Access to the territory and push backs

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In 2023, according to MOI data,[1] 157,652 people disembarked in Italy, 52,521 more than the previous year, marking a 33,31% increase in the number of disembarkations. Around 97,306 came from Tunisia, and 52,034 from Libya[2], showing a trend that highlights a significant change from 2022 in relation to the departure sites. UNHCR estimates that 192,651 people arrived in Italy through the different external and internal borders.[3] More than 12,000 people on the move were estimated entering Italy from the internal border between Italy and Slovenia.[4]

Arrivals by sea

As highlighted, in 2023, 157,652 persons disembarked in Italy,[5] with a substantial increase compared to 2022 (105,129) and an even more significant increase when compared to 2021 (67,477) and 2020 (34,154). The number of POM disembarked is the third highest since disembarkation data is recorded, higher than the number of sea arrivals in 2015 (153,842). In 2023, there were a total of 135,820 asylum applications.[6] The highest number of monthly sea arrivals was recorded in August, when 25,673 persons reached the Italian coasts.[7]

The number of unaccompanied minors (Minori Stranieri Non Accompagnati – MSNA) reached 17,319, compared to 14,044 in 2022.[8]

The main nationality of people disembarked was Guinean (18,211 in total), which represented a change compared to 2021, when most of the people disembarked were Egyptian. The number of Guinean nationals registered as asylum seekers in 2023 was 3,385, compared to the 23,450 applicants from Bangladesh, the first nationality of asylum applicants (among them “only” 12,169 arrived through a disembarkation procedure).

Until November 2023, 63% of sea crossings departed from Tunisia (95,861 persons), followed by 32% from Libya (49,111 persons), 4% from Türkiye (6,683 persons), and less than 1% from Algeria (535 persons), Lebanon (214 persons).[9] It must be highlighted that in the second half of the year, Libya became the first country of departures, over Tunisia.[10] The IOM Missing Migrants Project collected evidence of at least 2,500 persons dying along the Central Mediterranean Route throughout the past year.[11]

Italian authorities classify arrivals of migrants in a way that lacks transparency. As explained by Altreconomia,[12] the Italian authorities are mostly considering rescue operations as “law enforcement” interceptions, disembarking most of rescued people on the island of Lampedusa to increase the perception of a chronic emergency.

Furthermore, the approval of Decree Law 1/2023 converted into law 15/2023 had a major impact on the effectiveness of SAR operations conducted by NGOs: as of July 2023, only 4.2% of rescue operations had been conducted by the civil society since January, while 68% had been operated by the Public authority. If compared to 2022, the decrease of the capacity of SAR NGO is quite evident (they had conducted 15,2% of total operations).[13] By the end of 2023, only 8904 people have been rescued by SAR NGOs, less than the 6% of the total number[14]. Once more, this data highlights how misguided the theories attributing a “pull factor” role to NGO vessels for what concerns departures from Libya are.

State rescue operations and shipwreck incidents

On 31 March 2020, the Sophia Operation, started in 2015, definitively ended and was replaced by the IRINI Operation which changes its main task in implementing the arms embargo against Libya imposed by the UN. A note published by the Chamber of Deputies states that after the Sophia operation, in fact, vessels used for the purpose of rescuing people at sea in one of the main migratory routes no longer operate.[15] In this regard, the study by the Senate Commission notes that, with the IRINI mission, the displacement of the intervention area will bring ships to extremely decentralised areas with respect to the routes of human traffickers and therefore the “search and rescue component” of the new operation should be strongly reduced compared to Sophia.[16] The report of the Council of Europe Commissioner for human rights, observes that the focus of the EUNAVFOR MED IRINI operations area was the eastern part of the Libyan Search and Rescue Region and the high seas between Greece and Egypt, strongly reducing the possibility of encountering refugees and migrants in distress at sea.[17]

On 26 February 2023, nearby the Calabrian coast – precisely in Steccato di Cutro -, a tragic shipwreck took place.[18] A boat originally departing from Izmir in Türkiye got stranded at a hundred fifty metres from the coast after a five-day journey. The official number of deaths amounted to 94, including 35 minors; survivors were only 80, and around 15 people were missing.[19] Since the morning of the shipwreck, the dynamic of the event appeared unclear. According to declarations released by the different authorities involved in the following days, an aerial Frontex asset was present on the scene the night before the tragedy and sent an alert to the Italian Finance and Coast Guard (Guardia di Finanza and Guardia Costiera) and the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Center to inform having spotted a boat which, according to thermal camera data appeared to carry several people and was lacking life vests. Apparently, Guardia di Finanza took the lead of the operation; this entailed, however, that the operation was classified as a law enforcement operation, in accordance with a practice established in 2019.[20] Around 2am, two patrol boats left Crotone and Taranto’s harbours to reach the vessel but, due to the marine conditions, were not able to do so. Up to this moment, the operation was still considered as law enforcement operation instead of a search and rescue one, even if the sea conditions had worsened and there were indicators of the presence of multiple people onboard. Around 3.40am, staff from the Guardia di Finanza reached out to the port authority (Capitaneria di porto) of Reggio Calabria to ask if any vessel of the Coast guard was available, receiving a negative answer. After an emergency phone call, police authorities at land were informed about the emergency conditions of the boat and started patrolling the shores waiting for the boat to dock. A new emergency call reached the Coast guard around 4am; only at this stage, the operation was classified as a search and rescue operation. An official declaration from the Ministry of Interior Matteo Piantedosi stated that the accident took place at 5.30am. The first rescue operation was carried out by some fishermen and personnel from the military force of Carabinieri, but the situation immediately appeared tragic.

On 9 March, ASGI and other 41 associations submitted a collective complaint/report to the Public Prosecutor Office in the form of a report, asking to open extensive investigation aimed at ascertaining the public responsibilities of the authorities involved in the management of the operation.[21] Per recent press articles,[22] six law enforcement officials will be charged for failure to assist persons in danger and culpable disaster with different levels of responsibility, which could lead to sentences of up to 12 years in prison. Furthermore, a report prepared by the Fundamental Rights Office, which monitors the activities of the European Border Agency, published by Euractiv,[23] points out that “the Italian authorities present in the Frontex monitoring room in Warsaw (an official from the coast guard and one from the Guardia di Finanza) considered as ‘not of particular interest’ the report in which the boat on which the migrants were travelling was spotted (hours before the shipwreck).” This would contradict the government stance that they did not receive any alerts from Frontex.[24]

On the other hand, the prosecution of the alleged boat drivers has been carried out by the relevant prosecutors’ offices. The Crotone prosecutor’s office indicted four people for the crimes of aiding and abetting illegal immigration and death as a result of crime. On 8 February 2024, the judge for the preliminary hearing, following an abbreviated trial, sentenced one of the 4 boatmen to 20 years and a 3 million fine.[25] The Italian government and the Calabria Region also joined the trial as civil parties.[26]

At the same time ASGI and other CSOs supported survivors and family member of the missing and deceased migrants for the identifications of victims and the right to truth, reporting on the procedural errors in the management of the situation by Public authorities and on the unlawful and inhumane treatment to which survivors were subjected both in term of reception conditions and access to legal information.[27]

On 10 August 2020, the Court of Rome ordered new investigation in a case in which it had already indicted two officers of the Italian coastguard and of the navy, for the delay and failure of rescue in the shipwreck which occurred on 11 October 2013, and in which 286, including at least 60 minors, died at sea.[28]  Despite six verbal communications between a doctor on-board and the Italian MRCC and the presence of various commercial ships in the vicinity of the distress area, the Italian authorities did not take responsibility for the coordination of the SAR operation, nor informed Maltese authorities (the SAR incident was taking place in Maltese SAR zone). The Coordination centre ordered the commercial ships to move away from the distress area, which in turn led to the death of the migrants onboard. A criminal procedure against the General Commander for the port Authority and the Chief of the branch of CINCNAV control room, indicted for refusal of acts of duty (art. 328 penal code) and involuntary manslaughter (art. 589 penal code), was ongoing. On 15 December 2022, the Court of Rome took a final decision in this case. The Court dismissed the claim on the ground that it was statute barred, even if it recognised the criminal responsibilities of the indicted, highlighting that the attempt to avoid the obligation of coordination and assistance to search and rescue operations constitutes a reason for criminal accountability.[29] The case was previously scrutinised by the UN Committee for Human Rights, that condemned Italy and Malta for the violation of art. 2 (par 3) and art. 6 of the ICCPR.[30]

Hindrances in NGO search and rescue

The initial “closure of ports” policy

The Decree Law 130/2020 repealed the law provision introduced by Decree 53/2019[31] and introduced a new provision to give a legal basis to the Minister of the Interior bans on transit or stop to ships engaged in SAR activities,[32] thus further increasing the risk of criminalisation of actors involved in these activities.

According to Decree Law 130/2020 as amended by L 173/2020, the Minister of the Interior can limit or forbid the transit and the stop/docking of Italian or foreign merchant ships, or governmental ships used as merchant ships, for reasons of public order and public safety, as long as in compliance with the Montego Bay Convention (UNCLOS). The Decree Law provides both the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Transport with the competence to stop or limit the ships’ transit. In some cases, they have overlapping competences.[33]

The decree, however, excludes its application in case of rescue operations immediately notified to the coordination centre responsible for rescues at sea and to the flag State and carried out in compliance with the indications of the competent search and rescue authority. The Decree further foresees that the authorities must give indications to the rescue ships in respect for the conventions and laws under which they operate.

As highlighted by legal experts, this must imply that, on the one hand, if the indications require not to intervene, these should be respected unless, however, the evolution of the situation demonstrates that, in the absence of other interventions, the risk of injury for people materialises. On the other hand, entrusting people to the authorities of a country that has to be considered as an unsafe destination cannot be considered to comply with the aforementioned rules, which could be the case when the Libyan authority is indicated as the competent authority.[34]

In the Gregoretti case, involving government denial of disembarkation,[35] the former Minister of Interior, Matteo Salvini, faced a criminal trial, but in May 2021 the Court of Catania decided not to indict him for kidnapping.[36] On 17 April 2021, the former Minister of Interior, Salvini, was indicted by the Court of Palermo for the kidnapping of 147 migrants aboard the Open Arms, kept aboard the ship for six days in August 2019. The trial, that started on September 15, 2021 is still ongoing at the moment of writing.[37] In a hearing, confirmed having denied disembarkation and thus forcibly maintained 147 people aboard the ship.[38]

Search and seizures operations re. NGO rescue boats

On December 2020, the Administrative Court for Sicily, Palermo, forwarded a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU regarding the applicability of the Directive 2009/16/EC to ships that mainly carry out SAR activities. It did so following the appeal filed by Seawatch 4 against the notice of detention for the master, applied in September 2020, following the rescue at sea of 354 people, which took place at the end of August 2020.

After the rescue and the authorisation for the transfer of people on the Allegra ship, in Palermo, the Ministry of Health, imposed anchoring in Palermo for a quarantine period of 14 days for the crew and, at the end, the sanitisation of the ship. After sanitisation, the Port Authority of Palermo, carried out an inspection as “port state control” (PSC) for unspecified overriding factors recognised with respect to the boat. Following that inspection, it imposed the detention on the ship, observing how it did not respect a series of technical requirements and in particular it was not equipped to systematically carry out the rescue of large numbers of people at sea.

The Administrative Court observed that neither European, international or domestic law establish specific requirements regarding the criteria to classify private ships as SAR ships. Therefore, according to the Court, ships carrying out SAR activities should be excluded from the application of international standards (implemented by the Member States and the European Union) on safety in navigation and the protection of the marine environment.

This means that it should not be possible for the authorities of the port state to carry out inspections to impose requirements on merchant ships operating as SAR ships, as the evaluation of these requirements fall under the sole responsibility of the flag State authorities.[39]

Later, on 3 March 2021, having acknowledged the non-application of the accelerated procedure by the CJEU, the Court decided to accept the interim request for suspension advanced by the lawyers of the Seawatch 4. It observed that the Seawatch could not carry out its statutory purposes consisting in saving people at sea, and, since, at the moment, only NGOs carry out this task, the impediment deriving to such activity from a prolonged detention of the ships appears more relevant than the dangers connected to marine pollution raised by the Port Authorities and by the Ministry of Transports.[40]

The Administrative Court decision however was declared void by the High Administrative Court of Sicily,[41] following the appeal submitted by the Minister of Interior.[42]

The policy to block the rescue ships for administrative reasons continued in 2021. The ship Sea Eye 4 was again stopped in the Port of Palermo in June 2021 following an inspection.

