Access to the territory and push backs

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In 2024, according to MOI data,^[1] 66,317 people disembarked in Italy, 91,334 less than the previous year, marking a 57.93% decrease in the number of disembarkations. Throughout 2024, Libya returned to being consistently the main departure point for migrants and refugees reaching Italy by sea. Data analysis^[2] shows that approximately 62.4% of all people who reached Italy through the sea had departed from Libyan shores, while Tunisia accounted for about 27% of departures. Libya’s role as the primary departure point became particularly significant in the second half of the year, with peaks reaching 74% of total departures in November. Tunisia, which had started the year with a significant share of departures in January (52%), showed a gradual decrease in the following months, stabilizing at lower percentages. The remaining departures were mainly recorded from Turkey and Algeria, though these represented a much smaller proportion of the total flows. Based on the 2024 UNHCR fact sheets, approximately 6,800 people were detected entering Italy irregularly by land, primarily across the Italian border with Slovenia. The monthly data shows a relatively consistent pattern throughout the year, ranging from about 500 to 800 people per month, with a slight increase noted during the late summer and early autumn period. The main nationalities of those arriving through the land route were from Bangladesh, Syria, Türkiye, Pakistan, Morocco, and Afghanistan. These arrivals were part of the broader Western Balkan route, with most people entering through Slovenia after traveling through various Balkan countries.^[3]

Arrivals by sea

As highlighted, in 2024, 66,317 persons disembarked in Italy,^[4] a substantial decrease compared to 2023 (157,652) and to 2022 (105,131). Despite the decrease in the number of sea arrivals, in 2024, there were a total of 158,605 asylum applications.^[5] The highest number of monthly sea arrivals was recorded in August, when 8,526 persons reached the Italian coasts.^[6]

The number of unaccompanied minors (Minori Stranieri Non Accompagnati – MSNA) reached 8,043, compared to 18,820 in 2023.^[7]

The main nationality of people disembarked was Bangladesh (13,779 in total), which represented a change compared to 2023, when most of the people disembarked were Guinean. The other most represented nationalities in terms of arrivals by sea in Italy were Syria (12,504), Tunisia (7,677) and Egypt (4,296). It is worth noting that, except for Syria (for which through a circular dated 10 December 2024, the National Asylum Commission, after an official declaration of the Italian Government,^[8] requested the suspension of international protection recognition procedures pending verification of developments regarding the geopolitical situation), the other three nationalities are included in the list of safe countries of origin.

Italian authorities classify arrivals of migrants in a way that lacks transparency. As explained by Altreconomia,^[9] the Italian authorities mostly consider rescue operations as “law enforcement” interceptions, disembarking most of the rescued people on the island of Lampedusa to increase the perception of a chronic emergency.

Furthermore, the approval of Decree Law 1/2023 converted into law 15/2023 has had a major impact on the effectiveness of SAR operations conducted by NGOs: as of July 2023, only 4.2% of rescue operations had been conducted by the civil society since January, while 68% had been operated by the public authority. If compared to 2022, the decrease of the capacity of SAR NGO is quite evident (they had conducted 15,2% of total operations).^[10] By the end of 2023, only 8,904 people have been rescued by SAR NGOs, less than the 6% of the total number.^[11] Once more, this data highlights how misguided the theories attributing a “pull factor” role to NGO vessels for what concerns departures from Libya are. Throughout 2024, similar data was not made available.

State rescue operations and shipwreck incidents

On 31 March 2020, the Sophia Operation, started in 2015, definitively ended and was replaced by the IRINI Operation, the main task of which is implementing the arms embargo against Libya imposed by the UN. A note published by the Chamber of Deputies states that since the end of the Sophia operation, in practice, vessels used for the purpose of rescuing people at sea in one of the main migratory routes no longer operate.^[12] In this regard, the study by the Senate Commission noted that, with the IRINI mission, the displacement of the intervention area would bring ships to extremely decentralised areas with respect to the routes of human traffickers and therefore the “search and rescue component” of the new operation should be strongly reduced compared to Sophia.^[13] The report of the Council of Europe Commissioner for human rights observed that the focus of the EUNAVFOR MED IRINI operations area was the eastern part of the Libyan Search and Rescue Region and the high seas between Greece and Egypt, strongly reducing the possibility of encountering refugees and migrants in distress at sea.^[14]

On 10 August 2020, the Court of Rome ordered a new investigation in a case in which it had already indicted two officers of the Italian coastguard and of the navy, for delay and failure to rescue in the shipwreck which occurred on 11 October 2013, and in which 286 people, including at least 60 minors, died at sea.^[15] Despite six verbal communications between a doctor on-board and the Italian MRCC and the presence of various commercial ships in the vicinity of the distress area, the Italian authorities did not take responsibility for the coordination of the SAR operation, nor informed Maltese authorities (the SAR incident was taking place in Maltese SAR zone). The Coordination centre ordered the commercial ships to move away from the distress area, which in turn led to the death of the migrants onboard. A criminal procedure against the General Commander for the port Authority and the Chief of the branch of CINCNAV control room, indicted for refusal of acts of duty (art. 328 penal code) and involuntary manslaughter (art. 589 penal code), was ongoing. On 15 December 2022, the Court of Rome took a final decision in this case. The Court dismissed the claim on the ground that it was statute barred, even if it recognised the criminal responsibilities of the indicted, highlighting that the attempt to avoid the obligation of coordination and assistance to search and rescue operations constitutes a reason for criminal accountability.^[16] The case has previously been scrutinised by the UN Committee for Human Rights, that condemned Italy and Malta for the violation of art. 2 (par 3) and art. 6 of the ICCPR.^[17]

On 26 February 2023, nearby the Calabrian coast – precisely in Steccato di Cutro – a tragic shipwreck took place.^[18] A boat originally departing from Izmir in Türkiye got stranded at a hundred fifty metres from the coast after a five-day journey and sank after attempting to land. The official number of deaths amounted to 94, including 35 minors; only 80 people survived, and around 15 people were missing.^[19] From the morning of the shipwreck, what specifically happened was unclear. According to declarations released by the different authorities involved in the following days, an aerial Frontex asset was present on the scene the night before the tragedy and sent an alert to the Italian Finance and Coast Guard (Guardia di Finanza and Guardia Costiera) and the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Center to inform them that they had spotted a boat which according to thermal camera data appeared to carry several people and was lacking life vests. Apparently, Guardia di Finanza took the lead of the operation; this entailed, however, that the operation was classified as a law enforcement operation, in accordance with a practice established in 2019.^[20] Around 2am, two patrol boats left Crotone and Taranto’s harbours to reach the vessel but, due to the maritime conditions, were not able to do so. Up to this moment, the operation was still considered a law enforcement operation instead of a search and rescue one, even though the sea conditions had worsened and there were indicators of the presence of multiple people onboard. Around 3:40am, staff from the Guardia di Finanza reached out to the port authority (Capitaneria di porto) of Reggio Calabria to ask if any vessel of the Coast guard was available but received a negative answer. After an emergency phone call made through a satellite phone, police authorities at land were informed about the emergency conditions of the boat and started patrolling the shores waiting for the boat to dock. A new emergency call from the fishermen on the shore reached the Coast guard around 4am; only at this stage was the operation classified as a search and rescue operation. An official declaration from the Ministry of Interior Matteo Piantedosi stated that the accident took place at 5:30am. The first rescue operation was carried out by some fishermen and personnel from the military force of Carabinieri, but the situation immediately appeared tragic.

On 9 March, ASGI and other 41 associations submitted a collective complaint/report to the Public Prosecutor Office in the form of a report, asking to open an extensive investigation aimed at ascertaining the public responsibilities of the authorities involved in the management of the operation.^[21] Per recent press articles,^[22] six law enforcement officials will be charged for failure to assist persons in danger and culpable disaster with different levels of responsibility, which could lead to sentences of up to 12 years in prison. Furthermore, a report prepared by the Fundamental Rights Office of Frontex, which monitors the activities of the European Border Agency, published by Euractiv,^[23] points out that “the Italian authorities present in the Frontex monitoring room in Warsaw (an official from the coast guard and one from the Guardia di Finanza) considered as ‘not of particular interest’ the report in which the boat on which the migrants were travelling was spotted (hours before the shipwreck).” This contradicts the government stance that they did not receive any alerts from Frontex.^[24] On 6 November 2024, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Crotone requested the indictment of six military personnel (four from the Guardia di Finanza and two from the Coast Guard) accused of failing to prevent the sinking of the caique. The investigation shed light on the alleged “inertia” and “omissions” on the night between February 25 and 26, 2023, which contributed to causing the massacre at sea.^[25] The preliminary hearing, during which the judge will decide whether to proceed with the trial, was set to be held in March. The hearing has been postponed to May 12, awaiting the constitution of civil parties. During the hearing regarding the admission of civil parties to the proceedings, the judges granted civil party status to 88 out of 113 parties.^[26]

The prosecution of the alleged boat drivers has been carried out by the relevant prosecutors’ offices. The Crotone prosecutor’s office indicted five people for the crimes of aiding and abetting illegal immigration and death as a result of crime. On 8 February 2024, the judge for the preliminary hearing, following an abbreviated trial, sentenced two of the 5 boatmen, one of them to 20 years and a 3 million fine.^[27] The other three defendants were convicted even though they were not identified as boat drivers but as individuals who played an active role in managing the passengers of the sunken caique, even if their responsibility for the shipwreck is not comparable to that of those who were driving the boat.^[28] The Italian government and the Calabria Region also joined the trial as civil parties.^[29]

ASGI and other CSOs also supported survivors and family members of the missing and deceased migrants in the identification of victims and the right to truth, reporting on the procedural errors in the management of the situation by public authorities and on the unlawful and inhumane treatment to which survivors were subjected both in term of reception conditions and access to legal information.^[30]

Obstacles to NGO search and rescue activities

The initial “closure of ports” policy

The so-called “closed ports” policy began with Decree 53/2019 (known as the “Security Decree bis” or “Decreto Sicurezza bis”), which was introduced during Matteo Salvini’s tenure as Minister of the Interior. This decree formalized the government’s approach to restricting access to Italian ports for vessels conducting search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly those operated by NGOs. Law Decree 130/2020, as amended by Law 173/2020, repealed the provisions introduced by Decree 53/2019, introducing new regulations on ministerial powers to limit the transit or docking of SAR vessels. However, this regulatory framework has been significantly modified by Law Decree 1/2023 (converted into Law 15/2023), which established a new “Code of Conduct” for NGOs engaged in SAR activities, imposing more stringent obligations and new sanctions. The competencies of the Minister of the Interior and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, which overlap in some cases, have been further specified compared to the previous legislation. For a more detailed and accurate description of the previous legal framework, please refer to earlier versions of the report.

It was under this legal framework that the Gregoretti case started. Involving government denial of disembarkation,^[31] the former Minister of Interior, Matteo Salvini, faced a criminal trial, but in May 2021 the Court of Catania decided not to indict him for kidnapping.^[32] On 17 April 2021, the former Minister of Interior, Salvini, was indicted by the Court of Palermo for the kidnapping of 147 migrants aboard the Open Arms, kept aboard the ship for six days in August 2019. The trial started on 15 September 2021. In a hearing, confirmed having denied disembarkation and thus forcibly maintained 147 people aboard the ship.^[33] On 14 September 2024, the former Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini was charged with the crimes of kidnapping and refusal of official acts by the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Palermo.^[34] On 20 December, the Court of Palermo announced the verdict: the former Minister of Interior was acquitted because “the fact does not exist.” The Public Prosecutor’s Office of Palermo had requested that Salvini be sentenced to six years in prison.^[35]

Search and seizures operations of NGO rescue boats

In December 2020, the Administrative Court for Sicily in Palermo, submitted a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU^[36] regarding the applicability of Directive 2009/16/EC to ships primarily engaged in SAR activities. This request stemmed from an appeal filed by Sea Watch 4 against its detention in September 2020, after rescuing 354 people at sea in August 2020. Following the rescue and transfer of migrants to the Allegra ship in Palermo, the Ministry of Health imposed a 14-day quarantine for the crew and subsequent ship sanitization. After sanitization, the Port Authority of Palermo conducted a “port state control” inspection and detained the vessel, citing non-compliance with technical requirements, particularly that it was not equipped to systematically rescue large numbers of people at sea. The Administrative Court noted the absence of specific criteria in European, international, or domestic law for classifying private ships as SAR vessels. Initially, in March 2021, the Court accepted Sea Watch 4’s request for suspension of the detention, recognizing the importance of NGO rescue operations, but this decision was later overturned by the High Administrative Court of Sicily following an appeal by the Minister of Interior.

Similar cases occur to the Geo Barents of Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in December 2021 and Sea-Watch; both had to wait a long time offshore before being assigned a safe landing place after complicated rescues. In January 2022, the Ocean Viking of SOS Mediterranéee was blocked in Trapani after an 11-hour inspection by the Coast Guard for “malfunction of the on-board power supply” and “presence of flammable liquids stored in unsuitable premises of the ship” and then subjected to administrative detention.^[37]

In March 2021, the Public Prosecutor of Ragusa ordered the search and seizure against the Mar Jonio’s tugboat, accused of aiding and abetting illegal immigration for taking refugees on board from the Etienne oil tanker on 11 September 2020 and having later accepted a donation from it.^[38] In January 2022, another investigation against Mar Jonio concerning the rescue and transportation of 30 migrants in 2019 was archived by the Judge for preliminary Investigation (GIP) of Agrigento.^[39]

Finally, on 1 April 2022, the CJEU delivered its ruling (Case C-14/21)^[40] with regards to SeaWatch 4 case, establishing several important principles:

1. Vessels classified by a flag State as ships intended for pleasure yachting, but systematically engaged in SAR activities, fall within the scope of Directive 2009/16/EC on port State control.
2. When determining whether such ships should undergo more detailed inspection, authorities must consider that they may carry more persons than those for which they are certified, as a result of fulfilling their duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea.
3. However, port State authorities cannot require proof that these ships hold certificates other than those issued by the flag State or demand compliance with all requirements applicable to vessels in different categories.
4. Port State authorities retain the power to adopt detention measures or other restrictions when the safety of the ship, its crew or the persons rescued is at risk, but such measures must be suitable, necessary, and proportionate.

The CJEU ruling provided important clarification on the balance between legitimate safety concerns and the humanitarian mission of SAR vessels, establishing limits on how Member States can regulate NGO rescue ships while still ensuring maritime safety standards.

Reinstatement of the “closed ports” policy

By the end of 2022, after the appointment of the new government, the “closed ports” policy was reinstated. On 24 October 2022, the new Ministry of Interior, Matteo Piantedosi, issued a Directive (prot. 0070326)^[41] denying access to Italian ports to the Ocean Viking and Humanity 1, ships which had been involved in SAR operations in the Mediterranean. The Italian government instructed the involved ships to refer to their flag States (Norway and Germany) to be indicated a place of safety.^[42] On 4 November 2022, the government issued a decree allowing the Geo Barents and Humanity 1 ships to enter the territorial waters only with the purpose to disembark migrants in critical health conditions. The selective approach followed by the government failed due to the principles of international and maritime law which impose the duty to rescue people in distress and to grant a place of safety to the passengers.^[43] In particular, European institutions raised their concerns^[44] and appeals were submitted to local Courts^[45] with regards to the selective approach introduced by the Directive. The case was finally decided by the Civil Court of Catania on 6 February 2023. The court declared the decree unlawful, affirming that all rescued people had the right to reach safety ashore and seek asylum in Italy. This ruling rejected the government’s designation of some migrants as “residual cargo” who had initially been prevented from disembarking.^[46]

2023 Law decree and law re. NGO search and rescue and disembarkation on Italian territory

Following the same purpose, i.e. to prevent disembarkation of migrants rescued at sea by hindering NGO’s search and rescue activities, the government adopted the Law decree 1/2023 which was converted into Law 15/2023 on 24 February 2023. The new law^[47] once again modifies the prerequisites for the exercise of the faculties attributed to the Government and, at the same time, introduces rules of conduct for vessels (and their captains) carrying out search and rescue activities at sea, and consequent sanctions for those deemed responsible for non-compliance or erroneous compliance with those rules or orders issued by the Government by means of a specific inter-ministerial measure. With regards to the prerequisites, it is foreseen that the Italian government could limit or deny the transit or staying in its territorial waters of NGO ships when one of the following conditions is not respected:

1. the vessel systematically carrying out search and rescue activities has the authorisations issued by the authorities of the flag state and possesses the technical-nautical eligibility requirements for safe navigation;
2. timely information is immediately provided to the rescued persons about the possibility of seeking international protection;
3. the assignment of the port of disembarkation is requested in the immediacy of the event; and
4. the port of disembarkation is reached without delay;
5. complete and detailed information on the rescue operation is provided to the maritime or police authorities;
6. the search and rescue strategy did not contribute to dangerous situations on board or prevent the port of landing from being reached in a timely manner.

