/3rYbS9O.

^[111]  BVMN, Pushed-back from a Camp in Serbia to N. Macedonia, and then to Greece, 3 April 2020, available here.

^[112] IDEAS, Hod po žici – uticaj epidemije zarazne bolesti COVID-19 na sistem azila u Republici Srbiji – U susret „drugom talasu’ –  preliminiarni nalazi, March 2020, available in Serbian at: https://bit.ly/46kqDF3, p. 34.

^[113]  Ombudsman, Recommendation No. 4232/127/2020, 7 October 2020, available in Serbian at: http://bit.ly/36nVVPp.

^[114]  The author of this report informed the Deputy Ombudsman for Persons Deprived of Liberty on the whereabouts and the contact of victims since he was not able to visit them during the state of emergency and the curfew which implied official permission to move and reside outside the place of regular residency.

^[115]  AIDA, Country Report: Serbia, Update on the year 2019, May 2020, available here, pp 19-20.

^[116] BVMN, The Officers Encouraged the Dogs to Attack, 17 April 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/39ZgGSo and Serbian Authorities Place us 500m above the Border, they Beat you and Bring to the Border, 17 April 2020, available here..

^[117] BVMN, This gateway has been used to carry out pushbacks from north Macedonia to Greece repeatedly, 22 October 2020, available here.

^[118] BVMN, ‘They told us to leave van one by one and all of them together beat us’, 20 October 2020, available here.

^[119]  APC Twitter, available at: https://bit.ly/3tnyIGK.

[120] Protection Rights at Borders, Pushing Back Responsibility, April 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3RMSZmP, p. 7.

^[121] Ombudsman, Serbia: National Report on the situation of human rights of migrants at the borders, ENNHRI, July 2021, available here, p. 21.

^[122] Ombudsman, Serbia: National Report on the situation of human rights of migrants at the borders, ENNHRI, July 2021, available here, 21.

^[123] AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2018, March 2019, available here, p. 16.

^[124] APC, Migracije na jugu srbije, 29 December 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/33xTxHm, p. 2.

^[125] Klikaktiv, The Third Quarterly Report in 2022 (July-August-September), available at: https://bit.ly/3Ld2pFU, p. 15.

^[126] European Commission, Serbia: Progress Report, SWD(2022) 338 final 12 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3LedaYB, p. 61.

^[127] See, e.g., Government of the Republic of Serbia, Меморандум о сарадњи Србије, Мађарске и Аустрије у борби против илегалних миграција, 16 November 2022, available in Serbian at: https://bit.ly/3SLf8U8.

^[128] Klikaktiv, The Third Quarterly Report in 2022 (July-August-September), available at: https://bit.ly/3Ld2pFU, 20.

^[129] Klikaktiv, From migration to criminalization – growing oppressive treatment against people on the move in Serbia, Annual report for the year 2023, May 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/3VGpzYH, p. 15.

^[130] IDEAS internal report, 16/17 February 2024 and WhatsApp correspondence from 16 February 2024.

^[131]  Guardian, Videos show migrants stripped of clothing in freezing temperatures at Serbian border, 22 February 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/3XIsPFG.

^[132] BVMN, They were beating us severely, as if they were beating animals, available at: https://bit.ly/3zmNpBt.  

[133] BVMN, He had been kicked in the face after having fallen on the ground due to the heavy beating he received, available here.

[134]  Constitutional Court of Serbia, Decision No. UZ 1823/2017, Decision of 29 December 2020, EDAL, available here.

[135] O.H. and Others v. Serbia, Application No. 57185/17, Judgment of 3 February 2026, available here.

[136] BVMN, Shot at, beaten with ‘wooden tools’, fingers bent backwards, available here.

[137] BVMN, People shouldn’t behave like this with us. Treat us like humans, available here.

[138] BVMN, If you come back, we will kill you!, available here.

[139] The quarterly reports of Klikaktiv are available here, here, here and here.

^[140] HRC, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Serbia*, 3 May 2024, CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4, available here, paras. 32-33.

^[141]  HRC, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Serbia*, 10 April 2017, CCPR/C/SRB/CO/3, available at: https://bit.ly/46njRy9, para. 32,

^[142] CAT, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Serbia, 3 June 2015, CAT/C/SRB/CO/2*, para 15, available at: https://bit.ly/3uj15La.

^[143] Amnesty International, Europe’s Borderlands: Violations against refugees and migrants in Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, July 2015, available at: https://bit.ly/1dLK66T, pp. 31-34.

^[144] UNHCR, Serbia as country of asylum, August 2012, available at: https://bit.ly/2SevotT, para 13.

^[145] CAT, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Serbia, 3 June 2015, CAT/C/SRB/CO/2*, para 15, available at: https://bit.ly/3uj15La.

^[146] CAT, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Serbia*, 20 December 2021, CAT/C/SRB/CO/3, available at: https://bit.ly/3vd0s4r, para. 34.

^[147] HRC, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Serbia*, 3 May 2024, CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4, available here, paras. 32-33.