In December 2021, the Geo Barents of Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and Sea-Watch had to wait a long time offshore before being assigned a safe landing place after complicated rescues. In January 2022, the Ocean Viking of SOS Mediterranee was blocked in Trapani after an 11-hour inspection by the Coast Guard for “malfunction of the on-board power supply” and “presence of flammable liquids stored in unsuitable premises of the ship” and then subjected to administrative detention.[43]

In March 2021, the Public Prosecutor of Ragusa ordered the search and seizure against the Mar Jonio’s tugboat, accused of aiding and abetting illegal immigration for taking refugees on board from the Etienne oil tanker on 11 September 2020 and having later accepted a donation from it.[44] In January 2022, another investigation against Mar Jonio concerning the rescue and transportation of 30 migrants in 2019 was archived by the Judge for preliminary Investigation (GIP) of Agrigento.[45]

Reinstatement of the “closed ports” policy

By the end of 2022, after the appointment of the new government, the “closed ports” policy was reinstated. On 24 October 2022, the new Ministry of Interior, Matteo Piantedosi, issued a Directive (prot. 0070326)[46] denying access to Italian ports to the Ocean Viking and Humanity 1, ships which had been involved in SAR operations in the Mediterranean. The Italian government instructed the involved ships to refer to the flag States (Norway and Germany) for the indication of a place of safety.[47] On 4 November 2022, the government issued a decree allowing the Geo Barents and Humanity 1 ships to enter the territorial waters only with the purpose to disembark migrants in critical health conditions. The selective approach followed by the government failed due to the principles of international and maritime law which, as previously underlined, impose the duty to rescue people in distress and to grant a place of safety to the passengers.[48] In particular, European institutions raised their concerns[49] and appeals was submitted to local Courts[50] in order to get a decision of illegitimacy with regards to the selective approach introduced by the Directive.

2023 Law decree and law re. NGO search and rescue and disembarkation on Italian territory

Following the same purpose to prevent disembarkation of migrants rescued at sea by hindering NGO’s search and rescue activities, the government adopted the Law decree 1/2023 which was converted into Law 15/2023 on 24 February 2023. The new law[51] once again modifies the prerequisites for the exercise of the faculties attributed to the Government and, at the same time, introduces rules of conduct for vessels (and their captains) carrying out search and rescue activities at sea, and consequent sanctions for those deemed responsible for non-compliance or erroneous compliance with those rules or orders issued by the Government by means of a specific inter-ministerial measure. With regards to the prerequisites, it is foreseen that the Italian government could limit or deny the transit or staying in its territorial waters of NGO ships when one of the following conditions is not respected:

1. the vessel systematically carrying out search and rescue activities has the authorizations issued by the authorities of the flag state and possesses the technical-nautical eligibility requirements for safe navigation;
2. timely information is immediately provided to the rescued persons about the possibility of seeking international protection;
3. the assignment of the port of disembarkation is requested in the immediacy of the event; and
4. the port of disembarkation is reached without delay;
5. complete and detailed information on the rescue operation is provided to the maritime or police authorities;
6. the search and rescue strategy did not contribute to dangerous situations on board or prevent the port of landing from being reached in a timely manner.

In the practice of SAR operations conducted by NGO ships, most conditions imposed by the law decree are already fulfilled. Humanitarian vessels already immediately refer to the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) to obtain support and indication with regards to a place of safety. Moreover, they always immediately inform maritime or police authorities. It is interesting to note that the Law decree, with reference to letter a) does not take into consideration the recent CJEU decision on the joined cases C-14/21 and C-15/21,[52] in which the Court stated that the disembarkation State cannot require different certifications from the ones of the flag State, nor more restrictive or different requirements than the ones provided for the International Conventions.

Based on the previous observations, it can be inferred that the most evident aim of the law decree is to prevent, or at least significantly limit, the possibility for humanitarian vessels to dock on Italian territory, and consequently to prevent Italy to be the competent Country for international protection applications according to Regulation 2013/604. In this sense appear to have been designed letters d) and f), establishing that NGOs’ vessels are required to reach without delay the place of safety and implement actions at sea that do not contribute to dangerous situations onboard. The clear consequence of this timely performance seems to imply the duty not to rescue other people than the ones already onboard and to forbid the trans-shipment from a humanitarian vessel to another. It is immediately clear the unlawfulness of this provision according to international customary law, the SOLAS Convention (art. 98) and to domestic law (art. 1113 – which introduces a specific type of offence for failure to render assistance in cases requested by Maritime Authorities – and 1158 – establishing sanctions for failure to assist ships or persons in distress – of the Navigation Code). In conclusion, the State must require the captain of the ship to provide for rescue assistance in case of shipwrecks or dangers for lives at sea. The most ambivalent requirement is the one referred to the obligation to provide information on international protection to people rescued while still on-board (let. b)). Such obligation cannot fall on the captain of a ship sailing under the flag of another State, as the relevant powers and duties are indicated by the national law of that State (Article 8 of the Code of Navigation R.D. 327/42); therefore, the Italian State cannot impose rules that go beyond the law of the flag State. Furthermore, in terms of access to the international protection procedure within a European Union member State, it has to be underlined that art. 4 of Directive 2013/32 established that each state shall appoint specific authorities responsible for examining applications for international protection, for dealing with cases subject to the Dublin Regulation or for refusing entry under border examination procedures. In the light of the above, Italy, according to Legislative decree 25/2008, appointed the Territorial Commissions for the evaluation of the applications (also for applications at the border), the Dublin Unit (at the Ministry of the Interior) for ascertaining the competence of the State according to the criteria of Regulation 604/2013 (Art. 3) and the border police or the police headquarters territorially competent for receiving applications (Art. 26). It clearly appears that the competence of Italian authorities is triggered only when the asylum seeker is on national territory, and would not apply to that of another State, as in the case of foreign-flagged vessels. In addition, one of the principles enshrined within the Hirsi Jamaa vs. Italy‘s decision was the necessity of an individual examination of the single cases by expert professionals, which cannot be the case of crew members of a humanitarian vessel. Taking the above into consideration, the attempt of the Italian government to introduce new principles and criteria in relation to the competence to examine international application appears to be conflicting with regards to domestic, European and international law.

Incidents related to Law 15/2023

The impact of Law 15/2023 started resulting evident already from the first months of 2023, especially concerning search and rescue activity performed by NGO vessels.

• On 23 February, the Geo Barents vessel operated by Doctor without Borders – after a rescue operation concluded on 17 February – received a custody administrative order ending after 20 days and a 10,000-euro fine for not having shared some information not strictly related to the rescue activity.[53]
• On 25 March 2023, the Louise Michel boat was seized after being accused of obstructing search and rescue operations. The boat had been ordered to reach the Trapani port after a first rescue operation, but decided to carry out three further rescue operations and was consequently accused by the Italian Coast Guard of “obstruction to search and rescue activities”.[54]
• On 6 February 2023, the Civil Court of Catania ruled on an appeal lodged by Humanity 1,[55] concerning the standoff ordered in accordance with the Inter-ministerial Decree of 4 November 2022. The Court ruled on the unlawfulness of the decree, remarking that all people rescued from the ship Humanity 1 had the right to reach a place of safety ashore and to seek asylum in Italy. This decision concerns people who had been defined as “residual cargo” by the Italian government, and who, unlike minors and shipwrecked people in critical sanitary conditions, had not been disembarked immediately after the ship docked in the port of Catania.
• On 2 June 2023, Italian authorities ordered the administrative detention of the ship Mare-Go (in a situation similar to that previously explained regarding the ship Louise Michel) and the Sea-Eye4. In the first case, the Mare-Go ship, after completing multiple rescues, headed to Lampedusa (instead of the assigned port of Trapani) to proceed with disembarkation operations, contravening the instructions given by the Coordination Centre. As a result, a 20-day administrative detention and an administrative fine were ordered. The same measures were also taken against the Sea-Eye4 vessel that arrived at the assigned port of Ortona after carrying out a double rescue, despite the request to return to port at the conclusion of the first operation.[56]
• On 14 June and 28 August, Aurora SAR vessel was twice affected by similar provisions. In both situations the decision was taken due to non-compliance with the disembarkation orders (passengers were again disembarked in Lampedusa, while the assigned port was Trapani).[57] Two appeals were filed before the Civil Court of Palermo and are still pending. The second appeal was moved, due to competence reasons, to the Agrigento Court.
• On 22 August, Open Arms and Sea-Eye4 were both struck by a similar detention order because of delays in reaching the assigned port (Open Arms to Marina di Carrara) or delays in asking for a port of disembarkation (Sea-Eye4 to Salerno). Both organisations filed complaints against the administrative measures.
• For similar reasons, Open Arms received a new sanction on 4 October after reaching the port of Marina di Carrara. Also in October,[58] Mare Jonio and Sea-Eye4 both received the same measure on different grounds: the Mare Jonio rescue vessel because of a delay in the request of a port of disembarkation, while Sea-Eye4 for “having contributed to create a dangerous situation on board or preventing the ship from promptly reaching the port of disembarkation”. The disembarkation took place in Vibo Valentia on 30 October after a very complicated and tragic SAR operation.[59] On the same ground, on 2 December 2023, Humanity1 received a similar administrative measure after reaching Crotone port, as did the Ocean Viking twice, on 15 November and 30 December.
• On 21 January 2024, Open Arms, after the conclusion of a Search and Rescue operation in Crotone received the same administrative measures[60] on the basis of non-compliance with instructions given by the so-called Libyan Coastguard.
• Lastly, on 9 February 2024, the Ocean Viking received the same measure (administrative custody for 20 days plus an administrative fine) and decided to appeal against the administrative decision which was based on allegedly contributing ‘to creating any dangerous situation on board or preventing the ship from promptly reaching the port of disembarkation’ as provided by art 1 paragraph 2bis letter f). With an interim measure decision of 20 February 2024, the Civil Court of Brindisi ‘suspended the effectiveness of the administrative detention and custody order of the vessel Ocean Viking’[61] on the basis of “the well-foundedness of the claim regarding the lack of competence of the head of the Italian administrative authority in investing the case; as well as with regard to the non-existence on the merits of the prerequisites for the application of Art. 1, paragraph 2 sexies, of d.l. October 21, 2022, no. 130”[62] and on the basis of the risk for SOS Mediterranée to be “unable to exercise its inviolable rights” such as ‘the inviolable right to the freedom of expression of thought (art. 21 Italian Constitution), the freedom of association (art. 18) which could be affected by the denial to continue its rescue activities at sea’.

