The derogation from the non-refoulement principle
Applicants for international protection generally have the right to remain on the territory of Türkiye throughout the procedure.[1] However, an exception to this rule was introduced by way of emergency decree in October 2016, providing that a deportation decision “may be taken at any time during the international protection proceedings” against an applicant for reasons of: (i) leadership, membership or support of a terrorist organisation or a benefit-oriented criminal group; (ii) threat to public order or public health; or (iii) relation to terrorist organisations defined by international institutions and organisations.[2] Law No 7070 on 1 February 2018 consolidated the reform. In 2022, it was reported that since 2011, 9,000 Foreign Terrorist Fighters from 102 different nationalities have been deported.[3]There is no specific data shared regarding 2023.
For foreigners who have been convicted of an offence, the Public Prosecutor shall request the opinion of the Ministry of Interior as to whether they should be removed from the country.[4]
The law effectively enables the deportation of asylum seekers, beneficiaries of international protection and beneficiaries of temporary protection (see Temporary Protection: Protection from Refoulement) on the aforementioned grounds which remain largely vague and could be interpreted widely. The reform introduced by the Decree has been criticised for facilitating and exacerbating risks of arbitrary deportations jeopardising the life and safety of refugees.[5]
Amendments to the LFIP in 2019 allow for the travel costs for removal to be born by the deportee. If the individual does not have sufficient means , the expense shall be borne by PMM yet in the same article it states “money belonging to the foreigner, apart from the amount that is required to meet the basic needs identified by the Directorate General, will be recorded as income to the Treasury”.[6] There is no information yet about how this has been applied in practice.
A new regulation on Penal Execution Institutions and Execution of Penalties and Security Measures was enacted on 29 March 2020. According to Article 52 the following principles apply to convicts to be deported:
a) The decree on expulsion is sent to the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor where it is recorded in the execution book and sent to the highest security authority and immigration administration units.
b) Before being released from the institution, the administration of the institution informs the highest security authority of that place and the units of immigration administration on the release date of the convict. On the date of release, the convict is delivered to law enforcement for deportation proceedings.
c) The deportation of convicts not housed in institutions are carried out by immigration administration units.
Assessments regarding deportation procedures for convicts are made by the Ministry of Interior.
The country of deportation is not specified in deportation orders, which makes it questionable as to how assessment of the risk of refoulement is carried out as this assessment inherently requires an assessment of conditions in the country of deportation. This administrative deficiency is addressed in different ways by the courts. The general tendency is to assume that the country of removal is the country of origin and assess risk of refoulement based on this assumption. However, there are some positive decisions problematise the non-specification of country of removal. In 2023, Kırklareli Administrative Court found a deportation decision of an Iranian national unlawful because the deportation order did not clearly specify the country to which the foreign national would be deported. The absence of a specified destination creates legal uncertainty for the foreign national, undermining the protections intended by the non-refoulement principle[7].
There are also instances where the absence of a specified country of removal is used as an excuse to avoid conducting a risk assessment, assuming that the removal will adhere to the principle of non-refoulement. Administrative practice of non-specification of country of removal and its judicial oversight renders an effective risk assessment difficult.[8]
According to the Bar Association’s statement[9], there have been numerous complaints that migrants are being deported despite the administrative appeal period not having expired, or even after having filed a lawsuit against the deportation orders in accordance with Article 53/3 of the LFIP. An extensive survey among 47 bar associations revealed that these unlawful deportations are not isolated incidents but systematic administrative practices. Specifically, 376 lawyers reported that deportations were carried out before their clients could file an appeal within the 7-day period, and 314 lawyers noted that deportations proceeded despite notifying the authorities about the filed lawsuits. Furthermore, cases were documented where deportations occurred even after the Constitutional Court issued stay orders. Over half of those deported in such a manner were Syrian nationals, with others from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and other countries. Lawyers have taken multiple legal actions, including filing complaints with the Prosecutor’s Office. Additionally, it was reported that different deportation methods are used, with particular concern for Afghans being pushed back at the Iranian border into dangerous situations involving criminal gangs. Ankara Bar Association published a statement to draw attention to unlawful deportations despite the fact that a lawsuit was filed for the annulment of the deportation decision and the relevant authority was notified[10]. According to LFIP, if a lawsuit is filed against the deportation decision, people cannot be deported until the final decision has been taken by the court.
