In 2025, Türkiye hosted a population of over 2.3 million refugees[1] from Syria under the temporary protection regime and around 166,000 asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protection of other nationalities, principally originating from Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran among others.[2] 6,430 asylum seekers applied for international protection; the majority is from Afghanistan (3,472). Many of the challenges highlighted in the last year’s report remain for 2025, however, the regime change in Syria in December 2024, together with PRM’s funding cuts to USAID throughout 2025, affected individuals’ lives the most.
In 2025, key concerns in the field of migration and asylum in Türkiye centered on the conduct of public officials, both in individual practices and public discourse. Access to registration and re-registration remained a persistent barrier, while increasing reports of arbitrary decisions regarding the cancellation or deactivation of temporary protection statuses emerged. Stakeholders also highlighted the inconsistency of judicial decisions concerning these cases. It was widely understood that individuals had been suffering at different stages of the international protection procedure: accessing registration remained very difficult; once registered, people faced frequent arbitrary rejections; and obtaining positive outcomes from the courts was nearly impossible. Those who had been granted conditional refugee status years ago began losing that status, and individuals were being deprived of access to healthcare. Although these affected different groups and arose from different grounds, the outcome was the same — people were being deprived of access to basic rights, particularly healthcare, as officials sought to reduce the number of people benefiting from it, viewing it as a burden on the economy. Additionally, PMM exercised considerable discretion in granting humanitarian residence permit to the ones in need of international protection. Because it offers no non-refoulement protection and does not provide access to healthcare, stakeholders raised concerns that PMM is using it to channel individuals with credible international protection claims away from the international protection procedure and into a status with markedly weaker safeguards.
A new phase began after December 2024. With the regime change in Syria, it is anticipated that many Syrians mays wish to return, given the presumed elimination of persecution risks. As of June 2026, there was no formal announcement regarding the lifting of temporary protection. However, official figures indicate that more than 700,000 individuals have returned to Syria since December 2024. In addition, following the change in U.S. administration in January 2025, significant funding cuts to international assistance programs were observed. As a result, many NGOs operating in Türkiye had to scale down their operations, which in turn adversely impacted the refugee population’s access to services and support.
Deteriorating access to protection and rights
In 2025, public authorities’ practices regarding the status of individuals under international and temporary protection became increasingly arbitrary and unpredictable. Sudden cancellations, deactivations, apprehensions, and rejections created significant uncertainty and hardship for applicants. Individuals with minor or outdated criminal records, sometimes dating back years, or those merely attempting to file a legal complaint as a victim or complainant, were at risk of being apprehended on grounds related to “public order.” These practices were further complicated by the opaque application of security codes, which often served as the basis for deportation orders or ID deactivation without clear justification. Even in cases where individuals successfully reactivated their IDs after long legal struggles against wrongful cancellations or deportation decisions, many ultimately gave up and opted for return due to the persistent uncertainty and bureaucratic fatigue. Beyond the actions of government officials, individuals increasingly lost trust in judicial actors as well. In addition to inconsistent rulings from administrative courts, obtaining a positive outcome from Magistrates’ courts in challenges against administrative detention orders became nearly impossible. As a result, many legal practitioners began to question the effectiveness of this remedy.[3] Throughout 2025, it was nearly impossible to predict the outcome of a specific legal situation, since there are too many variables involved, which makes it very difficult to navigate the legal system.
As a consequence, an increasing number of individuals, regardless of whether they had active IDs, sought to cross Türkiye’s western borders irregularly, driven primarily by a perceived lack of future prospects in the country.[4] Many of those who succeeded, primarily men, left their families behind hoping to find safer means to reunite with them later. This separation often forced children to drop out of school to contribute economically to their household, highlighting the severe social toll of the ongoing uncertainty and restrictive protection environment.[5]
Effects of funding cuts
Since NGO operations were reduced while the need remained the same, access to services began to decline compared to before. Among individuals receiving counseling from NGOs, the issues they struggled with most were access to healthcare and GBV cases. On access to healthcare, GHI registrations were being denied in an arbitrary manner, and the resulting hardships, ranging from being unable to get even a simple hospital appointment, affected people because they depended on NGO counseling to navigate these problems. In GBV cases, when women survivors of violence went to police centers, they were pressured by police to reconcile with their abusers and were threatened with removal to a Removal Center if they pursued a complaint, as a result, they increasingly stopped being able to file complaints on their own. When an NGO representative accompanied them, however, it was more likely that their complaints would be officially recorded and that they would be placed in a shelter according to their needs. Finally, the status of individuals holding conditional refugee status began to be revoked abruptly, and those who were not receiving regular NGO counseling missed their appeal deadlines, since these status revocations were notified electronically.
