Temporary Accommodation Centres
The TPR does not provide a right to government-provided shelter as such for temporary protection beneficiaries. However, Article 37(1) TPR, as amended in 2018, authorises PMM to build camps to accommodate temporary protection beneficiaries.[1] These camps are officially referred to as Temporary Accommodation Centres.[2] A further amendment to the LFIP in 2018 sets out provisions on the financing of camps set up by PMM.[3]
Articles 23 and 24 TPR authorise PMM to determine whether a temporary protection beneficiary shall be referred to one of the existing camps or allowed to reside outside the camps on their own means in a province determined by the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Amended Article 24 TPR authorises PMM to allow temporary protection beneficiaries to reside outside the camp in provinces to be determined by the Ministry of Interior Affairs[4]. It also commits that out of temporary protection beneficiaries living outside the camps, those who are in financial need may be accommodated in other facilities identified by the Governorate.
As of May 2023, there are nine large-scale camps accommodating a total of 62,489 temporary protection beneficiaries, spread across five provinces in Southern Türkiye in the larger Syria border region.[5] The number of residents thus increased from 49,346 to 62,489 in May 2023. The policy applied by the Turkish government to new arrivals from Syria changed as of 6 June 2022; since then, a protection seeker can be referred to a temporary accommodation center for registration, or registered by PDMM if it falls under one of the following categories:
- If the applicant has a family member who is already registered under temporary protection and not obliged to stay at Temporary Accommodation Centers. This category would include the spouses with civil marriage, new-born babies, underage children and dependents of the individuals who are already registered under temporary protection and not obliged to stay at Temporary Accommodation Centers.
- If the applicant has travel restrictions due to medical conditions, and if the applicant has no self-care ability,
- If the applicant has a family member (spouses who can furnish a civil marriage certificate, children, dependents) of Turkish nationals and foreign nationals holding residence permit, work permit or registered under international protection,
- If the applicant is deemed not suitable to be accommodated in Temporary Accommodation Centers due to a specific need, and their spouses, children and dependents.
If the applicant has any substantiating document of the above-mentioned situations, they should provide the PDMM with the relevant supportive documents. The applicant is registered at the Temporary Accommodation Centers if they do not fall under these categories. At the Temporary Accommodation Center that they are referred to, the applicant is fingerprinted, and a security check is conducted. The applicant is required to stay at the Temporary Accommodation Centre during the procedure. The applicant is issued the Temporary Protection Identification Card after the security check. If the applicant cannot pass the security check, they are interviewed by the PDMM prior to any other action. PDMM issues a decision on an individual basis if the applicant is assessed to be excluded from temporary protection.[6]
By May 2023 less than 2% of Syrians lived in camps: Adana (Sarıçam –the most crowded), Hatay (Apaydın, Yayladağı, Altınözü), Kahramamaras (Merkez), Kilis (Elbeyli), Osmaniye (Cevdetiye), Gazinatep (Nizip) and Malatya (Beydagi).[7]
Urban and rural areas
The vast majority of the current population subject to Türkiye’s temporary protection regime reside outside the camps in residential areas across Türkiye. As of 25 May 2023, the total population of temporary protection beneficiaries registered with Turkish authorities was listed as 3,373,677.[8]
More than half of the Syrians were registered in 4 out of the 81 Turkish provinces (İstanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay and Şanlıurfa). While İstanbul hosts the largest number of registered temporary protection beneficiaries, this only corresponds to 3.23% of its population. Conversely, temporary protection beneficiaries correspond to 17.09% of the population in Gaziantep, 13,53% in Şanlıurfa, 15,93 % in Hatay and 33.59% in Kilis.[9]
Refugees rent houses or live in blighted neighborhoods. Many face harsh living conditions and lack healthy housing. Poor economic conditions lead to cramped, unhealthy apartments, affecting their health. The level of inclusion and quality of accommodation of temporary protection beneficiaries varies from one province to another. After 2021, the rising cost of living in urban areas has had a devastating impact on refugees and deteriorated their living conditions.[10] Disputes between property proprietors and Syrian tenents have increased. In Istanbul, Syrians feared being deported if they filed a lawsuit against an unlawful rent increase. Frequently, property owners file complaints against Syrian tenants in an effort to evict them and re-rent the property at a higher price. This may result in the deportation of some Syrian nationals.[11] Additionally, CIMER-related complaints about Syrians increased. Particularly, property owners lodge complaints against Syrians to have them deported when they oppose unlawful requests for rent increases.[12]
In a study conducted in Izmir in 2022, regardless of gender, education, or occupation, the majority of respondents did not want Syrians in Türkiye and viewed them as a future risk. Due to the economic crisis, cultural differences, low level of social integration, informal employment, the lowering of salaries on the market, and disinformation, public support for refugees in Türkiye has decreased drastically. Disparities in language and religion further divide the population. Anti-refugee attitudes are fueled by false claims on social media and sensationalist media headlines. Politicians use these beliefs for their own benefit. There has been an increase in assaults on businesses and even murders against refugees. [13] (See Reception Conditions).