PDMM has been using a form for the evaluation of a safe deportation country where Syrians could be deported. On this form, four countries are determined as safe countries for Syrians: Iran, Sudan, Haiti, and Micronesia. Refugees signed the form, but there was no information on Syrians being deported to Iran or another country based on this document.[11] As of the end of 2021 this form was still valid, but the country names had been changed; for example, Russia was included.[12] Another stakeholder mentioned that these countries are Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Sudan, and Ecuador in 2023[13]. According to stakeholders, no individual was deported to one of these countries. However, this practise might result in the cancellation of international protection and prevents individuals from re-applying for international protection.[14] In the case of an Afghan from the Hazara region, the 1st Administrative Court of Izmir discussed whether the deportation decision was suitable for his family and if the country of deportation was to be considered safe for him.[15]
Security codes
Deportation on public order, public security and public health grounds is linked to the security restriction codes issued by PMM, a practice still not governed by clear and publicly available criteria.[16] The implementation and regulation of these codes is not set out in the law but likely in internal circulars and instructions within the administration.
Security-related codes such as “G-89” for foreign terrorist fighters and “G-87” for general security seem to still be applied, though mainly in specific parts of the country, such as İstanbul.[17] The assessment of risks, conducted by the Risk Analysis Department as far as airports are concerned,[18] is made with reference to broad criteria and in practice may be based on the appearance or point of entry of the individual e.g. Turkish-Syrian border.[19] Intelligence from other countries often leads to the issuance of a security restriction code, even though the content and quality of intelligence vary depending on the issuing country.[20]
Security codes can be only appealed before the 1st Administrative Court of Ankara, since they are issued by PMM Headquarters. In appeals against the issuance of security codes, confidential documents submitted by PMM are not available to the individual or their lawyer; they can only be accessed in person at the registry of the Administrative Court of Ankara.[21] The court generally leaves a wide margin of discretion to PMM regarding the issuance of codes. It has not taken a uniform approach to the scrutiny of codes, with some rulings annulling the issuance of codes for lack of evidence and others upholding them.[22] In Gaziantep, two rulings annulling the issuance of codes were recorded in 2022.[23] In one case, a Syrian resident challenged the G-87 code, deportation, and detention orders issued by the PMM in 2017. He won initially but lost at the regional court. His deportation was halted in 2018, and he regained his residence permit. In January 2022, the PMM reissued the orders, but he won his cases as the PMM provided no specific evidence for the G-87 code. He received a humanitarian visa instead of a residence permit. In another case, a G-82 code was issued to an INGO employee due to alleged terrorist links of her employer. She was detained for a year, her deportation was suspended in 2021, but the administrative court upheld the deportation in 2022. She reapplied for temporary protection, with 15-20 others in similar situations in Gaziantep.[24]
Reports from lawyers suggest that individuals labelled with the code G-89 are often from Chechnya or the Caucasus, with most of them having entered Türkiye legally and valid residency permits for many years[25]. Stakeholders in Izmir observed that the majority of G codes are issued to Syrians and Iraqis, and that this application is prevalent among Iraqis living in Samsun, Kutahya, Ordu, Afyon, and Manisa. Personal issues among Iraqis or Syrians who relayed false information to Turkish intelligence services may be an explanation of this practice.[26] The 1st Administrative Court of Izmir is regarded as one of the best courts for the impartial evaluation of code cases, and stakeholders are more likely to receive favourable rulings from it than from other courts.[27] In many cases,[28] 1st Administrative Court of Ankara rulings annulling the issuance of a security restriction code are later overturned by higher instance courts.[29]
Operations targeting irregular migration
The government had several drives to apprehend irregular migrants. For example, on 29 January 2022, the Ministry of the Interior carried out a ‘Peace Practice’ operation to combat irregular migration. The operation was carried out at 8,820 points with 36,126 personnel and 608 detector dogs searching abandoned places where foreign citizens were known to stay, 127 organizers, 72 of whom were foreign nationals, were detained, and 2,028 irregular migrants were caught.[30] PMM regularly shared the number of irregular migrants caught. For instance, from 26 August to 1 September 2022, 2,234 irregular migrants coming from Afghanistan, Syria, Palestine and Eritrea were caught. PPM announced that a total of 38,117 migrant smugglers had been caught and 9,288 were arrested by law enforcement units between 2016 and 2022.[31] In 2022, these so-called “sweeping operations” were extensively implemented, resulting in a significant increase in the number of deported, unregistered Syrians in the country’s main cities such as Izmir, Istanbul, and Ankara.[32]