Relations with third countries

 Tunisia

Regarding the external sea borders with Tunisia, on 9 December 2020 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed a technical agreement with the UN Office for Services and Projects (UNOPS) to support the North African country in border control activities and in fighting migrant trafficking.[63] With at least 1,922 Tunisians repatriated in 2020 and 1,872 in 2021, which made Tunisia the main destination for repatriation from Italy (73.5% of the total number of migrants repatriated).[64]

As of 26 October, according to FTDES (Tunisian Forum for social and economic rights) data for 2022, more than 29,000 migrants were intercepted at sea and 544 died. MRCC Tunisia is independently managing Coastal guard activities and search and rescue operations even if a Search and Rescue area has not been communicated to IMO so far. Between 2020 and 2021, six projects funded by the Italian government through the so-called “Rewarding Fund for Repatriation Policies[65]” have been implemented within the framework of actions aiming at strengthening borders and providing economical support to return. An estimated amount of 19 million Euro has been granted by Italy. In 2021, the project called “Support to border control and management of migratory influx to Tunisia” received a second tranche of 7 million euros, that will be assigned as a result of concrete results in border control activities. According to a journalistic enquiry, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be effectively cooperating with UNOPS to obtain the assignment of funds aimed at requiring maintenance interventions for patrol boats.[66] On July 16 2023, the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia.[67] Migration management is one of the five pillars of the agreement: the EU pledges to provide an additional EUR 100 million to Tunisia to strengthen border management, search and rescue operations at sea, and “anti-trafficking” measures to reduce the number of arrivals from the country.[68] Despite the official reasons for the deal including “countering the root causes of migration”, the deal mainly risks resulting in preventing those seeking protection from accessing asylum.[69] Despite its approval and the amount of resources deployed, a few weeks after the European Parliament expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the agreement.[70] Euractiv has recently updated on how funds have been allocated with regards to migration management in Tunisia.[71]

Libya

Memorandum of Understanding and situation in Libya

On 2 February 2023, the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya was renewed for the second time after February 2020.[72] The agreement, originally signed by Italian Prime Minister Gentiloni and his Libyan counterpart Fayez El Serraj on 2 February 2017, aimed at strengthening cooperation on Libyan border management, “to ensure the reduction of illegal migration flows”. The agreement provides funding, equipment and technical support to the Libyan authorities, primarily the Libyan coastguard, for patrolling and rescuing boats in international waters. A naval blockade policy that, according to ASGI, should be balanced through the creation of evacuation programmes from Libya through the UNHCR-managed resettlement mechanism[73] and humanitarian corridors. Recent experience has shown the results of the blockade system, that led to the creation of the Libyan coastguard and its apparatus for managing SAR interventions. This is however not counter-balanced by an effective evacuation mechanisms. The only functioning mechanism available for persons present in Libyia are the voluntary return programmes coordinated by IOM; it should be noted that these programmes areproposed to vulnerable individuals who are not in a position to make a free choice about returning to their countries of origin.[74] In fact, the Libyan migration management system has continued to be based on the systematic detention of foreigners, without any kind of administrative authorisation or judicial validation and protracted indefinitely under conditions of systematic torture and fundamental rights violations (see chapter on Detention conditions).[75]

Evidences regarding the dramatic effects of this mechanism and policy has been reported by different institutions such, among others, IOM and UNHCR.[76] From a domestic perspective the Criminal Court of Trapani ruled that the agreement was in contrast with the Italian Constitution and international laws.[77] The Memorandum was heavily criticised by numerous associations including ASGI,[78] and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.[79]

On 9 of December 2022, the Special Representative for Libya of the UN Secretary General, issued a report[80] allegating that “many migrants and refugees continued to endure widespread human rights violations and faced serious humanitarian and protection concerns in Libya”. In the same report, the Special Representative mentioned that between January and 29 October 2022, a total of 19,308 individuals were intercepted and returned to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard, while 1,286 were reported dead or missing at sea. The dramatic conditions of migrants and refugees in Libya has been as well highlighted by Mohamed Aujjar, head of the Fact-Finding Mission on Libya of the Human Rights Council, who defined migrant detention centres as “places of terrible and systematic abuse, that may amount to crimes against humanity”.[81]

Furthermore, on 27 March 2023, the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission issued a report expressing deep concern about the country’s deteriorating human rights situation, highlighting that migrants, in particular, have been targeted and that there is overwhelming evidence that they have been systematically tortured. In particular, the press release[82] underlined that ‘there are reasonable grounds to believe migrants were enslaved in official detention centres well as “secret prisons,” and that rape as a crime against humanity was committed’.

Italian funding to Libya

Since 2017, the Italian government, through the SIBMILL programme, has provided funding in the context of Libya.[83] For the funding of this programme, Italy planned to spend 44.5 million euros; to date, this has been exceeded, reaching an estimate of 56.5 million, of which 12 million were allocated to the IOM for the development of certain projects. Funds managed directly by Italy were used for support measures for the so-called Libyan Coast Guard, including technical instrumentation and training courses.

The funds for the MRCC come from SIBMILL (Integrated Border Control System in Libya) project coordinated by the Italian Ministry of the Interior since 2017 and linked to the Trust Fund for Africa, set up by the European Commission at the end 2015, with the intended objective of “addressing the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration and to contribute to a better migration management”. The Sibmmil project is divided into two phases: the first has a budget of 46.3 million euros, the second of 15 million.[84]

Based on the approval of the MOI, Italy has since 2017 equipped Libya with naval units, supplied and financed the rehabilitation of several patrol boats and ensured the presence in Tripoli of an Italian naval unit (Nave Tremiti, Nave Capri, and then Nave Caprera)[85] to provide Libya technical assistance and training.[86] Nave Capri and Caprera have also coordinated Libyan naval units in the tracking of boats at sea.[87]

With regards to financial support, for the two-year period 2020-2021, the Ministry of Interior had foreseen an additional 1.2 million euros in naval supplies.[88]

As of December 2021, a new mobile “search and rescue” coordination centre (MRCC) was handed over to the Libyans. It was set up to be able to connect to the surface surveillance radar installed at the Abu Sitta naval base in Libyan territory (where Italian Navy assets are also moored). The small centre’s official purpose is  to “monitor” the Libyan “search and rescue” (SAR) area that Italy itself contributed to have established in 2017-2018 and recognised before the International Maritime Organization.

On the other hand, Italy has also provided funding to projects in Libya directly, including to the International Organisation for Migration. On July 2, 2021, the Directorate General for Italians Abroad and Migration Policies (DGIT) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) entered into an agreement with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) whereby it committed to fund an intervention called “Multi-sectoral support for mobile vulnerable populations and communities in Libya” for 4 million euros (for its first phase). Many of the activities to be funded with this are geared towards local community and protection. Special attention is given to support activities to Libyan authorities inside detention centres and in SAR operations, and ultimately – especially in the last phase – engaging more frequently on Assisted Voluntary Return. As of 6 June 2023, EUR 16 million has been allocated and the programme is currently on phase 3, which is focused on AVR, while the second phase, to which EUR 8.5 million was allocated, mainly focused on the condition of the Detention Centres.[89]

Interception at sea, refoulement and following legal actions

The resulting effects of Italy’s indirect pushbacks to Libya and the consequences on people suffering inhuman and cruel treatments are now being examined by the European Court of Human Rights in the case S.S. and others v. Italy concerning a rescue operation of the Sea Watch ship hindered in November 2017 by the Libyan coastguard through a patrol boat donated by Italy and with the coordination of the Italian MRCC.[90]

From January 2020 to September 2020, at least 9,000 people were tracked down by the Libyan coastguard and brought back to Libya.[91] According to data collected by IOM present at the landing sites in Libya, by the end of 2020, 12,000 people were intercepted and brought back by the Libyan authorities meaning that, in 2020, more than 42% of the people who attempted to leave Libya, have been brought back.[92]

Confirming what was previously mentioned regarding the number of people returned to Libya, Amnesty International recently reported that “in 2021, the Libyan coastguards, with the support of Italy and the European Union, captured 32,425 refugees and migrants at sea and brought them back to Libya: by far the highest number recorded so far, three times higher than the previous year. 1,553 people died or disappeared at sea in the central Mediterranean in 2021”.[93] According to IOM data, from the beginning of 2023 up to 25 November 2023, 15,057 migrants were intercepted at sea and brought back to Libya after attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe, while 957 died and 1,256 are missing.[94]

“Privatised pushbacks”:

• On 18 December 2019, the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) filed a complaint against Italy with the UN Human Rights Committee in the context of “privatised pushbacks”, consisting of requiring commercial ships to return refugees and other persons in need of protection to unsafe locations.[95] However, the complaint was considered inadmissible by the Committee for failure to exhaust domestic remedies in Libya.
• In February 2021, five Eritrean citizens, with the support of the ASGI and Amnesty International, initiated a civil action to declare the illegality of the refoulement to Libya carried out on 2 July 2018 by the ship “Asso Ventinove” of the Augusta Offshore during an operation coordinated by the Italian authorities stationed in Libya and with the collaboration of the Libyan Coast Guard.
• In June 2021, IOM and UNHCR, confirmed that over 270 migrants and refugees had been handed over to the Libyan Coast Guard by the ship “Vos Triton” and were subsequently taken into detention by the Libyan authorities. The two organisations reiterated that no one should be returned to Libya after being rescued at sea, as under international maritime law, rescued individuals should be disembarked at a place of safety.[96] A case was initially started due to a lack of transparency on a FOIA request submitted by the NGO Sea Watch, who had observed the dynamics of the pullbacks, coordinated by the Italian MRCC, through its aerial assets. Following two grades of administrative procedures, the Council of State confirmed the legality of the denial to access to the document required.[97]At the beginning of 2024, new evidence was handed over to the Italian Public Prosecutor Office in Rome by two Sudanese applicants involved in the Vos Triton pullbacks. The two Sudanese citizens are currently in Sudan and Libya provided the information with the support of ASGI, Comitato Nuovi Desaparecidos, Open Arms, Progetto Diritti, Sea Watch, Mediterranea, Jl Project and Alarm Phone.[98]
• In another case, on 14 October 2021, the criminal Court of Naples sentenced a commercial vessel captain, Asso28, to a one-year imprisonment, due to having returned migrants to Libya. On 30 July 2018, the vessel had intercepted a rubber dinghy with 101 people on board and, having taken on board a Libyan customs officer, the captain let him carry out the rescue and return operations to Libya of the migrants. The captain was acquitted of the charge of “disembarkation and arbitrary abandonment of persons”, pursuant to art. 1155 of the navigation code, and of “abandonment of minors” pursuant to art. 591 of the penal code. For the first time, the return to Libya led to the condemnation of a private boat.[99] The conviction of the ship’s captain was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Naples on 10 November 2022. The Court confirmed the grounds of the first instance decision.[100] On 1 February 2024 the Court of Cassation[101] ruled on the appeal brought by the ship’s captain against the decision of the Naples Court of Appeals, upholding the final conviction of the captain of the vessel Asso 28. The Supreme Court, in upholding the convictions on the two charges, reiterated that Libya and the port of Tripoli cannot be considered places of safety given the serious and systematic human rights violations taking place in the country to the detriment of migrants.[102]

Pushbacks at Adriatic ports

As monitored by ASGI, No Name Kitchen, Ambasciata dei Diritti di Ancona and Associazione SOS Diritti, refoulements continue to be carried out from Italy to Greece at Adriatic maritime borders, based on the bilateral agreement signed by the Italian and Greek government in 1999, which became operational in 2001, even if it was never ratified by the Italian Parliament.[103] In 2022, readmissions and refoulements were still recorded also towards Albania.[104]

As provided in the readmission agreement with Slovenia, the readmission agreement with Greece excludes the informal transfer between the two countries of illegally staying third-country nationals only for those recognized as refugees by the state requesting readmission.[105]

Access to the asylum procedure and to information is very limited, and transfers or re-admissions are being immediately executed to send foreign nationals back to Greece. On 18 January 2023, Lighthouse Reports, in collaboration with SRF, ARD Monitor, Al Jazeera, Domani and Solomon, published an online investigation on the illegal readmissions of asylum seekers to Greece that take place at the Adriatic seaports and the illegal detention to which third Country nationals undergo are subjected in unofficial places of detention on-board ships and ferries.[106] Despite the existence of a bilateral agreement between Italy and Greece, dated 1999, this procedure is adopted also to asylum seekers and minors.

In cases where the person is able to contact the network of NGOs operating at Adriatic ports, they generally managed to apply for asylum. In the others, the push back was carried out to the port of departure. According to the testimonies collected by the Network, if the ferry leaves immediately the person is kept on board. Otherwise, they will be held in a police station inside the port, and then taken back to the ferry.

On 7 February 2022, the Adriatic Ports Network sent a new communication to the Committee of Ministers of Europe,[107] requesting the continuation of the procedure to oversee the implementation of the Sharifi ruling, denouncing, contrary to the Government’s claim in the Action Report of 15 December 2021, the persistence of illegitimate practices. The Government declared, instead, to have taken all necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of the alleged violations and to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the ECtHR and called for the definitive closure of the procedure.[108] However, as the Network highlighted in its communication, the profiles of illegitimacy persist and the rejections and readmissions of foreign nationals traced onboard ships or in the immediate landing area of the main Italian Adriatic ports continue. Readmissions and rejections also occur many hours after apprehension, as intercepted foreign nationals are held in transit areas, where no individual assessment is carried out by border police nor legal assistance is provided, or inside the ferries themselves, where migrants are detained in a condition of total invisibility. The testimonies collected report incidents of mistreatment and behaviour detrimental to personal dignity both during the tracing phase on board the ship or ashore, and during and at the end of readmission procedures, such as confiscation and destruction of personal belongings, forcing them to undress, and exposure to extreme temperatures. On 15 August 2021, an Afghan national and a Kurd from Iraq, despite their intention to seek asylum and the alert sent to the relevant authorities by the network, were readmitted to Greece; on 6 October 2021, a Kurdish citizen from Iraq was granted access to the territory and asylum claim, following the network’s intervention that interrupted the readmission procedure already in place. In January 2022, a family with a minor in need of health care was turned away from the port of Bari, despite presenting relevant documentation attesting said health needs. From April to November 2022, the Network received 21 calls from nationals of different countries (i.e. Iraq, Türkiye, Afghanistan), mostly from Bari and Brindisi, while 1 was from Ancona. Most of them were adult men, two were unaccompanied minors. All these cases had a positive outcome, as access to the territory was ensured after an individual intervention.

