Access to the territory and push backs

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In 2025, according to MOI data, 66,296 people disembarked in Italy, a figure broadly in line with the previous year (66,617 in 2024, representing a marginal decrease of approximately 0.5%) and still well below the 2023 level (157,651).

Libya was by far the main departure point for migrants and refugees reaching Italy by sea in 2025. Approximately 58,000 people — around 87% of all sea arrivals — departed from Libyan shores, an increase of almost 40% compared with 2024 (approximately 42,000). Over the same period, departures from Tunisia fell sharply (by about 75%), while those from Türkiye decreased by approx. 65%. The Algeria–Sardinia route recorded an increase of approx. 31% but remained marginal in absolute terms, accounting for fewer than 2,000 arrivals.^[1]

Lampedusa remained the main port of disembarkation, receiving more than 49,500 people arrivals (approximately 75% of the total), followed by mainland Sicily (9%) and Calabria (4%).^[2]

As regards the land route, according to UNHCR estimates around 4,600 people had been detected entering Italy irregularly in the first nine months of 2025, primarily across the Italian border with Slovenia. Those arriving by land via south-eastern Europe mainly originated from Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Morocco and Egypt, as part of the broader Western Balkan route.^[3]

Arrivals by sea

In 2025, 66,296 persons disembarked in Italy, similar to 2024 (66,617) and still markedly lower than 2023 (157,651) and 2022 (105,131). Despite the number of sea arrivals remaining far below the 2023 peak, a total of 126,635 asylum applicants were registered in 2025,^[4] a decrease compared to the 158,605 recorded in 2024. The highest number of monthly sea arrivals was recorded in September, when 8,315 persons reached the Italian coasts.^[5] 12,142 unaccompanied minors (Minori Stranieri Non Accompagnati – MSNA) disembarked in 2025, up from 8,752 in 2024 but still below the 18,820 recorded in 2023.^[6]

As in 2024, the main nationality of people disembarked was Bangladesh (20,164 in total, approximately 30% of all sea arrivals). The other most represented nationalities were Egypt (9,091), Eritrea (7,579), Pakistan (4,383) and Sudan (4,183). The marked increase in Eritrean and Sudanese share of arrivals — rising respectively from 3% to 12% and from 3% to 6% of the total compared to 2024 — is notable, alongside a sharp fall in the share of Tunisian nationals (from 12% to 3%). The two main nationalities, Bangladesh and Egypt, are both included in the Italian list of safe countries of origin, whereas Eritrea, Pakistan and Sudan are not.^[7]

Italian authorities classify arrivals of migrants in a way that lacks transparency. As explained by Altreconomia,^[8] the Italian authorities mostly consider rescue operations as “law enforcement” interceptions, disembarking most of the rescued people on the island of Lampedusa to increase the perception of a chronic emergency.

Furthermore, the approval of Decree Law 1/2023, converted into Law 15/2023, had a major impact on the effectiveness of SAR operations conducted by NGOs, which has been further hindered. In 2023, civil society vessels accounted for only a small share of rescues: as of July 2023, just 4.2% of rescue operations had been carried out by NGOs since January, against 68% conducted by public authorities, while over the whole year only 8,904 people — less than 6% of the total — had been rescued by SAR GOs.^[9] NGOs vessels already played a limited, albeit slightly less limited, role in previous years: according to ISPI estimates, they had also rescued a minority of people arriving by sea in previous years (around 10% in 2022 and 11.5% in 2021).^[10] This confirms how misguided the theories attributing a “pull factor” role to NGO vessels are. Comparable official figures are not available for 2024 and 2025. Since the summer of 2024, the Ministry of the Interior has further reduced the transparency of its data, declining, including in response to FOIA requests, to disclose the classification of disembarkation events and the specific places of arrival.^[11] Independent monitoring indicates, however, that the practice of classifying rescues as “law enforcement” rather than search and rescue operations persists: according to data obtained by the NGO Open Arms, around 58% of sea rescues were still recorded as police operations in 2025.

State rescue operations and shipwreck incidents

State-coordinated search and rescue (SAR) in the Central Mediterranean has progressively weakened over the past decade. Following the replacement of the Sophia Operation by Operation IRINI on 31 March 2020, the operational focus shifted to the eastern part of the Libyan SAR region and the high seas between Greece and Egypt, sharply reducing the likelihood of encountering people in distress and, with it, the mission’s rescue component.^[12] Over the same period, a series of shipwrecks and judicial proceedings exposed a recurring pattern of delayed or omitted State intervention, and of rescue events being classified as law enforcement operations. A paradigmatic example is the shipwreck of 11 October 2013, in which 268 people, many of them children, died in the Maltese SAR zone: after years of proceedings, on 15 December 2022 the Court of Rome dismissed the case as statute-barred while nonetheless recognising the criminal responsibilities of the indicted officers. The UN Human Rights Committee had already condemned Italy and Malta for violations of the ICCPR.^[13] For a detailed account of these earlier events, see the previous updates of this report.^[14]

On 26 February 2023, a shipwreck occurred near Steccato di Cutro, on the Calabrian coast.^[15] A boat that had departed from Izmir, Türkiye, broke up a short distance from the shore as it attempted to land. The official death toll was 94, including 35 minors, with around 15 people missing and 80 survivors.^[16] The night before the tragedy, an aerial Frontex asset had alerted the Italian authorities to a boat that appeared to be heavily loaded and without visible life vests. The event was nonetheless handled by the Guardia di Finanza and classified as a law enforcement operation rather than a search and rescue one, in line with a practice established in 2019; the patrol boats that put to sea were unable to reach the vessel because of the deteriorating sea conditions, and the operation was reclassified as SAR only when it was already too late.^[17]

On 9 March, ASGI and other 41 associations submitted a collective complaint/report to the Public Prosecutor Office, asking them to open an extensive investigation aimed at ascertaining the public responsibilities of the authorities involved in the management of the operation.^[18] A report prepared by the Fundamental Rights Office of Frontex, which monitors the activities of the European Border Agency,^[19] points out that “the Italian authorities present in the Frontex monitoring room in Warsaw (an official from the coast guard and one from the Guardia di Finanza) considered as ‘not of particular interest’ the report in which the boat on which the migrants were travelling was spotted (hours before the shipwreck).” This contradicts the government stance that they did not receive any alerts from Frontex.^[20] At the end of 2024, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Crotone requested the committal for trial of six military personnel (four from the Guardia di Finanza and two from the Coast Guard) for alleged “inertia” and “omissions” on the night between 25 and 26 February 2023.^[21] The preliminary hearing began on 5 March 2025 and, on 21 July 2025, the judge for the preliminary hearing of Crotone committed all six defendants for trial on charges of negligent shipwreck and multiple negligent manslaughter. The Ministries of the Interior and of Infrastructure were summoned as parties bearing civil liability, while survivors, victims’ relatives and several SAR NGOs were admitted as civil parties. The trial was scheduled to open before the Court of Crotone on 14 January 2026.^[22]

As regards the prosecution of the persons accused of steering the vessel, five defendants were charged by the Crotone Prosecutor’s Office with aiding and abetting illegal immigration, negligent shipwreck and death as a consequence of another offence. Two of them were tried under the abbreviated procedure (rito abbreviato): the first was sentenced at first instance on 7 February 2024 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a EUR 3 million fine,^[23] a decision confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Catanzaro on 10 January 2025 and made final by the Court of Cassation on 11 June 2025; the second, considered the helmsman, was likewise sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, confirmed on appeal on 19 March 2025, with an appeal before the Court of Cassation pending as of mid-2026. The remaining three defendants were tried under the ordinary procedure before the Court of Crotone and sentenced at first instance in December 2024 to terms ranging from 11 to 16 years’ imprisonment; their appeal before the Court of Appeal of Catanzaro is still pending, with the Prosecutor General’s submissions expected in July 2026. The Italian Government and the Calabria Region joined the proceedings as civil parties.^[24]

ASGI and other CSOs also supported survivors and family members of the missing and deceased migrants in the identification of victims and the right to truth, reporting on the procedural errors in the management of the situation by public authorities and on the unlawful and inhumane treatment to which survivors were subjected both in term of reception conditions and access to legal information.^[25]

Obstacles to NGO search and rescue activities

The initial “closure of ports” policy

The so-called “closed ports” policy began with Decree 53/2019 (known as the “Security Decree bis” or “Decreto Sicurezza bis”), which was introduced during Matteo Salvini’s tenure as Minister of the Interior. This decree formalized the government’s approach to restricting access to Italian ports for vessels conducting search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly those operated by NGOs. Law Decree 130/2020, as amended by Law 173/2020, repealed the provisions introduced by Decree 53/2019, introducing new regulations on ministerial powers to limit the transit or docking of SAR vessels. However, this regulatory framework has been significantly modified by Law Decree 1/2023 (converted into Law 15/2023), which established a new “Code of Conduct” for NGOs engaged in SAR activities, imposing more stringent obligations and new sanctions. The competencies of the Minister of the Interior and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, which overlap in some cases, have been further specified compared to the previous legislation. For a more detailed and accurate description of the previous legal framework, please refer to earlier versions of the AIDA country report on Italy.^[26]

Search and seizures operations of NGO rescue boats

Over the period 2020–2022, Italian authorities repeatedly resorted to the criminal seizure of NGO vessels and to port State control detentions as a means of obstructing civil-society search and rescue. Several vessels, including the Sea Watch 4 (detained in Palermo in September 2020 after rescuing 354 people), the Geo Barents, the Ocean Viking (detained in Trapani in January 2022) and the Mar Jonio, were held on technical or administrative grounds following complex rescue operations. For a detailed account of these cases, see the previous versions of this report.^[27]

An important clarification came from the Court of Justice of the European Union which, ruling on the Sea Watch 4 detention on 1 April 2022 (Case C-14/21), held that vessels registered as pleasure craft but systematically engaged in SAR fall within the scope of Directive 2009/16/EC on port State control. At the same time, the Court made clear that any detention or restriction adopted by the port State must be suitable, necessary and proportionate, and that such authorities cannot require certificates other than those issued by the flag State.^[28]

The most emblematic criminal case concerned the Iuventa vessel, operated by the German NGO Jugend Rettet: seized in August 2017 and at the centre of charges of aiding and abetting illegal immigration brought in 2021 against crew members and organisations, including Save the Children and Médecins Sans Frontières. On 19 April 2024, the Court of Trapani dismissed all charges on the ground that no offence had been committed and lifted the seizure of the vessel. The proceedings, the longest and most extensive ever brought against SAR NGOs in Italy, are widely regarded as emblematic of the criminalisation of civil-society rescue.^[29]

Reinstatement of the “closed ports” policy and 2023 Law on NGOs SAR activities

By the end of 2022, the newly appointed government reinstated the “closed ports” policy. On 24 October 2022, the Minister of the Interior, Matteo Piantedosi, issued a directive^[30] denying access to Italian ports to the Ocean Viking and Humanity 1 and instructing them to seek a place of safety from their flag States; on 4 November 2022, a further decree allowed only migrants in critical health conditions to disembark from the Geo Barents and Humanity 1.^[31] This selective approach was declared unlawful by the Civil Court of Catania on 6 February 2023,^[32] which affirmed that all rescued persons had the right to reach safety ashore and to seek asylum in Italy, and rejected the government’s characterisation of some of them as “residual cargo”. For a fuller account of these events, see the previous versions of this report.

With the same objective, preventing the disembarkation of rescued migrants by hindering NGO search and rescue, the government adopted Decree Law 1/2023, converted into Law 15/2023 on 24 February 2023.^[33] The law introduced a set of rules of conduct for vessels carrying out SAR activities and their captains, backed by administrative sanctions, and allowed the Government to limit or deny the transit or stay of NGO ships in its territorial waters where any of the following conditions is not met:

1. the vessel systematically carrying out search and rescue activities has the authorisations issued by the authorities of the flag state and possesses the technical-nautical eligibility requirements for safe navigation;
2. timely information is immediately provided to the rescued persons about the possibility of seeking international protection;
3. the assignment of the port of disembarkation is requested in the immediacy of the event; and
4. the port of disembarkation is reached without delay;
5. complete and detailed information on the rescue operation is provided to the maritime or police authorities;
6. the search and rescue strategy did not contribute to dangerous situations on board or prevent the port of landing from being reached in a timely manner.

In practice, most of these conditions are already fulfilled by NGO vessels, which routinely refer to the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre and immediately inform the maritime and police authorities. Several aspects of the framework nonetheless remain problematic. As regards condition (a), the decree disregards the CJEU ruling in Joined Cases C-14/21 and C-15/21, under which the port State cannot require certifications or requirements other than those issued by the flag State.^[34] More broadly, the evident aim of the decree is to limit the possibility for humanitarian vessels to dock and thereby to prevent Italy from becoming the State responsible for examining international protection applications under Regulation 604/2013: conditions (d) and (f), by requiring vessels to reach the place of safety without delay and to avoid conduct contributing to dangerous situations on board, effectively imply a duty not to rescue further persons in distress and a ban on trans-shipment, which appears unlawful under customary international law, Article 98 of the SOLAS Convention and Articles 1113 and 1158 of the Italian Navigation Code. Condition (b), requiring information on international protection to be provided while still on board, cannot lawfully be imposed on the captain of a foreign-flagged vessel, whose powers and duties are governed by the law of the flag State, and conflicts with the allocation of competence for asylum applications under Directive 2013/32 and Legislative Decree 25/2008, as well as with the principle, affirmed in Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, that applications require an individual examination by qualified authorities.