Return dynamics and post-December 2024 developments
As of December 2025, there has been no formal public discussion regarding the lifting of temporary protection status in Türkiye. However, Turkish authorities permitted Syrians to realise up to three “go-and-see” visits between 1 January and 1 July 2025, with the stated aim of enabling individuals to assess the feasibility of rebuilding their lives in Syria. The return infrastructure at the Turkish-Syrian border was significantly expanded to accommodate this process. Despite this, according to stakeholders, the majority of those under temporary protection continue to adopt a cautious approach, citing serious concerns regarding the current state of infrastructure, healthcare, education, and overall security conditions in Syria. Furthermore, observed trends indicate that women and children are more inclined to remain in Türkiye compared to men. This is attributed in part to their perception that they enjoy broader rights and greater protection in Türkiye. One of the main challenges observed in the return process relates to custodial disputes. Single parents, predominantly mothers, who wish to return to Syria with their children are often required to present the consent of the father, even in cases where the father has abandoned the family, is untraceable, or has already returned to Syria either voluntarily or through deportation. This requirement has created significant legal and practical barriers, effectively preventing many mothers from returning with their children despite their willingness to do so.
Throughout 2025, the pace of returns visibly slowed down, despite Turkish officials’ efforts both to encourage Syrians to return and to publicise the relevant statistics very recently. Stakeholders reported that returnees frequently share information on the situation in Syria with those still in Türkiye. Although there is no major persecution problem, except for certain groups who could fall under a refugee claim (ethnic or religious minorities, or LGBTIQ+ people), the main problem is the lack of infrastructure in Syria: electricity is available only 3–8 hours a day outside Damascus, there are no decent jobs, salaries are at a record low, and healthcare is inadequate. Stakeholders also note that after more than ten years, it has become harder for people — especially those whose children were born and raised in Türkiye — to move to another country, one where their children cannot speak the language and have never seen before.
International protection
Asylum procedures
- Asylum statistics: In 2025, there were 6,430 applicants for international protection, which corresponds to a 28.6% decrease compared to 2024 and a 66.1% decrease compared to 2023.[6] It is a record-low number since 2010, even lower than prior to the adoption and implementation of the LFIP. Despite the number of applications, 63,406 international protection applications were concluded during the period, either positively or negatively.[7] While no official breakdown is available, stakeholders reported that the majority of these decisions were negative. This asymmetry reflects PMM’s apparent intention to gradually reduce the pool of pending applicants through negative decisions, while they remain reluctant to register new applications. Afghans accounted for the largest number of applicants (3,472) followed by Iraqis (1,463) and Iranians (585). According to PMM statistics,[8] 160,253 irregular migrants were apprehended in 2025, reflecting a significant decrease compared to 2024 (225,831). Afghans continued to constitute the largest group among those apprehended for irregular status, with 44,157 individuals. Syrians were the second most represented nationality, with 22,515 apprehensions. Other prominent nationalities included Turkmens, Egyptians, Moroccans, Uzbeks, Iraqis, and Iranians. While PMM does not publish disaggregated data on irregular entries, the reported figures encompass both individuals intercepted at or near borders and those whose legal status or identity documents were later cancelled by authorities. According to stakeholders, in line with these figures, Afghans remained the most frequently apprehended nationality following irregular border crossings in 2025.