The network also received three reports of people already readmitted to Greece.

The support provided by the network changes depending on the individual case, but generally the timing is quite tight and legal counselling is provided.

Through a F.O.I.A request sent to public administrations by Altreconomia, it has been made public that,[109] from 1 January 2022 to 14 November 2022, 1,917 third country nationals received a return order from the Border Police Office at the Adriatic ports cities and that 81 people were informally readmitted to Greece. Among these, 29 Afghan citizens, 15 Iraqi citizens and 11 Albanian citizens.

On 7 July 2023, the same practices that were reported by Lighthouse Reports (e.g, pushbacks at the Adriatic ports, obligation to undress, detention on ferries) were the subject of an important decision adopted by the Court of Rome.[110] The ruling reaffirmed the illegitimacy of the use of informal readmissions that take place at the Adriatic ports because they are adopted without the issuance of an individual measure, because they undermine the right of access to asylum because they lack appropriate information, and because they are adopted without a previous individual assessment of the concrete case. The present case is particularly significant because the applicant was an unaccompanied foreign minor, and an applicant for international protection in Greece, in possession of documentation certifying both of these facts. Nevertheless, the Italian authorities informally readmitted the applicant, forcing him to strip naked and be detained in a ferry compartment for many hours before being returned to the Greek authorities.[111] The decision, in addition to accounting for all the violations indicated, requires the Italian government to take the necessary steps to ensure the applicant’s access to Italian territory, suggesting the issuance of a humanitarian visa under Article 25 of EC Regulation 810/2009 (Visa Regulation).

The Protocol between Italy and Albania

On 6 November 2023, the “Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Italy and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on Strengthening Cooperation in Migration Matters”[112] was signed in Rome. The official purpose is to strengthen bilateral cooperation between the states on the management of migratory flows from third countries, through the construction of two centres on Albanian territory under Italian jurisdiction, to which “migrants” who have had been admitted into to border or repatriation procedures will be assigned. The Protocol includes two Annexes, notably one detailing the expenses to be borne by the Italian government for the construction of the centres. The Albanian authorities grant two areas within their territory to construct two detention centres during the spring of 2024, which will run for an initial period of 5 years. The Protocol envisages that the centres will have the capacity to accommodate a maximum of 3 000 individuals at one time. One centre is to be built near the port of Shengjin, where disembarkation, identification, border procedures, and elements related to asylum procedure will take place; the second centre will be built in Gjader, where people deemed ineligible for asylum will be accommodated. The two centres will be managed by the Italian authorities “in accordance with the relevant Italian and European legislation”. They will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Italian authorities and will have the sole purpose of carrying out border, asylum and return procedures in accordance with Italian and EU law. The Italian authorities will be responsible for transfers to and from these centres, as well as for “maintaining security and order” within them. The Albanian authorities will be responsible for ensuring “security and public order” at the external perimeter and during transfers to and from the detention centres. The Protocol assigns responsibility for ensuring the detention and “unauthorized exit” of individuals into Albanian territory (both during and after the completion of the procedures, and regardless of the final outcome) to the Italian authorities.

The European Commission response to the Protocol has been ambiguous. When asked about the legality of the Protocol, the Commission first told reporters that it had asked Italian authorities for more detailed information regarding the exact scope and expected impacts of the arrangement, and that ‘this must be done without prejudice to the asylum acquis’.[113] In any case, the protocol raises many questions about its compatibility with European Union law[114] and, more broadly, with international human rights law.[115]

After an initial phase of apparent political unwillingness on the part of the government for parliamentary passage to approve the law ratifying the Protocol,[116] on 5 December 2023, the Council of Ministers approved the draft law ratifying the Protocol.[117]. The text introduces a clause equating the Albanian areas provided for in the Protocol to the border or transit zones referred to in Legislative Decree No. 25 of January 28, 2008, in which expedited border procedures are carried out. These areas are equated with the hotspots and detention centres for repatriation provided for in the Immigration Consolidated Act (Testo Unico Immigrazione). On 13 December the Albanian Constitutional Court was called to rule on the appeal filed on 6 December by 30 Members of Parliament, belonging to opposition parties, concerning the constitutionality of the Italy-Albania bilateral protocol. The Albanian legal system, in addition to the subsequent type of constitutionality review, also requires of the Court a minor form of prior review of the compatibility of international agreements with the Constitution, i.e., prior to their ratification. On 29 January 2024, the Albanese Constitutional Court ruled that the agreement was compatible with the constitutional system.[118]

The Italian Parliament ratified the Protocol through Law 14 of 21 February 2024.[119]

Attempt to criminalise migrants’ refusal to be returned to third countries

As reported in 2020 AIDA report, in June 2020 the Criminal Appeal Court of Palermo overturned the decision of the Criminal Court of Trapani that had acquitted two migrants rescued at sea by Vos Thalassa ship in 2018, who had rebelled aboard the ship threatening the captain and the crew once they realised that it was bringing them back to Libya. The judge had recognised they acted in self-defence, and that the act of bringing them back to Libya would have been a crime.[120] Instead, according to the Court of Appeal, the defendants had voluntarily placed themselves in a dangerous condition, having planned an extremely dangerous sea crossing and having then asked for help in order to be recovered from rescue boats. Consequently, according to the Court their violent and threatening conduct – aimed at preventing the crew of the Vos Thalassa from returning them to the Libyan Coast Guard – cannot be considered self-defence.[121]

Through Decision n. 15869/2022,[122] adopted on 16 December 2021, and published on 26 April 2022, the Court of Cassation overturned the decision issued by the Court of Appeal of Palermo, reaffirming the principle that the migrants rescued at sea, asserting their right not to be refouled to Libya, were justified in resisting return procedures, as soon as their reaction to the risk of refoulement was proportionate and there were no proof of collusion with the traffickers.[123]

On 25 November 2022, the Criminal Court of Trieste acquitted a man accused of having provided false personal details to the authorities, to be registered as a minor. The Court recognized that the man was justified as he had acted in a state of necessity, to protect himself from the danger of serious harm that was the chain refoulement from Italy to Bosnia, which, in any case, he then suffered, being victim of inhuman treatment in Croatia, before being able to return to Italy and obtain refugee status.[124]

Arrivals by air

Different cooperatives are entrusted by public tender or other temporary contracts to provide information services in the main airports, directly by the local Prefectures.

At the Fiumicino airport of Rome, the Prefecture of Rome entrusted the social cooperative Albatros1973 with informing and managing foreign people arriving at the air border who want to seek asylum or who are Dublin returnees in 2020. For 2021 and 2022, the service was in charge of ITC cooperative. As of 31 October 2022, 980 third country nationals were not granted access to the Italian territory at the airport borders, and only 105 asylum applications were lodged at air borders.[125]

At the Milan Malpensa airport, since 2020 the cooperative Ballafon is responsible for providing services to asylum seekers arriving at the air border. According to Inlimine ASGI project’s FOIA, as of 31 October 2022, 909 third Country nationals were not granted access to the Italian territory at Malpensa airport, while only 128 people were able to seek asylum at the airport. Among people refouled, according to the same information, it is clear that persons coming from countries with critical security situations (such as Syria, Palestine, Democratic Republic of Congo or Pakistan) did not have access to the international protection procedure.[126]

On 20 June 2023, ASGI, similarly to what was done at Fiumicino Airport, conducted a visit to the offices and transit area of Milano Malpensa Airport, in compliance with Lazio Regional Administrative Court ruling No. 3392/2023. During the visit, the delegation had access to the places used for the stay of foreign nationals who receive refoulement orders. As of the date of the visit (June 20, 2023), there had 546 refusals of entry since the beginning of 2023. The time spent in the transit area awaiting the execution of the refoulement was as follows:

• 313 persons were refused entry in less than 24 hours after being notified of the rejection order;
• 215 persons between 24 and 48 hours;
• 14 persons after a stay in the transit zone of about 48 hours;
• 3 persons after a stay of three days;
• 1 person from Santo Domingo (for whom, officials report, there are only two direct flights per week) after a stay of four days.

Similarly to the findings at Fiumicino airport, the main critical issues found relate to poor information and access to international protection, ineffectiveness in terms of protecting the entity present at the airport, de facto detention operated, and lack of effective access to the right to defence and communication with the outside.[127]

Land borders

Arrivals at the Slovenian land border

By the end of August 2023, 13,700 migrants entered through the Friuli Venezia Giulia region, according to the information released by the Minister of Interior in September 2023.[128] In 2022, 13,000 migrants coming from the border between the province of Trieste and Slovenia were traced by the Border Police of Trieste or spontaneously presented themselves to the authorities of the municipalities.[129]

In 2023, according to information collected by Asgi only a few number of readmissions were carried out based on the Readmission Agreement signed by Italian and Slovenian Government in 1996,[130] never ratified by the Italian Parliament, contrary to what Article 80 of Italian Constitution dictates for the ratification of international treaties that are of a political nature.[131]

On 18 January 2021, the Civil Court of Rome declared that the informal readmission procedures were contrary to the law as, among other reasons, they violated the right to access the asylum procedure and in contrast with the Dublin Regulation. This decision was later reformed by the Civil Court of Rome which accepted the appeal submitted by the MoI considering not proved the involvement of the applicant in the procedure. However, the Court confirmed the illegitimacy of the readmission procedures that was at the base of the motivation of the first court.[132]Following the Court of Rome decision of 18 January 2021, in 2021, only 6 people were readmitted to Slovenia. However, starting from 31 July 2021, mixed patrols involving Italian and Slovenian police were resumed at the eastern Italian border for a total number of 10 monthly services, out of which 7 carried out in Slovenia (Koper and Nova Gorica) and 3 in Italy (Trieste and Gorizia).[133]

On several occasions, the Government outlined the imminent resumption of readmission procedures.[134] In January 2022, the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region announced that it had purchased, on request of the Prefecture of Trieste, 65 camera traps, to be allocated to the border police and to be placed on the Italian-Slovenian border to intercept arrivals and act as a “technological wall”.[135]

During the summer and autumn of 2022, partly as a result of changed entry policies at the Bosnia Herzegovina-Croatia border and the political change of government in Slovenia, a major increase in the number of arrivals from the Balkan route was reported. Although no official data on entries is available, press articles have pointed to increased interceptions of foreign nationals who are irregularly present.[136] The high number of new arrivals is also confirmed by the systematic difficulties that the Prefecture of Trieste and Gorizia have faced in relation to granting reception measures for asylum seekers in the territory.[137] This situation has created obvious unease and led to a new intensification of police controls on the Slovenian side, starting from 2 September 2022.[138] After the change of government, more focus was put on enhancing border controls, and on 28 November, Interior Ministry Chief of Staff issued a directive calling on public administrations at the borders to intensify actions to curb arrivals.[139] NGOs, such as ASGI, ICS and the network Rivolti ai Balcani regard it as a de facto reinstatement of informal readmissions,[140] which were previously declared illegitimate by the Rome Civil Court decision. On 6 December, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior Emanuele Prisco, during a visit in Trieste, confirmed the political intention of the Government to re-start informal readmission at the border with Slovenia.[141]

In December 2022 informal readmissions re-started, but they did not involve asylum seekers. However, the Slovenian government refused many people that the Italian border police tried to send back. According to the information obtained by Altreconomia through a FOIA request, out of 190 readmission requests, only 23 were successful. The Slovenian Government did not dispute the validity of the agreement, but it claimed there was no evidence of the previous passage of those people from Slovenia.[142]

Beyond the intention to reactivate informal readmissions, following a parliamentary question on 13 September 2023, the Italian Ministry of the Interior confirmed that, as of September 2022, the Italian and Slovenian governments had given more structure to cross-border police cooperation actions. Thanks to these initiatives, the government declared that during 2023, bilateral operations prevented 1,900 foreign nationals from entering Italian territory.[143] ASGI therefore presented a FOIA request to receive information about specific elements of this practice, and the Administration confirmed the direct involvement of Italian authorities in mixed patrols on Slovenian territory with powers of observation and information support, under the bilateral agreement on cross-border police cooperation of August 27, 2007, ratified by Law 60 of April 7, 2011.[144] During a hearing before the Parliamentary Schengen Committee, Interior Minister Piantedosi also announced ‘the establishment of Mixed Brigades of Police Forces, based on the fruitful experience (…) gained with joint patrol services.’[145] According to a 2 November 2023 news report, police coordination centres involving Italy, Slovenia and Croatia will also be set up in order to consolidate cooperation on countering irregular crossings. These developments fit into the general picture of increased patrolling of the territory, which had been confirmed through the news[146] of the purchase of 65 photo traps mobile cameras to place in the border areas of Trieste and Gorizia province. From initial information collected by ASGI and Altreconomia the camera model GDPR WN-42CM branded Wilnex, cost 34,710 euro, and the tool should exclusively be aimed at locating people crossing the border irregularly.