^[148] Constitutional Court, Decision No. UŽ 1823/2017, Decision of 29 December 2020, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2YJXJhi.

^[149]  AIDA, Country Report: Serbia, Update on the year 2019, May 2020, available here, p. 21.

^[150] Constitutional Court, Decision No. UŽ 1823/2017, Decision of 29 December 2020, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2YJXJhi.

^[151]  DW, Serbia: Court confirms illegal pushbacks into the EU, 22 January 2021, available at: http://bit.ly/3699fH8.

^[152] Which corresponds to Article 5 (4) of ECHR.

^[153]  Which will be further examined by the ECtHR, O.H. and Others v. Serbia, Application No. 57185/17, 1 August 2017, available at: https://bit.ly/3JyPhXo.

^[154] ECtHR, Čonka v. Belgium, Application no 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February 2002, available at: http://bit.ly/2YJEZ1y.  

^[155] ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application no 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012 [GC], EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2R5G6Em.

^[156] ECtHR, Georgia v Russia, Application no 13255/07, Judgment of 3 July 2014, EDAL, available at: https://bit.ly/49BWp3b.

^[157] Insajder, Odluka Ustavnog suda potvrda da se migranti proteruju iz Srbije, 22 January 2021, available in Serbian at: http://bit.ly/39Wgl2U [accessed on 24 January 2021].

^[158]  ECtHR, O.H. and Others v. Serbia, Application No. 57185/17, 1 August 2017, available at: https://bit.ly/3JyPhXo.

[159] ECtHR, O.H. and Others v. Serbia, Application No. 57185/17, Judgment of 3 February 2026, available here.

^[160]  ECtHR, A.H. v. Serbia and North Macedonia, and A.H. v. Serbia, Application Nos. 60417/16 79749/16, 19 October and 27 December 2016 respectively, available at: https://bit.ly/3oVp8dz. The case is litigated by Ms. Olga Đurović, attorney at law form Asylum Protection Center.

[161] For more detailed information on pushbacks from Croatia see more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – 2024 Update, available here, pp. 76-77.

[162] For more detailed information on pushbacks from Croatia see more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – 2024 Update, available here, p. 67.

^[163] Nikola Kovačević, Documenting ill-treatment and collective expulsions of refugees and migrants, January 2019, IAN, available at: https://bit.ly/2T8kEl5.

^[164] European Commission, Serbia: Progress Report, SWD(2022) 338 final 12 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3LedaYB, p. 48.

^[165] Klikaktiv, From migration to criminalization – growing oppressive treatment against people on the move in Serbia, Annual report for the year 2023, May 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/3VGpzYH, p. 19.

[166] See more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – 2024 Update, available here, pp. 76-77

^[167] Firstost, LIVE: Austria’s Nehammer Briefs Media With Orban, Vucic Following Discussion on Illegal Immigration, 7 July 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3XNbiMy.

[168] Ibid.

[169] Ibid.

[170] BLIC, Migranti pucali na policiju: Opsadno stanje kod Šida: Jedan mrtav, četvorica zadržana, za ostalima se traga, 23 May 2025, available here.

^[171]  Practice-informed observation of IDEAS, January 2024.

^[172] Practice-informed observation of IDEAS, January 2024.

^[173] See more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2020, March 2021, available here, pp 122-126.

^[174] Klikaktiv, From migration to criminalization – growing oppressive treatment against people on the move in Serbia, Annual report for the year 2023, May 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/3VGpzYH, pp 20-21.

^[175] Ibid., pp 9-10.

[176] Klikaktiv, Quarterly Report for 2025, available here, pp. 22-23.

[177] Radio Slobodna Evropa, Troje migranata poginulo u teškom udesu na jugu Srbije, 20 February 2024, available here.

[178] Blic, HAOS NA PUTU KOD BELE PALANKE Prevrnuo se kombi pun migranata, svi povređeni zbrinuti , 26 July 2024, available here.  

[179] BBC, Najmanje 10 migranata se utopilo u Drini, među njima i beba, 22 August 2024, available here.

[180] See more in Klikaktiv, Quarterly Report for 2025, available here, p. 24.

^[181] See AIDA, Country report: Hungary, Updates on the years 2016-2020, available here.

^[182] CJEU, Case C‑808/18, 17 December 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3MNe8uR.

^[183] FRA, Migration: Key fundamental rights concerns, Bulletin 2 for 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3BwONyt, p. 6.

^[184]  CJEU, Asylum policy: Hungary is ordered to pay a lump sum of 200 million euros and a penalty payment of 1 million euros per day of delay for failure to comply with a judgment of the Court of Justice, press release, 13 June 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/45KWPCG. 

^[185] The testimonies are available here.

^[186] BVMN, Testimony Database, available here.

^[187] Ibid.

^[188] BVMN, Testimonies, 1 January 2023-31 December 2023, available here.

[189]  BVMN, Testimonies, 1 January 2024-31 December 2024, available here.

[190] Klikaktiv, First Quarterly Report for 2025, available here, p. 22.