- Strengthened border control and border infrastructure: As of October 2025, security walls have been completed along approximately 87 percent of the Syria and Iran borders, covering 1,274 kilometers, alongside 1,275 kilometers of patrol roads along the same lines. Across all land borders, patrol roads now extend to 1,700 kilometers, covering roughly 58 percent of the country’s 2,949-kilometer land border. On the Van segment of the Iranian border, 26 kilometers of the planned 92-kilometer stretch had been completed by October 2025, and construction continues. On the Iraqi border, 25 kilometers of physical barriers and 26 kilometers of patrol roads have been completed, with a further 13 kilometers still underway. Surveillance infrastructure has also been expanded, with 223 watchtower systems installed along the eastern and southeastern borders, and 341 electro-optic towers established, 250 of which are located on the eastern borders. Together with high-capacity thermal cameras, elevator towers, armored surveillance vehicles, and seismic sensor systems, this infrastructure enables monitoring of 740 kilometers of the eastern border.[9] Following the political transition in Syria on December 2024, the ‘go and see’ visits initially took place through the Çobanbey and Zeytindalı border gates, with Yayladağı later added to the list. The duration of the permission granted for these visits was limited to 15 days. Approximately 15,000 individuals returned to Türkiye after participating in these visits and were issued a V-175 restriction code. As of June 2025, 27,000 people were granted permission to make use of this opportunity.[10]
- Access to the territory and pushbacks at the borders: Despite the building of border walls and increasing surveillance along Türkiye’s Eastern border, this did not prevent irregular crossings and instead led to crossings shifting to more dangerous, and mountainous routes or taking place during winter months when the weather conditions are very harsh. At the eastern border with Iran, the pushback practices continued in 2025, particularly targeting single men coming from Afghanistan, who faced more pushback to Iran than other groups. In some cases, they were held for months before being subjected to pushback without being taken to removal centres or the possibility of applying for protection. There are no clear or individual assessments at the border with Iran, and the migrants are often not informed about their rights. The advancement of wall construction along the Iran-Türkiye border in 2025 has pushed irregular migration routes into mountainous, higher-risk areas where construction has yet to be completed. This shift has made crossings markedly more dangerous, with stakeholders noting instances of cold-related injuries sustained during the journey.[11] Beginning on 20 August 2025, land border crossings between Türkiye and Syria started permitting passport-based entry and exit, a development tied to the broader normalisation process following Syria’s political transition in December 2024. This applies to Turkish citizens as well as Syrian nationals holding third-country citizenship, who may now use any land crossing point except those falling within the Operation Peace Spring zone.[12]
- Access to registration: The registration of applications remained one of the most significant barriers to people seeking international protection in Türkiye in 2025.[13] The provinces where PDMMs were willing to accept applications varied throughout the year and did not reflect a consistent practice. 1,169 neighbourhoods in 63 provinces where the foreign population exceeds 20% of the Turkish citizen population, were closed to new registrations of foreigners from 2023.[14] This practice continued in 2025. Given that the registration system had been effectively frozen for close to two years, applicants by 2025 had largely resigned themselves to the reality that certain profiles notably single men from Afghanistan, Iran, or Iraq faced nearly insurmountable obstacles to registering. Vulnerable applicants, particularly single mothers and single women, still managed to register in some instances, usually via NGO referral or sustained advocacy from a private lawyer. Nationalities less familiar to PDMM officials seemed to have somewhat better odds than more commonly encountered ones Sri Lankan applicants faring better than Afghan applicants, for example. On the rare occasions a single man did manage to register, the only viable route available to him was referral to the Nizip TAC in Gaziantep.
- Voluntary return: Voluntary, safe, and dignified returns have continued to be a priority policy area for the PMM in 2024, which established its voluntary return programme in 2021. Following the regime change in Syria in December 2024, this policy began to be referred to as voluntary, safe, dignified, and regular returns. Between 8 December 2024 and July 2026, more than 700,000 people voluntarily returned to Syria. Throughout 2025, returns to Syria dominated PMM’s agenda almost to the exclusion of everything else. Public communications were overwhelmingly oriented around this single issue — even individuals approaching PDMM offices for entirely unrelated matters reportedly received voluntary return counseling from officials. PMM was notably eager to publicise the steadily declining number of Syrians in Türkiye on a week-by-week basis; no other statistic received anywhere near that level of promotion.