However, the latest and most relevant political change in border management at the Italo-Slovenian border had been the reintroduction of border controls according to art. 28 Regulation 2016/399 (Border Schengen Code).[147] In particular, in a statement published on 18 October 2023,[148] the Italian government announced that it had notified relevant European authorities and partners of the reintroduction of internal land border controls with Slovenia from 21 October 2023 to 30 October 2023 due to the increased threat of violence within the EU as a result of the escalating crisis in the Middle East and the risk of possible terrorist infiltration. According to the government, this picture would be ‘further aggravated by the constant migratory pressure on Italy’. Since then, the duration of the border controls have already extended 5 times.[149] The last extension communicated on 19 January 2024 will last for five months and has been justified still with possible risks of “possible terrorist infiltration into irregular migration flows”.

The Ministry of Interior announced that, thanks to the border controls, police had intercepted the arrival of 1,600 irregular people, made 76 arrests and denied entrance on the territory to almost 900 people.[150]

Another risk factor at the Italian Slovenian border are chain pushbacks from Italy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this topic, the Civil Court of Rome, by a decision of 9 May 2023,[151] once again condemned the Italian administration for practices of chain readmissions. The case concerned an action for compensation of the damage suffered by a Pakistani citizen, already entitled of international protection in Italy, by a previous readmission that sent him violently back to Bosnia Herzegovina. The Italian Court stated that ‘The illegitimacy inherent in the informal readmission operated by the Italian police authorities at the border between Italy and Slovenia, the inhuman and degrading treatment related to the chain readmission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the concomitant lack of access to the political asylum procedure determine a right to compensation for damages in the hands of the recipient of this procedure’. The Tribunal reiterated the illegitimacy of the readmission procedure implemented at Italy’s eastern border on the basis of an agreement signed between Italy and Slovenia in 1996 that was never ratified by the Italian Parliament, as previously highlighted by the Court of Rome decision of 18 January 2021. This is the procedure that the Italian government, after suspending it following the January 2021 decision, had reinstated as of November 2022, albeit formally not with respect to those seeking international protection. Contrary to the decision related to the appeal against the 18 January 2021 decision, the ruling also recognises the successful demonstration of facts at trial, through cooperation with Slovenian NGO PIC (Pravni center za varstvo človekovih pravic in okolja – Legal Centre for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment),[152] of the immediate chain of readmissions suffered by the claimant from Italy to Slovenia and from Slovenia to Croatia and then the claimant’s presence in Bosnia.[153]

The situation at the French land borders

Refusals of entry and pushbacks

In 2023, the situation at Italian-French internal border, while reproducing some of the dynamics that have been in place for several years, some changes could be observed as of early 2024. Since November 2015 and due to the reintroduction of border controls by France, many migrants attempting to cross the borders with France have been subject to rejection at the border, often with the use of violence. A detailed account of the situation at the borders in previous years is available in the previous updates of the AIDA Report on Italy, and in the AIDA Report on France.[154]

From 14 December 2020, mixed Italian-French patrols began to operate along the border of Ventimiglia with the task of patrolling the borders according to the provisions of bilateral police cooperation agreements based on the 1997 Chambery agreements,[155] providing for conjunct actions and cooperation between Italian and French police[156] Police checks, which can be considered lawful in internal border areas only if conducted in a manner that police powers doesn’t have an equivalent effect to border checks[157], take indeed place only towards people of foreign appearance and systematically especially at Ventimiglia train station where migrants are prevented from getting on the train platform in order not to catch a train headed to France.[158] This practice, started in 2020, is still widely implemented.

Regarding pushbacks, as reported by ASGI and other NGOs,[159] people stopped at the border or on the train are taken to the San Luigi station, identified and given a “refusal of entry” (refus d’entrée). The rejection procedure is completed with the handing over of the concerned persons to the Italian police authorities who invite them to proceed on foot to the city of Ventimiglia. If the third country nationals are intercepted in border areas as defined by the bilateral readmission agreement, they are simply readmitted without any written measure.

Italian media realised some interviews with migrants having been readmitted to Italy or blocked at the border, and with NGOS operators at Ventimiglia. The migrants involved declared having been intercepted and sent back by French police, after all the efforts to reach France. NGOs’ operators observed that about 60 people per day attempted to reach France, and only 10 would succeed, as all the others – including UAMs – were pushed back. Volunteers regret the closure of the red cross Ventimiglia Camp that constituted a support for all the people on the move.[160] Notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the cases C-368/20 and C-369/20[161] in relation to the unlawfulness of prolonging internal border checks without new reasons that justify the reintroduction of such controls, the French Government continued with the temporary reintroduction of border controls,[162] the last extension being notified on 1 of November 2022. In May 2022, Anafé and other French CSOs, with the support of ASGI, submitted an appeal against the decision of the French government to prolong border checks at internal borders, but the French Council of State rejected the appeal on 27 July.[163]

The situation appears to have slightly changed in the first weeks of 2024, with CSOs reporting a decrease in pushbacks and, among these reduced numbers of refusals of entry, decisions mostly in line with the bilateral agreements[164]. This change can be explained in light of recent jurisprudence regarding the powers of Member State to issue refusal of entry provisions (Refus d’entrée) at its internal borders, when border controls have been reintroduced. In particular, the Court of Justice of the European Union, with the decision ADDE (C-143/22) of 21 September 2023, reaffirmed the principle – already introduced in the Affum Case (C-47/15) – according to which the Return directive (2008/11/CE), which provides for the possibility of transferring a third-country national in an irregular condition intercepted in the border area if the two countries in question have signed bilateral readmission agreements, must be applied together with the Schengen Borders Code. This entails that, although in such a situation a Member State can still adopt a refusal of entry decision, on the basis of the Schengen Borders Code, the removal must still comply with the common standards and procedures of the Return directive, and thus also the procedures set out in the bilateral readmission agreement. The Return Directive does not allow Member States to exclude third country nationals from the scope of the directive in case of a refusal of entry at the internal border (contrary to the external border, where it is allowed), even in case of temporarily reintroduced border controls.[165] This CJEU preliminary reference was issued by the Court in the context of a French national court case, led by several NGOs challenging the French CESEDA (Code de l’entrée et de séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile) on this topic before the Council of State, because it allowed the authorities to issue a refusal of entry decision in the context of temporarily reintroduced internal border controls under any circumstances. In light of the CJEU decision, the Council of State confirmed that, to comply with the Return directive, such refusal of entry decisions could only be taken at the internal borders with a view to the person concerned being re-admitted by the Member State from which they came, in application of an agreement existing on the date the Return directive came into force.

One route to France is through the Val di Susa, crossing the Bardonecchia and the Frejus mountain passes, on one side, or, on the other, through Oulx and Claviere leading to the Montgenèvre pass. MEDU,[166] an organisation granting medical assistance to migrants at Oulx, has reported the death of migrants that tried to cross the border walking through the Alps, highlighting the increase in deaths of very young migrants or MSNA. Many NGO signed an appeal consequently the death of migrants at this border.[167]

Among migrants’ deaths at the French border is that of Blessing Matthews. The case concerned a young Nigerian woman, who was found dead on the 9 of May 2018 at Prelles Dam, in the municipality of Saint-Martin-de-Queyrières, at ten kilometres from Briancon. On the night between 6 and 7 May 2018, Blessing Matthews crossed the Alps from Claviere – Italy but was discovered by police agents who started chasing her nearby the village of La Vachette. In a desperate attempt not to be caught by police officers who had reached her at the edge of the river Durance, she fell into the water and drowned. With the support of the organisation Tous Migrant, Blessing’s sister filed different legal actions to ascertain the responsibilities of the public authority, but all actions were dismissed both by the Tribunal of Gap and the Court of Appeal of Grenoble.[168] Due to a counter investigation conducted by Border Forensic,[169] the case was submitted to the Public Prosecutor in May 2022, but again dismissed. On 25 October 2022, an appeal on the case was presented to the European Court of Human Rights.[170] On 18 January 2024, the ECtHR considered the case inadmissible[171], alleging that the French authorities did what was reasonably necessary to be done.

Reception conditions at the Italian border

Regarding the reception conditions on the Italian side of the border, since 2020, due to the pandemic, both transit areas (Ventimiglia and Oulx) were left totally or partially without accommodation facilities. On 31 July 2020, the Roja Camp in Ventimiglia, managed by the Italian Red Cross, was closed,[172] after a previous period of quarantine due to two positive cases of COVID-19, which prevented new entries. Being the only formal place of accommodation for people in transit, its closure led to the proliferation of informal settlements and the occupation of public spaces to face the arrival of winter. Facilities provided by the local Caritas office are only able to guarantee a limited number of places for single parents and children.

As the practice of pushback from France to Italy was systematically implemented in 2021, humanitarian conditions registered in the Italian towns nearby remained dramatic. No public response was given since the closure of the Roya centre.[173] Hundreds of people were stranded in town without access to the most basic rights such as shelter and health care. The humanitarian crisis was faced only by NGO’s, while local authorities seemed to criminalise the situation by introducing local rules against homeless people.[174]

At the end of 2021, it was announced the imminent opening of a centre for people in transit,[175] but, despite several public statements,[176] there was no official action, and migrants continue living stranded under bridges with the only support of civil society organisations and volunteers.[177] The public debate regarding the opening of a reception centre gained once more traction during the diplomatic crisis between the Italian and French governments. This had already started in late 2022[178] but culminated in August and September 2023 with an intensification of border controls by the French authorities and, as a result, pushbacks. As a result of the increase of people with no shelter in the municipality, the city council of Ventimiglia offered to open a repatriation centre on its territory,[179] but received no positive response from the government.[180]

Violence and court cases on the Italian side

On 9 May 2021, Moussa Balde, a 22-year-old boy, was attacked in the streets of Ventimiglia by three Italian men. After being shortly hospitalized, Moussa was ordered to be confined at the CPR of Turin waiting to be deported. At the CPR he was placed in solitary confinement and was found dead on 23 May 2021.[181] On 10 January 2023, the Criminal Court of Imperia convicted three Italian citizens for the aggression, specifically for aggravated injury due to the use of a blunt object.[182] Regarding the responsibilities for the suicide of the young migrant, a criminal proceeding is still pending to ascertain whether it was caused by the lack of medical and psychological care provided to the victim and to his isolation. Indeed, after the confinement, competent authorities denied that Moussa Balde had been present in the CPR, preventing any kind of legal assistance and support. Moreover, despite the brutal aggression suffered in Ventimiglia, the managing authority of the centre decided to put him in isolation, in a separate building called “Ospitaletto” within the detention centre without any kind of human support even if in a critical psychological and physical condition. On October 2023, the Turin prosecutor’s office sent to trial the facility’s director and CPR doctor, charged with involuntary manslaughter, and a police inspector, for forgery and aiding and abetting.[183]

The criminal proceeding against the NGO Baobab, accused of aiding illegal immigration for helping 9 asylum seekers to buy train tickets to reach Ventimiglia after the eviction of an informal reception centre in Rome in 2016,[184] was considered unfounded by the Criminal Court of Rome (Judge for the preliminary hearing, GUP) which acquitted the NGO in May 2022.[185]

Lastly, the ECtHR on 16 November 2023 delivered its judgment regard the 2016 “border relief policy” practices. The application was submitted by four Sudanese applicants, which had since been granted international protection in Italy.[186] The events of the case referred to the situation in Ventimiglia in 2016, when, according to the so called “border relief policy”,[187] and the concurrent signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Sudan for the repatriation of irregular migrants of 24 August 2016,[188] the Italian authorities implemented a strategy of singling out Sudanese nationals, who were subjected to violent, inhumane and degrading methods of identification (confiscation of personal property, obligation to strip naked), forcibly transferred without being issued any order to the Taranto Hotspot (after a journey of nearly 1,200 km), re-identified and subjected to deportation procedures and concomitant removal order without being granted information or legal assistance. Within a few days the identified individuals were again transferred to Ventimiglia and then to Turin to be boarded without their knowledge to Khartoum. The four applicants managed by different circumstances not to be returned and to formalise asylum applications in CPR and obtain international protection. The Court declared that these practices constituted violations of art. 3 of the Convention (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments) with regards to the violations to which the applicants were exposed throughout the identification and transfer procedures, and of art. 5 §§ 1, 2 and 4 (right to liberty and security) due to the de facto detention to which the applicants were exposed.