In the practice of SAR operations conducted by NGO ships, most conditions imposed by the law decree are already fulfilled. Humanitarian vessels already immediately refer to the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) to obtain support and indication with regards to a place of safety. Moreover, they always immediately inform maritime or police authorities. It is interesting to note that the Law decree, with reference to letter a) does not take into consideration the recent CJEU decision on the joined cases C-14/21 and C-15/21,^[48] in which the Court stated that the disembarkation State cannot require different certifications from the ones of the flag State, nor more restrictive or different requirements than the ones provided for the International Conventions.

Based on the previous observations, it can be inferred that the most evident aim of the law decree is to prevent, or at least significantly limit, the possibility for humanitarian vessels to dock on Italian territory, and consequently to prevent Italy to be the competent Country for international protection applications according to Regulation 2013/604. In this sense appear to have been designed letters d) and f), establishing that NGOs’ vessels are required to reach without delay the place of safety and implement actions at sea that do not contribute to dangerous situations onboard. The clear consequence of this timely performance seems to imply the duty not to rescue other people than the ones already onboard and to forbid the trans-shipment from a humanitarian vessel to another. It is immediately clear the unlawfulness of this provision according to international customary law, the SOLAS Convention (art. 98) and to domestic law (art. 1113 – which introduces a specific type of offence for failure to render assistance in cases requested by Maritime Authorities – and 1158 – establishing sanctions for failure to assist ships or persons in distress – of the Navigation Code). In conclusion, the State must require the captain of the ship to provide for rescue assistance in case of shipwrecks or dangers for lives at sea. The most ambivalent requirement is the one referred to the obligation to provide information on international protection to people rescued while still on-board (let. b)). Such obligation cannot fall on the captain of a ship sailing under the flag of another State, as the relevant powers and duties are indicated by the national law of that State (Article 8 of the Code of Navigation R.D. 327/42); therefore, the Italian State cannot impose rules that go beyond the law of the flag State. Furthermore, in terms of access to the international protection procedure within a European Union member State, it has to be underlined that art. 4 of Directive 2013/32 established that each state shall appoint specific authorities responsible for examining applications for international protection, for dealing with cases subject to the Dublin Regulation or for refusing entry under border examination procedures. In the light of the above, Italy, according to Legislative decree 25/2008, appointed the Territorial Commissions for the evaluation of the applications (also for applications at the border), the Dublin Unit (at the Ministry of the Interior) for ascertaining the competence of the State according to the criteria of Regulation 604/2013 (Art. 3) and the border police or the police headquarters territorially competent for receiving applications (Art. 26). It clearly appears that the competence of Italian authorities is triggered only when the asylum seeker is on national territory, and would not apply to that of another State, as in the case of foreign-flagged vessels. In addition, one of the principles enshrined within the Hirsi Jamaa vs. Italy‘s decision was the necessity of an individual examination of the single cases by expert professionals, which cannot be the case of crew members of a humanitarian vessel. Taking the above into consideration, the attempt of the Italian government to introduce new principles and criteria in relation to the competence to examine international application appears to be conflicting with regards to domestic, European and international law.

Incidents related to Law 15/2023

The impact of Law 15/2023 started evident already from the first months of 2023, especially concerning search and rescue activity performed by NGO vessels. A non-exhaustive list of cases of administrative detention that occurred after the approval of the decree and the legal disputes that arose from it is reported:

• Geo Barents (23 February 2023): The vessel operated by Doctors Without Borders (MSF) received a custody administrative order lasting 20 days and a €10,000 fine after concluding a rescue operation on 17 February. The official reason provided was “not having shared some information not strictly related to the rescue activity.” MSF filed an appeal against the administrative order,^[49] which is still pending in front of the Court of Appeal of Rome.
• Louise Michel (25 March 2023): The vessel was seized after the accusation of obstructing search and rescue operations. Having been ordered to reach Trapani port after a first rescue operation, the boat instead conducted three further rescues, leading the Italian Coast Guard to accuse it of “obstruction to search and rescue activities.” Legal proceedings followed, with the vessel’s detention being upheld.^[50]
• Mare-Go and Sea-Eye 4 (2 June 2023): Italian authorities ordered the administrative detention of both vessels.^[51] Mare-Go, after completing multiple rescues, headed to Lampedusa instead of the assigned port of Trapani, contravening the Coordination Centre’s instructions. This resulted in a 20-day detention and fine. Sea-Eye 4 received the same measures after arriving at Ortona having conducted a double rescue, despite instructions to return to port after the first operation. Sea-Eye appealed the provision, and the case is still pending in front of the Court of Appeal.
• Aurora SAR (14 June and 21 August): Twice affected by similar detention provisions for non-compliance with disembarkation orders (disembarking in Lampedusa while the assigned port was Trapani).^[52] Two appeals were filed before the Civil Court of Palermo, but the court declared its lack of jurisdiction to decide on the case and transferred the proceedings to the Court of Cassation.
• Open Arms and Sea-Eye 4 (22 August):^[53] Both vessels received detention orders – Open Arms for delays in reaching Marina di Carrara, and Sea-Eye 4 for delays in requesting a port in Salerno. Both organizations filed complaints against these measures, and both procedures are still pending, one in front of The Court of Cassation.
• Mare Jonio and Sea-Eye 4 (October): Both received detention measures – Mare Jonio for delay in requesting a port of disembarkation, and Sea-Eye 4 for “having contributed to create a dangerous situation on board or preventing the ship from promptly reaching the port of disembarkation”.^[54] The Sea-Eye 4’s disembarkation took place in Vibo Valentia on October 30 after a “complicated and tragic SAR operation.” The NGO’s lawyers filed an appeal against the administrative detention and the resulting sanction. On 6 December 2024, the Civil Court of Vibo Valentia ruled, declaring the administrative measures imposed against the NGO to be illegitimate.^[55]
• Ocean Viking (15 November and 30 December): Detained twice on similar grounds related to alleged dangerous situations or delayed arrivals at assigned ports. SOS Méditerranée filed appeals in both cases to challenge both the administrative detention and the fine. Both cases are still pending.
• Open Arms (21 January 2024): After concluding a SAR operation in Crotone, received administrative measures based on alleged non-compliance with instructions from the Libyan Coastguard. Legal challenges followed, but the case is still pending.^[56]
• Ocean Viking (9 February 2024): Received a 20-day detention order and fine for allegedly contributing “to creating any dangerous situation on board or preventing the ship from promptly reaching the port of disembarkation.” SOS Méditerranée appealed this decision. On 20 February 2024, the Civil Court of Brindisi suspended the detention order, citing “the lack of competence of the head of the Italian administrative authority” and “the non-existence on the merits of the prerequisites for the application of Art. 1, paragraph 2 sexies, of d.l. 21 October 2022, no. 130.” The court also recognized that the detention infringed on SOS Méditerranée’s constitutional rights to freedom of expression and association.^[57] The Court of Brindisi has referred the case to the Constitutional Court, questioning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 2-sexies of Decree Law 130/2020 (as modified by Decree Law 1/2023), which imposes an automatic 20-day detention of vessels that do not follow instructions from maritime rescue authorities. The judge argues this provision violates several constitutional principles: the automatic nature of the sanction prevents judicial discretion (violating Article 3); the law’s vague reference to Libyan authorities’ orders lacks determinacy (violating Article 25); and enforcing Libyan instructions may violate international obligations as Libya is not considered a “safe port” (violating Articles 10 and 117).^[58]
• Sea-Eye 4: (7 March 2024); Administrative detention of SEA-EYE 4 for 60 days imposed by Italian authorities in Reggio Calabria based on the contested Decree Law No. 1/2023 and, in particular, as the related operations were allegedly carried out without the authorization and in disregard of the instructions of the Libyan Authority. The NGO filed an appeal against the decision and on 5 June 2024 the Court of Reggio Calabria, annulled the order.^[59]
• Humanity 1 (4 March 2024); The humanitarian vessel Humanity 1 conducted a rescue operation at sea during which the Libyan Coast Guard intervened. The ship continued with rescue operations despite the Libyan intervention, whose personnel were armed and even fired intimidating shots. Following this operation, Italian authorities imposed a twenty-day administrative detention on the vessel, claiming it had violated the instructions of the Libyan Coast Guard. The NGO filed an appeal in front of the Civil Court in Crotone. The Tribunal ruled on 26 June 2024 that the administrative detention of the Humanity 1 vessel was illegitimate, finding that the NGO had fulfilled its duty to rescue under international maritime law and that orders from the Libyan Coast Guard to cease rescue operations could not be considered legally binding, especially given Libya cannot be considered a “place of safety” under the Hamburg Convention.^[60]
• Geo Barents (26 August 2024); The Geo Barents rescue vessel operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has been issued a 60-day detention order and a €3,330 fine after docking in Salerno with 191 migrants rescued in Libyan waters through five separate operations. Italian authorities implemented the measure, accusing the ship of violating the “Cutro Decree” by failing to properly communicate with maritime safety authorities during rescue operations. Among the rescued migrants were three women and 23 unaccompanied minors.^[61] On 11 September 2024, the Civil Court of Salerno issued an interim order suspending the 60-day administrative detention of the Geo Barents rescue vessel. The judge found the appeal had merit based on evidence suggesting the ship did not create any dangerous situations during rescue operations and had properly informed the Libyan Coast Guard, which merely asked the vessel to leave the area without providing specific instructions. The court also cited “imminent danger of serious and irreparable harm,” as the detention would irreversibly prejudice the vessel’s humanitarian mission.^[62]
• Geo Barents (23 September 2024): The Geo Barents vessel docked in Genoa carrying onboard 205 migrants rescued in two separate operations off the Libyan coast. The Italian Authorities contested the NGO did not comply with orders and issue a 60-days detention order for the vessel. The NGO appealed against the provision and received a positive interim decision.
• Mare Jonio (15 October 2024): The NGO vessel Mare Jonio docked at Porto Empedocle after the Italian Immigration Department assigned it as a safe port. The ship carried 58 migrants rescued in the Sicilian Channel. Initially, authorities had ordered the vessel to disembark the migrants in Naples, but the organisation Mediterranea Saving Humans contested this decision, arguing the route was too distant from their position. After requesting a closer port, they were redirected to Porto Empedocle. Before this approval, Italian authorities had sent two patrol boats to escort the Mare Jonio to Naples. The 58 rescued individuals were found in international waters within the Tunisian SAR zone following an alert from Alarm Phone.^[63] The NGO has received a 20-day administrative detention order, which has been appealed by the organization’s legal team. The case is still pending.

Relations with third countries

 Tunisia

Regarding the external sea borders with Tunisia, on 9 December 2020 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed a technical agreement with the UN Office for Services and Projects (UNOPS) to support the North African country in border control activities and in fighting migrant trafficking.^[64] With at least 1,922 Tunisians repatriated in 2020 and 1,872 in 2021, Tunisia was the main destination for repatriation from Italy (73.5% of the total number of migrants repatriated).^[65]

As of 26 October, according to FTDES (Tunisian Forum for social and economic rights) data for 2022, more than 29,000 migrants were intercepted at sea and 544 died. MRCC Tunisia independently manages coastal guard activities and search and rescue operations even if a Search and Rescue area has not been communicated to the IMO so far. Between 2020 and 2021, six projects funded by the Italian government through the so-called “Rewarding Fund for Repatriation Policies^[66]” have been implemented within the framework of actions aiming at strengthening borders and providing economical support to return. An estimated amount of 19 million Euro has been granted by Italy. In 2021, the project called “Support to border control and management of migratory influx to Tunisia” received a second tranche of 7 million euros, that will be assigned as a result of concrete results in border control activities. According to a journalistic enquiry, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be effectively cooperating with UNOPS to obtain the assignment of funds aimed at requiring maintenance interventions for patrol boats.^[67]

On July 16 2023, the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia.^[68] Migration management is one of the five pillars of the agreement: the EU pledges to provide an additional EUR 100 million to Tunisia to strengthen border management, search and rescue operations at sea, and “anti-trafficking” measures to reduce the number of arrivals from the country.^[69] Despite the official reasons for the deal including “countering the root causes of migration”, the deal mainly risks resulting in preventing those seeking protection from accessing asylum.^[70] Despite its approval and the amount of resources deployed, a few weeks after the European Parliament expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the agreement.^[71] Euractiv has recently updated on how funds have been allocated with regards to migration management in Tunisia.^[72]

The consequences of Tunisia’s racist policies and the outsourcing strategies advocated by the European Union, especially Italy, have become evident – and have been called out – in recent months.^[73] The departure prevention system has been combined with a process of expelling sub-Saharan people – either led by Tunisian authorities or with their tacit consent -, to Libya and Algeria.^[74]

On 5 June, following the eviction on 3 May of around 500 migrants camped in front of the UNHCR and IOM offices in Tunis, a group of asylum seekers was transferred and abandoned by the police forces near the border with Algeria. Some people from the group filed an urgent appeal with the United Nations Human Rights Committee with the support of ASGI lawyers.^[75]

As reported by the inquiry “Desert Dumps” co-published by Lighthouse Reports,^[76] the interplay between these two approaches – and the EU funding to the Tunisian authorities – has created a process that severely violates the basic rights of migrant individuals, who find themselves involved in trafficking networks that function through exceptionally brutal means and by being expelled to nations marked by racist practices, with the genuine danger of being deserted in the wilderness or entrusted to human smugglers. Similar conclusions were reached by a research project promoted by an anonymous collective of researchers with the support of Border Forensic, ASGI and On Borders that gathered several testimonies from sub-Saharan citizens abandoned in the desert or handed over to Libyan militias in the report “State Trafficking”^[77] published on 25 January 2025. Efforts to call out the detrimental consequences of Tunisian (and, by implication, European) strategies were further advanced by various UN Special Rapporteurs through a collective press release dated 14 October 2024.^[78]

Regarding Italian funding to the Tunisian Coast Guard within the framework provided by the memorandum, in March 2024, several Italian associations, including ASGI, filed an appeal before the Administrative Court of Rome, asking the judge to assess the legitimacy of the acts by which the Ministry of the Interior ordered the transfer of new patrol boats to Tunisia. In May, there was an initial rejection decision by the Administrative Court of Rome, against which an appeal was made to the Council of State. After an initial precautionary decision through which the Council of State had suspended the delivery of some patrol boats, in July, the Council of State rejected the precautionary request with which civil society organizations asked for the suspension of the transfer of the patrol boats to the Tunisian National Guard, 2024.^[79] On 16 January 2025 the appeal was definitively rejected.^[80]

Libya 

• Memorandum of Understanding and situation in Libya

On 2 February 2023, the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya was renewed for the second time after February 2020.^[81] The agreement, originally signed by Italian Prime Minister Gentiloni and his Libyan counterpart Fayez El Serraj on 2 February 2017, aimed at strengthening cooperation on Libyan border management, “to ensure the reduction of illegal migration flows”. The agreement provides funding, equipment and technical support to the Libyan authorities, primarily the Libyan coastguard, for patrolling and rescuing boats in international waters. According to ASGI, this naval blockade policy should be balanced out through the creation of evacuation programmes from Libya through the UNHCR-managed resettlement mechanism^[82] and humanitarian corridors. Recent experience has shown the results of the blockade system, that led to the creation of the Libyan coastguard and its apparatus for managing SAR interventions. This is however not counter-balanced by an effective evacuation mechanism. The only functioning mechanism available for persons present in Libya are the voluntary return programmes coordinated by IOM; it should be noted that these programmes are proposed to vulnerable individuals who are not in a position to make a free choice about returning to their countries of origin.^[83] In fact, the Libyan migration management system has continued to be based on the systematic detention of foreigners, without any kind of administrative authorisation or judicial validation and protracted indefinitely under conditions of systematic torture and fundamental rights violations (see chapter on Detention conditions).^[84]

Evidence regarding the dramatic effects of this mechanism and policy has been reported by different institutions such, among others, IOM and UNHCR.^[85] From a domestic perspective the Criminal Court of Trapani ruled that the bilateral agreement was in contrast with the Italian Constitution and international laws.^[86] The Memorandum was heavily criticised by numerous associations including ASGI,^[87] and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.^[88]

On 9 of December 2022, the Special Representative for Libya of the UN Secretary General issued a report^[89] highlighting that “many migrants and refugees continued to endure widespread human rights violations and faced serious humanitarian and protection concerns in Libya”. In the same report, the Special Representative mentioned that between January and 29 October 2022, a total of 19,308 individuals were intercepted and returned to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard, while 1,286 were reported dead or missing at sea. The dramatic conditions of migrants and refugees in Libya has been as well highlighted by Mohamed Aujjar, head of the Fact-Finding Mission on Libya of the Human Rights Council, who defined migrant detention centres as “places of terrible and systematic abuse, that may amount to crimes against humanity”.^[90]

Furthermore, on 27 March 2023, the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission issued a report expressing deep concern about the country’s deteriorating human rights situation, highlighting that migrant, in particular, have been targeted and that there is overwhelming evidence that they have been systematically tortured. In particular, the press release^[91] underlined that ‘there are reasonable grounds to believe migrants were enslaved in official detention centres well as “secret prisons,” and that rape as a crime against humanity was committed’.