Prior to the 2023 Turkish elections, the situation of migrants has been grown increasingly challenging and negative attitudes towards refugees have become a major political crisis. According to a poll published in May 2022, respondents rank the refugee issue as the nation’s third most pressing concern, after the economy and unemployment.[14] The promises of opposition parties to repatriate refugees has been regarded as ‘an election investment’ by capitalising on anti-refugee sentiment. This trend has prompted political parties to embrace harder stances on migration, with the emergence of explicitly anti-refugee parties. On the other hand, the ruling coalition, led by President Erdogan, has been supporting the voluntary return of refugees to their home countries and has pursued military operations to establish safe zones in Syria. To facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, they propose repairing relations with the Assad regime, a diplomatic move which has made Syrians quite worried.[15] It is projected by the experts that as mass resettlement is not feasible, the issue of migrants will persist beyond the elections despite divergent approaches.[16] Integration policies are needed to foster social harmony and protect refugees from violence, disinformation, and exploitation.[17]
[1] Article 37(3) TPR, as amended by Regulation 2018/11208.
[2] Article 3 TPR.
[3] Article 121A LFIP, inserted by Article 71(e) Decree 703 of 9 July 2018.
[4] Article 24 as amended by Regulation 2019/30989.
[5] PMM, Temporary protection, available at: https://bit.ly/3wKyP0K.
[6] UNHCR, ‘Registration with the Turkish authorities’, last accessed 13 July 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/44mxjSJ.
[7] PMM, ‘GEÇİCİ KORUMA’, 22 June 2023, available in Turkish at: https://bit.ly/3NSpvkG.
[8] PMM, ‘GEÇİCİ KORUMA’, 22 June 2023, available in Turkish at: https://bit.ly/3NSpvkG.
[9] PMM, ‘GEÇİCİ KORUMA’, 22 June 2023, available in Turkish at: https://bit.ly/3NSpvkG.
[10] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[11] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[12] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[13] Hakan Ömer TUNCA, Altan ÖZKİL, ‘Suriyelilere Yönelik Güvenlik Algısı: İzmir Örneği’, 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/43nLZzR.
[14] Dokuz8haber, ‘Anket sonuçlarına göre yurttaşın en büyük sorunu ekonomi’, 6 May 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3XSJq7Z.
[15] Euronews, ‘Türkiye’de Suriyeli sığınmacılar endişeli’, 19 May 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3DhJsMQ.
[16] Merve Tahiroğlu, ‘Göç Politikaları: Türkiye’deki Mülteciler ve 2023 Seçimleri’, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. 20 September 2022, available in Turkish at: https://bit.ly/44IgEsy.
[17] Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, ‘Immigration Politics: Refugees in Turkey and the 2023 Elections’, 17 August 2022, available at: https://bit.ly/3JZ2lYN.