Legal access to the territory

Under Italian Law, it is not possible to apply for international protection from abroad, nor a specific visa is provided for people in need of protection that need to access the country.

In consideration of specific humanitarian crisis, such as the one existing in Afghanistan in 2021, the Italian Government implemented a measure known as “humanitarian corridors”, subscribing agreements with international organisations such as UNHCR and IOM, as well as NGOs, in order to allow a certain amount of people in need of protection to legally access the country. Humanitarian corridors are however not regulated by law, but only by Protocols created between the Minister of Interior, the Ministry of Foreigners affair and selected organizations, to which the Ministry delegates operations and the power to select the applicants that will be admitted. No official procedure that applicants should follow to be selected for the corridors is established, nor is there a procedure to challenge the non-admission to the list.

On 23 April 2021 a similar protocol was signed with the Community of Sant’Egidio, the Waldensian table and the Federation of Evangelical Churches for the arrival of 500 people from Libya. According to data provided by the Community of Sant’Egidio, from February 2016 to May 2024, 7,226 people arrived through this mechanism – Syrians fleeing the war and refugees from the Horn of Africa and Gaza.[189]

In 2021 humanitarian corridors to admit 1,000 refugees hosted in Lebanon were renewed.

The ones from Jordan, Niger and Ethiopia were concluded as of May 2022. According to information collected by ASGI, at the time of writing, of the 600 people admitted to access the corridors, 530 were actually included in the programme and arrived in Italy.

In 2021, in some selected cases of Afghans escaping from their country of origin after August 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allowed the persons involved to apply for a humanitarian visa to access the territory in application of Article 25 of the Visa Code EU Regulation 810/2009.

In 2023, 183 persons were resettled to Italy and 779 entered through humanitarian corridors. No person reached Italy after evacuation operations.[190] According to information collected by ASGI, resettlement was conducted from Lebanon, Turkyie, Iran and Pakistan. Regarding evacuations, these were stopped in 2023 but on December 2023 a new agreement with Libya was signed and, in early 2024, a person was evacuated and reached Italy.

With reference to the issue of entry visas for humanitarian reasons in situations of need for extraterritorial protection, on 22 November 2023 the Court of Rome upheld the appeal filed by an Iranian citizen, residing in Italy with a study permit, who, not yet having the requirements for family reunification, had asked the Italian Embassy in Iran for the issuance of an entry visa to allow her minor daughter, in serious danger, to reach her. A request to which the Italian Consular Representation has never responded, making it necessary to file an urgent appeal. In the case, the applicant demonstrated the danger to which her daughter was exposed to in Iran, due to her sexual orientation, for having participated in anti-government demonstrations after the assassination of Masha Amini (September 2022) and for behaviors deemed contrary to government religious morality, so much so that on one occasion she was even reprimanded by the morality police.

In terms of jurisdiction, the Court identified a solid link with the Italian State in the presence of the mother in Italy and in her right to protect her daughter, as well as in the right of the latter to live with her mother while escaping the very serious risks to which she is exposed in Iran, thus declining the principle of the best interests of the child referred to in the 1989 New York Convention,  but also in the light of art. 8 ECHR and, last but not least, the right to family unity provided for in the Constitution.

In the decision, the Judge also refers to art. 10, paragraph 3 of the Italian Constitution as the right to enter the national territory, leaving to the State to identify the instrument to allow entry.[191]

Between 2021 and 2022, a total of 4,797 Afghans were evacuated by the Italian Government through the following operations: Operation “Aquila 1”, in June 2021 (involving 228 persons); Operation “Aquila Omnia”, between August and September 2021 (4,493 persons) Operation “Post Aquila” , September 2021, (16 persons); Operation Aquila Omnia BIS between November 2021 and December 2022 (60 persons).[192]

[1] Cfr Ministery of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero available at: https://bit.ly/49F29sh.

[2] See UNHCR, Operational data portal, available at https://bit.ly/3wiHwDI.

[3] See UNHCR, Operational data portal, Fact Sheet Italy/December 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3usXryY.

[4] Ansa, Migranti: prefetto Trieste, si intensificano arrivi in Fvg, 28 February 2023, available at: bit.ly/41VNWmk.

[5] Ministery of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero, availbale in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3HdUq7M.

[6] Eurostat data, available at: https://bit.ly/41BaDfZ.

[7] See UNHCR, Operational data portal, Fact Sheet Italy/December 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3usXryY.

[8] Cfr Ministery of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero availbale at: https://bit.ly/3HdUq7M.

[9] UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/4bMDgNd.

[10] UNHCR, Operational Data Portal , ‘Mediterranean situation – Italy’, available at: http://bit.ly/3wWvsFq.

[11] IOM, Missing Migrants Project, available at: https://bit.ly/3I50Fvv.

[12] Altreconomia, “I dati che raccontano la guerra ai soccorsi nell’anno nero della strage di Cutro”, February 21 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4ak0glk;

[13] See SKY TG24, ‘Migranti e sbarchi, qual è il ruolo e il peso delle Ong sul totale dei salvataggi’, 27 September 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3T2zWWS.

[14] Altreconomia, “I dati che raccontano la guerra ai soccorsi nell’anno nero della strage di Cutro”, February 21 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4ak0glk

[15] Chamber of Deputies, ‘Emergenza COVID-19: le misure in materia di immigrazione’, 11 March 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/2RsUUAA.

[16] Senate studies service, Da Sophia A Irini: La Missione Militare Ue nel Mediterraneo cambia nome, e Priorità, April 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/2Rq68G4.

[17] Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, A distress call for human rights: The widening gap in migrant protection in the Mediterranean, March 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/2QX5ikh.

[18] Al Jazeera, ‘Mediterranean shipwreck: Stories of tragedy emerge after 62 drown’, 27 February 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3LBRlCw and LaStampa, ‘Naufragio di Cutro, la ricostruzione ora per ora di quello che è accaduto la notte del 26 febbraio’, 17 March 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3n5QGia.

[19] LaStampa, ‘Cutro due mesi dopo: inchieste congelate e sette cadaveri ancora senza nome’, 5 May 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3MTFcsP.

[20] See: Altreconomia, ‘Se i naufraghi nel Mediterraneo diventano ‘persone intercettate in operazioni di polizia’. Le ricadute sui soccorsi’, 8 October 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3dwtQ9p.

[21] See Watch the Med – Alarm Phone, ‘Cutro shipwreck: Associations file a collective complaint with the Office of the Public Prosecutor’, 10 March 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3Jw06uS and ASGI, ‘Naufragio Cutro: Associazioni depositano esposto collettivo in Procura’, 9 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3LvHJcp.

[22] La Repubblica, ‘Naufragio di Cutro, ufficiali a processo per mancato soccorso. Finanza e Capitaneria nel mirino’, 15 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uDv6pC; L’Unità, ‘Cosa è successo a Cutro e perché fu strage di Stato: chi pagherà per il mancato salvataggio’, 16 February 2024, available at https://bit.ly/3IaWe28.

[23] Euractiv, ‘Cutro: Italian authorities deemed migrant boat ‘not of interest’ before shipwreck’, 30 January 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/49x4yFk.

[24] ANSA, ‘Naufragio migranti, Meloni: “Nessun allarme da Frontex. Io non scappo, ora Cdm a Cutro”’, 5 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3OO1aOi.

[25] La Repubblica, ‘Cutro, prima sentenza per il naufragio: 20 anni e 3 milioni di multa allo scafista’, 8 February 2024, available in Italina at: https://bit.ly/3T65YBo.

[26] Il Fatto Quotidiano, ‘Strage di migranti a Cutro, il governo si costituirà parte civile nei processi agli scafisti’, 28 November 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uwY1M6.

[27] ASGI, ‘Naufragio di Cutro, ASGI: ritardi nell’attivazione dell’accoglienza per i superstiti’, 11 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3JsByTM.

[28] Ansa, ‘Naufragio bambini, due ufficiali a giudizio’, 16 September 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3fBEFsM; see also: Alarmphone, ‘Left-to-Die Trial in Rome’, 2 December 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/2LeRHyn; ECRE, ‘Italy: Officials of the Italian Coast Guard Prosecuted for Shipwreck in 2013’, 20 September 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/3ckBunh.

[29] ASGI, ‘Strage di bambini dell’11 ottobre 2013: le responsabilità e la cronaca della tragedia nella sentenza sul naufragio’, 5 January 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3WRnzeV.

[30] OHCHR, ‘Italy failed to rescue more than 200 migrants, UN Committee finds’, 21 January 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3JsyqZu.

[31] In detail, Article 1 (1, c and d) DL 130/2020 repealed Articles 11 (1 ter) and 12 (6bis, 6 ter, 6 quater) of the TUI.

[32] Article 1 (2) DL 130/2020, converted with amendments by L 173/2020.

[33] The provision refers to Article 83 of Navigation Code, according to which the Ministry of Transports can limit or ban the transit or stay of merchant ships for reasons of public order, navigation safety and protection of the marine environment, the last one together with the Ministry of the Environment.

[34] See ‘Il delitto d’inosservanza della limitazione o del divieto di transito e sosta nel mare territoriale’, Alberto di Martino e Laura Ricci, in Immigrazione, Protezione Internazionale e Misure Penali, commento al DL 130/2020.

[35] By the end of July 2019, the Minister of the Interior forbade the landing of the people rescued by the Gregoretti Italian Coast Guard ship. Only after six days, on 31 July 2019, the 116 people were disembarked and transferred to the Pozzallo hotspot before being redistributed between France, Germany, Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland. 50 people remained in Italy in charge of the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI).

[36] Ansa, ‘Gregoretti: Gup, non luogo a procedere per Salvini. Prosciolto perché ‘il fatto non sussiste”’, 15 May 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3oZysMh.

[37] Il Corriere, ‘Open Arms, Salvini rinviato a giudizio. Decisione del ministro e sbarco su ordine del pm: le differenze con il caso Gregoretti’, 17 April 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3aZKbVe; Androkonos, ‘Open Arms, rinviata al 4 marzo udienza processo a Salvini’, 21 January 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3CUigmJ.

[38] Fanpage.it, ‘La difesa di Salvini al processo Open Arms: “Mie scelte condivise dal governo, poi Conte cambiò idea”’, January 12, 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/49G0VNh.

[39] Administrative Court of Sicily, decision no. 2974 of 23 December 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3uldPvN.

[40] Administrative Court of Sicily, interim decision no. 145 of 2 March 2021.

[41] Consiglio per la giustizia Ammnistrativa della Regione Siciliana is the appeal body exercising, only for Sicily, the same functions as the Council of State.

[42] LaStampa, “La Sea Watch 4 è nel porto di Trapani di nuovo in fermo amministrativo”, May 8 2021, available in Italian at bit.ly/3J1VE7k;

[43] Altreconomia, ‘Sbarchi, i numeri non tornano. E per il Viminale i naufraghi diventano “persone scortate”’, 25 March 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3NsufwE.

[44] Fanpage, ‘Inchiesta su Mare Jonio, accusata di aver ricevuto soldi in cambio di un trasbordo di migranti’, 1 March 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3eWWsLh.