Incidents related to Law 15/2023

The impact of Law 15/2023 became evident from the first months of 2023, particularly through the administrative detention of NGO vessels engaged in search and rescue. By the end of 2025, some 36 detention measures had been imposed since the decree had entered into force, affecting around ten SAR vessels and keeping them ashore for more than 800 days in total, typically for having carried out multiple rescues or for not complying with instructions attributed to the so-called Libyan coastguard. For the numerous individual cases that arose in 2023 and 2024, see the 2023 and 2024 Updates of the AIDA country report on Italy.^[35] In a significant number of cases (around twelve), the courts suspended or annulled these measures.

A decisive development came from the Constitutional Court in judgment No. 101 of 8 July 2025. Ruling on questions referred by the Court of Brindisi in October 2024, which had arisen from SOS Méditerranée’s challenge to the administrative detention of the Ocean Viking (9 February 2024), the Court held that the detention regime is not in itself unreasonable or disproportionate, but adopted a constitutionally-oriented interpretation of the decree. It affirmed that an order whose execution would breach the overriding duty to save human life at sea is not binding and that its non-observance cannot be sanctioned, and that the only instructions binding on the captains of humanitarian vessels are those “legally given” and consistent with the Hamburg Convention. This excludes instructions from the Libyan authorities that would expose rescued persons to return to an unsafe place. The Court also acknowledged the punitive nature and “markedly dissuasive” character of the regime.^[36]

The most significant events related to this matter of 2025 confirmed the persistence of this practice.

• As regards the Humanity 1 (SOS Humanity), in June 2025 the Court of Appeal of Catanzaro upheld the 2024 ruling of the Civil Court of Crotone that the vessel’s detention had been unlawful, leading the NGO to announce it would claim compensation against the Italian Government. In December 2025 the vessel was seized again for having refused to communicate with the Libyan coordination centre.^[37]
• The Mediterranea (Mediterranea Saving Humans) was detained twice: in August 2025 (a 60-day detention and a EUR 10,000 fine, after docking in Trapani rather than the assigned port of Genoa) and again in November 2025, after rescuing 92 people, including 31 unaccompanied minors, and disembarking them at Porto Empedocle by order of the Palermo juvenile prosecutor instead of proceeding to the assigned port of Livorno. Both measures were suspended or annulled by the courts (the Court of Trapani in October and the Court of Agrigento on 12 December 2025).^[38]
• In September 2025, the Ocean Viking (SOS Méditerranée) and the Sea-Watch 5 (Sea-Watch) were fired upon by the Libyan coastguard during rescue operations.^[39]

These developments confirm a systematic recourse to administrative detention as a means of obstructing civil-society rescue, despite this practice being repeatedly found unlawful by the courts and even though, according to press estimates, NGO vessels accounted for only around 11% of the people who disembarked in Ital in 2025.^[40]

Relations with third countries

Tunisia

Regarding the external sea borders with Tunisia, on 9 December 2020 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed a technical agreement with the UN Office for Services and Projects (UNOPS) to support the North African country in border control activities and in fighting migrant trafficking.^[41]  With at least 1,922 Tunisians returned in 2020 and 1,872 in 2021, Tunisia was the main destination for forced returnees from Italy (73.5% of the total).^[42] This pattern has persisted: according to ActionAid’s monitoring (data updated to 31 December 2024), Tunisian nationals accounted for over 63% of all returns carried out from Italian pre-removal detention centres (CPR) between 2014 and 2024, and for more than 70% in the last six years, even though they represented less than 11% of sea arrivals in 2023. The Italian return system, largely concentrated in the Sicilian CPRs (from which 54% of national returns are executed, 85% of them concerning Tunisians), rests essentially on the bilateral readmission agreement with Tunisia and on national charter flights.^[43]

In 2022, Tunisia intercepted over 29,000 migrants and recorded 544 deaths at sea. In the same period, and although Tunisia has no formally declared SAR zone, Italy channelled substantial funds to strengthen the Tunisian coastguard and migration management: investigations by IRPIMedia and ActionAid (The Big Wall) documented a credit line of some EUR 27 million opened through the “Fondo di premialità” for the refurbishment of vessels and the supply of land equipment, including pick-ups and vehicles for transporting detainees, while cumulative Italian funding to Tunisia between 2011 and 2022 exceeded EUR 47 million.^[44]

On 16 July 2023, the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Tunisia.^[45] Migration management is one of the five pillars of the agreement: the EU pledges to provide an additional EUR 105 million to Tunisia to strengthen border management, search and rescue operations at sea, and “anti-trafficking” measures to reduce the number of arrivals from the country.^[46] Beyond the concerns later expressed by the European Parliament about the agreement’s effectiveness and its human rights safeguards,^[47] subsequent reporting has shown that a substantial share of these resources financed equipment for the Tunisian coastguard, including the refurbishment of 17 patrol boats and the delivery of 8 new ones, alongside broader border-management programmes, such as the EUR 65 million Border Management Programme for the Maghreb (2018–2024), implemented by the Italian Ministry of the Interior together with ICMPD. Civil society investigations have repeatedly underlined the opacity of these funding channels and the significant barriers to effective parliamentary and public scrutiny.^[48] Despite the official reasons for the deal including “countering the root causes of migration”, the deal mainly risks resulting in preventing those seeking protection from accessing asylum.^[49]

Euractiv recently provided an updated overview on the allocation of funds for migration management in Tunisia.^[50]    The EU began disbursing funds shortly after the signing of the MoU. A first tranche, released in September 2023, amounted to EUR 127 million, of which EUR 42 million was earmarked for the migration component. In 2024, the European Commission announced a further operational assistance package of approximately EUR 67 million for migration management. In practice, much of this money went to bolstering the Tunisian coastguard via new and refitted vessels (the memorandum envisaged 17 refurbished and 8 new patrol boats), thermal cameras and other operational assistance. A smaller share was channelled through UN agencies to support the protection and return of migrants. The EU Ombudsman, several MEPs and independent analysts have repeatedly criticised the persistent lack of transparency surrounding the actual use of these funds. They have questioned the continuation of EU financial support and cooperation despite well-documented human rights violations.^[51]

Since President Kais Saied’s February 2023 remarks against sub-Saharan migrants, the consequences of Tunisia’s racist policies and of the EU particularly Italy’s outsourcing strategies have been repeatedly documented and denounced.^[52] The departure-prevention system has been combined with a process of expelling sub-Saharan people, either led by the Tunisian authorities or with their tacit consent, towards Libya and Algeria. According to UNSMIL, 8,664 migrants expelled from Tunisia were intercepted at the Libyan border between the summer of 2023 and March 2024 alone. On 5 June 2024, following the eviction on 3 May of around 500 migrants camped in front of the UNHCR and IOM offices in Tunis, a group of asylum seekers was transferred and abandoned by the police forces near the border with Algeria. Some people from the group filed an urgent appeal with the United Nations Human Rights Committee with the support of ASGI lawyers.^[53] This pattern continued in 2025. The 2025 Desert Dumps investigation documented a systematic, racially-motivated pattern whereby groups of Black migrants are rounded up in coastal cities such as Sfax and abandoned in remote desert areas near the Libyan and Algerian borders, often relying on vehicles and equipment supplied by European States.^[54] Yet the documented violations have not prompted the EU to suspend cooperation, even as the Tunisian authorities stepped up their repression against civil society, as illustrated by the imprisonment, in April 2025, of dozens of political opponents, lawyers and human-rights defenders.^[55]

As reported by the “Desert Dumps” investigation,^[56] the interaction between these two approaches and the EU funding to the Tunisian authorities has created a system that severely violates migrants’ fundamental rights. They become trapped in trafficking networks operating through extreme violence and are expelled to countries where they face racist practices, with a real risk of being abandoned in the desert or handed over to human smugglers. Similar conclusions were reached in the “State Trafficking” report published in January 2025, a research project promoted by an anonymous collective of researchers with the support of Border Forensic, ASGI and On Borders, which draws on testimonies from sub-Saharan migrants abandoned in the desert or transferred to Libyan militias.^[57] Concerns about the human rights consequences of Tunisian migration policies, and, by extension, the role of European support for those policies, were further echoed by several UN Special Rapporteurs in a joint press release issued on 14 October 2024.^[58]

Regarding Italian funding to the Tunisian Coast Guard within the framework provided by the memorandum, in March 2024, several Italian associations, including ASGI, filed an appeal before the Administrative Court of Rome, asking the judge to assess the legitimacy of the acts by which the Ministry of the Interior ordered the transfer of new patrol boats to Tunisia. In May, the appeal was first rejected by the administrative court of Rome. A further appeal was made before the Council of State. After an initial precautionary decision through which the Council of State had suspended the delivery of some patrol boats, in July, the Council of State rejected the precautionary request with which civil society organizations asked for the suspension of the transfer of the patrol boats to the Tunisian National Guard, 2024.^[59] On 16 January 2025, the appeal was definitively rejected.^[60]

Libya

Memorandum of Understanding and situation in Libya

On 2 February 2023, the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya, originally signed by Prime Minister Gentiloni and his Libyan counterpart Fayez al-Serraj on 2 February 2017 to reduce irregular migration flows, was renewed for the second time, after a first renewal in February 2020.^[61] The agreement provides for funding, equipment and technical support to the Libyan authorities, primarily the coastguard. It has never been counter-balanced by an effective evacuation mechanism from Libya, through UNHCR-managed resettlement or humanitarian corridors.^[62] The only functioning channel to exit Libya remains IOM-coordinated voluntary returns, offered to highly vulnerable individuals unable to make a genuinely free choice,^[63] while the Libyan system continues to rest on the systematic, indefinite detention of foreigners under conditions of torture and grave rights violations (see chapter on Detention conditions). For a fuller account, see the previous versions of this report.^[64]

The Memorandum is tacitly renewed every three years unless one party gives written notice at least three months before expiry. Italy’s window to halt the renewal expired on 2 November 2025. Mid-October 2025, the Chamber of Deputies rejected opposition motions calling on the government not to proceed and approved a majority motion to continue preventing departures from Libya. The agreement has thus been tacitly renewed until 2029, despite the “Stop Memorandum Italia-Libia” campaign promoted by Refugees in Libya together with ASGI, Amnesty International, MEDU, Save the Children and Sea-Watch.^[65]

The government’s approach was epitomised by the Almasri case. Njeem Osama Almasri Habish, head of Tripoli’s judicial police, linked to the Mitiga detention centre, was arrested in Turin on 19 January 2025 under an ICC warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, torture and sexual violence. Two days later, after the Rome Court of Appeal declined to validate his detention on procedural grounds. The Minister of the Interior ordered his expulsion and he was flown back to Tripoli on a State aircraft, where he was welcomed as a hero. The case triggered domestic proceedings before the Tribunal of Ministers against several members of the government (proceedings against the Prime Minister were later dismissed, while proceedings concerning other ministers continued). At international level, on 17 October 2025 the ICC found that Italy had breached its cooperation obligations under the Rome Statute, and on 26 January 2026 referred Italy to the Assembly of States Parties for non-cooperation.^[66]

The dramatic effects of Libya’s system have been consistently documented by IOM, UNHCR and UN human-rights bodies.^[67] According to IOM, interceptions and forced returns to Libya have risen sharply over the years, from around 9,200 in 2019 to over 27,000 in 2025, with more than 20,000 people returned to Libyan detention centres in 2025 alone.^[68] A series of UN reports between 2022 and 2024 (the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya — which found that crimes against humanity had been committed — and the June 2024 OHCHR report) documented systematic torture, arbitrary detention, enslavement and sexual violence; for a detailed account of these findings, see the previous versions of this report.^[69] The most recent United Nations reporting confirmed the gravity of the situation. A joint UNSMIL–OHCHR report covering January 2024 to December 2025 described a systematic exploitation model that has become “business as usual”, documenting arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, slavery and trafficking, dangerous interceptions at sea, including cases in which Libyan actors fired at or near vessels in distress, and repeated collective expulsions. The report urged the international community, including the EU, to establish a moratorium on interceptions and returns to Libya and to apply strict human-rights due diligence to all cooperation with Libyan entities.^[70]

Italian courts have reached converging conclusions: the Criminal Court of Trapani found the bilateral agreement incompatible with the Italian Constitution and international law,^[71] and on 18 February 2024 the Court of Cassation ruled that facilitating interceptions by the Libyan coastguard was unlawful and might amount to collective refoulement, recognising that Libya is not a safe place of return.^[72] The Memorandum has been heavily criticised by, among others, ASGI^[73] and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.^[74] The discovery of several mass graves in 2024–2025 (including at least 65 bodies in south-western Libya and further graves reported in Jakharrah and the Alkufra desert in February 2025) further confirmed the gravity of the human rights situation in Libya.^[75]

In a related case followed by ASGI along with JL Project, Alarm Phone and Sea-Watch, on 29 November 2024 the Civil Court of Rome ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a visa to a Sudanese citizen who, after being rescued in 2021, had been forcibly transferred onto a Libyan patrol boat and returned to Libya. The Court found the Italian authorities responsible of having carried out a pushback in international waters through foreign vessels, on the basis of the constant support (or de facto coordination) provided by MRCC Rome. The man subsequently obtained the visa, reached Italy and lodged an asylum application^[76].