On 3 June 2024 a report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was published. Covering the period from April 2023 to March 2024,^[92] the report sheds light on the dire situation faced by migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers in Libya. The report documents gross and widespread human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by both State and non-State actors, particularly at borders and in arbitrary detention. In 2024, two significant events showcased the ongoing challenges and human rights concerns surrounding the treatment of migrants in Libya. In March 2024, a mass grave containing at least 65 bodies, presumed to be migrants, was discovered in South-Western Libya. This disturbing finding underscores the grave dangers and human rights abuses faced by migrants in the region. Furthermore, on 18 February 2024, the Italian Court of Cassation ruled^[93] that the facilitation of migrant and refugee interceptions by the Libyan Coast Guard was unlawful and might constitute collective refoulement, violating the European Convention on Human Rights. The court recognized that Libya is not a safe port of return for migrants and refugees. Throughout the reporting period, OHCHR, in cooperation with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), documented a consistent pattern of armed interceptions, forced returns without due process, and transfers to detention facilities where torture, ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, trafficking, forced labour, and extortion were verified.

On 29 November 2024, in a case followed by Asgi together with JL Project, Alarm Phone and Sea-Watch, the Civil Court of Rome issued an interim measure ordering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a visa to a Sudanese citizen to allow his arrival in Italy for submitting an asylum application. After having been rescued by the merchant ship Vos Triton (flag of Gibraltar) in 2021, the Sudanese national had been forcibly transferred onto a Libyan patrol boat and brought back to Libya, the country from which he had fled with dozens of other people.

The Court recognised the responsibility of the Italian authorities for a pushback that occurred in international waters by two foreign ships on the basis of the constant support (or de facto coordination) provided by the MRCC Rome during the operations. The following hearing has been set for the 28 May 2025.^[94] In the meanwhile the Sudanese man obtained the visa and arrived in Italy where he could submit an asylum request.[95]

The discovery of two additional mass graves (nineteen bodies were discovered in Jakharrah, while at least 30 more were found in a mass grave in the Alkufra desert in the southeast) reported on 10 February 2025 has further confirmed the dramatic condition of the migrant population in Libya.^[96]

• Italian funding to Libya         

Since 2017, the Italian government, through the SIBMILL programme, has provided funding in the context of Libya.^[97] For the funding of this programme, Italy planned to spend 44.5 million euros; to date, this has been exceeded, reaching an estimate of 56.5 million, of which 12 million were allocated to the IOM for the development of certain projects. Funds managed directly by Italy were used for support measures for the so-called Libyan Coast Guard, including technical instrumentation and training courses.

The funds for the MRCC come from SIBMILL (Integrated Border Control System in Libya) project coordinated by the Italian Ministry of the Interior since 2017 and linked to the Trust Fund for Africa, set up by the European Commission at the end of 2015, with the intended objective of “addressing the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration and to contribute to a better migration management”. The Sibmmil project is divided into two phases: the first has a budget of 46.3 million euros, the second of 15 million.^[98]

Based on the approval of the MOI, Italy has since 2017 equipped Libya with naval units, supplied and financed the rehabilitation of several patrol boats and ensured the presence in Tripoli of an Italian naval unit (Nave Tremiti, Nave Capri, and then Nave Caprera)^[99] to provide Libya with technical assistance and training.^[100] Nave Capri and Caprera have also coordinated Libyan naval units in the tracking of boats at sea.^[101]

With regards to financial support, for the two-year period 2020-2021, the Ministry of Interior had foreseen an additional 1.2 million euros in naval supplies.^[102]

As of December 2021, a new mobile “search and rescue” coordination centre (MRCC) was handed over to the Libyans. It was set up to be able to connect to the surface surveillance radar installed at the Abu Sitta naval base in Libyan territory (where Italian Navy assets are also moored). The small centre’s official purpose is to “monitor” the Libyan “search and rescue” (SAR) area that Italy itself contributed to have established in 2017-2018 and recognised before the International Maritime Organization.

On the other hand, Italy has also provided funding to projects in Libya directly, including to the International Organisation for Migration. On July 2, 2021, the Directorate General for Italians Abroad and Migration Policies (DGIT) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) entered into an agreement with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) whereby it committed to fund an intervention called “Multi-sectoral support for mobile vulnerable populations and communities in Libya” for 4 million euros (for its first phase). Many of the activities to be funded with this are geared towards local community and protection. Special attention is given to support activities to Libyan authorities inside detention centres and in SAR operations, and ultimately – especially in the last phase – engaging more frequently on Assisted Voluntary Return. As of 6 June 2023, EUR 16 million has been allocated and the programme is currently on phase 3, which is focused on AVR, while the second phase, to which EUR 8.5 million was allocated, mainly focused on the condition of the Detention Centres.^[103]

In relation to funding granted by the Italian government to Libya, in December 2024, following a FOIA request submitted by ASGI, data was made public^[104] regarding the Assisted Voluntary Return projects funded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by IOM between 2017 and 2025. ASGI is closely monitoring the issue of Italian government involvement in “voluntary” return programs from Libya and Tunisia as part of the opposition to externalization policies that lead to severe restriction of the fundamental rights of people in transit. ASGI argues that what has been presented as “voluntary returns” from Libya, funded by Italian cooperation, constitute human rights violations. Indeed, these returns violate the principle of non-refoulement and protection obligations toward minors and survivors of trafficking, torture, and gender-based violence. The UN Special Rapporteur on migrants’ rights has highlighted that genuine voluntary returns require free, informed choice with valid alternatives and without coercion—conditions impossible to meet in Libya, where many returns occur from arbitrary detention facilities where individuals suffer torture and abuse.

• Interception at sea, refoulement and following legal actions

The resulting effects of Italy’s indirect pushbacks to Libya and the consequences on people suffering inhuman and cruel treatments are now being examined by the European Court of Human Rights in the case S.S. and others v. Italy concerning a rescue operation of the Sea Watch ship hindered in November 2017 by the Libyan coastguard through a patrol boat donated by Italy and with the coordination of the Italian MRCC.^[105]

From January 2020 to September 2020, at least 9,000 people were tracked down by the Libyan coastguard and brought back to Libya.^[106] According to data collected by IOM present at the landing sites in Libya, by the end of 2020, 12,000 people were intercepted and brought back by the Libyan authorities meaning that, in 2020, more than 42% of the people who attempted to leave Libya, have been brought back.^[107] Confirming what was previously mentioned regarding the number of people returned to Libya, Amnesty International recently reported that “in 2021, the Libyan coastguards, with the support of Italy and the European Union, captured 32,425 refugees and migrants at sea and brought them back to Libya: by far the highest number recorded so far, three times higher than the previous year. 1,553 people died or disappeared at sea in the central Mediterranean in 2021”.^[108] According to IOM data, from the beginning of 2023 up to 25 November 2023, 15,057 migrants were intercepted at sea and brought back to Libya after attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe, while 957 died and 1,256 are missing.^[109]

According to data extracted from the three quarterly reports (Q1, Q2, and Q3 2024) of the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix,^[110] approximately 30,169 people departed from Libya to reach Italy by sea between January and September 2024. Regarding the tragic death toll, the central Mediterranean route confirms itself as the deadliest with a total of 1,237 migrants dead or missing in the first nine months of 2024: 384 people lost their lives in the first quarter, 481 in the second quarter, and 372 in the third quarter. These numbers represent a significant portion of the 2,686 total deaths recorded by IOM’s Missing Migrants Project across all Mediterranean and Western African Atlantic routes during the same period. Infomigrants reports^[111] that the number of migrants intercepted at sea and forcibly returned to Libya increased from 17,000 in 2023 to 20,839 in 2024, according to the UN migration agency IOM. In just the last week of November 2024, 255 people were returned to the Libyan coastal cities of Azzawya and Sirt, with 24 of them being children.

• “Privatised pushbacks”
• On 18 December 2019, the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) filed a complaint against Italy with the UN Human Rights Committee in the context of “privatised pushbacks”, consisting of requiring commercial ships to return refugees and other persons in need of protection to unsafe locations.^[112] However, the complaint was considered inadmissible by the Committee for failure to exhaust domestic remedies in Libya.
• In February 2021, five Eritrean citizens, with the support of the ASGI and Amnesty International, initiated a civil action to declare the illegality of the refoulement to Libya carried out on 2 July 2018 by the ship “Asso Ventinove” of the Augusta Offshore during an operation coordinated by the Italian authorities stationed in Libya and with the collaboration of the Libyan Coast Guard. On 26 June 2024, the Civil Court of Rome condemn the Ministries of Defence, Transport, the Presidency of the Council, the Captain of the Asso 29 and the shipowner Augusta Offshore to pay damages to the five plaintiffs who were taken back to Libya by the Italian merchant vessel. The Civil Court concluded in its judgment that the presence of Libyan border authorities and the existence of a Libyan SAR zone “cannot diminish the respect for international obligations by the Italian State, which has or should have had de facto control over the migrants” and that therefore it should have “taken the migrants to Italy, and not to Libya, regardless of Libyan instructions”.^[113] On 25 December 2024 a Sudanese citizen, among the plaintiffs in the Asso 28 case, entered Italy with a visa in order to exercise his right to asylum in Italy.^[114]
• In June 2021, IOM and UNHCR, confirmed that over 270 migrants and refugees had been handed over to the Libyan Coast Guard by the ship “Vos Triton” and were subsequently taken into detention by the Libyan authorities. The two organisations reiterated that no one should be returned to Libya after being rescued at sea, as under international maritime law, rescued individuals should be disembarked at a place of safety.^[115] A case was initially started due to a lack of transparency on a FOIA request submitted by the NGO Sea Watch, who had observed the dynamics of the pullbacks, coordinated by the Italian MRCC, through its aerial assets. Following two grades of administrative procedures, the Council of State confirmed the legality of the denial to access to the document required.^[116]At the beginning of 2024, new evidence was handed over to the Italian Public Prosecutor Office in Rome by two Sudanese applicants involved in the Vos Triton pullbacks. The two Sudanese citizens are currently in Sudan and Libya provided the information with the support of ASGI, Comitato Nuovi Desaparecidos, Open Arms, Progetto Diritti, Sea Watch, Mediterranea, Jl Project and Alarm Phone.^[117]
• In another case, on 14 October 2021, the criminal Court of Naples sentenced a commercial vessel captain, Asso28, to a one-year imprisonment, due to having returned migrants to Libya. On 30 July 2018, the vessel had intercepted a rubber dinghy with 101 people on board and, having taken on board a Libyan customs officer, the captain let him carry out the rescue and return operations to Libya of the migrants. The captain was acquitted of the charge of “disembarkation and arbitrary abandonment of persons”, pursuant to art. 1155 of the navigation code, and of “abandonment of minors” pursuant to art. 591 of the penal code. For the first time, the return to Libya led to the condemnation of a private boat.^[118] The conviction of the ship’s captain was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Naples on 10 November 2022. The Court confirmed the grounds of the first instance decision.^[119] On 1 February 2024 the Court of Cassation^[120] ruled on the appeal brought by the ship’s captain against the decision of the Naples Court of Appeals, upholding the final conviction of the captain of the vessel Asso 28. The Supreme Court, in upholding the convictions on the two charges, reiterated that Libya and the port of Tripoli cannot be considered places of safety given the serious and systematic human rights violations taking place in the country to the detriment of migrants.^[121]

Pushbacks at Adriatic ports

As monitored by ASGI, No Name Kitchen, Ambasciata dei Diritti di Ancona and Associazione SOS Diritti, refoulements continue to be carried out from Italy to Greece at Adriatic maritime borders, based on the bilateral agreement signed by the Italian and Greek government in 1999, which became operational in 2001, even if it was never ratified by the Italian Parliament.^[122] In 2022, readmissions and refoulements were still recorded also towards Albania.^[123]

As provided in the readmission agreement with Slovenia, the readmission agreement with Greece excludes the informal transfer between the two countries of illegally staying third-country nationals only of those recognised as refugees by the state requesting readmission.^[124]

Access to the asylum procedure and to information is very limited, and transfers or re-admissions are immediately executed to send foreign nationals back to Greece. On 18 January 2023, Lighthouse Reports, in collaboration with SRF, ARD Monitor, Al Jazeera, Domani and Solomon, published an online investigation on the illegal readmissions of asylum seekers to Greece that take place at the Adriatic seaports and the illegal detention to which third Country nationals undergo are subjected in unofficial places of detention on-board ships and ferries.^[125] Despite the existence of a bilateral agreement between Italy and Greece, dated 1999, this procedure is adopted also to asylum seekers and minors.

In cases where the person can contact the network of NGOs operating at Adriatic ports, they generally managed to apply for asylum. In the others, the push back was carried out to the port of departure. According to the testimonies collected by the Network, if the ferry leaves immediately the person is kept on board. Otherwise, they are held in a police station inside the port and then taken back to the ferry.

On 7 February 2022, the Adriatic Ports Network sent a new communication to the Committee of Ministers of Europe,^[126] requesting the continuation of the procedure to oversee the implementation of the Sharifi ruling, denouncing, contrary to the Government’s claim in the Action Report of 15 December 2021, the persistence of illegitimate practices. The Government declared, instead, to have taken all necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of the alleged violations and to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the ECtHR and called for the definitive closure of the procedure.^[127] However, as the Network highlighted in its communication, the practices of illegitimacy persist and the rejections and readmissions of foreign nationals traced onboard ships or in the immediate landing area of the main Italian Adriatic ports continue. Readmissions and rejections also occur many hours after apprehension, as intercepted foreign nationals are held in transit areas, where no individual assessment is carried out by border police nor legal assistance is provided, or inside the ferries themselves, where migrants are detained in a condition of total invisibility. The testimonies collected report incidents of mistreatment and behaviour detrimental to personal dignity both during the tracing phase on board the ship or ashore, and during and at the end of readmission procedures, such as confiscation and destruction of personal belongings, forcing them to undress, and exposure to extreme temperatures. On 15 August 2021, an Afghan national and a Kurd from Iraq, despite their intention to seek asylum and the alert sent to the relevant authorities by the network, were readmitted to Greece; on 6 October 2021, a Kurdish citizen from Iraq was granted access to the territory and asylum claim, following the network’s intervention that interrupted the readmission procedure already in place. In January 2022, a family with a minor in need of health care was turned away from the port of Bari, despite presenting relevant documentation attesting said health needs. From April to November 2022, the Network received 21 calls from nationals of different countries (i.e. Iraq, Türkiye, Afghanistan), mostly from Bari and Brindisi, while 1 was from Ancona. Most of them were adult men, two were unaccompanied minors. All these cases had a positive outcome, as access to the territory was ensured after an individual intervention.