[45] Il Fatto quotidiano, ‘Migranti, archiviata dal gip l’indagine sulla Mare Jonio che salvò 30 migranti’, 28 January 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3t9NxyI.

[46] Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Direttiva Piantedosi su due navi Ong in navigazione nel Mediterraneo’, 25 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3JQuZvB and Infomigrants, ‘New Italian interior minister says ‘governing migration’ priority’, 25 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3ZZzRnU.

[47] Guardian, ‘Giorgia Meloni faces first migration test from two NGO rescue boats’, 26 October 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3n5I63e.

[48] European Parliament Briefing, Search and rescue efforts for Mediterranean migrants, 24 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/40lxPOq.

[49] Infomigrants, ‘EU Parliament chief: Don’t forget solidarity toward migrants’, 1 November 2022, available at https://bit.ly/40lURVJ.

[50] AlJazeera, ‘Rescue charity to take Italy to court over migrant boats standoff’, 7 November 2022, available at http://bit.ly/3YZw6gI.

[51] For a legal analysis of the law, see ASGI, ‘Una prima lettura di ASGI del Decreto Legge 1/2023 convertito in Legge’, 16 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3n5gwmJ.

[52] CJEU, Joined Cases C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch eV v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Others, 1 August 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3Xp4QaM.

[53] Corriere della Sera, ‘Migranti, Medici senza Frontiere: fermo di 20 giorni e multa da 10mila euro alla nave Geo Barents’, 23 February 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3Ki0WvJ.

[54] IlSussidiario.net, ‘Ong Louise Michel, perché è stata sequestrata – Ha disobbedito alla Guardia Costiera’, 29 March 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3ZS2Vwu.

[55] ASGI, ‘Sbarco e domanda di asilo devono essere garantiti senza distinzioni. Commento all’ordinanza su SOS Humanity’, 14 February 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/40T6G6M.

[56] ANSA, ‘Due navi Ong disubbidiscono al decreto migranti, scattano i fermi’, 2 June 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49kTJ9N.

[57] TG La7, ‘Migranti, fermo amministrativo di 20 giorni per la nave di Sea Watch’, 21 August 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3wztxcH.

[58] SkyTG24, ‘Migranti, tre navi Ong fermate per 20 giorni. Monta polemica sui soccorsi in mare’, 23 August 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3UPomPX.

[59] Sea-Eye, ‘PREGNANT WOMAN FIGHTS FOR HER LIFE ON SEA-EYE 4 – ITALY SENDS NO HELP’, 27 October 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/4bE5N7o.

[60] SkyTG24, ‘Migranti, fermo amministrativo per la Open Arms a Crotone’, 21 January 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3UM9VME.

[61] La Repubblica, ‘Ong, giudice di Brindisi sospende il fermo amministrativo dell’Ocean Viking: ‘Violato il diritto di esercitare attività di soccorso in mare’, 21 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/42Mqf1M.

[62] Translation by the authors.

[63] See ASGI, Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Strengthening the operational capacities of Tunisian authorities in monitoring the maritime borders: 8 million from the Rewarding Fund for Repatriation Policies’, 13 April 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3MF4TKK.

[64] See ASGI, ‘Sempre più politiche securitarie: lo studio sui rimpatri in Tunisia’, 30 March 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3yvpnS9.

[65] ASGI Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Strengthening the operational capacities of Tunisian authorities in monitoring the maritime borders: 8 million from the Rewarding Fund for Repatriation Policies’, 13 April 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3YY5ooO.

[66] See Irpi Media, ‘Tunisia, il muro della Guardia costiera’, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3xaiQud.

[67] European Commission, ‘The European Union and Tunisia: political agreement on a comprehensive  partnership package’, 16 July 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3uM4Kl9.

[68] Politico, ‘EU finalizes migrant deal with Tunisia’, 16 July 2023, available at https://bit.ly/49mmCSI.

[69] The big wall – Action Aid, ‘Memorandum Ue – Tunisia: l’Unione europea sottoscrive rastrellamenti, deportazioni illegali e violenze contro i migranti’, 20 July 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bGoI1r.

[70] European Parliament, ‘EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding’, 11 September 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3wv1sDj.

[71] Euractiv, ‘EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding state of play’, 25 January 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/3I6kfrq.

[72] Memorandum d’intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all’immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana, available on ASGI website at: https://bit.ly/3l6ND8t.

[73] ASGI Sciabaca Oruka, The Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) programme from Libya to Niger: an update as of December 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3XdtTgS.

[74] ASGI Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Voluntary returns from Libya in the EU externalisation strategy: a critical analysis in the light of ASGI’s strategic litigation’, 2 February 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3Yujyhy.

[75] OHCHR, Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, 27 March 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3RaqBJQ.

[76] IOM and UNHCR Press Release, ‘IOM and UNHCR condemn the return of migrants and refugees to Libya’, 16 June 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/414CAwZ.

[77] Criminal Court of Trapani, sentence of 23 May 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3dutMHl; According to article 80 of the Italian Constitution, political agreements can be signed only with Parliament’s authorization. Furthermore, it is an agreement concluded with a party, the Libyan coastguard, repeatedly referred to as responsible for crimes against humanity. Therefore, the court found that the agreement violates the principle of non-refoulement.

[78] ASGI, ‘Memorandum Italia-Libia, lettera aperta del Tavolo Asilo alle istituzioni italiane: non rinnovatelo’, 30 October 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2Wik9Wi.

[79] On 31 January 2020, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, called on the Italian government to urgently suspend the ongoing cooperation activities with the Libyan Coast Guard which affect the repatriation of people intercepted at sea in Libya where they have suffered serious human rights violations, see: ASGI, ‘Il governo italiano deve sospendere ogni cooperazione con la Guardia Costiera libica’, 31 January 2020, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2zmpaEy.

[80] UNMSIL, Report of the Secretary General, 9 December 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3DFSaFh.

[81] UN News ‘Libya detention centres remain places of violations and abuse’, 28 March 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3lbXCcW.

[82] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Libya detention centres remain places of violations and abuse: experts’, 27 March 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3uMus9l.

[83] For further details on these previous funding programmes, see AIDA, Country report Italy, available at: https://bit.ly/49lG7tX.

[84] Altreconomia, ‘Nuovi affari dell’Italia sulla frontiera per respingere le persone in Libia’, 1 February 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3F35lzE.

[85] Analisi difesa, ‘Nave Caprera ha sostituito la Capri nel porto di Tripoli’, 4 April 2018, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2SP6Hag.

[86] ASGI, ‘ASGI chiede l’immediato annullamento del Memorandum con la Libia’, 2 February 2020, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2zlh1QB.

[87] Altreconomia, ‘Il grande inganno della Libia sicura e le tappe della regia italiana dei respingimenti delegati’, 18 April 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/35MIMgW.

[88] Altreconomia, ‘L’Italia continua ad equipaggiare la Libia per respingere i migranti, il caso delle motovedette ricondotte a Tripoli’, 2 March 2020, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2SSmsNU.

[89] The Big Wall, ‘L’esternalizzazione dei rimpatri dalla Libia in un imbuto umanitario’, 9 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49mpEXm.

[90] ECtHR, Application No. 21660/18, S.S. and others v. Italy, available at: https://bit.ly/3dvkBGt; the Third-party intervention by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights is available at: https://bit.ly/35OFYjn.

[91] Report of Fondazione Migrantes, Il diritto d’asilo, 2020.

[92] Form elaborated by IOM for the Ministry of Labour’s Monitoring report on unaccompanied minors, December 2020; see also the following report: https://bit.ly/34nMePk, 26.

[93] Amnesty International, Cinque anni dal memorandum Italia-Libia: condizioni infernali per migranti e richiedenti asilo, 31 January 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/37Fq8gb.

[94] IOM, Libya Maritime update 25 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49s3hja.

[95] Communication to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in the case of SDG against Italy, available at: https://bit.ly/41zjJt7.

[96] Available at: https://bit.ly/3F96BBj. See also ECRE, ‘Med: UN Condemnation of Returns to Unsafe Libya by Merchant Ship, Survivors Rescued in Maltese SAR Zone Accepted by Italy, Parliament President Urges EU Lead on Rescues at Sea’, 18 June 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3Jb1bap.

[97] A reconstruction of the entire Vos Triton affair and the proceedings relating to “state secrets” can be found at the following link: bit.ly/3KDPFGF.

[98] L’Unità, ‘Stragi di naufraghi e respingimenti illegali, si muovono le Procure: esposto per la deportazione in Libia di 25 migranti’, 2 January 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bUybm3.

[99] ASGI, ‘Condanna di Asso 28, un precedente che può scardinare la prassi dei respingimenti in Libia’, 19 October 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3vHe5HF. See also Infomigrants, ‘Ship captain sentenced to prison for returning migrants to Libya’, 15 October 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vK0b7s.

[100] ASGI, ‘Asso 28, la corte di appello di Napoli conferma: il respingimento verso la Libia è illegittimo’, 18 January 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3XYMA8Q.

[101] Judgment No. 4557, full decision available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3UPSJFW.

[102] Avvenire, ‘Cassazione: «La Libia non è un porto sicuro». Reato obbedire ai guardacoste’, 16 February 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4bYYJCG.

[103] Available in Italian and Greek at: https://bit.ly/3qHhuVf.

[104] According to Altreconomia FOIA, from January 2022 to 14 November, 1827 Third Country Nationals have been refouled from Bari, Brindisi, Ancona, Trieste to Albania. See Altreconomia, ‘L’ossessione di respingere anche ai confini interni. Via terra e per mare’ February 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IoKGtc.

[105] Readmission agreement between Italy and Greece, Article 6.

[106] Lighthouse Reports, ‘Detained below deck’, 18 January 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3kgpOLp.

[107] Available at: https://bit.ly/3KQTUg1.

[108] Available at: https://bit.ly/3MMKzHf.

[109] Altreconomia, ‘L’ossessione di respingere anche ai confini interni. Via terra e per mare’, 1 February 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3IoKGtc.

[110] Full decision in Italian, available at https://bit.ly/4bMFgot.

[111] For a broader description of the case, see ASGI Medea, ‘Illegitimacy of informal pushbacks at Adriatic ports and humanitarian visa’, 11 August 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/48uzyVl.

[112] The full text of the Protocol is available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uGnzq5. For a comprehensive analysis of the protocol, see CEPS, The 2023 Italy-Albania Protocol on Extraterritorial Migration Management – A worst practice in migration and asylum policies, 1 December 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3wrPL0p.

[113] EU Observer, ‘EU unclear on legality of Italy-Albania deal to offshore asylum’, 7 November 2023, available at https://bit.ly/4bLpXMW.

[114] SIDIBlog, ‘On the incompatibility of the Italy-Albania protocol with EU asylum law’, 15 November 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3PhmwEf.

[115] Questione Giustizia, ‘Profili di illegittimità del Protocollo Italia-Albania’, 28 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4bOIec1. ASGI, ‘L’analisi giuridica del Protocollo Italia – Albania’, 22 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/49FJrRP.

[116] ASGI, ‘Accordo Italia-Albania, ASGI: è incostituzionale non sottoporlo al Parlamento’, 14 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4c1MNjF.

[117] Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 61, 5 December 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49I647A; Sistema Penale, Il Disegno di legge di ratifica ed esecuzione del Protocollo tra Italia ed Albania in materia di immigrazione: analisi del progetto e questioni di legittimità, 28 December 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3URu57T.

[118] BalkanInsight, ‘Albanian Court Approves Deal with Italy on Processing Migrants’, 29 January 2024, available at https://bit.ly/3STBXmX.

[119] Senato della Repubblica, Giovedì 15 Febbraio 2024 – 159ª Seduta pubblica, February 15 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IclK7o.

[120] Criminal Court of Trapani, cited above. See: Diritto penale contemporaneo, La legittima difesa dei migranti e l’illegittimità dei respingimenti verso la Libia (caso Vos-Thalassa), Luca Masera, 24 June 2019, available in Italian at: https://cutt.ly/7yv9bfe; see also: EDAL, ‘Italy – Tribunal of Trapani – Office of the Judge for Preliminary Investigations (Piero Grillo)’, available at: https://bit.ly/42CrUWO.

[121] Criminal Court of Appeal of Palermo, Decision no. 1525/2020, of 3 June 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3vIWwFg.