In 2023, Kalkan (Shield) operations, are carried out against migrant smuggling organisers and irregular immigrants, especially in metropolitan and border cities, often where mobile migration points are located. As of June 2024, 24 Kalkan operations were carried out in various cities. Sometimes operations were carried out simultaneously in different cities, while sometimes operations were targeted a specific neighbourhood in a city. For instance, in October 2023, Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya announced that the “Kalkan” operations in Izmir, primarily in the Basmane district, resulted in the capture of 309 irregular migrants for deportation, and 1,257 personnel involved in the operation including checks in various locations[33]. In November 2023, it was announced that, 62 operations were carried out in the border towns during 3 days with the support of UAVs, helicopters, and gyrocopters, resulting in the arrest of 82 migrant smuggler and the capture of 1,222 irregular migrants[34]. From the beginning of 2023 to May 2023, 40,480 irregular immigrants were caught, 93% of them (37,785) were deported, and the total number of deportations since 2016 reached 487,735[35]. The Minister of Interior, Ali Yerlikaya stated that between 1 June and 22 September 2023, 42,875 irregular immigrants were deported, and 105,488 foreigners whose visas and residence permits expired boarded the plane and left the country[36]. In 2023, 10,482 smugglers and 254,008 irregular migrants were apprehended, majority of whom were Afghan, Syrian, and Palestinian national[37].
Mobile migration points[38], which were first stated as İstanbul model, carry out identity checks of foreigners they suspect of being irregular migrants by law enforcement units (police, and gendarmerie) and if the document that allows the legal stay cannot be shown or if any issues arise, they are being taken to mobile migration points where the PMM staff can query data with fingerprints. When foreigners who do not have a legal right to stay in Türkiye are identified, they are sent to the removal centres and the administrative detention and deportation process is initiated. The total number of mobile migration points is 162 in 30 metropolitan cities, 103 only in Istanbul[39]. In practice, according to observation of some stakeholders, there are some unofficial quotas for each police to capture certain numbers of migrants[40].
Afghans have been labeled as ‘illegal migrants’ by the press and government officials, facing restrictive measures. In January 2022, Türkiye resumed deporting ‘illegal Afghans’ via Ariana Airlines and charter flights. Former Minister Soylu mentioned that five charter flights were departing every 3-5 days[41]. By September 2022, 186 charter flights had returned 44,786 Afghans, and by October 2022, 78,716 irregular migrants had been deported since January 2022. Deportations of Afghans increased by 146% over 2022[42], and continue during 2023. The detailed data regarding the charter flights have not been shared in 2023. In the first quarter of 2023, the number of immigrants deported from all nationalities was 21,211. With the 15 charter flights 2,319 migrants and with scheduled flights, 4,526 migrants were deported to Afghanistan[43]. Sometimes Afghans are deported to Pakistan with the charter flights with Pakistan nationals[44]. The other statements regarding deportations did not provide the details regarding the nationalities.
The vast majority of returns from removal centres are believed not to be voluntary andthere are serious concerns about people being forced to sign voluntary return forms.[45] Detained migrants also frequently criticised the conditions in detention centres.[46] As defined in a report[47] the conditions in the removal centres ‘contribute the degradation of the individual’s dignity and constituting forms of mistreatment, violating the rights of detainees and perpetuating their suffering’. Although legally lawyers can appeal a deportation decision and applicants are allowed to remain in the territory until the time for exercising their right to an effective remedy expires, in practice this rule is not always applied, and the risk of deportation remains[48].
Appeal before the Administrative Court
The appeal against a deportation decision is a remedy separate from remedies in the international protection procedure.[49] It has an automatic suspensive effect, following a review of the LFIP in reforms from December 2019, and the deletion of exceptions to the right to remain on the territory.[50] Appeals are made with legal counsel or by a direct petition to the court.