Italian funding to Libya

Since 2017, Italy has financed cooperation with Libya mainly through the SIBMILL programme (Integrated Border Management System in Libya), linked to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior. Initially budgeted at EUR 44.5 million, since exceeded (of which EUR 12 million to IOM), the programme funded support to the so-called Libyan coastguard, naval units and the rehabilitation of patrol boats, technical equipment and training, and the presence of an Italian naval vessel in Tripoli, as well as the mobile MRCC handed over to the Libyan authorities in December 2021 to monitor the SAR zone Italy helped establish in 2017–2018.^[77] More recent monitoring by SOS Méditerranée and IRPIMedia found that some EUR 27.1 million, i.e. around 44% of the SIBMILL budget, remains untraceable, with FOIA requests repeatedly denied. The funded assets included the patrol boat that fired on the Ocean Viking during a rescue in August 2025.^[78]

Italy has also funded projects directly through IOM: under a 2 July 2021 agreement, the MAECI Directorate-General for Italians Abroad and Migration Policies (DGIT) committed an initial EUR 4 million to the intervention “Multi-sectoral support for mobile vulnerable populations and communities in Libya”, focused on protection, support to the Libyan authorities in detention centres and SAR operations and, increasingly, on Assisted Voluntary Return. By 6 June 2023, EUR 16 million had been allocated and the programme had reached its third phase.^[79] In December 2024, following a FOIA request by ASGI, data were released on the Assisted Voluntary Return projects funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by IOM between 2017 and 2025. ASGI argues that these “voluntary returns” from Libya breach the principle of non-refoulement and protection obligations towards minors and survivors of trafficking, torture and gender-based violence, since genuine voluntary return is impossible from arbitrary detention facilities where individuals suffer abuse.^[80]

Interception at sea, refoulement and following legal actions

Italy’s system of indirect pushbacks to Libya was at the centre of the case S.S. and Others v. Italy, concerning the incident of 6 November 2017 in which the Libyan coastguard, using a patrol boat donated by Italy and following coordination by the Rome MRCC, intercepted a sinking dinghy and interfered with the rescue carried out by NGO vessel Sea-Watch 3. Around 20 people died and dozens were pulled back to Libya, where some were detained and tortured. On 12 June 2025, after seven years of proceedings, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously declared the application inadmissible, finding that Italy had not exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR.^[81] In the Court’s view, neither the financial and technical support provided to Libya nor the initiation of the rescue by the Rome MRCC amounted to effective control over the area or the persons concerned. While acknowledging that Libya is not a safe place and that the situation remained governed by other rules of international law on rescue at sea, refugee protection and State responsibility, the Court declined to rule on the merits, a decision widely criticised as normalising “refoulement by proxy” and as diverging from the approach of the UN Human Rights Committee.^[82]

According to IOM data, interceptions and forced returns to Libya have continued to rise: from around 17,000 in 2023^[83] to 21,762 in 2024 and to over 22,500 in 2025, the highest figure to date. In 2025, 58,408 people who had departed from Libya reached Italy (88% of all sea arrivals), while the Central Mediterranean route remained the world’s deadliest migratory path, with at least 1,330 people dead or missing by the end of the year.^[84]

“Privatised pushbacks”

The practice of requiring commercial ships to return rescued people to unsafe locations in Libya has been the subject of several legal proceedings. A complaint filed by the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) with the UN Human Rights Committee in December 2019 was declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.^[85] In the Italian courts, the practice has repeatedly been found unlawful. In the Asso 28 case, the captain of a commercial vessel who had returned migrants to Libya in 2018 was convicted.^[86] In the Asso 29 case, on 26 June 2024 the Civil Court of Rome ordered the Ministries of Defence, Transport and the Presidency of the Council, together with the captain and the shipowner, to pay damages to five Eritrean plaintiffs returned to Libya in 2018, holding that Italy should have brought them to safety in Italy regardless of Libyan instructions.^[87] Related proceedings concern the Vos Triton pullbacks of 2021, on which new evidence was submitted to the Rome Public Prosecutor’s Office in early 2024.^[88] For a more detailed account of these cases, see the previous versions of this report.^[89]

Pushbacks at Adriatic ports

As monitored by ASGI, No Name Kitchen, Ambasciata dei Diritti di Ancona and Associazione SOS Diritti, refoulements continue to be carried out from Italy to Greece at Adriatic maritime borders, based on the bilateral agreement signed by the Italian and Greek government in 1999, which became operational in 2001, even though it was never ratified by the Italian Parliament.^[90] In 2022, readmissions and refoulements continued to be recorded, also towards Albania.^[91] These practices persisted in the following years, as highlighted in a ruling by the Court of Rome in July 2023 (see below) and, on the basis of official data released in 2026, continued to be recorded at the Adriatic ports throughout 2025.

The readmission agreement with Greece excludes the informal transfer between the two countries of illegally staying third-country nationals; it permits a readmission following a formal procedure and doesn’t apply to asylum seekers.^[92]

In Italy, access to the asylum procedure and to information is very limited. Transfers or re-admissions are immediately executed to send foreign nationals back to Greece. On 18 January 2023, Lighthouse Reports, in collaboration with SRF, ARD Monitor, Al Jazeera, Domani and Solomon, published an online investigation on the illegal readmissions of asylum seekers to Greece that take place at the Adriatic seaports, and the illegal detention undergone by third country nationals in unofficial places of detention on-board ships and ferries.^[93] Despite the existence of a bilateral agreement between Italy and Greece, dated 1999, this unofficial procedure is applied also to asylum seekers and minors.

In cases where the person is able contact the network of NGOs operating at Adriatic ports, they generally manage to apply for asylum. to the others are pushed back from the port of departure. According to the testimonies collected by the Network, if the ferry leaves immediately, the person is kept on board. Otherwise, they are held in a police station inside the port and then taken back to the ferry.

The Adriatic Ports Network has repeatedly submitted Rule 9 communications to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, most recently requesting the continuation of the supervision of the Sharifi ruling and denouncing, contrary to the Government’s Action Report of 15 December 2021 and its request for closure, the persistence of unlawful practices, including readmissions carried out without individual assessment or legal assistance, detention onboard ferries and episodes of mistreatment. Regarding individual cases documented in 2021 and 2022, see the previous versions of this report.^[94]

Detailed figures obtained through FOIA requests for 2022, documenting over 1,900 return orders and dozens of informal readmissions to Greece from the Adriatic ports, are reported in the previous versions of this report.^[95]

On 7 July 2023, the same practices reported by Lighthouse Reports (e.g, pushbacks at the Adriatic ports, obligation to undress, detention on ferries) were the subject of an important decision adopted by the Court of Rome.^[96] The ruling reaffirmed the illegitimacy of the use of informal readmissions as they take place at the Adriatic ports, because they are adopted without the issuance of an individual measure, undermine the right to access the asylum as people are not appropriately informed, and because they are adopted without a previous individual assessment of the concrete case. This case is particularly significant because the applicant was an unaccompanied foreign minor, and an applicant for international protection in Greece, in possession of documentation certifying both of these facts. Nevertheless, the Italian authorities informally readmitted the applicant, forcing him to strip naked and be detained in a ferry compartment for many hours before being returned to the Greek authorities.^[97] The decision, in addition to accounting for all the violations indicated, requires the Italian government to take the necessary steps to ensure the applicant’s access to Italian territory, suggesting the issuance of a humanitarian visa under Article 25 of EC Regulation 810/2009 (Visa Regulation).

More recent official data confirm that the practice has continued. Following FOIA requests, in May 2026 the Ministry of the Interior released monthly figures on refusals of entry and active readmissions at the Adriatic ports. Between 30 April and 31 December 2025, the Bari Maritime Border Police recorded 637 refusals of entry under Article 10 of Legislative Decree 286/1998 and 14 active readmissions to Greece under the 1999 bilateral agreement (all of them granted), while the Brindisi Maritime Border Police recorded 21 refusals and one readmission. The practice continued in 2026 (303 refusals in Bari and 16 in Brindisi in the first four months of the year). These figures, however, reflect only formal measures and do not capture the informal readmissions denounced by the monitoring network; moreover, the Ministry disclosed only aggregate monthly totals, omitting the breakdown by nationality, gender, age and grounds that had been expressly requested, confirming the persistent opacity surrounding these operations.^[98]

These data remain relevant to the supervision of the execution of the ECtHR’s judgment in Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, which is still pending before the Committee of Ministers under the enhanced procedure. The Committee has repeatedly asked Italy to demonstrate that migrants intercepted in the Adriatic ports are systematically provided with information on their rights and given access to reception services and to the asylum procedure, and to confirm that it has ceased transferring asylum seekers to Greece. Italy relies, in this respect, on the information and orientation services established at border crossings under Article 11(6) of Legislative Decree 286/1998 and provided through ad hoc cooperation agreements with civil-society organisations. Yet the scope of these services remains minimal: at the port of Bari, the service was entrusted to a single social cooperative for the two-year period 2024–2026 for only 16 hours per week (of which 4 of cultural mediation) and a total annual value of around EUR 19,500, a provision manifestly inadequate to guarantee effective access to information and to the asylum procedure in light of the several hundred refusals recorded at that port in 2025 alone.^[99]

The Protocol between Italy and Albania

On 6 November 2023, the “Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Italy and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on Strengthening Cooperation in Migration Matters”^[100] was signed in Rome, for an intial validity period of five years. The official purpose is to strengthen bilateral cooperation between the states on the management of migratory flows from third countries, through the construction of two centres on Albanian territory under Italian jurisdiction, to which “migrants” who have had been admitted into to border or return procedures will be assigned. The Protocol includes two Annexes, notably one detailing the expenses to be borne by the Italian government for the construction of the centres. The Albanian authorities offered up two areas within their territory to construct two detention centres during the spring of 2024. The Protocol envisages that the centres should have the capacity to accommodate a maximum of 3,000 individuals at the same time. One centre has been built near the port of Shengjin, where disembarkation, identification, border procedures, and elements related to asylum procedure will take place; the second centre has been built in Gjader, where people deemed ineligible for asylum will be accommodated. The two centres are managed by the Italian authorities “in accordance with the relevant Italian and European legislation”. They are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Italian authorities and were originally thought to have the sole purpose of carrying out border, asylum and return procedures in accordance with Italian and EU law. The Italian authorities are responsible for transfers to and from these centres, as well as for “maintaining security and order” within them. The Albanian authorities are instead responsible for ensuring “security and public order” at the external perimeter and during transfers to and from the detention centres. The Protocol assigns responsibility for ensuring the detention and “unauthorised exit” of individuals into Albanian territory (both during and after the completion of the procedures, and regardless of the outcome) to the Italian authorities.

The European Commission response to the Protocol has been ambiguous. When asked about the legality of the Protocol, the Commission first told reporters that it had asked Italian authorities for more detailed information regarding the exact scope and expected impacts of the arrangement, and that ‘this must be done without prejudice to the asylum acquis’.^[101] In any case, the protocol raises many questions about its compatibility with European Union law^[102] and, more broadly, with international human rights law.^[103]

After an initial phase of apparent political unwillingness on the part of the government for parliamentary passage to approve the law ratifying the Protocol,^[104] on 5 December 2023, the Council of Ministers approved the draft law ratifying the Protocol.^[105] The text introduces a clause equating the Albanian areas provided for in the Protocol to the border or transit zones referred to in Legislative Decree No. 25 of January 28, 2008, in which expedited border procedures are carried out. These areas are equated with the hotspots and detention centres for repatriation provided for in the Immigration Consolidated Act (on the functioning of the accelerated border procedure applied in these areas, and on its extension to all accelerated-procedure cases by Law 75 of 23 May 2025, see the section “Border procedure” of this report). On 13 December, the Albanian Constitutional Court was called to rule on the appeal filed on 6 December by 30 Members of Parliament, belonging to opposition parties, concerning the constitutionality of the Italy-Albania bilateral protocol. The Albanian legal system, in addition to the subsequent type of constitutionality review, also requires the Court a minor form of prior review of the compatibility of international agreements with the Constitution, prior to their ratification. On 29 January 2024, the Albanese Constitutional Court ruled that the agreement was compatible with the constitutional system.^[106]

The Italian Parliament ratified the Protocol through Law 14 of 21 February 2024.^[107]

After the opening was repeatedly postponed, the centres were declared operational on 11 October 2024.^[108]

The first transfer procedure to Albania began on 14 October 2024.^[109] Immediately, a series of logistical complexities became evident, including the duration of transfer operations, the number of transfers required, and the screening procedures, both health-related and for determining the nationalities of the individuals involved. On 16 October, four migrants had already been released after being brought to the port of Shengjin in Albania. Upon more thorough screening, two were found to be minors and two had health problems. These four were boarded onto the Italian navy ship Libra and sent back to Italy, to Brindisi, where they were transferred to a reception centre. On 18 October, the Court of Rome did not to validate the detention orders issued to twelve migrants of both Egyptian and Bangladeshi nationalities. The court’s decision was based on a European Court of Justice ruling, which determined that the migrants’ countries of origin could not be considered safe. The European Court of Justice had explained that only countries without territorial safety exceptions could be included in the list of safe countries of origin,^[110], and according to the Court of Rome, this is not the case for either Egypt nor Bangladesh.^[111] The twelve migrants were brought to Italy, specifically to Brindisi to be transferred into the regular reception system.