^[191] HHC, World Refugee Day – 1 out of 40,000: Karox, 20 June 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3h2z0Oe.

^[192] BCHR, Mađarska – ovde se ne traži azil, 16 November 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3JDXSbj.

^[193] Telex, He had never been to Serbia in his life, he did not know anyone there, and yet he was pushed-back there, 30 September 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3I83gmN.

^[194]  The author of this Report acts as her legal representative.

^[195] ECtHR, K.P. v. Hungary, Application No. 82479/17, Judgment of 18 January 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/4dfbjOS.  

^[196]  ECRE, Hungary: New Law on the Lodging of Asylum Applications at Embassies, 19 June 2020, available at: http://bit.ly/2MRn0mX.

[197] See AIDA, Country report: Hungary, 2024 Update, available here, p. 9.

[198] ECtHR, H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, Application Nos. 46084/21 40185/22 53952/22, Judgment of 24 June 2025, available here.

^[199] ECtHR, Shahzad v. Hungary, Application No. 12625/17, Judgment of 8 July 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3BwQH1U.

^[200]  Ibid., para. 67.

^[201] ECtHR, H.K. v. Hungary, Application No. 18531/17, Judgment of 22 September 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3LhVaMI.

^[202]  ECtHR, W.A. and Others v. Hungary, Applications Nos. 64050/16 64558/16 and 66064/16, Judgment of 15 December 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/427BS2z.

^[203]  S.S. and Others v. Hungary, Application Nos. 56417/19 44245/20, Judgment of 12 October 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/4fAyrbK.

[204] ECtHR, M.D. and Others v. Hungary, Application No. 60778/19, Judgment of 19 September 2024, available here.

[205] ECtHR, H.M. v. Hungary, Application No. 4922/23, Communicated on 13 January 2026, available here.

[206]  See ECRE, AIDA, Country report : Hungary, 2025 update, available here, 27.

[207] ECRE, AIDA, Country report : Serbia, 2024 Update, from p. 67, available here.

^[208] AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2018, March 2019, available here, 18-20 and AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – Update on the year 2020, March 2021, available here, p. 26; AIDA, Country Report: Serbia, Update on the year 2019, May 2020, available here, p. 22.

^[209]  NPM, НПМ у ненајављеној посети Аеродрому „Никола Тесла, проверавао услове боравка, 22 November 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3RSGJl0.

^[210] Practice based observation of IDEAS, March 2024.

^[211] This pattern of behaviour was drawn on the basis of 27 interviews which the author of this report has conducted with Burundians nationals who managed to access Serbian territory, but also interviews with other foreign nationals who continued to arrive via Belgrade airport asking for the assistance.

^[212]  Article 15 Foreigners Act.

^[213] Article 13(2) Foreigners Act.

^[214]  CAT, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Serbia, 3 June 2015, CAT/C/SRB/CO/2, para 15, available at: https://bit.ly/3uj15La.

^[215] ECtHR, Gebremedhin (Gaberamadhien) v France, Application No. 25389/05, Judgment of 26 April 2007, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2RwU82a, paras 66-67.

^[216]  Article 15 Foreigners Act.

^[217] See by analogy ECtHR, M.A. v. Lithuania, Application No 59793/17, Judgment of 11 December 2018, EDAL, available at: https://bit.ly/2txDq72, paras 83-84, see also CAT, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Serbia, 3 June 2015, CAT/C/SRB/CO/2, para 15, available at: https://bit.ly/3uj15La.

^[218] Constitutional Court, Constitutional appeal no 9440/16, Decision of 13 June 2019.

^[219] Article 27 Constitution.        

^[220] ECtHR, Z.A. and others v. Russia [GC], Application nos. 61411/15, 61420/15, 61427/15, 3028/16, Judgment of 21 November 2019, EDAL, [Chamber judgment] available at: http://bit.ly/2R5G6Em.

^[221] ECtHR, Nolan and K. v. Russia, Application No. 2512/04, Judgment of 12 February 2009, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/36NVSdx, para. 96.

^[222] ECtHR, Guide on Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Right to liberty and Security, 2025 Update, available here, pp 9-10.

^[223] ECtHR, Amuur v. France, Application no 19776/92, Judgment of 25 June 1996, EDAL, available at: http://bit.ly/2TayPpz, para. 42.

^[224] ECtHR, Arons v. Serbia, Application No. 65457/16, Decision on Interim Measures of 24 November 2016.

[225] ECtHR, H.G.D. v. Serbia, Application No. 3158/20, Judgment of 7 October 2025, available here, para. 11.

[226] The data received from the MoI on the refusal on entry practice at Serbian airports did not provide.

[227] See more in AIDA, Country Report: Serbia – 2024 Update, available here, p. 80.

[228] Ibid.

^[229] European Commission, Progress Report: Serbia, 6 October 2020, SWD (2020) 352 final, available at: https://bit.ly/2YaPjPJ, pp 48-49.

^[230] ECtHR, Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application No 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996, EDAL, available at: https://bit.ly/2U22cYJ, para 73.