In 2022, the network also received three reports of people already readmitted to Greece, without having the chance to intervene in order to halt the readmission procedure.

The support provided by the network changes depending on the individual case, but generally the timing is quite tight and legal counselling is provided.

Through a F.O.I.A request sent to public administrations by Altreconomia, it has been made public that,^[128] from 1 January 2022 to 14 November 2022, 1,917 third country nationals received a return order from the Border Police Office at the Adriatic ports cities and that 81 people were informally readmitted to Greece. Among these, 29 Afghan citizens, 15 Iraqi citizens and 11 Albanian citizens.

On 7 July 2023, the same practices that were reported by Lighthouse Reports (e.g, pushbacks at the Adriatic ports, obligation to undress, detention on ferries) were the subject of an important decision adopted by the Court of Rome.^[129] The ruling reaffirmed the illegitimacy of the use of informal readmissions that take place at the Adriatic ports because they are adopted without the issuance of an individual measure, because they undermine the right of access to asylum because they lack appropriate information, and because they are adopted without a previous individual assessment of the concrete case. The present case is particularly significant because the applicant was an unaccompanied foreign minor, and an applicant for international protection in Greece, in possession of documentation certifying both of these facts. Nevertheless, the Italian authorities informally readmitted the applicant, forcing him to strip naked and be detained in a ferry compartment for many hours before being returned to the Greek authorities.^[130] The decision, in addition to accounting for all the violations indicated, requires the Italian government to take the necessary steps to ensure the applicant’s access to Italian territory, suggesting the issuance of a humanitarian visa under Article 25 of EC Regulation 810/2009 (Visa Regulation). No data for the year 2024 has been made public.

The Protocol between Italy and Albania

On 6 November 2023, the “Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Italy and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on Strengthening Cooperation in Migration Matters”^[131] was signed in Rome. The official purpose is to strengthen bilateral cooperation between the states on the management of migratory flows from third countries, through the construction of two centres on Albanian territory under Italian jurisdiction, to which “migrants” who have had been admitted into to border or repatriation procedures will be assigned. The Protocol includes two Annexes, notably one detailing the expenses to be borne by the Italian government for the construction of the centres. The Albanian authorities offered up two areas within their territory to construct two detention centres during the spring of 2024, which will run for an initial period of 5 years. The Protocol envisages that the centres will have capacity to accommodate a maximum of 3,000 individuals at the same time. One centre has been built near the port of Shengjin, where disembarkation, identification, border procedures, and elements related to asylum procedure will take place; the second centre has been built in Gjader, where people deemed ineligible for asylum will be accommodated. The two centres are managed by the Italian authorities “in accordance with the relevant Italian and European legislation”. They are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Italian authorities and will have the sole purpose of carrying out border, asylum and return procedures in accordance with Italian and EU law. The Italian authorities are responsible for transfers to and from these centres, as well as for “maintaining security and order” within them. The Albanian authorities are instead responsible for ensuring “security and public order” at the external perimeter and during transfers to and from the detention centres. The Protocol assigns responsibility for ensuring the detention and “unauthorised exit” of individuals into Albanian territory (both during and after the completion of the procedures, and regardless of the outcome) to the Italian authorities.

The European Commission response to the Protocol has been ambiguous. When asked about the legality of the Protocol, the Commission first told reporters that it had asked Italian authorities for more detailed information regarding the exact scope and expected impacts of the arrangement, and that ‘this must be done without prejudice to the asylum acquis’.^[132] In any case, the protocol raises many questions about its compatibility with European Union law^[133] and, more broadly, with international human rights law.^[134]

After an initial phase of apparent political unwillingness on the part of the government for parliamentary passage to approve the law ratifying the Protocol,^[135] on 5 December 2023, the Council of Ministers approved the draft law ratifying the Protocol.^[136] The text introduces a clause equating the Albanian areas provided for in the Protocol to the border or transit zones referred to in Legislative Decree No. 25 of January 28, 2008, in which expedited border procedures are carried out. These areas are equated with the hotspots and detention centres for repatriation provided for in the Immigration Consolidated Act (Testo Unico Immigrazione). On 13 December, the Albanian Constitutional Court was called to rule on the appeal filed on 6 December by 30 Members of Parliament, belonging to opposition parties, concerning the constitutionality of the Italy-Albania bilateral protocol. The Albanian legal system, in addition to the subsequent type of constitutionality review, also requires the Court a minor form of prior review of the compatibility of international agreements with the Constitution, prior to their ratification. On 29 January 2024, the Albanese Constitutional Court ruled that the agreement was compatible with the constitutional system.^[137]

The Italian Parliament ratified the Protocol through Law 14 of 21 February 2024.^[138]

The migrant detention facilities Italy built in Albania have been plagued by persistent delays and uncertainty. Originally slated to open on May 20, the launch date has been repeatedly pushed back: first to August 1, as announced by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni during her June visit to Albania, then to August 10 according to various news outlets^[139]. After the postponement of three additional dates, the centres were finally declared operational on 11 October.^[140]

The first transfer procedure to Albania began on 14 October 2024.^[141] Immediately, a series of logistical complexities became evident, including the duration of transfer operations, the number of transfers required, and the screening procedures, both health-related and for determining the nationalities of the individuals involved. On 16 October, four migrants had already been released after being brought to the port of Shengjin in Albania. Upon more thorough screening, two were found to be minors and two had health problems. These four were boarded onto the Italian navy ship Libra and sent back to Italy, to Brindisi, where they were transferred to a reception centre. On 18 October, the Court of Rome did not to validate the detention orders issued to twelve migrants of both Egyptian and Bangladeshi nationalities. The court’s decision was based on a European Court of Justice ruling, which determined that the migrants’ countries of origin could not be considered safe. The European Court of Justice had explained that only countries without territorial safety exceptions could be included in the list of safe countries of origin,^[142], and according to the Court of Rome, this is not the case for either Egypt nor Bangladesh.^[143] The twelve migrants were brought to Italy, specifically to Brindisi to be transferred into the regular reception system.

The government’s sharp and indignant response against the Court’s decision came without delay. On 23 October, the Government approved Decree Law 158/2024, by which a new list of countries considered safe was included directly in the law.^[144] Despite removing three countries for which the Foreign Ministry had indicated territorial safety exceptions, the list still designates countries such as Tunisia, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Ivory Coast, and Peru as safe. For these countries, the Ministry’s own reports had noted exceptions for certain groups highlighting systematic violations of fundamental rights. These concerns prompted the Court of Bologna to submit a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice about the correctness of the procedure used to define the safe countries list, while the Catania Tribunal disapplied Decree Law 158/2024, invalidating the detention order of a person undergoing accelerated asylum review due to coming from a “safe” country, based on the evaluation that the 19 countries included in the list cannot be considered as safe, under current EU legal provisions, as there are exclusions for specific groups.^[145]

On 8 November 2024, following operations that had begun several days earlier and the approval of the decree law, the government transferred eight migrants to Albania, despite the pending case before the Court of Justice.^[146] On 11 November, the Civil Court of Rome did not validate the detention of seven migrants ordering their release and return to Italy. This time, the judges also requested that the CJEU rule on the case. Initially, eight people from Egypt and Bangladesh had been selected for this transfer, but one was found to be vulnerable due to health issues and was then brought to Italy.^[147]

Through L. 187/2024, the competence to decide on administrative detentions (including those relating to the procedure in Albania) has been moved from the specialized sections on immigration of the courts of first instance to the courts of appeal.^[148]

On 31 January 2025, the Civil Court of Appeal of Rome did not validate the detention of 43 asylum applicants detained in Albania and requested a preliminary judgement to the Court of Justice of the European Union basing its decision on the same findings raised by the Court of Rome. On 25 February, the Court of Justice held a hearing on the referrals made by Italian judges concerning the concept of safe third country. The lawyers highlighted, among other things, five central issues:

• Judges must have authority to review and disapply “safe country” designations that violate EU criteria, as these designations trigger accelerated procedures with severe consequences for asylum seekers.
• Judicial assessment must focus on whether persecution or serious harm is consistently absent in a country, not on the formal designation procedure.
• EU Directive 2013/32 does not permit designating countries as “safe” while excluding certain vulnerable categories, as this undermines the harmonized European asylum system.
• Member States do not have discretion to create exceptions for certain groups in safe country designations without explicit EU legislative authorization.
• Using quantitative criteria to determine category exceptions is problematic due to the unclear definition of “category of person” and creates risks of improperly applying accelerated procedures.^[149]

On 10 April 2025, the General Advocate of the Court of Justice published their conclusions on the proceedings,^[150] and the Court’s decision is awaited in fall 2025.

However, on 28 March 2025, the Government issued the DL 37/2025, amending L 14/2024 ratifying the Protocol between Italy and Albania. The amendment introduced, among the categories of people who can be transferred to Albania, those who are already subject to detention measures validated or extended pursuant to Article 14 TUI due to their irregular stay and are thus detained in repatriation centres.

On 8 May 2025, through decision no. 17510/2025, the Criminal Court of Cassation overturned a ruling by the Civil Court of Appeal, which had refused to validate the detention of a foreign national. The individual had been detained with the authorisation of the competent Justice of the Peace and subsequently transferred to Albania under the provisions of the new DL 37/2025. After his transfer, he had submitted an asylum application. According to the Court of Appeal the areas in Albania where people can be transferred are equated to border or transit areas where it is only allowed the entry and stay of people destined for repatriation or border procedures and not that of those seeking asylum pursuant to art. 6 of the Reception Decree.

However, according to the Court of Cassation, since DL 37/2025 allowed the transfer to Albania from the CPRs present in Italy, and equates the Gjader center to the Italian CPRs, the same procedure carried out in CPRs applies there. Therefore, the Court annulled the decision of the Court of Appeal and sent the decision back to the latter on the basis of the principle of law according to which “Article 3 of L. 14/2024 does not prevent the application of the art. 6(3) of the Reception Decree in the event that a citizen detained in Gjader applies for asylum; therefore, detention at this centre is possible even after the submission of the asylum application because the centre is equivalent to the centres referred to in the art. 14 TUI” (CPRs).^[151]

Attempt to criminalise migrants’ refusal to be returned to third countries

As reported in 2020 AIDA report, in June 2020 the Criminal Appeal Court of Palermo overturned the decision of the Criminal Court of Trapani that had acquitted two migrants rescued at sea by Vos Thalassa ship in 2018, who had rebelled aboard the ship threatening the captain and the crew once they realised that it was bringing them back to Libya. The judge had recognised they acted in self-defence, and that the act of bringing them back to Libya would have been a crime.^[152] Instead, according to the Court of Appeal, the defendants had voluntarily placed themselves in a dangerous condition, having planned an extremely dangerous sea crossing and having then asked for help in order to be recovered from rescue boats. Consequently, according to the Court their violent and threatening conduct – aimed at preventing the crew of the Vos Thalassa from returning them to the Libyan Coast Guard – cannot be considered self-defence.^[153]

Through Decision n. 15869/2022,^[154] adopted on 16 December 2021, and published on 26 April 2022, the Court of Cassation overturned the decision issued by the Court of Appeal of Palermo, reaffirming the principle that the migrants rescued at sea, asserting their right not to be refouled to Libya, were justified in resisting return procedures, as soon as their reaction to the risk of refoulement was proportionate and there were no proof of collusion with the traffickers.^[155]

On 25 November 2022, the Criminal Court of Trieste acquitted a man accused of having provided false personal details to the authorities, to be registered as a minor. The Court recognised that the man was justified as he had acted in a state of necessity, to protect himself from the danger of serious harm that was the chain refoulement from Italy to Bosnia, which, in any case, he then suffered, being victim of inhuman treatment in Croatia, before being able to return to Italy and obtain refugee status.^[156]

Arrivals by air

Different cooperatives are entrusted by public tender or other temporary contracts to provide information services in the main airports, directly by the local Prefectures.

At the Fiumicino airport of Rome, in 2021 and 2022, the ITC cooperative was in charge of informing and managing foreign people arriving at the air border wanting to seek asylum or who are Dublin returnees. As of 31 October 2022, 980 third country nationals were not granted access to the Italian territory at the airport borders, and only 105 asylum applications were lodged at air borders.^[157]

At the Milan Malpensa airport, since 2020 the cooperative Ballafon is responsible for providing services to asylum seekers arriving at the air border. According to Inlimine ASGI’s project FOIA, as of 31 October 2022, 909 third country nationals were not granted access to the Italian territory at Malpensa airport, while only 128 people were able to seek asylum at the airport. Among people refouled, according to the same information, it appears that persons coming from countries with critical security situations (such as Syria, Palestine, Democratic Republic of Congo or Pakistan) did not have access to the international protection procedure.^[158]

On 20 June 2023, ASGI conducted a visit to the offices and transit area of Milano Malpensa Airport, in compliance with the Lazio Regional Administrative Court ruling No. 3392/2023. During the visit, the delegation had access to the places used for the stay of foreign nationals who receive refoulement orders. As of the date of the visit (June 20, 2023), there had been 546 refusals of entry since the beginning of 2023. The time spent in the transit area awaiting the execution of the refoulement was as follows:

• 313 persons were refused entry in less than 24 hours after being notified of the rejection order;
• 215 persons between 24 and 48 hours;
• 14 persons after a stay in the transit zone of about 48 hours;
• 3 persons after a stay of three days;
• 1 person from Santo Domingo (for whom, officials report, there are only two direct flights per week) after a stay of four days.

Similarly to the findings from a previous ASGI visit to Fiumicino Airport, the main critical issues identified include a failure to provide adequate safeguards for individuals at the airport, particularly due to insufficient information provision and in terms of identifying vulnerabilities, limited access to international protection, de facto detention practices by the police, and a lack of effective access to legal representation and communication with the outside world.^[159]

Data obtained by ASGI following a FOIA request presented relevant information related to refusals of entry and asylum requests at both airports. The examination of migration management data from January 2024 to March 2025 reveals significant border control activities at Italy’s primary international air entry points. Border authorities executed a total of 3,016 refusals of entry across Fiumicino (1,617) and Malpensa (1,399) airports. At Fiumicino, the predominant grounds for rejection were Article E violations (inadequate documentation substantiating purpose and conditions of stay, 624 cases), Article G violations (insufficient financial resources, 504 cases), and Article C violations (absence of valid visa or residence permit, 364 cases). Albanian nationals constituted the largest demographic subject to rejection measures (664 individuals: 270 at Fiumicino and 394 at Malpensa), followed by nationals of Moldova (228), Brazil (210), and Georgia (178). A pronounced disparity exists between rejection enforcement and international protection applications, with only 456 asylum requests registered during the corresponding period (328 at Fiumicino and 128 at Malpensa). At Fiumicino, Tunisian and Iranian nationals submitted the highest number of protection applications (26 and 25 respectively), while at Malpensa, Sri Lankan nationals predominated the asylum-seeking population (62 applications). The rejection-to-application ratio of approximately 6.6:1 raises substantive questions regarding protection mechanism accessibility at these strategic border control points, particularly considering that numerous rejections affected individuals originating from states experiencing documented conditions of socio-political instability or humanitarian crises.