The government’s response against the Court’s decision came without delay and on 23 October the Government approved Decree Law 158/2024, which introduced in a law the list of safe countries of origin, previously only published via Decree.^[112] Despite removing three countries for which the Foreign Ministry had indicated territorial safety exceptions, the list still designates countries such as Tunisia, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Ivory Coast, and Peru as safe. For these countries, the Ministry’s own reports had noted exceptions for certain groups highlighting systematic violations of fundamental rights. These concerns prompted the Court of Bologna to submit a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice about the correctness of the procedure used to define the safe countries list, while the Catania Tribunal disapplied Decree Law 158/2024, invalidating the detention order of a person undergoing accelerated asylum review due to coming from a “safe” country, based on the evaluation that the 19 countries included in the list cannot be considered as safe, under current EU legal provisions, as there are exclusions for specific groups.^[113]

On 8 November 2024, following operations that had begun several days earlier and the approval of the decree law, the government transferred eight migrants to Albania, despite the pending case before the Court of Justice.^[114] On 11 November, the Civil Court of Rome did not validate the detention of seven migrants ordering their release and return to Italy. This time, the judges also requested that the CJEU rule on the case. Initially, eight people from Egypt and Bangladesh had been selected for this transfer, but one was found to be vulnerable due to health issues and was then brought to Italy.^[115]

Through L. 187/2024, the competence to decide on administrative detentions (including those relating to the procedure in Albania) has been moved from the specialized sections on immigration of the courts of first instance to the courts of appeal.^[116]

On 31 January 2025, the Civil Court of Appeal of Rome did not validate the detention of 43 asylum applicants detained in Albania and requested a preliminary judgement to the Court of Justice of the European Union basing its decision on the same findings raised by the Court of Rome. On 25 February, the Court of Justice held a hearing on the referrals made by Italian judges concerning the concept of safe third country. The lawyers highlighted, among other things, five central issues:

• Judges must have authority to review and disapply “safe country” designations that violate EU criteria, as these designations trigger accelerated procedures with severe consequences for asylum seekers.
• Judicial assessment must focus on whether persecution or serious harm is consistently absent in a country, not on the formal designation procedure.
• EU Directive 2013/32 does not permit designating countries as “safe” while excluding certain vulnerable categories, as this undermines the harmonized European asylum system.
• Member States do not have discretion to create exceptions for certain groups in safe country designations without explicit EU legislative authorization.
• Using quantitative criteria to determine category exceptions is problematic due to the unclear definition of “category of person” and creates risks of improperly applying accelerated procedures.^[117]

Despite this, on 28 March 2025, the Government issued the DL 37/2025, amending L 14/2024 ratifying the Protocol between Italy and Albania. The amendment introduced, among the categories of people who can be transferred to Albania, those who are already subject to detention measures validated or extended pursuant to Article 14 TUI due to their irregular stay and are thus detained in repatriation centres.

On 8 May 2025, through decision no. 17510/2025, the Criminal Court of Cassation overturned a ruling by the Civil Court of Appeal which had refused to validate the detention of a foreign national. The individual had been detained with the authorisation of the competent Justice of the Peace and subsequently transferred to Albania under the provisions of the new DL 37/2025. After his transfer, he had submitted an asylum application. According to the Court of Appeal, the areas in Albania where people can be transferred are equated to border or transit areas where it is only allowed the entry and stay of people destined for repatriation or border procedures and not that of those seeking asylum pursuant to art. 6 of the Reception Decree. However, according to the Court of Cassation, since DL 37/2025 allowed the transfer to Albania from the CPRs present in Italy, and equates the Gjader center to the Italian CPRs, the same procedure carried out in CPRs applies there. Therefore, the Court annulled the decision of the Court of Appeal and sent the decision back to the latter on the basis of the principle of law according to which “Article 3 of L. 14/2024 does not prevent the application of the art. 6(3) of the Reception Decree in the event that a citizen detained in Gjader applies for asylum; therefore, detention at this centre is possible even after the submission of the asylum application because the centre is equivalent to the centres referred to in the art. 14 TUI” (CPRs).^[118]

On 1 August 2025, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU delivered its judgment in the joined cases Alace and Canpelli (C-758/24 and C-759/24), on the references made by the Court of Rome concerning two Bangladeshi nationals transferred to the Gjadër centre and rejected under the accelerated border procedure. The Court held that a Member State may designate a safe country of origin by a legislative act, but only on condition that the designation is amenable to effective judicial review of its compliance with the substantive criteria of Directive 2013/32/EU, and that the sources of information underlying it are made accessible to the applicant and to the court. Crucially, in continuity with its ruling of 4 October 2024 (C-406/22), the Court confirmed that a country cannot be designated as safe unless it offers adequate protection to its entire population, thereby excluding designations that carve out exceptions for specific categories of persons. The judgment, which the Italian Government criticised, confirmed the case-law of the Italian courts that had blocked the accelerated procedures underpinning the Albanian scheme. The CJEU’s decision’s practical scope is nonetheless limited in time, since the Asylum Procedures Regulation (EU) 2024/1348, applicable from 12 June 2026, allows both an EU-level list of safe countries and territorial or category-based exceptions.^[119]

Against this background, the two centres in Albania have remained largely unused. Between October 2024 and January 2025, only three groups of migrants (73 people in total) were transferred, and all were promptly returned to Italy after the courts refused to validate their detention. Faced with this outcome, and while awaiting the CJEU’s ruling, the Government repurposed the Gjadër facility. Through Decree Law 37/2025 it was converted into a pre-removal detention centre (CPR) for irregular migrants already detained in Italy and awaiting removal. Observers have estimated the scheme’s cost at around EUR 800 million over five years — several times the cost of an equivalent facility in Italy — while the centres have continued to operate well below capacity. The model has been expressly linked to the European Commission’s March 2025 proposal on “return hubs” in third countries, although, unlike that proposal, the Italy-Albania arrangement retains full Italian jurisdiction over the centres.^[120].

Independent monitoring and investigative reporting have documented the harsh detention conditions at the Gjadër CPR. According to data gathered by the Tavolo Asilo e Immigrazione, around 132 people had been transferred to the centre by mid-2025, of whom only 32 were actually repatriated; in every case in which the operator’s vulnerability commission was convened, the person was found unfit for detention and returned to Italy, indicating that, for many, the transfer should never have taken place. Altreconomia, having obtained the register of “critical events” through a FOIA request, revealed a stark discrepancy between the four incidents officially recorded by the Prefecture of Rome between 11 April and 29 May 2025 and the far higher numbers documented during parliamentary inspections (65 events between 11 April and 18 June 2025, and 54 in the first two months of the centre’s use as a CPR), most of them acts of self-harm, attempted suicides and protests. Concerns over the right to health were confirmed on 28 July 2025, when the Civil Court of Rome ordered the immediate release of a detainee, noting the absence of any permanent presence of the Italian National Health Service in Albania.^[121]

Arrivals by air

Information and orientation services for foreign nationals at the main airport border crossings are entrusted by the local Prefectures to different cooperatives, through public tenders or temporary contracts under Article 11(6) of Legislative Decree 286/1998. At Rome Fiumicino the service has been run by the ITC cooperative, and at Milan Malpensa by the Ballafon cooperative.

On 20 June 2023, ASGI conducted a visit to the offices and transit area of Milano Malpensa Airport, in compliance with the Lazio Regional Administrative Court ruling No. 3392/2023. During the visit, the delegation had access to the places used for the stay of foreign nationals who receive refoulement orders. As of the date of the visit (20 June 2023), there had been 546 refusals of entry since the beginning of 2023. The time spent in the transit area awaiting the execution of the refoulement was as follows:

• 313 persons were refused entry in less than 24 hours after being notified of the rejection order;
• 215 persons between 24 and 48 hours;
• 14 persons after a stay in the transit zone of about 48 hours;
• 3 persons after a stay of three days;
• 1 person from Santo Domingo (for whom, officials report, there are only two direct flights per week) after a stay of four days.

Similarly to the findings from a previous ASGI visit to Fiumicino Airport, the main critical issues identified include a failure to provide adequate safeguards for individuals at the airport, particularly due to insufficient information provision and in terms of identifying vulnerabilities, limited access to international protection, de facto detention practices by the police, and a lack of effective access to legal representation and communication with the outside world.^[122]

Data obtained by ASGI following a FOIA request presented relevant information related to refusals of entry and asylum requests at both airports. The examination of migration management data from January 2024 to March 2025 reveals significant border control activities at Italy’s primary international air entry points. Border authorities executed a total of 3,016 refusals of entry across Fiumicino (1,617) and Malpensa (1,399) airports. At Fiumicino, the predominant grounds for rejection were Article E violations (inadequate documentation substantiating purpose and conditions of stay, 624 cases), Article G violations (insufficient financial resources, 504 cases), and Article C violations (absence of valid visa or residence permit, 364 cases). Albanian nationals were the main natinality subject to rejection measures (664 individuals: 270 at Fiumicino and 394 at Malpensa), followed by nationals of Moldova (228), Brazil (210), and Georgia (178).

There is a marked disparity between the enforcement of refusals of entry and international protection applications, with only 456 asylum requests registered during the corresponding period (328 at Fiumicino and 128 at Malpensa). At Fiumicino, Tunisian and Iranian nationals submitted the highest number of protection applications (26 and 25 respectively), while at Malpensa, half of the applications were submitted by Sri Lankan nationals (62 applications). This raises substantive questions regarding access to international protection at these border control points, particularly considering that numerous refusals of entry affected people originating from states experiencing documented conditions of socio-political instability or humanitarian crises.

On 14 October 2024, the Rome Civil Court ordered the Ministry of Interior to pay €5,500 compensation to a Congolese citizen who was unlawfully detained for six days in 2020 in the transit area of Rome Fiumicino Airport. In the judgment, the court recognised that the detention occurred without any judicial authorisation, violating Article 13 of the Italian Constitution and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The claimant, who was later granted subsidiary protection, had been deprived of personal freedom under degrading conditions (no hot shower, inability to use a phone, lack of sleeping materials) after presenting a counterfeit residence permit. The Court quantified the non-material damages at €1,000 per day, following criteria previously established by the Milan Court of Appeal in a 2018 ruling.^[123]

Land borders

Arrivals at the Slovenian land border

In 2023, according to information collected by Asgi, only a few readmissions were carried out based on the Readmission Agreement signed by the Italian and Slovenian Governments in 1996,^[124] an agreement never ratified by the Italian Parliament, contrary to what Article 80 of Italian Constitution dictates for the ratification of international treaties that are of a political nature.^[125]

For detailed information on practice and litigation prior to end of 2023, please refer to previous versions of this country report.^[126]

In September 2023, the Italian Ministry of the Interior confirmed that, as of September 2022, the Italian and Slovenian governments had given more structure to cross-border police cooperation actions and that bilateral operations prevented 1,900 foreign nationals from entering Italian territory.^[127] Following a FOIA request by ASGI, the administration confirmed the direct involvement of Italian authorities in mixed patrols on Slovenian territory with powers of observation and information support, under the bilateral agreement on cross-border police cooperation of August 27, 2007, ratified by Law 60 of April 7, 2011.^[128] During a hearing before the Parliamentary Schengen Committee, Interior Minister Piantedosi also announced ‘the establishment of Mixed Brigades of Police Forces, based on the fruitful experience (…) gained with joint patrol services.’^[129] According to a 2 November 2023 news report, police coordination centres involving Italy, Slovenia and Croatia would also be set up in order to consolidate cooperation on countering irregular crossings. media also reported the purchase of 65 photo traps mobile cameras to place in the border areas of Trieste and Gorizia province.^[130] From initial information collected by ASGI and Altreconomia, the camera model GDPR WN-42CM branded Wilnex cost 34,710 EUR, and its sole purpose would be to locate people crossing the border irregularly.

In October 2023,^[131] Italy reintroduced border controls according to art. 28 Regulation 2016/399 (Border Schengen Code),^[132] from 21 October 2023 to 30 October 2023, arguing the increased threat of violence within the EU as a result of the escalating crisis in the Middle East and the risk of possible terrorist infiltration. According to the government, this picture would be ‘further aggravated by the constant migratory pressure on Italy’. Since then, these border controls have been extended 5 times:^[133] twice during 2024, each time for a period of 6 months, until 18 December 2024. Currently, the controls remain in effect until 18 December 2026. According to the Ministry of Interior, thanks to the border controls, police had intercepted the arrival of 1,600 irregular people, made 76 arrests and denied entrance on the territory to almost 900 people in 2023.^[134]

Another risk factor at the Italian Slovenian border are chain pushbacks from Italy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2023, the Civil Court of Rome once again condemned the Italian administration for practices of chain readmissions.^[135] The case concerned an action for compensation by a Pakistani citizen, already granted international protection in Italy, concerning a previous readmission through which he was violently sent back to Bosnia Herzegovina. The Italian Court stated that ‘The illegitimacy inherent in the informal readmission operated by the Italian police authorities at the border between Italy and Slovenia, the inhuman and degrading treatment related to the chain readmission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the concomitant lack of access to the political asylum procedure determine a right to compensation for damages in the hands of the recipient of this procedure’. The Tribunal reiterated the illegitimacy of the readmission procedure implemented at Italy’s eastern border on the basis of an agreement signed between Italy and Slovenia in 1996 that was never ratified by the Italian Parliament, as previously highlighted by the Court of Rome decision of 18 January 2021. This is the procedure that the Italian government, after suspending it following the January 2021 decision, had reinstated as of November 2022, albeit formally not with respect to those seeking international protection. The ruling also recognises the successful demonstration of facts at trial, through cooperation with Slovenian NGO PIC (Pravni center za varstvo človekovih pravic in okolja – Legal Centre for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment),^[136] regarding the immediate chain of readmissions suffered by the claimant from Italy to Slovenia and from Slovenia to Croatia and then the claimant’s presence in Bosnia.^[137]

During a hearing before the Schengen Parliamentary Commission on 7 November 2023, Interior Minister Piantedosi announced “the establishment of mixed brigades of police forces, based on the productive experience (…) gained with joint patrol services”^[138]. On 16 January 2024, a first trilateral meeting was held in Nova Gorica between the Interior Ministers of Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia, during which initial cooperation guidelines to combat irregular immigration along the Balkan route were defined by the three countries.^[139] On 14 October 2024, during the trilateral summit in Zaprešić (Croatia), the Interior Ministers of the three countries further discussed and defined the operational modalities of cross-border cooperation, agreeing on the need to formalize the agreements through a specific memorandum.^[140] On 20 January 2025, the Interior Ministers of the three countries met again in Nova Gorica to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on joint border patrols at the EU border.^[141] The agreement, as reported by official sources, provides for the implementation of joint patrols between the police forces of the three countries along the Balkan route, with the aim of:

• strengthening control of the European Union’s external border;
• combating irregular migration flows;
• intensifying operational cooperation between the police forces of the three countries;
• implementing coordinated border surveillance measures.

