The LFIP provides three types of international protection status in accordance with Türkiye’s “geographical limitation” policy on the 1951 Refugee Convention.
- Persons who fall within the refugee definition in Article of the 1951 Convention and come from a “European country of origin”[1] qualify for refugee status under LFIP, in full acknowledgment of Türkiye’s obligations under the 1951 Convention. The Turkish legal status of refugee under LFIP should afford rights and entitlements in accordance with the requirements of the 1951 Convention, including the prospect of long-term legal integration in Türkiye. The numbers of persons who qualified for refugee status have never been transparent but in an event organised in October 2021, PMM informed that there were 28 refugees in Türkiye.[2] In 2023, no information was shared.
- Persons who fall within the refugee definition in Article of the 1951 Convention but come from a so-called ‘non-European country of origin’, are instead offered conditional refugee status under LFIP. Conditional refugee status is a Turkish legal concept introduced by the LFIP for the purpose of differentiating in treatment between 1951 Convention-type refugees originating from ‘non-European’ states and those originating from ‘European’ states. The status of conditional refugee affords to beneficiaries a set of rights and entitlements lesser to that granted to refugee status holders and to subsidiary protection holders in some respects. Most importantly, conditional refugees are not offered the prospect of long-term legal integration in Türkiye and are excluded from Family Reunification The number of people granted conditional refugee status has never been made public. There is no data shared in 2023, the latest number was roughly 2,000 conditional refugees in October 2021.[3]
- Persons who do not fulfil the eligibility criteria for either refugee status or conditional refugee status but would however be subjected to death penalty or torture in country of origin if returned, or would be at “individualised risk of indiscriminate violence” due to situations or war or internal armed conflict, qualify for subsidiary protection status under LFIP. The Turkish legal status of subsidiary protection mirrors the subsiandiary protection definition provided by the EU Qualification Directive. Similar to the conditional refugee status holders, subsidiary protection beneficiaries receive a lesser set of rights and entitlements as compared to refugee status holders and are barred from long-term legal integration in Türkiye. Notably however, unlike conditional refugees, subsidiary protection beneficiaries are granted family reunification rights in Türkiye.
Türkiye hosts 220,000 asylum seekers and protection beneficiaries from various nationalities, mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Ukraine. Specifically, there are 12,549 from Afghanistan, 12,909 from Iraq, and 5,388 from Iran[4]. In 2023, Türkiye recorded 38,725 displaced Ukrainians, including 3,230 who applied for international protection[5].
As it was mentioned in the section Reception Conditions, since 2022, there has been a noticeable rise in anti-migrant sentiment, with discussions during the election campaign in 2023 General Election centering on issues such as voluntary return, unwanted immigrants, and border protection. During the 2023 elections in Türkiye, the issue of immigration emerged as one of the most dominant topics of debate, marking a significant shift in the country’s political landscape, Türkiye had not witnessed widespread anti-immigrant sentiments despite its large foreign population until recently[6]. However, with a deepening economic crisis which has led to migrants being scapegoated for job competition and seen as a burden on the welfare system[7] and with the rise of the anti-migrant party whose discourse shaped the discussion surrounding migration, anti-migrant sentiments have shifted dramatically[8]. Almost all political parties have proposed political solutions for the immigration issue in their rhetoric and political programs, and the parties’ political statements found resonance with the voters. Almost every partys’ voters supported such discourse on refugees’ return[9]. During the election periods in Türkiye, as well as in the policies implemented after the May 2023 elections, anti-immigrant sentiment created challenges for immigrant and refugee communities to force them to be more invisible due to the fear of deportation or being targeted of any discrimination.
Specifically, the Afghan community in Türkiye, often labeled by the media and political actors as “undocumented,” “illegal,” and a “security risk,” faces the strictest security measures. Consequently, they adopt strategies to become invisible and introverted in urban areas, making minimal or no claims to rights or services[10]. Furthermore, the lack of consensus on the number of foreigners in Türkiye highlighted the need for greater transparency and public dialogue on immigration issues[11].
The earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria in February 2023, occurring at a time of limited resources and government capacity, further exacerbated anti-migrant sentiments[12]. The effects of the earthquakes are discussed under the Content of Temporary Protection, as the main refugee group in the region is Syrians under temporary protection.
Additionally, policies aimed at rendering migrant and refugee groups invisible in Türkiye have resulted in instances of discrimination and hate speech. The attack in Izmir Konak, where one refugee was killed and another severely injured, has highlighted the scapegoating of refugees as responsible for poverty and unemployment in Türkiye, exposing them to hate speech and racist attacks[13]. According to a survey, 43.6% of respondents consider irregular migration as the biggest threat to Türkiye[14], indicating the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments and the need for addressing such issues. (For further details, see Reception Conditions)
EU funding is almost exclusively allocated to Syrians (see Content of Temporary Protection), neglecting other groups. For instance,[15] often NGOs and civil society actors, who wish to support non-Syrians, especially Afghans must rely on their own resources, leaving those aiding Afghans unsupported and underfunded by state and international bodies. Other issues regarding the funding[16] are (1) overall budget cuts of different funding instruments, especially for the projects supporting inclusion, (2) overlooking some priorities identified by stakeholders, (3) requirements to access the EU fundings through INGOs, (4) lack of targeted funding to municipalities which provide services to refugees regardless of the status or nationality, and (5) difficulties to ensure the sustainability of the projects.
[1] For the purpose of “geographical limitation” in regards to the interpretation of the 1951 Convention, Government of Türkiye considers countries members of the Council of Europe as ‘European countries of origin’.
[2] QHA, ‘Göç ve uyum konulu toplantıda Türkiye’deki göç olgusu anlatıldı’, 17 March 2021, available in Turkish here
[3] ibid.
[4] UNHCR Türkiye Factsheet April 2024, available here
[5] UNHCR, Ukraine Refugee Situation, available here
[6] Balta, E., Elçi, E., & Sert, D. (2023). Political Party Representation of Anti-Immigration Attitudes: The Case of Turkey. Istanbul: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. Available here
[7] Ibid.
[8] Balta, E., Elçi, E., & Sert, D. (2023). 2023 Seçimleri ve Türkiye’deki göç tartışmaları. Istanbul: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.
[9] Doç. Dr. Didem Danış: “Erdoğan zor bir yol ayrımında çünkü toplumdaki mülteci karşıtlığı çok yükselmiş durumda” – Medyascope, available here
[10] GAR, October 2023, Actors and Mechanisms of (Non-)reception of the Afghans in Turkey GAR Report No. 9
[11] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[12] Sert, D., Danış, D., & Sevinin, E. (2023). Göç ve Deprem Durum Tespit Raporu. Istanbul: Göç Araştırmaları Derneği, GAR.
[13] Ege Evrensel, 16.08.2023, İHD İzmir Şubesi, Konak’taki ırkçı saldırıya ve mülteci düşmanlığına tepki gösterdi available here
[14] Kisadalga, 07.08.2023, Metropoll’den ‘en büyük tehdit’ araştırması: Düzensiz göç mü dış güçler mi?, available here
[15] GAR Report No. 9, Actors and Mechanisms of (Non-)Reception of the Afghans in Turkey, October 2023, available here
[16] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024