Regarding litigation cases, on 14 October 2024, the Rome Civil Court ordered the Ministry of Interior to pay €5,500 compensation to a Congolese citizen who was unlawfully detained for six days (from 28 November to 4 December 2020) in the transit area of Rome Fiumicino Airport. In the judgment, the court recognized that the detention occurred without any judicial authorization, violating Article 13 of the Italian Constitution and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The claimant, who was later granted subsidiary protection, had been deprived of personal freedom under degrading conditions (no hot shower, inability to use a phone, lack of sleeping materials) after presenting a counterfeit residence permit. The Court quantified the non-material damages at €1,000 per day, following criteria previously established by the Milan Court of Appeal in a 2018 ruling.^[160]

Land borders

Arrivals at the Slovenian land border

By the end of August 2023, 13,700 migrants had entered through the Friuli Venezia Giulia region, according to the information released by the Minister of Interior in September 2023.^[161] In 2022, 13,000 migrants coming from the border between the province of Trieste and Slovenia were traced by the Border Police of Trieste or spontaneously presented themselves to the authorities of the municipalities.^[162]

In 2023, according to information collected by Asgi, only a few readmissions were carried out based on the Readmission Agreement signed by the Italian and Slovenian Governments in 1996,^[163] an agreement never ratified by the Italian Parliament, contrary to what Article 80 of Italian Constitution dictates for the ratification of international treaties that are of a political nature.^[164]

On 18 January 2021, the Civil Court of Rome declared that the informal readmission procedures were contrary to the law as, among other reasons, they violated the right to access the asylum procedure and were not in conformity with the Dublin Regulation. This decision was later partially overturned by the Civil Court of Rome which accepted the appeal submitted by the MoI as it considered that the applicant’s involvement in the procedure was not sufficiently demonstrated. However, the Court confirmed the illegitimacy of the readmission procedures, which was the basis of the motivation of the first court.^[165] Following the Court of Rome decision of 18 January 2021, in 2021, only 6 people were readmitted to Slovenia. However, starting from 31 July 2021, mixed patrols involving Italian and Slovenian police resumed at the eastern Italian border for a total number of 10 monthly services, out of which 7 were carried out in Slovenia (Koper and Nova Gorica) and 3 in Italy (Trieste and Gorizia).^[166]

On several occasions in 2021, the Government outlined the imminent resumption of readmission procedures.^[167] In January 2022, the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region announced that it had purchased, upon request of the Prefecture of Trieste, 65 camera traps, to be allocated to the border police and to be placed on the Italian-Slovenian border to intercept arrivals and act as a “technological wall”.^[168]

During the summer and autumn of 2022, partly because of changed entry policies at the Bosnia Herzegovina-Croatia border and the political change of government in Slovenia, a major increase in the number of arrivals from the Balkan route was reported. Although no official data on entries is available, press articles pointed to increased interceptions of foreign nationals who are irregularly present.^[169] The high number of new arrivals was also confirmed by the systematic difficulties faced by the Prefecture of Trieste and Gorizia in relation to granting reception measures for asylum applicants in the territory.^[170] This situation has created obvious unease and led to a new intensification of police controls on the Slovenian side, starting from 2 September 2022.^[171] After national elections, more focus was put on enhancing border controls, and on 28 November, Interior Ministry Chief of Staff issued a directive calling on public administrations at the borders to intensify actions to curb arrivals.^[172] NGOs, such as ASGI, ICS and the network Rivolti ai Balcani regarded it as a de facto reinstatement of informal readmissions,^[173] which were previously declared illegitimate by the Rome Civil Court decision. On 6 December, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior Emanuele Prisco, during a visit in Trieste, confirmed the political intention of the Government to re-start informal readmission at the border with Slovenia.^[174]

In December 2022 informal readmissions re-started, but they did not involve asylum seekers. However, the Slovenian government refused many people that the Italian border police tried to send back. According to the information obtained by Altreconomia through a FOIA request, out of 190 readmission requests, only 23 were successful. The Slovenian Government did not dispute the validity of the agreement, but it claimed there was no evidence of the previous passage of those people from Slovenia.^[175]

Beyond the intention to reactivate informal readmissions, following a parliamentary question on 13 September 2023, the Italian Ministry of the Interior confirmed that, as of September 2022, the Italian and Slovenian governments had given more structure to cross-border police cooperation actions. Thanks to these initiatives, the government declared that during 2023, bilateral operations prevented 1,900 foreign nationals from entering Italian territory.^[176] ASGI therefore presented a FOIA request to receive information about specific elements of this practice, and the Administration confirmed the direct involvement of Italian authorities in mixed patrols on Slovenian territory with powers of observation and information support, under the bilateral agreement on cross-border police cooperation of August 27, 2007, ratified by Law 60 of April 7, 2011.^[177] During a hearing before the Parliamentary Schengen Committee, Interior Minister Piantedosi also announced ‘the establishment of Mixed Brigades of Police Forces, based on the fruitful experience (…) gained with joint patrol services.’^[178] According to a 2 November 2023 news report, police coordination centres involving Italy, Slovenia and Croatia will also be set up in order to consolidate cooperation on countering irregular crossings. These developments fit into the general picture of increased patrolling of the territory, which had been confirmed through the news^[179] of the purchase of 65 photo traps mobile cameras to place in the border areas of Trieste and Gorizia province. From initial information collected by ASGI and Altreconomia the camera model GDPR WN-42CM branded Wilnex, cost 34,710 EUR, and the tool should exclusively be aimed at locating people crossing the border irregularly.

However, the latest and most relevant political change in border management at the Italo-Slovenian border had been the reintroduction of border controls according to art. 28 Regulation 2016/399 (Border Schengen Code).^[180] In particular, in a statement published on 18 October 2023,^[181] the Italian government announced that it had notified relevant European authorities and partners of the reintroduction of internal land border controls with Slovenia from 21 October 2023 to 30 October 2023 due to the increased threat of violence within the EU as a result of the escalating crisis in the Middle East and the risk of possible terrorist infiltration. According to the government, this picture would be ‘further aggravated by the constant migratory pressure on Italy’. Since then, the duration of the border controls has already been extended 5 times.^[182] The Italian authorities have extended the controls twice during 2024, each time for a period of 6 months, until 18 December 2024. Currently, the controls remain in effect until 18 June 2025.

The Ministry of Interior announced that, thanks to the border controls, police had intercepted the arrival of 1,600 irregular people, made 76 arrests and denied entrance on the territory to almost 900 people.^[183]

Another risk factor at the Italian Slovenian border are chain pushbacks from Italy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this topic, the Civil Court of Rome, by a decision of 9 May 2023,^[184] once again condemned the Italian administration for practices of chain readmissions. The case concerned an action for compensation of the damage suffered by a Pakistani citizen, already recognised with international protection in Italy, during a previous readmission that sent him violently back to Bosnia Herzegovina. The Italian Court stated that ‘The illegitimacy inherent in the informal readmission operated by the Italian police authorities at the border between Italy and Slovenia, the inhuman and degrading treatment related to the chain readmission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the concomitant lack of access to the political asylum procedure determine a right to compensation for damages in the hands of the recipient of this procedure’. The Tribunal reiterated the illegitimacy of the readmission procedure implemented at Italy’s eastern border on the basis of an agreement signed between Italy and Slovenia in 1996 that was never ratified by the Italian Parliament, as previously highlighted by the Court of Rome decision of 18 January 2021. This is the procedure that the Italian government, after suspending it following the January 2021 decision, had reinstated as of November 2022, albeit formally not with respect to those seeking international protection. Contrary to the appeal decision regarding the 18 January 2021 decision, the ruling also recognises the successful demonstration of facts at trial, through cooperation with Slovenian NGO PIC (Pravni center za varstvo človekovih pravic in okolja – Legal Centre for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment),^[185] regarding the immediate chain of readmissions suffered by the claimant from Italy to Slovenia and from Slovenia to Croatia and then the claimant’s presence in Bosnia.^[186]

During a hearing before the Schengen Parliamentary Commission on 7 November 2023, Interior Minister Piantedosi announced “the establishment of mixed brigades of police forces, based on the productive experience (…) gained with joint patrol services”^[187]. On 16 January 2024, a first trilateral meeting was held in Nova Gorica between the Interior Ministers of Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia, during which initial cooperation guidelines to combat irregular immigration along the Balkan route were defined by the three countries.^[188] On 14 October 2024, during the trilateral summit in Zaprešić (Croatia), the Interior Ministers of the three countries further discussed and defined the operational modalities of cross-border cooperation, agreeing on the need to formalize the agreements through a specific memorandum.^[189] On 20 January 2025, the Interior Ministers of the three countries met again in Nova Gorica to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on joint border patrols at the EU border.^[190] The agreement, as reported by official sources, provides for the implementation of joint patrols between the police forces of the three countries along the Balkan route, with the aim of:

• strengthening control of the European Union’s external border;
• combating irregular migration flows;
• intensifying operational cooperation between the police forces of the three countries;
• implementing coordinated border surveillance measures.

The Memorandum is part of the broader framework of measures to strengthen controls at the EU’s Croatian external border.

The situation at the French land borders

Refusals of entry and pushbacks

Since November 2015 and due to the reintroduction of border controls by France, many migrants attempting to cross the borders with France have been subject to rejection at the border, often with the use of violence. A detailed account of the situation at the borders in previous years is available in the previous updates of the AIDA Report on Italy, and in the AIDA Report on France.^[191]

On 14 December 2020, mixed Italian-French patrols began to operate along the border of Ventimiglia with the task of patrolling the borders according to the provisions of bilateral police cooperation agreements based on the 1997 Chambery agreements,^[192] providing for joint actions and cooperation between Italian and French police.^[193] Police checks, which can be considered lawful in internal border areas only if conducted in a manner that police powers doesn’t have an equivalent effect to border checks^[194], in practice only take place people of foreign appearance and systematically especially at Ventimiglia train station, where migrants are prevented from getting on the train platform so that they do not catch a train to France.^[195] This practice, started in 2020, is still widely implemented.

Regarding pushbacks, as reported by ASGI and other NGOs,^[196] people stopped at the border or on the train are taken to the San Luigi station, identified and given a “refusal of entry” (refus d’entrée). The rejection procedure is completed with the handing over of the concerned persons to the Italian police authorities who invite them to proceed on foot to the city of Ventimiglia. If the third country nationals are intercepted in border areas as defined by the bilateral readmission agreement, they are simply readmitted to Italy without any written decision.

Italian media have conducted interviews with migrants having been readmitted to Italy or blocked at the border, and with NGO operators at Ventimiglia. The migrants involved declared having been intercepted and sent back by French police, after substantial efforts to reach France. In 2021, NGO operators observed that about 60 people per day attempted to reach France, and only 10 usually succeeded, while all the others – including UAMs – were pushed back. Volunteers regret the closure of the Red Cross Ventimiglia Camp that served as a support point for all the people on the move.^[197] Notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the cases C-368/20 and C-369/20^[198] in relation to the unlawfulness of prolonging internal border checks without new reasons that justify the reintroduction of such controls, the French Government has continued with the temporary reintroduction of border controls,^[199] without disruption, since 2015. The latest prolongation runs from 1 May 2025 to 31 October 2025. In May 2022, Anafé and other French CSOs, with the support of ASGI, submitted an appeal against the decision of the French government to prolong border checks at internal borders, but the French Council of State rejected the appeal on 27 July.^[200]

However, The situation appeared to have slightly changed in the first weeks of 2024, with CSOs reporting a decrease in pushbacks and, among these reduced numbers of refusals of entry, decisions mostly in line with the bilateral agreements.^[201] This change can be explained in light of recent jurisprudence regarding the powers of Member State to issue refusal of entry provisions (Refus d’entrée) at its internal borders, when border controls have been reintroduced. In particular, the CJEU, with the decision ADDE (C-143/22) of 21 September 2023, reaffirmed the principle – already introduced in the Affum Case (C-47/15) – according to which the Return directive (2008/11/CE), which provides for the possibility of transferring a third-country national in an irregular condition intercepted in the border area if the two countries in question have signed bilateral readmission agreements, must be applied together with the Schengen Borders Code. This entails that, although in such a situation a Member State can still adopt a refusal of entry decision, on the basis of the Schengen Borders Code, the removal must comply with the common standards and procedures of the Return directive, and thus also the procedures set out in the bilateral readmission agreement. The Return Directive does not allow Member States to exclude third country nationals from the scope of the directive in case of a refusal of entry at the internal border (contrary to the external border, where it is allowed), even in case of temporarily reintroduced border controls.^[202] This CJEU preliminary reference was issued by the Court in the context of a French national court case, led by several NGOs challenging French legislation contained in the CESEDA (Code de l’entrée et de séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile) on this topic, because it allowed the authorities to issue a refusal of entry decision in the context of temporarily reintroduced internal border controls under any circumstances. In light of the CJEU decision, the Council of State confirmed that, to comply with the Return directive, such refusal of entry decisions could only be taken at the internal borders with a view to the person concerned being re-admitted by the Member State from which they came, in application of an agreement existing on the date the Return directive came into force.

The effects of the Council of State’s decision were particularly evident in the decline in readmission numbers recorded throughout 2024. A civic access request promoted by ASGI Medea project^[203] revealed a notable drop in the number of people pushed back to Italy following interceptions by the French Border Police (PAF), at least regarding the Ventimiglia border crossing. Data on passive readmissions – cases in which Italy agrees to take back migrants rejected by France – show significantly higher figures: a total of 7,216 people, including 6,808 accepted and 408 rejected readmissions. The monthly distribution shows a significant increase during the middle months of the year, with peak numbers in August (959 readmissions) and September (851). The most represented countries of origin are Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Eritrea, followed by countries from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

One route to France is through the Val di Susa, crossing the Bardonecchia and the Frejus mountain passes, on one side, or, on the other, through Oulx and Claviere leading to the Montgenèvre pass. MEDU,^[204] an organisation granting medical assistance to migrants at Oulx, has reported the death of migrants that tried to cross the border walking through the Alps, highlighting the increase in deaths of very young migrants or MSNA. Many NGOs signed an appeal consequently the death of migrants at this border.^[205]

Among migrants’ deaths at the French border is that of Blessing Matthews. The case concerned a young Nigerian woman, who was found dead on the 9 of May 2018 at Prelles Dam, in the municipality of Saint-Martin-de-Queyrières, at ten kilometres from Briancon. On the night between 6 and 7 May 2018, Blessing Matthews crossed the Alps from Claviere – Italy but was discovered by police agents who started chasing her nearby the village of La Vachette. In a desperate attempt not to be caught by police officers who had reached her at the edge of the river Durance, she fell into the water and drowned. With the support of the organisation Tous Migrant, Blessing’s sister filed different legal actions to ascertain the responsibilities of the public authority, but all actions were dismissed both by the Tribunal of Gap and the Court of Appeal of Grenoble.^[206] Due to a counter investigation conducted by Border Forensic,^[207] the case was submitted to the Public Prosecutor in May 2022, but again dismissed. On 25 October 2022, an appeal on the case was presented to the European Court of Human Rights.^[208] On 18 January 2024, the ECtHR considered the case inadmissible,^[209] alleging that the French authorities did what was reasonably necessary to be done.

Reception conditions at the Italian border

Regarding reception conditions on the Italian side of the border, from 2020 onwards, due to the pandemic, both transit areas (Ventimiglia and Oulx) were left totally or partially without accommodation facilities. On 31 July 2020, the Roja Camp in Ventimiglia, managed by the Italian Red Cross, was closed.^[210]. Being the only formal place of accommodation for people in transit, its closure led to the proliferation of informal settlements and the occupation of public spaces to face the arrival of winter. Facilities provided by the local Caritas office are only able to guarantee a limited number of places for single parents and children.

As the practice of pushbacks from France to Italy was systematically implemented in 2021, humanitarian conditions registered in the Italian towns nearby remained dramatic. No public response was given since the closure of the Roya centre.^[211] Hundreds of people were stranded in town without access to the most basic rights such as shelter and health care. The humanitarian crisis was handled only by NGOs, while local authorities seemed to criminalise the situation by introducing local rules against homeless people.^[212]

At the end of 2021, the imminent opening of a centre for people in transit was announced,^[213] but, despite several public statements,^[214] there was no official action, and migrants continue living stranded under bridges with the only support of civil society organisations and volunteers.^[215] The public debate regarding the opening of a reception centre gained once more traction during the diplomatic crisis between the Italian and French governments. This had already started in late 2022^[216] but culminated in August and September 2023 with an intensification of border controls by the French authorities and, as a result, pushbacks. As a result of the increase in people with no shelter in the municipality, the city council of Ventimiglia offered to open a repatriation centre on its territory,^[217] but received no positive response from the government.^[218]

In 2024, transit flows at the Italian border with France decreased. Organizations in the area published a report^[219] highlighting a decrease in numerical presence while also noting that several individuals continue to remain blocked in Ventimiglia, generating situations that remain difficult to manage in terms of support and reception.