The Memorandum is part of the broader framework of measures to strengthen controls at the EU’s Croatian external border.

The situation at the French land borders

Refusals of entry and pushbacks

Since November 2015 and due to the reintroduction of border controls by France, many migrants attempting to cross the borders with France have been subject to rejection at the border, often with the use of violence. A detailed account of the situation at the borders in previous years is available in the previous updates of the AIDA Report on Italy, and in the AIDA Report on France.^[142]

On 14 December 2020, mixed Italian-French patrols began to operate along the border of Ventimiglia with the task of patrolling the borders according to the provisions of bilateral police cooperation agreements based on the 1997 Chambery agreements,^[143] providing for joint actions and cooperation between Italian and French police.^[144] Police checks, which can be considered lawful in internal border areas only if conducted in a manner that police powers doesn’t have an equivalent effect to border checks^[145], in practice only take place people of foreign appearance and systematically especially at Ventimiglia train station, where migrants are prevented from getting on the train platform so that they do not catch a train to France.^[146] This practice, started in 2020, is still widely implemented.

Regarding pushbacks, as reported by ASGI and other NGOs,^[147] people stopped at the border or on the train are taken to the San Luigi station, identified and given a “refusal of entry” (refus d’entrée). The rejection procedure is completed with the handing over of the concerned persons to the Italian police authorities who invite them to proceed on foot to the city of Ventimiglia. If the third country nationals are intercepted in border areas as defined by the bilateral readmission agreement, they are simply readmitted to Italy without any written decision.

Italian media have conducted interviews with migrants having been readmitted to Italy or blocked at the border, and with NGO operators at Ventimiglia.^[148] Notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the cases C-368/20 and C-369/20^[149] in relation to the unlawfulness of prolonging internal border checks without new reasons that justify the reintroduction of such controls, the French Government has continued with the temporary reintroduction of border controls,^[150] without disruption, since 2015. France has continued to prolong these controls without interruption: under the notification of 3 November 2025, they remain in force at all its internal borders, including with Italy, until 30 April 2026. In 2025, while France’s successive prolongations were upheld by its Council of State (Conseil d’État), France was among the Member States to which the European Commission recommended putting an end to internal border control. It considered them disproportionate and increasingly redundant following the entry into operation of the Entry/Exit System.^[151]

The situation appeared to have slightly changed in the first weeks of 2024, with CSOs reporting a decrease in pushbacks and, among these reduced numbers of refusals of entry, decisions mostly in line with the bilateral agreements.^[152] This change can be explained in light of recent jurisprudence regarding the powers of Member State to issue refusal of entry provisions (Refus d’entrée) at its internal borders, when border controls have been reintroduced. In particular, the CJEU, with the decision ADDE (C-143/22) of 21 September 2023, reaffirmed the principle – already introduced in the Affum Case (C-47/15) – according to which the Return directive (2008/11/CE), which provides for the possibility of transferring a third-country national in an irregular condition intercepted in the border area if the two countries in question have signed bilateral readmission agreements, must be applied together with the Schengen Borders Code. This entails that, although in such a situation a Member State can still adopt a refusal of entry decision, on the basis of the Schengen Borders Code, the removal must comply with the common standards and procedures of the Return directive, and thus also the procedures set out in the bilateral readmission agreement. The Return Directive does not allow Member States to exclude third country nationals from the scope of the directive in case of a refusal of entry at the internal border (contrary to the external border, where it is allowed), even in case of temporarily reintroduced border controls.^[153] This CJEU preliminary reference was issued by the Court in the context of a French national court case, led by several NGOs challenging French legislation contained in the CESEDA (Code de l’entrée et de séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile) on this topic, because it allowed the authorities to issue a refusal of entry decision in the context of temporarily reintroduced internal border controls under any circumstances. In light of the CJEU decision, the Council of State confirmed that, to comply with the Return directive, such refusal of entry decisions could only be taken at the internal borders with a view to the person concerned being re-admitted by the Member State from which they came, in application of an agreement existing on the date the Return directive came into force.

The effects of the Council of State’s decision were particularly evident in the decline in readmission numbers recorded throughout 2024. A civic access request promoted by ASGI Medea project^[154] revealed a notable drop in the number of people pushed back to Italy following interceptions by the French Border Police (PAF), at least regarding the Ventimiglia border crossing. Data on passive readmissions – cases in which Italy agrees to take back migrants rejected by France – show significantly higher figures: a total of 7,216 people, including 6,808 accepted and 408 rejected readmissions. The monthly distribution shows a significant increase during the middle months of the year, with peak numbers in August (959 readmissions) and September (851). The most represented countries of origin are Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Eritrea, followed by countries from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

More recent official data, obtained through a FOIA request submitted by the ASGI Medea project, cover the Alpine crossings of the Val di Susa (Bardonecchia sector) for the period 1 January 2025–28 February 2026. Over that period, 8,260 irregular migrants were detected at the Fréjus and Claviere/Montgenèvre crossings, the large majority while attempting to leave Italy for France. Passive readmissions, cases in which France returns people intercepted after crossing to Italy, reached 7,625 requests, of which 5,891 were accepted (5,599/3,972 at Claviere and 2,026/1,919 at Fréjus), against only 476 active readmissions from Italy to France. Civil-society monitoring by On Borders recorded a lower figure of some 3,426 readmissions at these crossings over 2025, equivalent to around 30% of new arrivals registered at the Fraternità Massi shelter in Oulx, a discrepancy that reflects the different scope and counting methods of the two sources.^[155]

One route to France is through the Val di Susa, crossing the Bardonecchia and the Frejus mountain passes, on one side, or, on the other, through Oulx and Claviere leading to the Montgenèvre pass. MEDU,^[156] an organisation granting medical assistance to migrants at Oulx, has reported the death of migrants that tried to cross the border walking through the Alps, highlighting the increase in deaths of very young migrants or MSNA. Many NGOs signed an appeal consequently the death of migrants at this border.^[157]

Among migrants’ deaths at the French border is that of Blessing Matthews. The case concerned a young Nigerian woman, who was found dead on the 9 of May 2018 at Prelles Dam, in the municipality of Saint-Martin-de-Queyrières, at ten kilometres from Briancon. On the night between 6 and 7 May 2018, Blessing Matthews crossed the Alps from Claviere – Italy but was discovered by police agents who started chasing her nearby the village of La Vachette. In a desperate attempt not to be caught by police officers who had reached her at the edge of the river Durance, she fell into the water and drowned. With the support of the organisation Tous Migrant, Blessing’s sister filed different legal actions to ascertain the responsibilities of the public authority, but all actions were dismissed both by the Tribunal of Gap and the Court of Appeal of Grenoble.^[158] Due to a counter investigation conducted by Border Forensic,^[159] the case was submitted to the Public Prosecutor in May 2022, but again dismissed. On 25 October 2022, an appeal on the case was presented to the European Court of Human Rights.^[160] On 18 January 2024, the ECtHR considered the case inadmissible,^[161] alleging that the French authorities did what was reasonably necessary to be done.

Reception conditions at the Italian border

Regarding reception conditions on the Italian side of the border, from 2020 onwards, due to the pandemic, both transit areas (Ventimiglia and Oulx) were left totally or partially without accommodation facilities. On 31 July 2020, the Roja Camp in Ventimiglia, managed by the Italian Red Cross, was closed.^[162] Being the only formal place of accommodation for people in transit, its closure led to the proliferation of informal settlements and the occupation of public spaces to face the arrival of winter. Facilities provided by the local Caritas office are only able to guarantee a limited number of places for single parents and children. No public response has been given since the closure of the Roya centre.^[163] Hundreds of people were stranded in town without access to the most basic rights such as shelter and health care. The humanitarian crisis was handled only by NGOs, while local authorities seemed to criminalise the situation by introducing local rules against homeless people.^[164]

At the end of 2021, the imminent opening of a centre for people in transit was announced,^[165] but, despite several public statements,^[166] there was no official action, and migrants continue living stranded under bridges with the only support of civil society organisations and volunteers.^[167]

In 2024, transit flows at the Italian border with France decreased. Organisations in the area published a report^[168] highlighting a decrease in numerical presence while also noting that several individuals continue to remain blocked in Ventimiglia, generating situations that remain difficult to manage in terms of support and reception. In 2025, the situation continued. The number of people in transit continued to fall, while a stable population living in conditions of severe marginalisation (homeless single men, often with addictions and physical or mental-health problems) grew. There has been no permanent reception facility since the closure of the Roja camp in 2020, and assistance relies almost entirely on NGOs and volunteers: in 2025 Caritas alone distributed 17,821 meals and 4,462 clothing kits, and reactivated a shower service, while the number of people taken into care rose to 1,103 (+17.8%). The only institutional response remained the “Punto di Accoglienza Diffuso” (PAD), opened in August 2023 for women, children and families, which has hosted around 1,200 people over its two years of existence, while some sixty to seventy people continued to sleep under the via Tenda flyover for months before any placement. Although the time needed to lodge an asylum application before the Imperia police headquarters improved markedly (from around four months in 2024 to a few weeks in 2025) and the number of asylum seekers assisted rose from 199 to 240 — mainly Bangladeshi, Peruvian and Afghan nationals, the latter increasingly returning from France and Germany after the rejection of their claims — many applicants, especially those readmitted from other EU States, remained excluded from reception. The organisations also recorded 119 contacts with potential victims of trafficking and 35 cases of labour exploitation.^[169]

Violence and court cases on the Italian side

On 9 May 2021, Moussa Balde, a 22-year-old boy, was attacked in the streets of Ventimiglia by three Italian men. After being hospitalised for a short period of time, Moussa was ordered to be confined at the CPR of Turin waiting to be deported. At the CPR he was placed in solitary confinement and was found dead on 23 May 2021.^[170] On 10 January 2023, the Criminal Court of Imperia convicted three Italian citizens for the aggression, specifically for aggravated injury due to the use of a blunt object.^[171] Regarding the responsibilities for the suicide of the young migrant to ascertain whether it was caused by the lack of medical and psychological care provided to the victim and to his isolation. Indeed, after the confinement, competent authorities denied that Moussa Balde had been present in the CPR, preventing any kind of legal assistance and support. Moreover, despite the brutal aggression suffered in Ventimiglia, the managing authority of the centre decided to put him in isolation, in a separate building called “Ospitaletto” within the detention centre without any kind of human support even if in a critical psychological and physical condition. On October 2023, the Turin prosecutor’s office sent to trial the facility’s director and CPR doctor, charged with involuntary manslaughter, and a police inspector, for forgery aiding and abetting.^[172]

On 29 October 2024, the investigating judge (GIP) of the Court of Turin accepted the request for indictment of the deputy director of the company managing the CPR and the doctor of the facility at the time of Moussa Balde’s death. The indicted chief police inspector has plea-bargained for a one-year prison sentence.^[173] On 12 February 2025 the trial began: defendants facing involuntary manslaughter charges are the centre’s director working for Gepsa (the company that won the management contract), and the doctor who ordered Balde’s isolation in the facility’s “Ospedaletto” (small hospital) section.^[174] On 11 February 2026, the Court of Turin, at first instance, convicted the former director of the centre (managed by Gepsa) of involuntary manslaughter, sentencing her to one year’s imprisonment, suspended, and ordering her and the managing company jointly to pay over EUR 350,000 in provisional damages to Balde’s family. The facility’s doctor was acquitted, as were the police officers involved, the chief inspector having earlier plea-bargained a one-year sentence. Balde’s family, together with ASGI, the Frantz Fanon association and the regional Ombudsman for the rights of detained persons, took part as civil parties. The judgment was welcomed as the first to recognise the criminal liability of a private CPR operator, but was criticised for leaving unaddressed the responsibility of the Prefecture and the Ministry of the Interior. In its reasoning, the Court described a process of “dehumanisation” to which Balde had been subjected. The “Ospedaletto” isolation area was subsequently closed, having been found inhuman and degrading, while the Turin CPR, shut in 2023, reopened in March 2025 under a new operator.^[175]

Legal access to the territory

Under Italian Law, it is not possible to apply for international protection from abroad, nor is a specific visa provided for people in need of protection that need to access the country.