However, removal decisions must be appealed before the Administrative Court within seven days of notification.[51] Deportation decisions are often poorly communicated to individuals, hindering their ability to notify legal representatives or family members, this lack of communication obstructs timely appeals. In practice, detainees face obstacles in accessing legal representation, as lawyers are frequently misinformed about the detainee’s location or case status, significantly delaying legal assistance[52]. In 2023, the practice of frequent transfer of individuals, including unaccompanied minors whose age appeared to be over 18 on paper[53], from one centre to another centre made it very hard for the lawyers to trace the location and to reach out to the person[54]. Accessing information about foreigners detained is very difficult due to the lack of a centralised system[55] and Lawyers reported difficulties in trying to gather all the information and write an appeal in seven days particularly if the case needs translation work or there are difficulties accessing a client in detention[56]. This short time limit has a negative effect on both access to justice and the quality of the lawyer-client relationship. Some courts exercise the seven-day rule very strictly, which creates significant problems, as Administrative Court decisions on deportation appeals are final.
Appeals against deportation and administrative detention decisions mean different practices in different provinces since there are no higher judicial bodies or higher authority to standardise practices. Lawyers have found it difficult to prepare and file an appeal in such a short period. Notification is also a common issue in removal centres. The seven-day time limit starts with the notification of the deportation decision, so it carries special importance. When the file of the applicant is sent to the court by PDMM, sometimes there is no notification. In this case, the PDMM sometimes include a note such as “refused to give their signature” before sending the documents to the court. The 1st Administrative Court of Izmir requested the Constitutional Court to conduct a normative review of the seven-day limit in January 2023.[57]
The Constitutional Court of Türkiye reviewed a petition challenging the reduction of the appeal period for deportation orders from 15 days to 7 days as stipulated in Article 53, Paragraph 3 of the LFIP. The arguments highlighted that the shortened appeal period is of vital importance because it undermines constitutional guarantees, making deportation easier and preventing foreigners in removal centres from adequately understanding their right to appeal or accessing a lawyer. Difficulties in determining the location of detained foreigners and other obstacles, such as not speaking Turkish, lack of financial means, and being under surveillance in removal centres, were cited as reasons why the 7-day period is insufficient, thus excessively restricting the right to seek legal remedy and defend against deportation, potentially leading to ill-treatment in their home countries.The Constitutional Court found that the reduction was justified by the need to limit the freedom of foreigners and reduce accommodation costs. Referring to the European Convention on Human Rights Protocol No. 7, it noted that while it mandates an opportunity to challenge deportation decisions, it does not specify a minimum appeal period. Concluding that the 7-day period was not excessively short to the extent that it prevents the preparation of an appeal or securing legal representation, it ruled that the 7-day appeal period did not violate the Constitution, without addressing the mentioned challenges[58].
The mere existence of a criminal investigation can be sufficient for a deportation decision to be issued. An acquittal has not stopped deportations. Deportation decisions have started to be made even for those whose trial was pending and brought before the court due to a summary offense.[59] The quality of decisions often depends on the judges. For instance, with the appointment of a judge to the Gaziantep Magistrates’ Court, the quality of decisions improved slightly. For instance, if a criminal proceeding is pending against the applicant, the judge ruled that the deportation must halt until its conclusion.[60] At the same time, however, the quality of criminal cases’ decisions in which the defendant is a foreigner appeared to drop.[61]
There are data verification centres for refugees in İzmir where individuals can update the information on their ID cards as well as a separate building from the PDMM. In the two communications, it was implied that the software used by the PMM (Göç Net database) is now connected to UYAP and can draw on personal information about foreigner nationals regarding their legal cases, etc. PMM did not have this access in the past. PMM does not require the existence of a final judgment – it is sufficient to identify a criminal file linked to the foreigner. In the past, in data verification centres, deportation procedures could be initiated if the foreigner had a security-related code such as G87. However, with the latest communications sent by PMM, it is possible to start the deportation process because of a simple fight with a neighbour.[62]
Since first-instance Administrative Court decisions are not shared with the public in Türkiye, it is difficult for experts and lawyers to assess the effectiveness and quality of judicial review. In the past, there was no uniform application of the non-refoulement principle in Administrative Court reviews of deportation decisions. Even where the execution of removal was suspended by Administrative Courts, compliance with court orders was reported to be arbitrary and dependent upon the individual police officers in question.