Violence and court cases on the Italian side

On 9 May 2021, Moussa Balde, a 22-year-old boy, was attacked in the streets of Ventimiglia by three Italian men. After being hospitalised for a short period of time, Moussa was ordered to be confined at the CPR of Turin waiting to be deported. At the CPR he was placed in solitary confinement and was found dead on 23 May 2021.^[220] On 10 January 2023, the Criminal Court of Imperia convicted three Italian citizens for the aggression, specifically for aggravated injury due to the use of a blunt object.^[221] Regarding the responsibilities for the suicide of the young migrant, a criminal proceeding is still pending to ascertain whether it was caused by the lack of medical and psychological care provided to the victim and to his isolation. Indeed, after the confinement, competent authorities denied that Moussa Balde had been present in the CPR, preventing any kind of legal assistance and support. Moreover, despite the brutal aggression suffered in Ventimiglia, the managing authority of the centre decided to put him in isolation, in a separate building called “Ospitaletto” within the detention centre without any kind of human support even if in a critical psychological and physical condition. On October 2023, the Turin prosecutor’s office sent to trial the facility’s director and CPR doctor, charged with involuntary manslaughter, and a police inspector, for forgery and aiding and abetting.^[222]

On 29 October 2024, the investigating judge (GIP) of the Court of Turin accepted the request for indictment of the deputy director of the company managing the CPR and the doctor of the facility at the time of Moussa Balde’s death. The indicted chief police inspector has plea-bargained for a one-year prison sentence.^[223] On 12 February 2025 the trial began: defendants facing involuntary manslaughter charges are the centre’s director working for Gepsa (the company that won the management contract), and the doctor who ordered Balde’s isolation in the facility’s “Ospedaletto” (small hospital) section.^[224]

The criminal proceeding against the NGO Baobab, accused of aiding illegal immigration for helping 9 asylum seekers buy train tickets to reach Ventimiglia after the eviction of an informal reception centre in Rome in 2016,^[225] was considered unfounded by the Criminal Court of Rome (Judge for the preliminary hearing, GUP) which acquitted the NGO in May 2022.^[226]

The ECtHR on 16 November 2023 delivered its judgment regard the 2016 “border relief policy” practices. The application was submitted by four Sudanese applicants, which had since been granted international protection in Italy.^[227] The events of the case referred to the situation in Ventimiglia in 2016, when, according to the so called “border relief policy”,^[228] and the concurrent signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Sudan for the repatriation of irregular migrants of 24 August 2016,^[229] the Italian authorities implemented a strategy of singling out Sudanese nationals, who were subjected to violent, inhumane and degrading methods of identification (confiscation of personal property, obligation to strip naked), forcibly transferred without being issued any order to the Taranto Hotspot (after a journey of nearly 1,200 km), re-identified and subjected to deportation procedures and concomitant removal order without being granted information or legal assistance. Within a few days the identified individuals were again transferred to Ventimiglia and then to Turin to be boarded without their knowledge to Khartoum. The four applicants managed by different circumstances not to be returned and to formalise asylum applications in CPR and obtain international protection. The Court declared that these practices constituted violations of art. 3 of the Convention (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments) with regards to the violations to which the applicants were exposed throughout the identification and transfer procedures, and of art. 5 §§ 1, 2 and 4 (right to liberty and security) due to the de facto detention to which the applicants were exposed.

Legal access to the territory

Under Italian Law, it is not possible to apply for international protection from abroad, nor is a specific visa provided for people in need of protection that need to access the country.

In consideration of specific humanitarian crises, such as the one in Afghanistan in 2021, the Italian Government implements a measure known as “humanitarian corridors”, subscribing agreements with international organisations such as UNHCR and IOM, as well as NGOs, to allow a certain amount of people in need of protection to legally access the country. Humanitarian corridors are however not regulated by law, but only by Protocols created between the Minister of Interior, the Ministry of Foreigners affair and selected organisations, to which the Ministry delegates operations and the power to select the applicants that will be admitted. No official procedure that applicants should follow to be selected for the corridors is established, nor is there a procedure to challenge non-admission to the list.

On 23 April 2021 such a protocol was signed with the Community of Sant’Egidio, the Waldensian table and the Federation of Evangelical Churches for the arrival of 500 people from Libya. According to data provided by the Community of Sant’Egidio, from February 2016 to May 2024, 7,226 people arrived through this mechanism – Syrians fleeing the war and refugees from the Horn of Africa and Gaza.^[230]

In 2021 humanitarian corridors to admit 1,000 refugees hosted in Lebanon were renewed.

Humanitarian corridors for admissions from Jordan, Niger and Ethiopia were concluded as of May 2022. According to information collected by ASGI, of the 600 people admitted to access the corridors, 530 were actually included in the programme and arrived in Italy.

In 2023, 183 persons were resettled to Italy and 779 entered through humanitarian corridors. No person reached Italy after evacuation operations.^[231] According to information collected by ASGI, resettlement was conducted from Lebanon, Türkiye, Iran and Pakistan. Regarding evacuations, these were stopped in 2023 but in December 2023 a new agreement with Libya was signed and, in early 2024, a person was evacuated and reached Italy.

In 2021, in some selected cases of Afghans escaping from their country of origin after August 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allowed the persons involved to apply for a humanitarian visa to access the territory in application of Article 25 of the Visa Code EU Regulation 810/2009. This first corridor for Afghan nationals was established through a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Italian government on 4 November 2021.^[232] This agreement provided for the legal entry of Afghan citizens in need of international protection, coming from refugee camps in Pakistan, Iran or other countries. This initial agreement allowed for the arrival of 1,200 Afghans over two years (with a possible extension to 36 months).^[233] That first corridor enabled 812 Afghan citizens (refugees in Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) to enter and be welcomed and integrated by various Italian associations. The new addendum, signed in April 2025,^[234] builds upon the agreement from November 2021 and involves collaboration between Italy’s Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs along with various associations including the Italian Episcopal Conference, the Community of Sant’Egidio, and other Church and international organizations.

Between 2021 and 2022, a total of 4,797 Afghans were evacuated by the Italian Government through the following operations: Operation “Aquila 1”, in June 2021 (involving 228 persons); Operation “Aquila Omnia”, between August and September 2021 (4,493 persons) Operation “Post Aquila” , September 2021, (16 persons); Operation Aquila Omnia BIS between November 2021 and December 2022 (60 persons).^[235]

Regarding the issuance of entry visas for humanitarian reasons in situations of need for extraterritorial protection, on 22 November 2023 the Court of Rome upheld the appeal filed by an Iranian citizen, residing in Italy with a study permit, who, not yet meeting the requirements for family reunification, had asked the Italian Embassy in Iran for the issuance of an entry visa to allow her minor daughter, in serious danger, to reach her. The Italian Consular Representation never responded, making it necessary to file an urgent appeal. In this case, the applicant demonstrated the danger to which her daughter was exposed to in Iran, due to her sexual orientation, for having participated in anti-government demonstrations after the assassination of Masha Amini (September 2022) and for behaviours deemed contrary to government religious morality, so much so that on one occasion she was even reprimanded by the morality police.

In terms of jurisdiction, the Court identified a solid link with the Italian State given the presence of the mother in Italy and in her right to protect her daughter, as well as in the right of the latter to live with her mother while escaping the very serious risks to which she is exposed in Iran, thus applying the principle of the best interests of the child referred to in the 1989 New York Convention, but also in the light of art. 8 ECHR and, last but not least, the right to family unity provided for in the Constitution. In the decision, the Judge also refers to art. 10, paragraph 3 of the Italian Constitution as the right to enter the national territory, leaving to the State to identify the instrument to allow entry.^[236]

On 8 June 2023, the Civil Court of Rome ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affair to issue a humanitarian visa to family where one of the applicants, requesting the visa together with his family, had lived in Italy for a long time, obtained a degree in law and, after his return to Afghanistan, attended other courses in Italy as an Afghan soldier in the context of cooperation with NATO forces, particularly with the Italian military. Regarding the power of attorney, significantly the Court applied the principles affirmed by the CJEU in the case C-1/23 PPU extending to the granting of the power of attorney what was assumed by the Court regarding the need for Member States to adopt flexible solutions that allow the submission of a request for reunification through remote means of communication and without personal appearance.^[237]

In 2024, the Civil Court of Rome accepted the appeal presented by an Afghan refugee against the denial of family reunification with his adult son. The Court, taking into account that the conditions established by law for the reunification of an adult child were not met, nevertheless considered the application for a humanitarian visa worthy of acceptance. The Court valued the work carried out by the father (driver at the Italian embassy in Kabul) and the fact that his wife and other daughters also live in Italy. For this reason, the court accepted the request for a humanitarian visa presented by the father for his adult son who remained alone in Iran where he also risked repatriation to Afghanistan.^[238]

^[1] Cfr Ministry of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero available here.

^[2] See UNHCR Operational Data Portal, available at https://shorturl.at/kp2QC.

^[3] Ansa, Migranti: prefetto Trieste, si intensificano arrivi in Fvg, 28 February 2023, available at: bit.ly/41VNWmk.

^[4] Ministery of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero, availbale in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3HdUq7M.

^[5] Eurostat data, available at: https://shorturl.at/HqM8O.

^[6] See UNHCR, Operational data portal, Fact Sheet Italy/December 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3usXryY.

^[7] Cfr Ministery of Interior, Cruscotto statistico giornaliero availbale at: https://bit.ly/3HdUq7M.

^[8] EUNews, 9 December 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/iRwdZ.

^[9] Altreconomia, “I dati che raccontano la guerra ai soccorsi nell’anno nero della strage di Cutro”, February 21 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4ak0glk;

^[10] See SKY TG24, ‘Migranti e sbarchi, qual è il ruolo e il peso delle Ong sul totale dei salvataggi’, 27 September 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3T2zWWS.

^[11] Altreconomia, “I dati che raccontano la guerra ai soccorsi nell’anno nero della strage di Cutro”, February 21 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4ak0glk

^[12] Chamber of Deputies, ‘Emergenza COVID-19: le misure in materia di immigrazione’, 11 March 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/2RsUUAA.

^[13] Senate studies service, Da Sophia A Irini: La Missione Militare Ue nel Mediterraneo cambia nome, e Priorità, April 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/2Rq68G4.

^[14] Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, A distress call for human rights: The widening gap in migrant protection in the Mediterranean, March 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/2QX5ikh.

^[15] Ansa, ‘Naufragio bambini, due ufficiali a giudizio’, 16 September 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3fBEFsM; see also: Alarmphone, ‘Left-to-Die Trial in Rome’, 2 December 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/2LeRHyn; ECRE, ‘Italy: Officials of the Italian Coast Guard Prosecuted for Shipwreck in 2013’, 20 September 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/3ckBunh.

^[16] ASGI, ‘Strage di bambini dell’11 ottobre 2013: le responsabilità e la cronaca della tragedia nella sentenza sul naufragio’, 5 January 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3WRnzeV.

^[17] OHCHR, ‘Italy failed to rescue more than 200 migrants, UN Committee finds’, 21 January 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3JsyqZu.

^[18] Al Jazeera, ‘Mediterranean shipwreck: Stories of tragedy emerge after 62 drown’, 27 February 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3LBRlCw and LaStampa, ‘Naufragio di Cutro, la ricostruzione ora per ora di quello che è accaduto la notte del 26 febbraio’, 17 March 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3n5QGia.

^[19] LaStampa, ‘Cutro due mesi dopo: inchieste congelate e sette cadaveri ancora senza nome’, 5 May 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3MTFcsP.

^[20] See: Altreconomia, ‘Se i naufraghi nel Mediterraneo diventano ‘persone intercettate in operazioni di polizia’. Le ricadute sui soccorsi’, 8 October 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3dwtQ9p.

^[21] See Watch the Med – Alarm Phone, ‘Cutro shipwreck: Associations file a collective complaint with the Office of the Public Prosecutor’, 10 March 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3Jw06uS and ASGI, ‘Naufragio Cutro: Associazioni depositano esposto collettivo in Procura’, 9 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3LvHJcp.

^[22] La Repubblica, ‘Naufragio di Cutro, ufficiali a processo per mancato soccorso. Finanza e Capitaneria nel mirino’, 15 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uDv6pC; L’Unità, ‘Cosa è successo a Cutro e perché fu strage di Stato: chi pagherà per il mancato salvataggio’, 16 February 2024, available at https://bit.ly/3IaWe28.

^[23] Euractiv, ‘Cutro: Italian authorities deemed migrant boat ‘not of interest’ before shipwreck’, 30 January 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/49x4yFk.

^[24] ANSA, ‘Naufragio migranti, Meloni: “Nessun allarme da Frontex. Io non scappo, ora Cdm a Cutro”’, 5 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3OO1aOi.

^[25] RaiNews.it, “Naufragio di Cutro: la procura chiede il processo per il 6 militari indagati”, November 6 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/KiyN7.

^[26] ANSA, “Naufragio Cutro: al processo ammesse 88 parti civili”, May 29, 2025, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/2juXF.

^[27] La Repubblica, ‘Cutro, prima sentenza per il naufragio: 20 anni e 3 milioni di multa allo scafista’, 8 February 2024, available in Italina at: https://bit.ly/3T65YBo.

^[28] Ansa, “Condannati tre presunti scafisti della strage di Cutro”, December 10, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/75CMT.

^[29] Il Fatto Quotidiano, ‘Strage di migranti a Cutro, il governo si costituirà parte civile nei processi agli scafisti’, 28 November 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uwY1M6.

^[30] ASGI, ‘Naufragio di Cutro, ASGI: ritardi nell’attivazione dell’accoglienza per i superstiti’, 11 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3JsByTM.

^[31] By the end of July 2019, the Minister of the Interior forbade the landing of the people rescued by the Gregoretti Italian Coast Guard ship. Only after six days, on 31 July 2019, the 116 people were disembarked and transferred to the Pozzallo hotspot before being redistributed between France, Germany, Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland. 50 people remained in Italy in charge of the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI).

^[32] Ansa, ‘Gregoretti: Gup, non luogo a procedere per Salvini. Prosciolto perché ‘il fatto non sussiste”’, 15 May 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3oZysMh.

^[33] Fanpage.it, ‘La difesa di Salvini al processo Open Arms: “Mie scelte condivise dal governo, poi Conte cambiò idea”’, January 12, 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/49G0VNh.

^[34] Questione Giustizia, “Le conclusioni del Pubblico Ministero di Palermo sul caso Open Arms”, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/Oplbv.

^[35] ADIF, “Sentenza Salvini/Open Arms: perchè le persone (r)esistono ed i fatti sussistono, secondo il principio di realtà”, December 21 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/1Iu01.

^[36] Administrative Court of Sicily, decision no. 2974 of 23 December 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3uldPvN.  

^[37] Altreconomia, ‘Sbarchi, i numeri non tornano. E per il Viminale i naufraghi diventano “persone scortate”’, 25 March 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3NsufwE.

^[38] Fanpage, ‘Inchiesta su Mare Jonio, accusata di aver ricevuto soldi in cambio di un trasbordo di migranti’, 1 March 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3eWWsLh.

^[39] Il Fatto quotidiano, ‘Migranti, archiviata dal gip l’indagine sulla Mare Jonio che salvò 30 migranti’, 28 January 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3t9NxyI.

^[40]Court of Justice of the European Union, Joined Cases C‑14/21 and C‑15/21 August 1, 2022, available at https://shorturl.at/PkPxw.

^[41] Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Direttiva Piantedosi su due navi Ong in navigazione nel Mediterraneo’, 25 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3JQuZvB and Infomigrants, ‘New Italian interior minister says ‘governing migration’ priority’, 25 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3ZZzRnU.

^[42] Guardian, ‘Giorgia Meloni faces first migration test from two NGO rescue boats’, 26 October 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3n5I63e.

^[43] European Parliament Briefing, Search and rescue efforts for Mediterranean migrants, 24 October 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/40lxPOq.

^[44] Infomigrants, ‘EU Parliament chief: Don’t forget solidarity toward migrants’, 1 November 2022, available at https://bit.ly/40lURVJ.

^[45] AlJazeera, ‘Rescue charity to take Italy to court over migrant boats standoff’, 7 November 2022, available at http://bit.ly/3YZw6gI.