In consideration of specific humanitarian crises, the Italian Government relies on a measure known as “humanitarian corridors”, concluding protocols with international organisations such as UNHCR and IOM and with NGOs to allow a certain number of people in need of protection to access the country legally. Humanitarian corridors are not regulated by law, but only by protocols between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and selected organisations, to which the Ministry delegates operations and the power to select the beneficiaries; no formal procedure for selection is established, nor any means to challenge non-admission.^[176]

The main programme, promoted by the Community of Sant’Egidio together with the Waldensian Table, the Federation of Evangelical Churches and CEI-Caritas, brought 8,592 people to Italy between February 2016 and December 2025, Syrians fleeing the war and refugees from the Horn of Africa, Greece, Cyprus, Gaza and Afghanistan. According to UNHCR, over the ten years since 2015 some 11,000 refugees from 24 countries have reached Italy through humanitarian corridors more broadly. In parallel, Italy participates in the UNHCR resettlement programme: 2,805 refugees were resettled between 2015 and 2025, the largest group from Lebanon (1,412), followed by Türkiye (446), Jordan (346), Sudan (306), Iran (102), Pakistan (72), Libya (70) and Syria (52). Since 2017, around 2,081 particularly vulnerable people have also been transferred from Libya through evacuations and resettlement (104 of them via Niger), a channel that had been suspended in 2023 and later resumed: on 11 December 2025, 122 refugees, mainly from Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea, were evacuated to Rome.^[177]

A specific channel was put in place for Afghan nationals. From 2021, in selected cases of Afghans fleeing the country after August 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allowed the persons concerned to apply for a humanitarian visa under Article 25 of the Visa Code (Regulation 810/2009). This first corridor, established through a Memorandum of Understanding of 4 November 2021, provided for the arrival of 1,200 Afghans over two years and enabled 812 Afghan citizens (refugees in Pakistan, Iran and Türkiye) to enter Italy.^[178] A new addendum, signed in April 2025, builds on the 2021 agreement and provides for a further 700 Afghan nationals (allocated among the Community of Sant’Egidio, CEI, the Federation of Evangelical Churches and ARCI); 338 people had already arrived by the time of signing, and a further group, including 119 people who reached Rome from Islamabad on 10 July 2025, followed thereafter.^[179] Separately, between 2021 and 2022 a total of 4,797 Afghans were evacuated by the Italian Government through various operations, including Operation Aquila Omnia.^[180]

Regarding the issuance of entry visas for humanitarian reasons in situations of need for extraterritorial protection, on 22 November 2023 the Court of Rome upheld the appeal filed by an Iranian citizen, residing in Italy with a study permit, who, not yet meeting the requirements for family reunification, had asked the Italian Embassy in Iran for the issuance of an entry visa to allow her minor daughter, in serious danger, to reach her. The Italian Consular Representation never responded, making it necessary to file an urgent appeal. In this case, the applicant demonstrated the danger to which her daughter was exposed to in Iran, due to her sexual orientation, for having participated in anti-government demonstrations after the assassination of Masha Amini (September 2022) and for behaviours deemed contrary to government religious morality, so much so that on one occasion she was even reprimanded by the morality police. In terms of jurisdiction, the Court identified a solid link with the Italian State given the presence of the mother in Italy and in her right to protect her daughter, as well as in the right of the latter to live with her mother while escaping the very serious risks to which she is exposed in Iran, thus applying the principle of the best interests of the child referred to in the 1989 New York Convention, but also in the light of art. 8 ECHR and, last but not least, the right to family unity provided for in the Constitution. In the decision, the Judge also refers to art. 10, paragraph 3 of the Italian Constitution as the right to enter the national territory, leaving to the State to identify the instrument to allow entry.^[181]

On 8 June 2023, the Civil Court of Rome ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affair to issue a humanitarian visa to family where one of the applicants, requesting the visa together with his family, had lived in Italy for a long time, obtained a degree in law and, after his return to Afghanistan, attended other courses in Italy as an Afghan soldier in the context of cooperation with NATO forces, particularly with the Italian military. Regarding the power of attorney, significantly the Court applied the principles affirmed by the CJEU in the case C-1/23 PPU extending to the granting of the power of attorney what was assumed by the Court regarding the need for Member States to adopt flexible solutions that allow the submission of a request for reunification through remote means of communication and without personal appearance.^[182]

In 2024, the Civil Court of Rome accepted the appeal presented by an Afghan refugee against the denial of family reunification with his adult son. The Court, taking into account that the conditions established by law for the reunification of an adult child were not met, nevertheless considered the application for a humanitarian visa worthy of acceptance. The Court valued the work carried out by the father (driver at the Italian embassy in Kabul) and the fact that his wife and other daughters also live in Italy. For this reason, the court accepted the request for a humanitarian visa presented by the father for his adult son who remained alone in Iran where he also risked repatriation to Afghanistan.^[183]

This line of case law was further developed in 2025 in connection with the situation in Gaza. Faced with the failure of the Italian Consulate in Jerusalem and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to respond to numerous requests, a working group set up within ASGI lodged several urgent appeals before the Civil Court of Rome, which ordered the issuance of humanitarian entry visas under Article 25 of the Visa Code and Article 10(3) of the Italian Constitution. The Court held that Italy has a duty of protection towards persons exposed to a serious and immediate risk to their life, referring to the findings of United Nations bodies and to the orders of the International Court of Justice, and confirmed the emerging orientation according to which such visas may be granted even in the absence of a prior “qualified link” between the applicant and the Italian State.^[184]

^[1]          UNHCR, Italy – Sea Arrivals Overview 2025, UNHCR Operational Data Portal, available here; see also the Italy sea arrivals page here.

^[2]          UNHCR, Italy – Sea Arrivals Overview 2025, UNHCR Operational Data Portal, available here; see also the Italy sea arrivals page here.

^[3]          UNHCR, Italy Fact Sheets, 2025 (monthly), UNHCR Operational Data Portal, Italy page, available here.  

^[4]          Eurostat, Migration and Asylum Database, 2025 data, available at: https://shorturl.at/HqM8O; see also the Statistics section of this report.

^[5]          Ministry of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero, 31 December 2025, available in Italian here.

^[6]          Ministry of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero, 31 December 2025, available in Italian here.

^[7]          Ministry of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero, 31 December 2025, available in Italian here.

^[8]          Altreconomia, “I dati che raccontano la guerra ai soccorsi nell’anno nero della strage di Cutro”, February 21 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4ak0glk;

^[9]          See SKY TG24, ‘Migranti e sbarchi, qual è il ruolo e il peso delle Ong sul totale dei salvataggi’, 27 September 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3T2zWWS and Altreconomia, “I dati che raccontano la guerra ai soccorsi nell’anno nero della strage di Cutro”, February 21 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4ak0glk

^[10]         ISPI, Migrazioni nel Mediterraneo: tutti i numeri, available in Italian here (share of sea arrivals rescued by NGO vessels).

^[11]         Altreconomia, “Attività di polizia”: la finzione del Viminale per celare i luoghi di sbarco dal Mediterraneo, 2 September 2024, available in Italian here and Fanpage, Più della metà dei soccorsi in mare classificata come operazione di polizia: i dati raccolti da Open Arms, 29 October 2025, available in Italian here.

^[12]         Senate studies service, Da Sophia A Irini: La Missione Militare Ue nel Mediterraneo cambia nome, e Priorità, April 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/2Rq68G4 and Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, A distress call for human rights: The widening gap in migrant protection in the Mediterranean, March 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/2QX5ikh.

^[13]         Ansa, ‘Naufragio bambini, due ufficiali a giudizio’, 16 September 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3fBEFsM; see also: Alarmphone, ‘Left-to-Die Trial in Rome’, 2 December 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/2LeRHyn; ECRE, ‘Italy: Officials of the Italian Coast Guard Prosecuted for Shipwreck in 2013’, 20 September 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/3ckBunh.

^[14]         AIDA, Country report – Italy: Update on the year 2024, July 2025, available here.

^[15]         Al Jazeera, ‘Mediterranean shipwreck: Stories of tragedy emerge after 62 drown’, 27 February 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3LBRlCw and LaStampa, ‘Naufragio di Cutro, la ricostruzione ora per ora di quello che è accaduto la notte del 26 febbraio’, 17 March 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3n5QGia.

^[16]         LaStampa, ‘Cutro due mesi dopo: inchieste congelate e sette cadaveri ancora senza nome’, 5 May 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3MTFcsP.

^[17]         See: Altreconomia, ‘Se i naufraghi nel Mediterraneo diventano ‘persone intercettate in operazioni di polizia’. Le ricadute sui soccorsi’, 8 October 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3dwtQ9p.

^[18]         See Watch the Med – Alarm Phone, ‘Cutro shipwreck: Associations file a collective complaint with the Office of the Public Prosecutor’, 10 March 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3Jw06uS and ASGI, ‘Naufragio Cutro: Associazioni depositano esposto collettivo in Procura’, 9 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3LvHJcp.

^[19]         Euractiv, ‘Cutro: Italian authorities deemed migrant boat ‘not of interest’ before shipwreck’, 30 January 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/49x4yFk.

^[20]         ANSA, ‘Naufragio migranti, Meloni: “Nessun allarme da Frontex. Io non scappo, ora Cdm a Cutro”’, 5 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3OO1aOi.

^[21]         RaiNews.it, “Naufragio di Cutro: la procura chiede il processo per il 6 militari indagati”, November 6 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/KiyN7.

^[22]         ANSA, “Naufragio Cutro: al processo ammesse 88 parti civili”, May 29, 2025, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/2juXF.

^[23]         La Repubblica, ‘Cutro, prima sentenza per il naufragio: 20 anni e 3 milioni di multa allo scafista’, 8 February 2024, available in Italina at: https://bit.ly/3T65YBo.

^[24]         Court of Cassation, 11 June 2025 (final conviction); Court of Appeal of Catanzaro, 10 January 2025; GUP Court of Crotone, 7 February 2024. See ANSA, Cutro, definitiva la condanna di uno degli scafisti, 11 June 2025, available in Italian here and Court of Appeal of Catanzaro, 19 March 2025. See Il Crotonese, Naufragio Cutro: in appello confermata condanna a 20 anni, 19 March 2025, available in Italian here and Court of Crotone, December 2024 (first-instance convictions under the ordinary procedure); appeal pending before the Court of Appeal of Catanzaro. See Gazzetta del Sud, 30 June 2026, available in Italian here.

^[25]         ASGI, ‘Naufragio di Cutro, ASGI: ritardi nell’attivazione dell’accoglienza per i superstiti’, 11 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3JsByTM.

^[26]         AIDA, Country Report on Italy – Update on 2023, July 2024, available here.

^[27]         For a broader description of legal cases, see AIDA, Country Report on Italy – Update on 2024, July 2025, available here.

^[28]         CJEU, Judgment of 1 April 2022, Sea Watch (Joined Cases C‑14/21 and C‑15/21), available here.

^[29]         Court of Trapani (GUP), decision of 19 April 2024 (non luogo a procedere for all defendants in the Iuventa case and lifting of the 2017 seizure). See Melting Pot, Processo Iuventa: non luogo a procedere per tutti gli imputati, 19 April 2024, available in Italian here;  France 24, Italian court drops trafficking charges against crew members of migrant rescue ships, 19 April 2024, available here.

^[30]         Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Direttiva Piantedosi su due navi Ong in navigazione nel Mediterraneo’, 25 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3JQuZvB and Infomigrants, ‘New Italian interior minister says ‘governing migration’ priority’, 25 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3ZZzRnU.

^[31]         Guardian, ‘Giorgia Meloni faces first migration test from two NGO rescue boats’, 26 October 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3n5I63e.

^[32]         ASGI, ‘Sbarco e domanda di asilo devono essere garantiti senza distinzioni. Commento all’ordinanza su SOS Humanity’, 14 February 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/40T6G6M.

^[33]         For a legal analysis of the law, see ASGI, ‘Una prima lettura di ASGI del Decreto Legge 1/2023 convertito in Legge’, 16 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3n5gwmJ.

^[34]         CJEU, Joined Cases C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch eV v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Others, 1 August 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3Xp4QaM.

^[35]         See AIDA, Country report – Italy: Update on the year 2024, July 2025, available here.

^[36]         Corte costituzionale, sentenza n. 101/2025, 8 July 2025. See ASGI, Decreto Piantedosi – La Corte Costituzionale ribadisce il primato del soccorso in mare, available in Italian here.

^[37]         L’Espresso, L’Ong SOS Humanity… chiede un risarcimento al governo italiano, 3 November 2025, available here; on the December 2025 seizure, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 11 December 2025 (below).

^[38]         L’Espresso, ‘La nave della ong mediterranea in fermo amministrativo per non aver rispettato il porto assegnato dal governo’, 25 August 2025, available here; Editoriale Domani / Unità, 11–12 December 2025 (November detention and its suspension by the Court of Agrigento), available in Italian here.

^[39]         L’Espresso, 3 November 2025 (Ocean Viking and Sea-Watch 5 fired upon, September 2025), available in italian here.

^[40]         Il Fatto Quotidiano, Il giudice libera la nave di Mediterranea, il governo ne ferma un’altra, 11 December 2025, available in Italian here.

^[41]         See ASGI, Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Strengthening the operational capacities of Tunisian authorities in monitoring the maritime borders: 8 million from the Rewarding Fund for Repatriation Policies’, 13 April 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3MF4TKK.

^[42]         See ASGI, ‘Sempre più politiche securitarie: lo studio sui rimpatri in Tunisia’, 30 March 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3yvpnS9.

^[43]         ActionAid & University of Bari, Trattenuti 2024 and the Trattenuti open-data platform (data to 31 December 2024), available in Italian here and here.

^[44]         ASGI Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Strengthening the operational capacities of Tunisian authorities in monitoring the maritime borders: 8 million from the Rewarding Fund for Repatriation Policies’, 13 April 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3YY5ooO; See Irpi Media, ‘Tunisia, il muro della Guardia costiera’, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3xaiQud. And IRPIMedia & ActionAid, The Big Wall – Tunisia, il muro della guardia costiera, 2 November 2022, available in Italian here;  L’agenzia europea che costruisce le frontiere in Tunisia, 24 July 2023, available in Italian here.

^[45]         European Commission, ‘The European Union and Tunisia: political agreement on a comprehensive partnership package’, 16 July 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3uM4Kl9.

^[46]         Politico, ‘EU finalizes migrant deal with Tunisia’, 16 July 2023, available at https://bit.ly/49mmCSI.

^[47]         European Parliament, ‘EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding’, 11 September 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3wv1sDj.

^[48]         IRPIMedia & ActionAid, The Big Wall (Border Management Programme for the Maghreb, ICMPD); Euractiv (allocation of EU migration funds to Tunisia); Editoriale Domani, 10 August 2023 (patrol boats under the July 2023 memorandum).

^[49]         The big wall – Action Aid, ‘Memorandum Ue – Tunisia: l’Unione europea sottoscrive rastrellamenti, deportazioni illegali e violenze contro i migranti’, 20 July 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bGoI1r.

^[50]         Euractiv, ‘EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding state of play’, 25 January 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/3I6kfrq.