[122] Decision available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3vzvZgz.

[123] Espresso, ‘I migranti hanno il diritto di opporsi alla riconsegna in Libia»: storica sentenza della Cassazione’, 17 December 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3t9BxNz.

[124] Criminal Court of Trieste, decision of 25 November 2022. See Altreconomia, ‘Fingersi minore per sfuggire ai respingimenti italiani a catena fino in Bosnia non è reato’, 28 February 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3J0Lipe.

[125] ASGI InLimine, ‘La frontiera di Fiumicino: i riscontri della pubblica amministrazione’, 10 November 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3I3RJGk.

[126] ASGI Inlimine, ‘La frontiera di Malpensa: alcuni riscontri dalla pubblica amministrazione’, 13 November 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3k23MMf.

[127] ASGI Inlimine, La situazione emersa dal sopralluogo della Zona di transito internazionale dell’aeroporto di Milano Malpensa, December 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3TaPmYV.

[128] See Ansa, Migranti: Piantedosi, 13.700 ingressi dal Friuli quest’anno, 13 September 2023, available at https://encr.pw/Uj6Cn.

[129] Ansa, ‘Migranti, il Prefetto di Trieste: si intensificano arrivi in FVG’, 28 February 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/41VNWmk.

[130] Readmission agreement between the Italian and Slovenian Government, available at: https://bit.ly/3vwPuGF.

[131] Italian Consititution, Article 80 states: ‘Le Camere autorizzano con legge la ratifica dei trattati internazionali che sono di natura politica, o prevedono arbitrati o regolamenti giudiziari, o importano variazioni del territorio od oneri alle finanze o modificazioni di leggi.’

[132] Civil Court of Rome, decision of 3 May 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3KIswAZ.

[133] Written response provided to the question made by the member of the Italian Parliament Riccardo Magi, signed by the undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior, Nicola Molteni, on 13 October 2021, attached to the bulletin of Constitutional Affairs n. 5-06810.

[134] Rai news, ‘“Stop ai cortei, sì alle riammissioni informali”, dice il prefetto Vardè’, 9 November 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3w6N9CS.

[135] Il Gazzettino.it, ‘Clandestini dai Balcani, il Friuli Venezia Giulia compra 65 fototrappole: “Un muro tecnologico”’, 21 January 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3ILHC7v.

[136] See Radio Capodistria ‘In aumento i flussi di migranti fra Italia e Slovenia’, 22 August 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3xWVOHW.

[137] Rainews, ‘Le strutture per l’accoglienza dei migranti a Trieste sono al collasso, available in Italian at http://bit.ly/3ED2aQg; ANSA, ‘Migranti: Ics a Governo, non si violi accoglienza a Trieste’, 23 October 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3SyAx0w. For a more comprehensive collection of information related to people on the move present in Trieste, IRC, Abandoned lives, December 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3IbXulF.

[138] IlFriuli.it, ‘Migranti, ripartono le pattuglie miste al confine’, 6 September 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3IxupAZ.

[139] Il fatto quotidiano, ‘Migranti, il governo riattiva i respingimenti sul confine Sloveno. Erano stati dichiarati illegittimi dal tribunale di Roma nel 2021’, 12 December 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3Z3wmfv.

[140] MeltingPot Europa, ‘Trieste, nuova direttiva Piantedosi: ripartono le riammissioni illegali in Slovenia’, 9 December 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3YZQtdR and Altreconomia, ‘Sulla sconcertante ripresa delle ‘riammissioni informali’ al confine italo-sloveno’, 12 December 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3TsuniU.

[141] RAI – TGR Friuli Venezia Giulia, ‘Il Governo ha deciso: tornano i respingimenti di migranti in Slovenia’, 6 December 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3n8ZnZq.

[142] Altreconomia, ‘Respingimenti alla frontiera con la Slovenia, i dati che smontano gli annunci del governo’, 9 May 2023, available at: bit.ly/3Mr215M.

[143] Camera dei Deputati, XIX LEGISLATURA – Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea – Seduta n. 161 di mercoledì 13 settembre 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bQ37DI.

[144] FOIA reply from the Ministry of Interior Prot. 0102589 of October 25, 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3OTrEOs.

[145] Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Comitato parlamentare Schengen, audizione del Ministro Piantedosi’, 7 November 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/48uWSlR.

[146] Il Gazzettino, ‘Clandestini dai Balcani, il Friuli Venezia Giulia compra 65 fototrappole: «Un muro tecnologico»‘, 21 January 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3zDbMb1.

[147] For a more detailed analysis of the reintroduction of border controls at the Italo-Slovenian border, see ASGI Medea, ‘Schengen Area: From Free Movement Zone to Labyrinth’, 20 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/42UYcNH.

[148] Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, ‘Reintroduzione dei controlli delle frontiere interne terrestri con la Slovenia, nota di Palazzo Chigi’, 18 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49IMQP8.

[149] European Commission, ‘Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control’, available at: https://bit.ly/3DmVntw.

[150] Ministry of Interior, available at the Government webpage: https://bit.ly/3TtmsDK.

[151] Full decision Court of Rome N. R.G. 3938/2022 of May 9, 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3wFks20;

[152] More information on the organisation, available at: https://bit.ly/3PkgfaT.

[153] ASGI Medea, Balkan route, evidence and testimonies confirm chain readmissions. Ministerial liability for compensation for damages, August 8, 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3OYCxyC.

[154] AIDA, Country Report Italy, 2017 Update, March 2018, available at: https://bit.ly/2Ga01zb, 22-24.

[155] Riviera time, ‘Una ‘squadra mista’ italo-francese: parte da Ventimiglia il progetto pilota della Polizia di Frontiera’, 21 December 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3bd9bbM.

[156] The text of the Agreement is available at: https://bit.ly/39wdS2v.

[157] Article 23 of the Regulation 399/2016 (Schengen border Code).

[158] Regarding ethnic profiling procedure carried out at Ventimiglia train station, ASGI Medea, Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Review of Italy – 110th Session Racial and ethnic profiling practices in police (border) checks and lack of accessible and effective remedy in Italy, July 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3Ict6rl, 16-19.

[159] ASGI, ‘La situazione al confine tra Italia e Francia: effetti della pandemia e tendenze consolidate’, 22 February 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2RDidb9; see also Medici Senza Frontiere, Vietato passare – La sfida quotidiana delle persone in transito respinte e bloccate alla frontiera franco-italiana, August 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IiO1ZO; Stories in motion, A Collaborative Research Report of Rights Violations at the Franco-Italian Border, 1 June 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49IV8q8; MEDU, Rapporto sulla situazione umanitaria dei migranti in transito lungo la frontiera nord-ovest tra Italia e Francia, October 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3y1SzgQ.

[160] La7, ‘Ventimiglia, continuano i respingimenti francesi’, 26 June 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3q7LTeW.

[161] ASGI, ‘EU Court of Justice – It is illegitimate to renew internal border controls on the basis of reasons already given’, 23 May 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3R9JPiW.

[162] European Commission, Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control, available at: http://bit.ly/3DmVntw.

[163] ASGI, ‘The French Council of State ignores the principles on free Schengen circulation reaffirmed by the European Court of Justice’, 29 July 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3kOeFl2.

[164] Il Fatto Quotidiano, “Migranti, la Francia si piega al Consiglio di Stato: alla frontiera di Ventimiglia crollano i respingimenti. Attivisti: “Ma militarizzazione prosegue”, February 17, 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4aXEsMz.

[165] CJEU, Reintroduction of border controls at internal borders: the ‘Returns’ Directive applies to any third-country national who has entered the territory of a Member State without fulfilling the conditions of entry, stay or residence, 21 September 2023, Press release No. 145/23, available at: https://bit.ly/3PLsLQC. 

[166] MEDU, ‘Ancora critica la situazione dei migranti sulla rotta nord ovest delle Alpi’, 4 February 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/33u6GNZ.

[167] Medici per i diritti umani, ‘Si ritorna a morire alla frontiera nord ovest delle Alpi’, 4 February 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3KHwp9m. See also ASGI,Medea project, Confine italo-francese: una frontiera dove si continua a morire. Appello alle autorità, 11 February 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3KzYFdE.

[168] Altreconomia, ‘Le nuove prove sulla morte di Blessing Matthew al confine italo-francese’, 1 June 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3DiZQ06.

[169] Border Forensic, ‘The death of Blessing Matthews – a counter investigation on violence at the alpine frontier’, available at: http://bit.ly/3wzK25t.

[170] Border Forensic, ‘25.10.2022 – Death of Blessing Matthew: Facing impunity in France, we file an application before the European Court of Human Rights’, available at: http://bit.ly/3Df5a4L.

[171] Mediapart, ‘Mort de Blessing Matthew: la justice européenne ne permet pas de rouvrir le dossier’, 18 January 2023, available in French at: https://bit.ly/3UXccVy.

[172] Parole sul confine, ‘Il Campo Roja di Ventimiglia ha definitivamente chiuso’, 24 August 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3uFs7YE.

[173] See ASGI, Medea project, Ventimiglia, un territorio che resiste? October 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vYAVdI.

[174] Sanremo news, Ventimiglia: firmate stamattina dal Sindaco e subito operative le ordinanze anti degrado e alcol, 21 October 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3s3VXXv.

[175] Stranieri in Italia, Il progetto. A Ventimiglia un centro di transito per accogliere i migranti, 26 November 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vYoS02.

[176] Riviera24.it, Migranti a Ventimiglia, centro di transito: spunta di nuovo l’ipotesi Parco Roja, 4 April 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3JiY5Uw, and Ansa, ‘Migranti: a Ventimiglia sit-in bipartisan per riaprire centro’, 16 November 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3HDcERO.

[177] Il Fatto Quotidiano, ‘Nel limbo di Ventimiglia tra i migranti respinti dalla Francia e accampati al confine. Associazione: ‘Serve centro di transito’, 25 December 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/405tUGq.

[178] Euronews, ‘The simmering migrant crisis at the French-Italian border’, 29 December 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49ufwvE.

[179] RaiNews24-Tg Liguria, ‘Cpr a Ventimiglia, l’apertura del ministro Piantedosi’, 20 September 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uUrXBK.

[180] ANSA, ‘Piantedosi, un Cpr in Liguria ma non sarà a Ventimiglia’, 2 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3Tb8B4P.

[181] See Black book on Pre-Removal Detention Centre (CPR): when EU denies the human, 23 September 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vxhQAx.

[182] Il Fatto Quotidiano, ‘Moussa Balde, condannati a due anni gli autori del pestaggio. La famiglia del migrante: ‘Ora verità sulla sua morte in isolamento nel Cpr’, 10 January 2023 available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3HcKn2T.

[183] TGR Piemonte, ‘CPR. Per il suicidio di Moussa Balde la Procura chiede tre rinvii a giudizio’, 25 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/48rllZz.

[184] Roma today, ‘Baobab, il presidente rischia fino a 18 anni per favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina’, 19 April 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3kp6qZ9.

[185] Ansa, ‘Migranti: assolto il presidente di Baobab’, 3 May 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/39HDjy4.

[186] European Court of Human Rights, Applications No. 18911/17 and others, A.E. and others vs Italy, 16 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3SRhFKN.

[187] A more exhaustive illustration of the “border relief policy” and the subsequent forced transfers to Taranto Hotspot available in the report Hotspot leaks: dossier sulla frontiera di Taranto, prodotto dal progetto STAMP – Sostegno ai Transitanti, Accoglienza a Migranti e ai Profughi, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49GXxly and in Amnesty International, Hotspot Italia: come le politiche dell’Unione Europea portano a violazioni dei diritti di rifugiati e migranti, 3 November 2016, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49K4XEg.

[188] A more exhaustive illustration of the MOU between Italy and Sudan is available on ASGI, ‘Memorandum d’Intesa Italia-Sudan: un’analisi giuridica’, 30 October 2017, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3T9z42B.

[189] See Sant’Egidio webpage at: bit.ly/3RhD1Rl.

[190] MOI, available at bit.ly/3VflQRT.

[191] Civil Court of Rome, interim measure of 22 November 2023, procedure no. 52019/2023 available in Italian at bit.ly/3VEhTaR.

[192] Report to Senate of the Minister of Interior, Piantedosi, communicated to the Presidency on 29 November 2022, available at: bit.ly/3yV5brW, 12.