^[46] ASGI, ‘Sbarco e domanda di asilo devono essere garantiti senza distinzioni. Commento all’ordinanza su SOS Humanity’, 14 February 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/40T6G6M.

^[47] For a legal analysis of the law, see ASGI, ‘Una prima lettura di ASGI del Decreto Legge 1/2023 convertito in Legge’, 16 March 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3n5gwmJ.

^[48] CJEU, Joined Cases C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch eV v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Others, 1 August 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3Xp4QaM.

^[49] Corriere della Sera, ‘Migranti, Medici senza Frontiere: fermo di 20 giorni e multa da 10mila euro alla nave Geo Barents’, 23 February 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3Ki0WvJ.

^[50] IlSussidiario.net, ‘Ong Louise Michel, perché è stata sequestrata – Ha disobbedito alla Guardia Costiera’, 29 March 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3ZS2Vwu.

^[51] ANSA, ‘Due navi Ong disubbidiscono al decreto migranti, scattano i fermi’, 2 June 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49kTJ9N.

^[52] ANSA, ‘Due navi Ong disubbidiscono al decreto migranti, scattano i fermi’, 2 June 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49kTJ9N.

^[53] SkyTG24, ‘Migranti, tre navi Ong fermate per 20 giorni. Monta polemica sui soccorsi in mare’, 23 August 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3UPomPX.

^[54] Sea-Eye, ‘PREGNANT WOMAN FIGHTS FOR HER LIFE ON SEA-EYE 4 – ITALY SENDS NO HELP’, 27 October 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/4bE5N7o.

^[55] ASGI, “Tribunale di Vibo Valentia:le sanzioni alle navi della flotta civile sono illegittime”, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/YjG4o.

^[56] SkyTG24, ‘Migranti, fermo amministrativo per la Open Arms a Crotone’, 21 January 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3UM9VME.

^[57] La Repubblica, ‘Ong, giudice di Brindisi sospende il fermo amministrativo dell’Ocean Viking: ‘Violato il diritto di esercitare attività di soccorso in mare’, 21 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/42Mqf1M.

^[58] ASGI, “Decreto Piantedosi contro le ONG: finalmente al vaglio della Corte Costituzionale la scelta del governo di punire chi svolge attività umanitaria”, available in italian at: https://shorturl.at/9sFJX.

^[59] ASGI, “Illegittimo il fermo amministrativo di 60 giorni della Sea-Eye”, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/y2cMI.

^[60]  ASGI, “Tribunale di Crotone: illegittimo il fermo della Humanity 1”, available in italian at: https://shorturl.at/BcYrt.

^[61] Sky Tg24, “Migranti, multa e 60 giorni fermo per nave ong Geo Barents”, August 26, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/i4Umx.

^[62]  ASGI, “Tribunale di Salerno: no al fermo della Geo Barents”, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/2JGeT.

^[63] ANSA, “A Porto Empedocle nave ong Mare Jonio con migranti”, October 15, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/ZmxUH.

^[64] See ASGI, Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Strengthening the operational capacities of Tunisian authorities in monitoring the maritime borders: 8 million from the Rewarding Fund for Repatriation Policies’, 13 April 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3MF4TKK.

^[65] See ASGI, ‘Sempre più politiche securitarie: lo studio sui rimpatri in Tunisia’, 30 March 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3yvpnS9.

^[66] ASGI Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Strengthening the operational capacities of Tunisian authorities in monitoring the maritime borders: 8 million from the Rewarding Fund for Repatriation Policies’, 13 April 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3YY5ooO.

^[67] See Irpi Media, ‘Tunisia, il muro della Guardia costiera’, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3xaiQud.

^[68] European Commission, ‘The European Union and Tunisia: political agreement on a comprehensive partnership package’, 16 July 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3uM4Kl9.

^[69] Politico, ‘EU finalizes migrant deal with Tunisia’, 16 July 2023, available at https://bit.ly/49mmCSI.

^[70] The big wall – Action Aid, ‘Memorandum Ue – Tunisia: l’Unione europea sottoscrive rastrellamenti, deportazioni illegali e violenze contro i migranti’, 20 July 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bGoI1r.

^[71] European Parliament, ‘EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding’, 11 September 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3wv1sDj.

^[72] Euractiv, ‘EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding state of play’, 25 January 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/3I6kfrq.

^[73]  ASGI, “A un anno dall’inizio della crisi: continuano le violazioni dei diritti delle persone migranti in Tunisia”, April 8, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/Crumc.

^[74] ASGI, “Sgombero e trasferimento forzato di richiedenti asilo e rifugiati subsahariani a Tunisi: Lettera aperta a OIM e UNHCR”, 5 May 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/YoWom.

^[75] ASGI, Tunisia, famiglie sudanesi scaricate al confine presentano ricorso al Comitato per i Diritti Umani delle Nazioni Unite, June 5, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/uh2Ez.

^[76]  Lighthouse Reports, “Desert Dumps”, available at https://shorturl.at/SqpZ7.

^[77] Border Forensic, “State Trafficking – Expulsion and sale of migrants from Tunisia to Libya”,  29 January 2025, available at https://shorturl.at/fD8Gs.

^[78] United Nations – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Tunisia: UN experts concerned over safety of migrants, refugees and victims of trafficking”, 14 October 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/tC0N8.

^[79] ASGI, Motovedette alla Garde Nationale tunisina: urgente affrontare le responsabilità italiane per le violenze sulle persone migranti in Tunisia, 18 July 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/kdy8G.

^[80] Council of State, 16 January 2025, decision no. 332/2025.

^[81]  Memorandum d’intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all’immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana, available on ASGI website at: https://bit.ly/3l6ND8t.

^[82] ASGI Sciabaca Oruka, The Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) programme from Libya to Niger: an update as of December 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3XdtTgS.

^[83] ASGI Sciabaca Oruka, ‘Voluntary returns from Libya in the EU externalisation strategy: a critical analysis in the light of ASGI’s strategic litigation’, 2 February 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3Yujyhy.

^[84] OHCHR, Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, 27 March 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3RaqBJQ.

^[85]  IOM and UNHCR Press Release, ‘IOM and UNHCR condemn the return of migrants and refugees to Libya’, 16 June 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/414CAwZ.

^[86] Criminal Court of Trapani, sentence of 23 May 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3dutMHl; According to article 80 of the Italian Constitution, political agreements can be signed only with Parliament’s authorisation. Furthermore, it is an agreement concluded with a party, the Libyan coastguard, repeatedly referred to as responsible for crimes against humanity. Therefore, the court found that the agreement violates the principle of non-refoulement.

^[87] ASGI, ‘Memorandum Italia-Libia, lettera aperta del Tavolo Asilo alle istituzioni italiane: non rinnovatelo’, 30 October 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2Wik9Wi.

^[88] On 31 January 2020, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, called on the Italian government to urgently suspend the ongoing cooperation activities with the Libyan Coast Guard which affect the repatriation of people intercepted at sea in Libya where they have suffered serious human rights violations, see: ASGI, ‘Il governo italiano deve sospendere ogni cooperazione con la Guardia Costiera libica’, 31 January 2020, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2zmpaEy.

^[89] UNMSIL, Report of the Secretary General, 9 December 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3DFSaFh.

^[90] UN News ‘Libya detention centres remain places of violations and abuse’, 28 March 2022, available at: http://bit.ly/3lbXCcW.

^[91] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Libya detention centres remain places of violations and abuse: experts’, 27 March 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3uMus9l.

^[92] United Nation, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve human rights in Libya”, 3 June 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/Yk1HM.

^[93] For a broader description of the decision, read paragraph “Interception at sea, refoulement and following legal actions”

^[94] Civil Court of Rome, interim measure of 29 November 2024.

[95] Domani, Respinto in Libia, sbarca a Fiumicino su richiesta del tribunale: «Responsabilità dell’Italia», 24 March 2025, available here.

^[96]  IOM Press Release, “IOM Deeply Alarmed by Mass Graves Found in Libya, Urges Action”, 10 February 2025, available at: https://shorturl.at/J96Pl.

^[97] For further details on these previous funding programmes, see AIDA, Country report Italy, available at: https://bit.ly/49lG7tX.

^[98] Altreconomia, ‘Nuovi affari dell’Italia sulla frontiera per respingere le persone in Libia’, 1 February 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3F35lzE.

^[99] Analisi difesa, ‘Nave Caprera ha sostituito la Capri nel porto di Tripoli’, 4 April 2018, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2SP6Hag.

^[100] ASGI, ‘ASGI chiede l’immediato annullamento del Memorandum con la Libia’, 2 February 2020, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2zlh1QB.

^[101] Altreconomia, ‘Il grande inganno della Libia sicura e le tappe della regia italiana dei respingimenti delegati’, 18 April 2019, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/35MIMgW.

^[102] Altreconomia, ‘L’Italia continua ad equipaggiare la Libia per respingere i migranti, il caso delle motovedette ricondotte a Tripoli’, 2 March 2020, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2SSmsNU.

^[103] The Big Wall, ‘L’esternalizzazione dei rimpatri dalla Libia in un imbuto umanitario’, 9 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49mpEXm.

^[104]ASGI, “Rimpatri volontari dalla Libia: i finanziamenti italiani”, December 6 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/8shs4.

^[105] ECtHR, Application No. 21660/18, S.S. and others v. Italy, available at: https://bit.ly/3dvkBGt; the Third-party intervention by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights is available at: https://bit.ly/35OFYjn.

^[106] Report of Fondazione Migrantes, Il diritto d’asilo, 2020.

^[107] Form elaborated by IOM for the Ministry of Labour’s Monitoring report on unaccompanied minors, December 2020; see also the following report: https://bit.ly/34nMePk, 26.

^[108] Amnesty International, Cinque anni dal memorandum Italia-Libia: condizioni infernali per migranti e richiedenti asilo, 31 January 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/37Fq8gb.

^[109] IOM, Libya Maritime update 25 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49s3hja.

^[110] IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, “Mixed migration flows to Europe”, available at: https://shorturl.at/GmXaM.

^[111] InfoMigrants, “Libya’s coast guard has intercepted and returned nearly 21,000 migrants in 2024”, December 6, 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/GjBdO.

^[112] Communication to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in the case of SDG against Italy, available at: https://bit.ly/41zjJt7.

^[113] ASGI, “Caso Asso 29, arriva a sentenza: La Libia non è un luogo sicuro dove condurre i migranti”, June 28, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/jt4oR.

^[114] ASGI, “Respinto illegalmente nel 2018, A. arriva oggi in Italia con un visto di ingresso”, December 25, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/xJnti.

^[115] Available at: https://bit.ly/3F96BBj. See also ECRE, ‘Med: UN Condemnation of Returns to Unsafe Libya by Merchant Ship, Survivors Rescued in Maltese SAR Zone Accepted by Italy, Parliament President Urges EU Lead on Rescues at Sea’, 18 June 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3Jb1bap.

^[116] A reconstruction of the entire Vos Triton affair and the proceedings relating to “state secrets” can be found at the following link: https://bit.ly/3KDPFGF.

^[117] L’Unità, ‘Stragi di naufraghi e respingimenti illegali, si muovono le Procure: esposto per la deportazione in Libia di 25 migranti’, 2 January 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bUybm3.

^[118] ASGI, ‘Condanna di Asso 28, un precedente che può scardinare la prassi dei respingimenti in Libia’, 19 October 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3vHe5HF. See also Infomigrants, ‘Ship captain sentenced to prison for returning migrants to Libya’, 15 October 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vK0b7s.

^[119] ASGI, ‘Asso 28, la corte di appello di Napoli conferma: il respingimento verso la Libia è illegittimo’, 18 January 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3XYMA8Q.

^[120] Judgment No. 4557, full decision available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3UPSJFW.

^[121] Avvenire, ‘Cassazione: «La Libia non è un porto sicuro». Reato obbedire ai guardacoste’, 16 February 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4bYYJCG.

^[122] Available in Italian and Greek at: https://bit.ly/3qHhuVf.

^[123] According to Altreconomia FOIA, from January 2022 to 14 November, 1827 Third Country Nationals have been refouled from Bari, Brindisi, Ancona, Trieste to Albania. See Altreconomia, ‘L’ossessione di respingere anche ai confini interni. Via terra e per mare’ February 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IoKGtc.

^[124] Readmission agreement between Italy and Greece, Article 6.

^[125] Lighthouse Reports, ‘Detained below deck’, 18 January 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3kgpOLp.

^[126] Available at: https://bit.ly/3KQTUg1.

^[127]  Available at: https://bit.ly/3MMKzHf.

^[128]  Altreconomia, ‘L’ossessione di respingere anche ai confini interni. Via terra e per mare’, 1 February 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3IoKGtc.

^[129]  Full decision in Italian, available at https://bit.ly/4bMFgot.

^[130] For a broader description of the case, see ASGI Medea, ‘Illegitimacy of informal pushbacks at Adriatic ports and humanitarian visa’, 11 August 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/48uzyVl.

^[131] The full text of the Protocol is available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uGnzq5. For a comprehensive analysis of the protocol, see CEPS, The 2023 Italy-Albania Protocol on Extraterritorial Migration Management – A worst practice in migration and asylum policies, 1 December 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3wrPL0p.

^[132] EU Observer, ‘EU unclear on legality of Italy-Albania deal to offshore asylum’, 7 November 2023, available at https://bit.ly/4bLpXMW.

^[133]  SIDIBlog, ‘On the incompatibility of the Italy-Albania protocol with EU asylum law’, 15 November 2023, available at https://bit.ly/3PhmwEf.

^[134] Questione Giustizia, ‘Profili di illegittimità del Protocollo Italia-Albania’, 28 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4bOIec1. ASGI, ‘L’analisi giuridica del Protocollo Italia – Albania’, 22 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/49FJrRP.

^[135] ASGI, ‘Accordo Italia-Albania, ASGI: è incostituzionale non sottoporlo al Parlamento’, 14 November 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4c1MNjF.

^[136] Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 61, 5 December 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49I647A; Sistema Penale, Il Disegno di legge di ratifica ed esecuzione del Protocollo tra Italia ed Albania in materia di immigrazione: analisi del progetto e questioni di legittimità, 28 December 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3URu57T.

^[137] BalkanInsight, ‘Albanian Court Approves Deal with Italy on Processing Migrants’, 29 January 2024, available at https://bit.ly/3STBXmX.

^[138] Senato della Repubblica, Giovedì 15 Febbraio 2024 – 159ª Seduta pubblica, 15 February 2024, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IclK7o.

^[139] Il Post, “L’organizzazione dei centri per migranti in Albania è un caos”, 18 August 2024, available in Italian at: https://shorturl.at/71nBD and EuroNews, “Opening of controversial Italian migrant centres delayed yet again”, August 1, 2024, available at: https://shorturl.at/3c8b5.

^[140] InfoMigrants, “Italy’s migrant centers in Albania ready for operations”, 10 October 2024, available at: https://shorturl.at/jBdzq.

^[141] The Guardian, “Italy sends first asylum seekers to Albania under controversial pact”, 15 October 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/PQcZF.

^[142] InfoCuria Case-law, Case C‑406/22 – Decision of the Grand Chamber, 4 October 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/Moaj9.

^[143] Questione Giustizia, “Nota ai provvedimenti di rigetto delle richieste di convalida dei trattenimenti disposti dalla Questura di Roma ai sensi del Protocollo Italia-Albania, emessi dal Tribunale di Roma, sezione specializzata nella protezione internazionale, il 18 ottobre 2024”, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/7hpo4.

^[144] Article 2 bis Procedure Decree as amended by DL 158/2024, then repealed but L. 187/2024 converting DL 145/2024 included the amendment.

^[145] ASGI, “La nuova “lista dei paesi sicuri” e lo svuotamento del diritto di asilo”, November 5, 2024, available in Italian at: https://shorturl.at/YmCSn.

^[146] Domani, “Migranti in rotta verso l’Albania, nuovo scontro con i magistrati in vista”, November 6, 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/KDCa0.

^[147] IlSole24ore, “Migranti Albania, uno è vulnerabile: già di ritorno in Italia. Attesa la decisione dei giudici sugli altri sette”, 8 November 2024, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/m1bLv.

^[148]  Article 16 Decree Law 145/2024, as amended by L. 187/2024 and amending Article 3 (1) lett. c) DL 13/2017.