- Use of security restriction codes and due process concerns: Throughout 2025, security restriction codes and foreign fighter codes, which create serious suspicion and stigma against individuals, have not been subject to adequate judicial review through administrative courts. Decisions of non-prosecution, or acquittals issued by criminal courts, demonstrating that individuals were not involved in any crime or terrorism-related act, are likewise disregarded by the PMM. Even where a person was placed in administrative detention solely on the basis of such an allegation, they are not released from detention once the allegation is found to be unlawful. In some case files, individuals whose administrative detention was terminated have reportedly been re-apprehended by law enforcement shortly afterwards and placed back into administrative detention, with a deportation decision issued against them simultaneously. Similarly, it has been reported that in cases where a release decision was issued but the person had not yet been released and remained in an RC, documents were drawn up stating that the person had been re-apprehended “outside,” despite the fact that they had not been released even for a brief period, which creates an endless loop.[15] In a documentary, legal practitioners stated that notes and codes placed on individuals by foreign intelligence agencies are treated with excessive weight by Turkish officials. This practice runs contrary to the basic principles of asylum, as it places undue reliance on precisely the type of information that may have driven the individual to flee their country of origin in the first place.[16]
- Detention based on minor criminal records: In late 2025, stakeholders reported a new practice whereby roughly 150 families, among them Syrian, Egyptian, and Palestinian nationals, were detained based on minor criminal records attributed to their children, in some cases dating back five or six years. These records involved low-level offences such as threats, insults, and motorcycle-related traffic violations. While stakeholders recognised that the authorities’ underlying concern was likely the involvement of children in organised gangs, they characterised the practice as a clear breach of the presumption of innocence and the principle of individual criminal liability. It was seen as a further example of criminal and immigration enforcement being blurred together in ways that pushed at the limits of the non-refoulement principle.[17]
- Country of Origin Information (COI): The 2025–2028 EUAA–PMM Roadmap for Cooperation designates Country of Origin Information capacity development as a priority area, covering COI methodology training, identity and document verification, and the translation and dissemination of EUAA COI publications into Turkish to support asylum adjudication at both central and provincial levels.[18] Stakeholders, however, report that country of origin information is not given adequate weight in practice, as applicants face a high threshold to be recognised as in need of international protection.[19]
- Increased number of rejection decisions: PMM took 63,406 decisions in 2025, which constitutes a decrease compared to the 85,125 taken in 2024. The pattern of new applications remaining low while decision output stays high persisted into 2025, with the ratio between the two reaching a record low of 10.1%, reflecting PMM’s apparent priority of clearing the existing backlog rather than accepting new applications. While no public data is available, stakeholders report that rejection rates are considerably higher than acceptance rates. One stakeholder noted that PDMMs must obtain PMM approval to accept cases, but they can reject applications independently based on their assessments.[20]
- Judicial review of international protection cases: As LFIP-related caseloads rose, several additional chambers were designated to handle the growing volume in Istanbul and Ankara. In 2025, five Istanbul courts (1st, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Administrative Courts) and two Ankara courts (1st and 26th) handle LFIP cases, while the 1st Administrative Court remains the sole designated chamber elsewhere. In practice, the Istanbul and Ankara courts operate as de facto immigration courts. Stakeholders noted, however, that spreading LFIP cases across multiple Istanbul chambers has undermined consistency, with different courts reaching divergent conclusions on the same legal questions.[21]
Reception conditions
- Reception of women: In 2025, the intersection between poverty and GBV became increasingly visible, with women requesting shelter placement in the absence of physical violence, driven instead by economic hardship. Shelter officials reportedly apply stricter admission criteria to foreign women than to Turkish nationals: while Turkish women can be accepted on the basis of risk of violence alone, combined with a statement that they have nowhere else to go, foreign women are required to present valid identification and a formal complaint evidencing an actual incident of violence. Combined with existing barriers to registration and access to adequate housing, this disparity has further worsened the situation of affected individuals.
Administrative detention of asylum seekers and access to procedural safeguards
- Detention facilities: As of 2025, there are 32 removal centres operating across 25 provinces in Türkiye, with a total detention capacity of approximately 18,780. Throughout 2025, multiple reports[22] flagged serious concerns over the erosion of procedural safeguards, along with restrictions limiting both detainees and their lawyers from fully exercising their rights. Allegations included administrative detention and deportation processes proceeding unpredictably and arbitrarily, with inconsistent decisions on similar-profile detainees undermining legal certainty; centers frequently disregarding court-ordered releases or detainee-specific accommodations without seeking PMM approval, causing delays; ill-treatment complaints rarely advancing due to denied investigation permits or missing/incomplete camera footage; families and lawyers unable to locate detainees or determine which facility held them; lawyers barred from accompanying clients during international protection applications; courts routinely rejecting detention appeals without genuine review, even where family ties, health conditions, or child welfare warranted release; consular officials—particularly Afghan—allegedly discouraging detainees from pursuing legal remedies; opaque, undocumented release practices involving notarized guarantees arranged through intermediaries, applied inconsistently; unofficial detention/transfer sites lacking any legal status, with lawyers, interpreters, and relatives barred from access; broken lawyer-client communication systems (intercoms, glass partitions, absent translation lines); restricted numbers of simultaneous visits; suicides and deaths with severely limited information access.