^[51]         Al Jazeera, EU to start releasing money to Tunisia under migration pact, 22 September 2023,  available here; European Commission, Tunisia – Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (EUR 105 million migration support 2023; 2024 operational assistance package), available here;  on the transparency concerns, DGAP, Two Years In, the Impact of the EU-Tunisia Deal on Migration Is Overstated, Memo 35/2025.

^[52]         ASGI, “A un anno dall’inizio della crisi: continuano le violazioni dei diritti delle persone migranti in Tunisia”, April 8, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/Crumc.

^[53]         ASGI, Tunisia, famiglie sudanesi scaricate al confine presentano ricorso al Comitato per i Diritti Umani delle Nazioni Unite, June 5, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/uh2Ez.

^[54]         Lighthouse Reports / IRPIMedia, Desert Dumps investigation (Espulsioni di migranti subsahariani nel deserto, 2024; Discariche nel deserto, 2025), available in Italian here.

^[55]         DGAP, S. Meiners & S. Niederfranke, Two Years In, the Impact of the EU-Tunisia Deal On Migration Is Overstated, Memo 35, July 2025, available here.

^[56]         Lighthouse Reports, “Desert Dumps”, available at https://shorturl.at/SqpZ7.

^[57]         Border Forensic, “State Trafficking – Expulsion and sale of migrants from Tunisia to Libya”, 29 January 2025, available at https://shorturl.at/fD8Gs.

^[58]         United Nations – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Tunisia: UN experts concerned over safety of migrants, refugees and victims of trafficking”, 14 October 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/tC0N8.

^[59]         ASGI, Motovedette alla Garde Nationale tunisina: urgente affrontare le responsabilità italiane per le violenze sulle persone migranti in Tunisia, 18 July 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/kdy8G.

^[60]         Council of State, 16 January 2025, decision no. 332/2025.

^[61]         Memorandum d’intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all’immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana, available on ASGI website at: https://bit.ly/3l6ND8t.

^[62]         ASGI, Sciabaca Oruka, The Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) programme from Libya to Niger: an update as of December 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3XdtTgS.

^[63]         ASGI, Sciabaca Oruka, The Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) programme from Libya to Niger: an update as of December 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3XdtTgS and ASGI Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Voluntary returns from Libya in the EU externalisation strategy: a critical analysis in the light of ASGI’s strategic litigation’, 2 February 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3Yujyhy

^[64]         AIDA, Country report on Italy – Update on 2024, available here.

^[65]         Amnesty International Italia, Stop al Memorandum Italia-Libia, 15 October 2025, available in Italian here; Editoriale Domani, 14 October 2025 (parliamentary motions); Centro Astalli, Rinnovato l’accordo Italia-Libia, 6 November 2025, available in Italian here.

^[66]         Internazionale (A. Camilli), Quello che non torna del caso Almasri, 29 January 2025, available in Italian here; Avvenire, L’accusa all’Italia e il rinvio: cosa ha detto la Cpi su Almasri, 18 October 2025; Sistema Penale, La Camera preliminare I della CPI ha deferito l’Italia all’Assemblea degli Stati parte (26 January 2026).

^[67]         IOM and UNHCR Press Release, ‘IOM and UNHCR condemn the return of migrants and refugees to Libya’, 16 June 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/414CAwZ.

^[68]         IOM, Missing Migrants Project / DTM data on interceptions and returns to Libya; SOS Méditerranée & IRPIMedia, available in Italian here.

^[69]         See, inter alia, UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary General, 9 December 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3DFSaFh, UN News, ‘Libya detention centres remain places of violations and abuse’, 28 March 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3lbXCcW, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Libya detention centres remain places of violations and abuse: experts’, 27 March 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3uMus9l and United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve human rights in Libya”, 3 June 2024, available at: https://shorturl.at/Yk1HM.

^[70]         UNSMIL & OHCHR, Joint report on human rights violations and abuses against migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in Libya (January 2024–December 2025), OHCHR, February 2026, available here.

^[71]         Criminal Court of Trapani, sentence of 23 May 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3dutMHl; According to article 80 of the Italian Constitution, political agreements can be signed only with Parliament’s authorisation. Furthermore, it is an agreement concluded with a party, the Libyan coastguard, repeatedly referred to as responsible for crimes against humanity. Therefore, the court found that the agreement violates the principle of non-refoulement.

^[72]         For a broader description of the decision, read paragraph “Interception at sea, refoulement and following legal actions”.

^[73]         ASGI, ‘Memorandum Italia-Libia, lettera aperta del Tavolo Asilo alle istituzioni italiane: non rinnovatelo’, 30 October 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2Wik9Wi.

^[74]         On 31 January 2020, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, called on the Italian government to urgently suspend the ongoing cooperation activities with the Libyan Coast Guard which affect the repatriation of people intercepted at sea in Libya where they have suffered serious human rights violations, see: ASGI, ‘Il governo italiano deve sospendere ogni cooperazione con la Guardia Costiera libica’, 31 January 2020, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2zmpaEy.

^[75]         IOM Press Release, “IOM Deeply Alarmed by Mass Graves Found in Libya, Urges Action”, 10 February 2025, available at: https://shorturl.at/J96Pl.

^[76]         Domani, Respinto in Libia, sbarca a Fiumicino su richiesta del tribunale: «Responsabilità dell’Italia», 24 March 2025, available here

^[77]         For further details on these previous funding programmes, see AIDA, Country report Italy, available at: https://bit.ly/49lG7tX. On specific topics related to this paragraph see Altreconomia, ‘Nuovi affari dell’Italia sulla frontiera per respingere le persone in Libia’, 1 February 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3F35lzE, Altreconomia, ‘Il grande inganno della Libia sicura e le tappe della regia italiana dei respingimenti delegati’, 18 April 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/35MIMgW.

^[78]         SOS Méditerranée & IRPIMedia, Finanziare la violenza: il costo nascosto delle politiche europee in Libia, 2026; ActionAid & IRPIMedia, The Big Wall (Libia), available in Italian here.

^[79]         The Big Wall, ‘L’esternalizzazione dei rimpatri dalla Libia in un imbuto umanitario’, 9 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49mpEXm.

^[80]         ASGI, “Rimpatri volontari dalla Libia: i finanziamenti italiani”, December 6 2024, available in Italian at: https://shorturl.at/8shs4.

^[81]         ECtHR, S.S. and Others v. Italy, App. no. 21660/18, decision of 12 June 2025 (inadmissibility), available here; joint press release by ASGI and the de:border / migration justice collective, 12 June 2025, available here.

[82]         V. Moreno Lax, ‘SS and Others v Italy – or doubling down on Banković’, June 19, 2025, available here.

^[83]         IOM, Libya Maritime update 25 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49s3hja.

^[84]         IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, “Mixed migration flows to Europe”, available at: https://shorturl.at/GmXaM and IOM, Libya Weekly Maritime Update (October 2025) and DTM Libya Migrant Report, Round 60 (data to end of 2025), available here: https://dtm.iom.int/libya; see also Libya Review, 30 October 2025.

^[85]         Communication to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in the case of SDG against Italy, available at: https://bit.ly/41zjJt7.

^[86]         Criminal Court of Naples, 2021; upheld on appeal in 2022 and by the Court of Cassation on 1 February 2024, which reiterated that Libya and the port of Tripoli cannot be considered places of safety. For a detailed understanding of the case, see ASGI, ‘Condanna di Asso 28, un precedente che può scardinare la prassi dei respingimenti in Libia’, 19 October 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3vHe5HF. See also Infomigrants, ‘Ship captain sentenced to prison for returning migrants to Libya’, 15 October 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vK0b7s; ASGI, ‘Asso 28, la corte di appello di Napoli conferma: il respingimento verso la Libia è illegittimo’, 18 January 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3XYMA8Q, Judgment No. 4557, full decision available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3UPSJFW, and Avvenire, ‘Cassazione: «La Libia non è un porto sicuro». Reato obbedire ai guardacoste’, 16 February 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4bYYJCG.

^[87]         ASGI, “Caso Asso 29, arriva a sentenza: La Libia non è un luogo sicuro dove condurre i migranti”, June 28, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/jt4oR and ASGI, “Respinto illegalmente nel 2018, A. arriva oggi in Italia con un visto di ingresso”, December 25, 2024, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/xJnti.

^[88]         Available at: https://bit.ly/3F96BBj. See also ECRE, ‘Med: UN Condemnation of Returns to Unsafe Libya by Merchant Ship, Survivors Rescued in Maltese SAR Zone Accepted by Italy, Parliament President Urges EU Lead on Rescues at Sea’, 18 June 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3Jb1bap, A reconstruction of the entire Vos Triton affair and the proceedings relating to “state secrets” can be found at the following link: https://bit.ly/3KDPFGF and L’Unità, ‘Stragi di naufraghi e respingimenti illegali, si muovono le Procure: esposto per la deportazione in Libia di 25 migranti’, 2 January 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bUybm3.

^[89]         AIDA, Country report on Italy – Update on 2024, July 2025, available here.

^[90]         Available in Italian and Greek at: https://bit.ly/3qHhuVf.

^[91]         According to Altreconomia FOIA, from January 2022 to 14 November, 1827 Third Country Nationals have been refouled from Bari, Brindisi, Ancona, Trieste to Albania. See Altreconomia, ‘L’ossessione di respingere anche ai confini interni. Via terra e per mare’ February 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IoKGtc.

^[92]         Readmission agreement between Italy and Greece, Article 6.

^[93]         Lighthouse Reports, ‘Detained below deck’, 18 January 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3kgpOLp.

^[94] Adriatic Ports Network (ASGI, No Name Kitchen, Ambasciata dei Diritti di Ancona, Associazione SOS Diritti), Rule 9.2 communication to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the case of Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece (App. no. 16643/09), 7 February 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3KQTUg1 and Italy, Communication from the Government (Action Report of 15 December 2021) in the case of Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece (App. no. 16643/09), Committee of Ministers doc. DH-DD(2022)25, available at: https://bit.ly/3MMKzHf.

^[95]         AIDA, Country report on Italy – Update on 2024, July 2025, available here.

^[96]         Full decision in Italian, available at https://bit.ly/4bMFgot.

^[97]         For a broader description of the case, see ASGI Medea, ‘Illegitimacy of informal pushbacks at Adriatic ports and humanitarian visa’, 11 August 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/48uzyVl.

^[98]         Ministry of the Interior, Department of Public Security, Central Directorate for Immigration and Border Police, replies to generalised civic-access requests (Prot. no. 0041996 and no. 0041999 of 25 May 2026), tables on refusals of entry (Art. 10 of Legislative Decree 286/1998) and active readmissions at the Bari and Brindisi maritime border, period 30 April 2025–30 April 2026 (on file with the authors).

^[99]         Prefecture of Bari (Ufficio territoriale del Governo), Convention with the social cooperative Panacea for the reception, information and orientation service at the Bari border crossing under Article 11(6) of Legislative Decree 286/1998, 2024–2026 (Prot. no. 0048288 of 10 April 2024); on the state of execution, see Committee of Ministers, Sharifi and Others group (enhanced supervision), and the Rule 9 communications cited.

^[100]       The full text of the Protocol is available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uGnzq5. For a comprehensive analysis of the protocol, see CEPS, The 2023 Italy-Albania Protocol on Extraterritorial Migration Management – A worst practice in migration and asylum policies, 1 December 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3wrPL0p.

^[101]       EU Observer, ‘EU unclear on legality of Italy-Albania deal to offshore asylum’, 7 November 2023, available at https://bit.ly/4bLpXMW.

^[102]       SIDIBlog, ‘On the incompatibility of the Italy-Albania protocol with EU asylum law’, 15 November 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3PhmwEf.

^[103]       Questione Giustizia, ‘Profili di illegittimità del Protocollo Italia-Albania’, 28 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4bOIec1. ASGI, ‘L’analisi giuridica del Protocollo Italia – Albania’, 22 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/49FJrRP.

^[104]       ASGI, ‘Accordo Italia-Albania, ASGI: è incostituzionale non sottoporlo al Parlamento’, 14 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4c1MNjF.

^[105]       Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 61, 5 December 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49I647A; Sistema Penale, Il Disegno di legge di ratifica ed esecuzione del Protocollo tra Italia ed Albania in materia di immigrazione: analisi del progetto e questioni di legittimità, 28 December 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3URu57T.

^[106]       BalkanInsight, ‘Albanian Court Approves Deal with Italy on Processing Migrants’, 29 January 2024, available at https://bit.ly/3STBXmX.

^[107]       Senato della Repubblica, Giovedì 15 Febbraio 2024 – 159ª Seduta pubblica, 15 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IclK7o.

^[108]       InfoMigrants, “Italy’s migrant centers in Albania ready for operations”, 10 October 2024, available at: https://shorturl.at/jBdzq.

^[109]       The Guardian, “Italy sends first asylum seekers to Albania under controversial pact”, 15 October 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/PQcZF.

^[110]       InfoCuria Case-law, Case C‑406/22 – Decision of the Grand Chamber, 4 October 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/Moaj9.

^[111]       Questione Giustizia, “Nota ai provvedimenti di rigetto delle richieste di convalida dei trattenimenti disposti dalla Questura di Roma ai sensi del Protocollo Italia-Albania, emessi dal Tribunale di Roma, sezione specializzata nella protezione internazionale, il 18 ottobre 2024”, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/7hpo4.

^[112]       Article 2 bis Procedure Decree as amended by DL 158/2024, then repealed but L. 187/2024 converting DL 145/2024 included the amendment.

^[113]       ASGI, “La nuova “lista dei paesi sicuri” e lo svuotamento del diritto di asilo”, November 5, 2024, available in Italian at: https://shorturl.at/YmCSn.