^[149] Court de Justice de l’Union Européenne, “Press and media – Broadcasting of hearings”, 25 February 2025, available at https://shorturl.at/48jyX.

^[150] InfoCuria Jurisprudence, “OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL RICHARD DE LA TOUR delivered on 10 April 2025 – Joined Cases C‑758/24 [Alace] and C‑759/24 [Canpelli]”, available at https://shorturl.at/a8iUy.

^[151] Court of Cassation, decision no. 17510/2025 of 8 May 2025.

^[152] Criminal Court of Trapani cited above. See: Diritto penale contemporaneo, La legittima difesa dei migranti e l’illegittimità dei respingimenti verso la Libia (caso Vos-Thalassa), Luca Masera, 24 June 2019, available in Italian at: https://cutt.ly/7yv9bfe; see also: EDAL, ‘Italy – Tribunal of Trapani – Office of the Judge for Preliminary Investigations (Piero Grillo)’, available at: https://bit.ly/42CrUWO.

^[153]  Criminal Court of Appeal of Palermo, Decision no. 1525/2020, of 3 June 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3vIWwFg.

^[154]  Decision available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3vzvZgz.

^[155] Espresso, ‘I migranti hanno il diritto di opporsi alla riconsegna in Libia»: storica sentenza della Cassazione’, 17 December 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3t9BxNz.

^[156] Criminal Court of Trieste, decision of 25 November 2022. See Altreconomia, ‘Fingersi minore per sfuggire ai respingimenti italiani a catena fino in Bosnia non è reato’, 28 February 2023, available at: http://bit.ly/3J0Lipe.

^[157]  ASGI InLimine, ‘La frontiera di Fiumicino: i riscontri della pubblica amministrazione’, 10 November 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3I3RJGk.

^[158] ASGI Inlimine, ‘La frontiera di Malpensa: alcuni riscontri dalla pubblica amministrazione’, 13 November 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3k23MMf.

^[159] ASGI Inlimine, La situazione emersa dal sopralluogo della Zona di transito internazionale dell’aeroporto di Milano Malpensa, December 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3TaPmYV.

^[160] ASGI InLimine, “Risarcimento del danno per illegittima detenzione informale presso l’aeroporto di Roma Fiumicino”, 2 December 2024, available in italian at: https://shorturl.at/gJQYy.

^[161] See Ansa, Migranti: Piantedosi, 13.700 ingressi dal Friuli quest’anno, 13 September 2023, available at: https://encr.pw/Uj6Cn.

^[162] Ansa, ‘Migranti, il Prefetto di Trieste: si intensificano arrivi in FVG’, 28 February 2023, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/41VNWmk.

^[163] Readmission agreement between the Italian and Slovenian Government, available at: https://bit.ly/3vwPuGF.

^[164] Italian Consititution, Article 80 states: ‘Le Camere autorizzano con legge la ratifica dei trattati internazionali che sono di natura politica, o prevedono arbitrati o regolamenti giudiziari, o importano variazioni del territorio od oneri alle finanze o modificazioni di leggi.’

^[165]  Civil Court of Rome, decision of 3 May 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3KIswAZ.

^[166] Written response provided to the question made by the member of the Italian Parliament Riccardo Magi, signed by the undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior, Nicola Molteni, on 13 October 2021, attached to the bulletin of Constitutional Affairs n. 5-06810.

^[167] Rai news, ‘“Stop ai cortei, sì alle riammissioni informali”, dice il prefetto Vardè’, 9 November 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3w6N9CS.

^[168] Il Gazzettino.it, ‘Clandestini dai Balcani, il Friuli Venezia Giulia compra 65 fototrappole: “Un muro tecnologico”’, 21 January 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3ILHC7v.

^[169] See Radio Capodistria ‘In aumento i flussi di migranti fra Italia e Slovenia’, 22 August 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3xWVOHW.

^[170] Rainews, ‘Le strutture per l’accoglienza dei migranti a Trieste sono al collasso, available in Italian at http://bit.ly/3ED2aQg; ANSA, ‘Migranti: Ics a Governo, non si violi accoglienza a Trieste’, 23 October 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3SyAx0w. For a more comprehensive collection of information related to people on the move present in Trieste, IRC, Abandoned lives, December 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3IbXulF.

^[171] IlFriuli.it, ‘Migranti, ripartono le pattuglie miste al confine’, 6 September 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3IxupAZ.

^[172] Il fatto quotidiano, ‘Migranti, il governo riattiva i respingimenti sul confine Sloveno. Erano stati dichiarati illegittimi dal tribunale di Roma nel 2021’, 12 December 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3Z3wmfv.

^[173] MeltingPot Europa, ‘Trieste, nuova direttiva Piantedosi: ripartono le riammissioni illegali in Slovenia’, 9 December 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3YZQtdR and Altreconomia, ‘Sulla sconcertante ripresa delle ‘riammissioni informali’ al confine italo-sloveno’, 12 December 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3TsuniU.

^[174] RAI – TGR Friuli Venezia Giulia, ‘Il Governo ha deciso: tornano i respingimenti di migranti in Slovenia’, 6 December 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3n8ZnZq.

^[175] Altreconomia, ‘Respingimenti alla frontiera con la Slovenia, i dati che smontano gli annunci del governo’, 9 May 2023, available at: bit.ly/3Mr215M.

^[176] Camera dei Deputati, XIX LEGISLATURA – Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea – Seduta n. 161 di mercoledì 13 settembre 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/4bQ37DI.

^[177] FOIA reply from the Ministry of Interior Prot. 0102589 of October 25, 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3OTrEOs.

^[178] Ministero dell’Interno, ‘Comitato parlamentare Schengen, audizione del Ministro Piantedosi’, 7 November 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/48uWSlR.

^[179] Il Gazzettino, ‘Clandestini dai Balcani, il Friuli Venezia Giulia compra 65 fototrappole: «Un muro tecnologico»‘, 21 January 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3zDbMb1.

^[180]  For a more detailed analysis of the reintroduction of border controls at the Italo-Slovenian border, see ASGI Medea, ‘Schengen Area: From Free Movement Zone to Labyrinth’, 20 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/42UYcNH.

^[181] Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, ‘Reintroduzione dei controlli delle frontiere interne terrestri con la Slovenia, nota di Palazzo Chigi’, 18 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49IMQP8.

^[182] European Commission, ‘Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control’, available at: https://bit.ly/3DmVntw.

^[183] Ministry of Interior, available at the Government webpage: https://bit.ly/3TtmsDK.

^[184] Full decision Court of Rome N. R.G. 3938/2022 of May 9, 2023, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/3wFks20;

^[185]  More information on the organisation, available at: https://bit.ly/3PkgfaT.

^[186] ASGI Medea, Balkan route, evidence and testimonies confirm chain readmissions. Ministerial liability for compensation for damages, August 8, 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3OYCxyC.

^[187] Ministero dell’Interno, “Comitato parlamentare Schengen, audizione del Ministro Piantedosi”, November 7 2023, available at https://shorturl.at/MZvlZ.

^[188] Radio Capodistria, “Niente di nuovo dal trilaterale dei Ministri degli interni sui pattugliamenti”, January 18, 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/IitfC.

^[189] Ministero dell’Interno,”Trilaterale Italia, Slovenia, Croazia: Piantedosi incontra a Zaprešić gli omologhi Božinović e Poklukar”, October 14, 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/IBHvY.

^[190] Ministero dell’Interno, “A Nova Gorica incontro trilaterale tra i ministri dell’Interno di Italia, Slovenia e Croazia”, January 20, 2025, available at https://shorturl.at/eETuk.

^[191] AIDA, Country Report Italy, 2017 Update, March 2018, available at: https://bit.ly/2Ga01zb, 22-24.

^[192] Riviera time, ‘Una ‘squadra mista’ italo-francese: parte da Ventimiglia il progetto pilota della Polizia di Frontiera’, 21 December 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3bd9bbM.

^[193] The text of the Agreement is available at: https://bit.ly/39wdS2v.

^[194] Article 23 of the Regulation 399/2016 (Schengen border Code).

^[195] Regarding ethnic profiling procedure carried out at Ventimiglia train station, ASGI Medea, Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Review of Italy – 110th Session Racial and ethnic profiling practices in police (border) checks and lack of accessible and effective remedy in Italy, July 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3Ict6rl, 16-19.

^[196] ASGI, ‘La situazione al confine tra Italia e Francia: effetti della pandemia e tendenze consolidate’, 22 February 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/2RDidb9; see also Medici Senza Frontiere, Vietato passare – La sfida quotidiana delle persone in transito respinte e bloccate alla frontiera franco-italiana, August 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3IiO1ZO; Stories in motion, A Collaborative Research Report of Rights Violations at the Franco-Italian Border, 1 June 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49IV8q8; MEDU, Rapporto sulla situazione umanitaria dei migranti in transito lungo la frontiera nord-ovest tra Italia e Francia, October 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3y1SzgQ.

^[197]  La7, ‘Ventimiglia, continuano i respingimenti francesi’, 26 June 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3q7LTeW.

^[198] ASGI, ‘EU Court of Justice – It is illegitimate to renew internal border controls on the basis of reasons already given’, 23 May 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3R9JPiW.

^[199] European Commission, Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control, available at: http://bit.ly/3DmVntw.

^[200] ASGI, ‘The French Council of State ignores the principles on free Schengen circulation reaffirmed by the European Court of Justice’, 29 July 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3kOeFl2.

^[201] Il Fatto Quotidiano, “Migranti, la Francia si piega al Consiglio di Stato: alla frontiera di Ventimiglia crollano i respingimenti. Attivisti: “Ma militarizzazione prosegue”, February 17, 2024, available in Italian at https://bit.ly/4aXEsMz.

^[202] CJEU, Reintroduction of border controls at internal borders: the ‘Returns’ Directive applies to any third-country national who has entered the territory of a Member State without fulfilling the conditions of entry, stay or residence, 21 September 2023, Press release No. 145/23, available at: https://bit.ly/3PLsLQC.

^[203] ASGI Medea, “I dati sulla situazione migratoria a Ventimiglia nel 2024: l’accesso civico del progetto Medea”, 3 March 2025, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/arGgF.

^[204] MEDU, ‘Ancora critica la situazione dei migranti sulla rotta nord ovest delle Alpi’, 4 February 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/33u6GNZ.

^[205] Medici per i diritti umani, ‘Si ritorna a morire alla frontiera nord ovest delle Alpi’, 4 February 2022, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3KHwp9m. See also ASGI,Medea project, Confine italo-francese: una frontiera dove si continua a morire. Appello alle autorità, 11 February 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3KzYFdE.

^[206] Altreconomia, ‘Le nuove prove sulla morte di Blessing Matthew al confine italo-francese’, 1 June 2022, available in Italian at: http://bit.ly/3DiZQ06.

^[207] Border Forensic, ‘The death of Blessing Matthews – a counter investigation on violence at the alpine frontier’, available at: http://bit.ly/3wzK25t.

^[208] Border Forensic, ‘25.10.2022 – Death of Blessing Matthew: Facing impunity in France, we file an application before the European Court of Human Rights’, available at: http://bit.ly/3Df5a4L.

^[209] Mediapart, ‘Mort de Blessing Matthew: la justice européenne ne permet pas de rouvrir le dossier’, 18 January 2023, available in French at: https://bit.ly/3UXccVy.

^[210] Parole sul confine, ‘Il Campo Roja di Ventimiglia ha definitivamente chiuso’, 24 August 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3uFs7YE.

^[211] See ASGI, Medea project, Ventimiglia, un territorio che resiste? October 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vYAVdI.

^[212] Sanremo news, Ventimiglia: firmate stamattina dal Sindaco e subito operative le ordinanze anti degrado e alcol, 21 October 2021, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3s3VXXv.

^[213] Stranieri in Italia, Il progetto. A Ventimiglia un centro di transito per accogliere i migranti, 26 November 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vYoS02.

^[214]  Riviera24.it, Migranti a Ventimiglia, centro di transito: spunta di nuovo l’ipotesi Parco Roja, 4 April 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3JiY5Uw, and Ansa, ‘Migranti: a Ventimiglia sit-in bipartisan per riaprire centro’, 16 November 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3HDcERO.

^[215] Il Fatto Quotidiano, ‘Nel limbo di Ventimiglia tra i migranti respinti dalla Francia e accampati al confine. Associazione: ‘Serve centro di transito’, 25 December 2022, available in italian at: http://bit.ly/405tUGq.

^[216] Euronews, ‘The simmering migrant crisis at the French-Italian border’, 29 December 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/49ufwvE.

^[217] RaiNews24-Tg Liguria, ‘Cpr a Ventimiglia, l’apertura del ministro Piantedosi’, 20 September 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3uUrXBK.

^[218] ANSA, ‘Piantedosi, un Cpr in Liguria ma non sarà a Ventimiglia’, 2 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3Tb8B4P.

^[219] Primalariviera.it, “Meno migranti, ma più problemi: ecco il report “Ventimiglia ai margini 2024”, 20 March 2025, available in italian at https://shorturl.at/mJILy.

^[220]  See Black book on Pre-Removal Detention Centre (CPR): when EU denies the human, 23 September 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3vxhQAx.

^[221]  Il Fatto Quotidiano, ‘Moussa Balde, condannati a due anni gli autori del pestaggio. La famiglia del migrante: ‘Ora verità sulla sua morte in isolamento nel Cpr’, 10 January 2023 available in italian at: http://bit.ly/3HcKn2T.

^[222] TGR Piemonte, ‘CPR. Per il suicidio di Moussa Balde la Procura chiede tre rinvii a giudizio’, 25 October 2023, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/48rllZz.

^[223] Domani, “Due rinvii a giudizio per la morte di Moussa Balde nel Cpr di Torino nel 2021”, 29 October 2024, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/FoqJn.

^[224] Il Manifesto, “Cpr di Torino, al via il processo per la morte di Moussa Balde”, 12 February 2025, available in Italian at https://shorturl.at/hHXCO.

^[225] Roma today, ‘Baobab, il presidente rischia fino a 18 anni per favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina’, 19 April 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3kp6qZ9.

^[226]  Ansa, ‘Migranti: assolto il presidente di Baobab’, 3 May 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/39HDjy4.

^[227] European Court of Human Rights, Applications No. 18911/17 and others, A.E. and others vs Italy, 16 November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3SRhFKN.

^[228] A more exhaustive illustration of the “border relief policy” and the subsequent forced transfers to Taranto Hotspot available in the report Hotspot leaks: dossier sulla frontiera di Taranto, prodotto dal progetto STAMP – Sostegno ai Transitanti, Accoglienza a Migranti e ai Profughi, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49GXxly and in Amnesty International, Hotspot Italia: come le politiche dell’Unione Europea portano a violazioni dei diritti di rifugiati e migranti, 3 November 2016, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/49K4XEg.

^[229] A more exhaustive illustration of the MOU between Italy and Sudan is available on ASGI, ‘Memorandum d’Intesa Italia-Sudan: un’analisi giuridica’, 30 October 2017, available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3T9z42B.

^[230] See Sant’Egidio webpage at: bit.ly/3RhD1Rl.

^[231] MOI, available at: bit.ly/3VflQRT.

^[232] Agenzia Fides, “EUROPE/ITALY – Humanitarian corridors from Afghanistan, a way to save lives”, 15 December 2021, available at https://shorturl.at/iIjdP.

^[233] InfoMigrants, “Italy: 1,200 Afghans to arrive with humanitarian corridors”, 8 November 2021, available at https://shorturl.at/pziLD.

^[234] Sant’Egidio, “Afghanistan: an agreement for new refugee entries with humanitarian corridors signed on April 7th”, 7 April 2025, available at https://shorturl.at/sSqpY.

^[235] Report to Senate of the Minister of Interior, Piantedosi, communicated to the Presidency on 29 November 2022, available at: bit.ly/3yV5brW, 12.

^[236] Civil Court of Rome, interim measure of 22 November 2023, procedure no. 52019/2023 available in Italian at: bit.ly/3VEhTaR.

^[237] Civil Court of Rome, decision of 8 June 2023, available here.

^[238]  Civil Court of Rome, decision of 14 July 2024, available here.