- Judicial review of administrative detention: Judicial review of administrative detention before magistrates’ courts remains largely ineffective in practice. Throughout 2025, decisions terminating administrative detention were extremely rare, with most profiles receiving no release decision at all. Individuals have continued to be detained despite clear legal grounds for release, including family ties, health conditions, the availability of alternatives to detention, or the best interests of the child. Lawyers have widely reported that magistrates dismiss detention appeals without reviewing their content. Separately, requests to lift administrative detention where a deportation decision is also in place are routinely rejected unless the deportation decision itself has been annulled, despite LFIP imposing no such requirement. In practice, annulment of the deportation decision has become a de facto precondition for release from an RC. Additionally, foreign nationals under criminal investigation or prosecution are automatically placed in administrative detention, and magistrates disregard favourable outcomes, such as non-prosecution or acquittal, when reviewing detention appeals.[23]
Content of international protection
- Resettlement: In 2025, UNHCR continued to expedite the resettlement processing of the most vulnerable refugees. As of February 2025, more than 43,815 Syrian refugees had been resettled from Türkiye to the EU under the 1:1 scheme. Around 13 EU countries were expected to participate in the resettlement efforts, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Italy, Finland, France, Norway, and Ireland. According to statistics shared by the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM), participation from all these countries was confirmed – except for Ireland.
Temporary protection
- Detention of Syrian nationals in temporary accommodation centers (TAC): Following a policy change in 2022, Syrians who enter the country are transferred to temporary accommodation centres. By the end of 2025 The remaining operational facilities are the Sarıçam TAC in Adana, the Nizip and Islahiye-2 TACs in Gaziantep, the Elbeyli TAC in Kilis, and the Harran TAC in Şanlıurfa. Hence, the camps have become a new form of detention facility for Syrians who are either not registered under the temporary protection regime or have had their temporary protection status revoked. Individuals detained in the temporary accommodation centres often face indefinite detention, unlike those in regular detention centres, which have a maximum detention period of up to 12 months. Immigration lawyers believe that the indefinite detention in these centres aims to hinder Syrians from appealing deportation decisions or to coerce them into signing voluntary return forms.[24] An unpublished circular dated 6 June 2022 outlined four exceptions to the requirement of staying in Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs): (1) children of individuals exempt from TAC residence; (2) those for whom travel is not advisable due to health conditions; (3) individuals married to Turkish citizens or to foreigners legally residing in Türkiye under a residence permit, work permit, or international protection status, along with their children; and (4) individuals with special needs who are not suitable for placement in TACs, as well as their dependent children As of 2025, Nizip TAC has assumed a primary function in the processing of international protection applications in the south-east, a role previously associated with Harran TAC in 2024. Individuals whose international protection applications are received by the relevant Provincial Directorate of Migration Management are in practice referred to Nizip TAC for the duration of the procedure, without travel costs being covered. Decisions have been observed to be issued within approximately two to three months, the majority of which are negative, though a number of individuals have been granted international protection status.
- Apprehensions and changing enforcement practices: Apprehensions of Syrian nationals for irregular status declined markedly over the review period. In 2023, Syrians accounted for approximately 58,621 of the 254,008 total apprehensions nationwide more than double the 2021 figure. This fell to 50,641 in 2024, and further to 22,515 in 2025.[25] Stakeholders attribute this decline to a shift in official attitudes towards Syrian nationals over the course of 2025: following the regime change in Syria in December 2024, forced returns were largely replaced by counselling and encouragement to pursue voluntary return.
- Registration under Temporary Protection: Registration continues to be one of the main issues faced by applicants. In a statement published in August 2024, the Ministry of Interior declared that no new registrations of Syrians under temporary protection had taken place since June 2022, effectively closing the discussion on the matter. In line with this policy, the regime change in Syria, and the public encouragement of voluntary returns, the number of Syrians under temporary protection decreased to 2,347,756 as of 2025.