^[114]       Domani, “Migranti in rotta verso l’Albania, nuovo scontro con i magistrati in vista”, November 6, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/KDCa0.

^[115]       IlSole24ore, “Migranti Albania, uno è vulnerabile: già di ritorno in Italia. Attesa la decisione dei giudici sugli altri sette”, 8 November 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/m1bLv.

^[116]       Article 16 Decree Law 145/2024, as amended by L. 187/2024 and amending Article 3 (1) lett. c) DL 13/2017.

^[117]       Court de Justice de l’Union Européenne, “Press and media – Broadcasting of hearings”, 25 February 2025, available at https://shorturl.at/48jyX.

^[118]       Court of Cassation, decision no. 17510/2025 of 8 May 2025.

^[119]       CJEU (Grand Chamber), judgment of 1 August 2025, Joined Cases C-758/24 (Alace) and C-759/24 (Canpelli); CJEU Press Release, 1 August 2025, available here.

^[120]       Global Detention Project, European Court Ruling Challenges Italy–Albania Detention Deal and Other Externalisation Plans, 11 August 2025, available here; Decree Law 37/2025 of 28 March 2025 (conversion of the Gjadër centre into a CPR).

^[121]       Altreconomia, Le incongruenze sul numero degli “eventi critici” nel Cpr di Gjadër in Albania, 2025, available in Italian here; Altreconomia, L’impatto dei centri italiani per migranti di Shëngjin e Gjadër sulla popolazione locale, 27 October 2025, available in Italian here;  on the transfer/repatriation figures and vulnerability findings, Tavolo Asilo e Immigrazione monitoring; Civil Court of Rome, order of 28 July 2025.

^[122]       ASGI Inlimine, La situazione emersa dal sopralluogo della Zona di transito internazionale dell’aeroporto di Milano Malpensa, December 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3TaPmYV.

^[123]       ASGI InLimine, “Risarcimento del danno per illegittima detenzione informale presso l’aeroporto di Roma Fiumicino”, 2 December 2024, available in italian at: https://shorturl.at/gJQYy.

^[124]       Readmission agreement between the Italian and Slovenian Government, available at: https://bit.ly/3vwPuGF.

^[125]       Italian Consititution, Article 80 states: ‘Le Camere autorizzano con legge la ratifica dei trattati internazionali che sono di natura politica, o prevedono arbitrati o regolamenti giudiziari, o importano variazioni del territorio od oneri alle finanze o modificazioni di leggi.’

[126]       AIDA, Country report : Italy – Update on 2024, July 2025, available here.

^[127]       Camera dei Deputati, XIX LEGISLATURA – Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea – Seduta n. 161 di mercoledì 13 settembre 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bQ37DI.

^[128]       FOIA reply from the Ministry of Interior Prot. 0102589 of October 25, 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3OTrEOs.

^[129]       Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Comitato parlamentare Schengen, audizione del Ministro Piantedosi’, 7 November 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/48uWSlR.

^[130]       Il Gazzettino, ‘Clandestini dai Balcani, il Friuli Venezia Giulia compra 65 fototrappole: «Un muro tecnologico»‘, 21 January 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3zDbMb1.

^[131]       Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, ‘Reintroduzione dei controlli delle frontiere interne terrestri con la Slovenia, nota di Palazzo Chigi’, 18 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49IMQP8.

^[132]       For a more detailed analysis of the reintroduction of border controls at the Italo-Slovenian border, see ASGI Medea, ‘Schengen Area: From Free Movement Zone to Labyrinth’, 20 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/42UYcNH.

^[133]       European Commission, ‘Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control’, available at: https://bit.ly/3DmVntw.

^[134]       Ministry of Interior, available at the Government webpage: https://bit.ly/3TtmsDK.

^[135]       Full decision Court of Rome N. R.G. 3938/2022 of May 9, 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3wFks20;

^[136]       More information on the organisation, available at: https://bit.ly/3PkgfaT.

^[137]       ASGI Medea, Balkan route, evidence and testimonies confirm chain readmissions. Ministerial liability for compensation for damages, August 8, 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3OYCxyC.

^[138]       Ministero dell’Interno, “Comitato parlamentare Schengen, audizione del Ministro Piantedosi”, November 7 2023, available at https://shorturl.at/MZvlZ.

^[139]       Radio Capodistria, “Niente di nuovo dal trilaterale dei Ministri degli interni sui pattugliamenti”, January 18, 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/IitfC.

^[140]       Ministero dell’Interno,”Trilaterale Italia, Slovenia, Croazia: Piantedosi incontra a Zaprešić gli omologhi Božinović e Poklukar”, October 14, 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/IBHvY.

^[141]       Ministero dell’Interno, “A Nova Gorica incontro trilaterale tra i ministri dell’Interno di Italia, Slovenia e Croazia”, January 20, 2025, available at https://shorturl.at/eETuk.

^[142]       AIDA, Country Report Italy, 2017 Update, March 2018, available at: https://bit.ly/2Ga01zb, 22-24.

^[143]       Riviera time, ‘Una ‘squadra mista’ italo-francese: parte da Ventimiglia il progetto pilota della Polizia di Frontiera’, 21 December 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3bd9bbM.

^[144]       The text of the Agreement is available at: https://bit.ly/39wdS2v.

^[145]       Article 23 of the Regulation 399/2016 (Schengen border Code).

^[146]       Regarding ethnic profiling procedure carried out at Ventimiglia train station, ASGI Medea, Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Review of Italy – 110th Session Racial and ethnic profiling practices in police (border) checks and lack of accessible and effective remedy in Italy, July 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3Ict6rl, 16-19.

^[147]       ASGI, ‘La situazione al confine tra Italia e Francia: effetti della pandemia e tendenze consolidate’, 22 February 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2RDidb9; see also Medici Senza Frontiere, Vietato passare – La sfida quotidiana delle persone in transito respinte e bloccate alla frontiera franco-italiana, August 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IiO1ZO; Stories in motion, A Collaborative Research Report of Rights Violations at the Franco-Italian Border, 1 June 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49IV8q8; MEDU, Rapporto sulla situazione umanitaria dei migranti in transito lungo la frontiera nord-ovest tra Italia e Francia, October 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3y1SzgQ. ODV Caritas Intemelia Onlus CSD – Servizi Inclusione Diaconia Valdese – WeWorld Onlus -Medici del Mondo Italia, “Ventimiglia ai margini”, available in Italian at https://riforma.it/2025/03/24/ventimiglia-ai-margini/.

^[148]       La7, ‘Ventimiglia, continuano i respingimenti francesi’, 26 June 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3q7LTeW.

^[149]       ASGI, ‘EU Court of Justice – It is illegitimate to renew internal border controls on the basis of reasons already given’, 23 May 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3R9JPiW.

^[150]       European Commission, Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control, available at: http://bit.ly/3DmVntw.

^[151]       European Commission, Member States’ notifications of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, France notification in force 1 November 2025–30 April 2026, available here; ; on the Commission’s recommendation to end internal controls, Commission opinions of 2 June 2026 (IP/26/1223).

^[152]       Il Fatto Quotidiano, “Migranti, la Francia si piega al Consiglio di Stato: alla frontiera di Ventimiglia crollano i respingimenti. Attivisti: “Ma militarizzazione prosegue”, February 17, 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4aXEsMz.

^[153]       CJEU, Reintroduction of border controls at internal borders: the ‘Returns’ Directive applies to any third-country national who has entered the territory of a Member State without fulfilling the conditions of entry, stay or residence, 21 September 2023, Press release No. 145/23, available at: https://bit.ly/3PLsLQC.

^[154]       ASGI Medea, “I dati sulla situazione migratoria a Ventimiglia nel 2024: l’accesso civico del progetto Medea”, 3 March 2025, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/arGgF.

^[155]       Ministry of the Interior, Department of Public Security, Central Directorate for Immigration and Border Police, reply to the FOIA request of the ASGI Medea project (Prot. no. 0037788 of 8 May 2026), tables on irregular migrants traced and on active and passive readmissions at the Italian-French border (Bardonecchia sector), period 1 January 2025–28 February 2026 (on file with the authors); On Borders, La frontiera alpina del NordOvest: dati e rapporto gennaio-dicembre 2025. On the internal-transfer mechanism, see Article 23 bis of Regulation (EU) 2016/399, as introduced by Article 1(14) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1717.

^[156]       MEDU, ‘Ancora critica la situazione dei migranti sulla rotta nord ovest delle Alpi’, 4 February 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/33u6GNZ.

^[157]       Medici per i diritti umani, ‘Si ritorna a morire alla frontiera nord ovest delle Alpi’, 4 February 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3KHwp9m. See also ASGI,Medea project, Confine italo-francese: una frontiera dove si continua a morire. Appello alle autorità, 11 February 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3KzYFdE.

^[158]       Altreconomia, ‘Le nuove prove sulla morte di Blessing Matthew al confine italo-francese’, 1 June 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3DiZQ06.

^[159]       Border Forensic, ‘The death of Blessing Matthews – a counter investigation on violence at the alpine frontier’, available at: http://bit.ly/3wzK25t.

^[160]       Border Forensic, ‘25.10.2022 – Death of Blessing Matthew: Facing impunity in France, we file an application before the European Court of Human Rights’, available at: http://bit.ly/3Df5a4L.

^[161]       Mediapart, ‘Mort de Blessing Matthew: la justice européenne ne permet pas de rouvrir le dossier’, 18 January 2023, available in French at: https://bit.ly/3UXccVy.

^[162]       Parole sul confine, ‘Il Campo Roja di Ventimiglia ha definitivamente chiuso’, 24 August 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3uFs7YE.

^[163]       See ASGI, Medea project, Ventimiglia, un territorio che resiste? October 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vYAVdI.

^[164]       Sanremo news, Ventimiglia: firmate stamattina dal Sindaco e subito operative le ordinanze anti degrado e alcol, 21 October 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3s3VXXv.

^[165]       Stranieri in Italia, Il progetto. A Ventimiglia un centro di transito per accogliere i migranti, 26 November 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vYoS02.

^[166]       Riviera24.it, Migranti a Ventimiglia, centro di transito: spunta di nuovo l’ipotesi Parco Roja, 4 April 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3JiY5Uw, and Ansa, ‘Migranti: a Ventimiglia sit-in bipartisan per riaprire centro’, 16 November 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3HDcERO.

^[167]       Il Fatto Quotidiano, ‘Nel limbo di Ventimiglia tra i migranti respinti dalla Francia e accampati al confine. Associazione: ‘Serve centro di transito’, 25 December 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/405tUGq.

^[168]       Primalariviera.it, “Meno migranti, ma più problemi: ecco il report “Ventimiglia ai margini 2024”, 20 March 2025, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/mJILy.

^[169]       Caritas Intemelia, Diaconia Valdese, WeWorld & Médecins du Monde, Ventimiglia ai margini 2025, 2025; see also Diaconia Valdese – Servizio Inclusione, monitoring of the Ventimiglia border (2025).

^[170]       See Black book on Pre-Removal Detention Centre (CPR): when EU denies the human, 23 September 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vxhQAx.

^[171]       Il Fatto Quotidiano, ‘Moussa Balde, condannati a due anni gli autori del pestaggio. La famiglia del migrante: ‘Ora verità sulla sua morte in isolamento nel Cpr’, 10 January 2023 available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3HcKn2T.

^[172]       TGR Piemonte, ‘CPR. Per il suicidio di Moussa Balde la Procura chiede tre rinvii a giudizio’, 25 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/48rllZz.

^[173]       Domani, “Due rinvii a giudizio per la morte di Moussa Balde nel Cpr di Torino nel 2021”, 29 October 2024, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/FoqJn.

^[174]       Il Manifesto, “Cpr di Torino, al via il processo per la morte di Moussa Balde”, 12 February 2025, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/hHXCO.

^[175]       Court of Turin, first-instance judgment of 11 February 2026 in the criminal proceedings concerning the death of Moussa Balde; see Progetto Melting Pot Europa, Il caso Moussa Balde e la violenza strutturale della detenzione amministrativa, November 2025, available here;  il manifesto and lavialibera, February 2026.

^[176]       See Sant’Egidio webpage here.

^[177]       MOI, available here. For further details Community of Sant’Egidio, Corridoi umanitari (data updated to December 2025), available in Italian here; UNHCR, Corridoi umanitari: in 10 anni 11.000 rifugiati accolti in Italia, 23 December 2025; UNHCR, Reinsediamento in Italia (2015–2025 figures), available here.

^[178]       Agenzia Fides, “EUROPE/ITALY – Humanitarian corridors from Afghanistan, a way to save lives”, 15 December 2021, available at https://shorturl.at/iIjdP and InfoMigrants, “Italy: 1,200 Afghans to arrive with humanitarian corridors”, 8 November 2021, available at https://shorturl.at/pziLD.

^[179]       Sant’Egidio, “Afghanistan: an agreement for new refugee entries with humanitarian corridors signed on April 7th”, 7 April 2025, available at https://shorturl.at/sSqpY.

^[180]       Report to Senate of the Minister of Interior, Piantedosi, communicated to the Presidency on 29 November 2022, available in Italian here, 12.

^[181]       Civil Court of Rome, interim measure of 22 November 2023, procedure no. 52019/2023 available in Italian at: bit.ly/3VEhTaR.

^[182]       Civil Court of Rome, decision of 8 June 2023, available here.

^[183]       Civil Court of Rome, decision of 14 July 2024, available here.

^[184]       ASGI, Visti umanitari and the working group on Gaza, available in Italian here; Civil Court of Rome, urgent orders of 2025 on the issuance of humanitarian visas to persons fleeing Gaza (Article 25 of Regulation 810/2009 and Article 10(3) of the Italian Constitution).