Access to rights and support under the Temporary Protection
- Increased EU funding: For 2023 and 2024, the EU has pledged over 2 billion EUR in support for Syrian refugees and their host communities. It was stressed that the EU would continue to collaborate with Turkiye to ensure the delivery of cross-border aid to Syria. As part of the MFF mid-term review package, the European Council on 1 February 2024 agreed to increase by 1.5 billion EUR the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve for the period 2024-2027.[26]
- Access to employment: Widespread confusion between the exemption mechanism and the standard work permit procedure meant that awareness of the measure remained very low, only beginning to spread more broadly among the affected population by mid-2025. The extent of this lack of awareness became apparent in June 2026, when the Minister of Interior publicly announced the introduction of a work permit exemption for foreigners under temporary protection to support registered employment.[27] The announcement was widely reported as a new development, even though the measure had in fact been in force since October 2024.
- Decreasing apprehensions of temporary protection beneficiaries: By the end of 2025, there were 22,515 Syrians among the 160,253 people apprehended across the country.After the increasing trend seen between 2022 and 2024, this number reflects a reduced rate of apprehension of Syrians, matched by reduced public interest in capturing Syrians, with attention shifting instead toward encouraging voluntary returns.[28]
- Access to social assistance and support: Kızılaykart statistics indicate that those returning throughout 2025 were predominantly aid-dependent individuals. The number of ESSN beneficiaries fell from 995,742 in May 2025 to 672,337 in May 2026. A similar trend is evident in Temporary Accommodation Centres, which officials have reportedly sought to empty: the number of individuals receiving in-camp assistance dropped sharply from 31,559 in May 2025 to just 3,884 in May 2026.[29]
[1] PMM, Temporary Protection Statistics, available here.
[2] UNHCR, Türkiye – Annual Overview 2025, January 2026, available here.
[3] Information provided by stakeholders, March, April and May 2025.
[4] Mülteci-Der, Belirsizlikle Başa Çıkmak, 24.01.2025, available here.
[5] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2025.
[6] PMM, International Protection Statistics, available here.
[7] PMM, Faaliyet Raporu 2025, available here.
[8] PMM, Irregular Migration Statistics, available here.
[9] AA, Türkiye’nin kara sınırlarının yaklaşık yüzde 44’üne güvenlik duvarı örüldü, 30 October 2025, available here.
[10] Habertürk, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya Özel Röportaj’da Soruları Yanıtlıyor, 05 June 2025, available here.
[11] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2026.
[12] PMM, Suriye’ye Pasaportla Geçiş, 20 August 2025, available here.
[13] Information provided by stakeholders, February, March, – April and May 2026.
[14] PMM, “İstanbul’da 39 İlçenin Yabancıların İkamet İzinlerine Kapatıldığı” İddialarına İlişkin Basın Açıklaması, 16 July 2023, available here.
[15] İstanbul Barosu, ‘İstanbul’daki Geri Gönderme Merkezleri: 2025 Yılına İlişkin Gözlem ve Tespitler’, 20 June 2026, available here.
[16] İdame Medya, Boraltan köprüsü | Türkiye’de Mülteci Olmak, 28 August 2026, available here.
[17] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2026.
[18] EUAA, Roadmap for Cooperation between the EUAA and Türkiye (2025-2028), June 2025, available here.
[19] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, March, April and May 2026.
[20] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, April and May 2025.
[21] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2026.
[22] İstanbul Barosu, İstanbul’daki Geri Gönderme Merkezleri: 2025 Yılına İlişkin Gözlem ve Tespitler, 20 June 2026, available here.
[23] İstanbul Barosu, İstanbul’daki Geri Gönderme Merkezleri: 2025 Yılına İlişkin Gözlem ve Tespitler, 20 June 2026, available here.
[24] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, 12 June 2024, available here
[25] PMM, Irregular Migration Statistics, available here.
[26] European Commission, Commission signs €400 million agreement with Türkiye to support its recovery after the 2023 earthquakes, 07 February 2024, available here.
[27] PMM, İçişleri Bakanı Mustafa Çiftçi Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları ile İstişare ve Değerlendirme Toplantısı’nda Bir Araya Geldi, 26 June 2026, available here.
[28] PMM, Irregular migration statistics, available here.
[29] Kızılaykart, Infografik, available here; see also AIDA, Country report: Türkiye – Update on the year 2024, July 2025, available here.