In 2023 there were some positive decisions to annulle deportations. In the case of an Afghan asylum seeker, the Istanbul 15th Administrative Court[63] found that the authorities did not conduct an adequate and legally acceptable investigation into the risks to the asylum seeker’ life if returned to Afghanistan and noted the lack of consent to return. Thus, the deportation decision was deemed unlawful and annulled. It was determined that the deportation decision was made without sufficient investigation into whether the asylum seeker was among those who could not be deported. Erzurum Administrative Court[64] annulled the deportation decision for an Afghan family, which lacked legal compliance as it did not sufficiently investigate if the person fells under the exceptions in Article 55 of Law No. 6548 and as deportation based solely on violating the entry ban is contrary to the relevant legal provisions. Edirne and Erzurum Administrative Courts decided to cancel the deportation decisions for Afghan nationals who or whose families worked in or with the military before due to the lack of a sufficient investigation to identify whether they would not be sent back to their country and whether there was a real risk of violation in the country in question.
Article 60(a) LFIP on assisted voluntary return was amended in December 2019 to add that in-kind or cash support can be provided to persons deemed appropriate by the PMM in cases of voluntary return to their country of origin.[65] PMM created its own assisted voluntary return mechanism; however, such mechanism lacks transparency, and the number of returnees is unclear. There are ongoing legislative works for enactment of a regulation on assisted voluntary return, which could potentially address the issues of transparency.[66] Problems regarding voluntary returns and the process remained the same in 2023. (For more details, see Temporary Protection Procedure section) Voluntary returns are ongoing and those who returned are mostly Syrians.[67] According to Human Rights Watch[68], since 2017, thousands of Syrian refugees have been often coerced into signing “voluntary” return forms and deported to northern Syria, in July 2023 alone, Türkiye sent back over 1,700 Syrians into the Tel Abyad area. PMM mentioned in the Annual Report 2023 there was 30% increase in voluntary and safe returns[69].
Stakeholders kept reporting that people who had been persuaded to sign a voluntary return form from removal centres came back to Türkiye in 2023. The temporary protection regulation provides a legal opportunity for re-arrivals, as it is stipulated in the law that re-application will reactivate IDs. In practice, people either cannot access registration or their applications are rejected, and they have to appeal against the decision.[70]
The complaint procedure before the Constitutional Court
An individual complaints procedure is available before the Constitutional Court, which is styled after the individual complaints procedure of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and is partially aimed at reducing the high number of complaints against Türkiye at the ECtHR. Individuals can file an individual complaint with the Constitutional Court on claims of a violation of “any of the fundamental rights and liberties provided by the Turkish Constitution and safeguarded by the ECHR and its Protocols” within 30 days of the exhaustion of all existing administrative and judicial remedies.[71]
While individual complaints to the Constitutional Court do not carry suspensive effect, the applicants can request an urgent interim measure as per Article 73 of the Rules of Court on account of “serious risk on the applicant’s life, physical and moral integrity”. This urgent application procedure by the Constitutional Court, in situations of imminent risk of deportation where the person concerned alleges a risk to their life or risk of torture if returned, is similar in nature to the Rule 39 procedure of the ECtHR. From October 2016 to December 2019, the Constitutional granted 1,545 interim measures to halt deportation decisions when automatic suspensive effect of the appeal of deportation orders were removed with a legislative amendment and stopped this practice when a legal amendment to these and other articles of the LFIP was made in December 2019 to bring back the automatic suspensive effect.[72] Lawyers no longer directly apply to the Constitutional Court when an administrative entity unlawfully deports their client but to the relevant administrative court.
On February 15, 2023, the Constitutional Court General Assembly ruled on the application of Wisam Sulaiman Dawood Eaqadah (Application No: 2021/2831). The Court decided that the claims regarding the violation of the prohibition of ill-treatment and the right to an effective remedy in connection with the freedom of settlement, within the context of procedural safeguards in deportation processes, were clearly unfounded and therefore inadmissible.In the Abdulkerim Hammud decision (Application No. 2019/24388, Decision Date May 2, 2023), the Constitutional Court of Türkiye examined, for the first time, an individual application alleging forced return to Syria. The Court unanimously ruled that there had been violations of the right to life and the prohibition of ill-treatment as protected under Article 17 of the Constitution, as well as the right to an effective remedy under Article 40, in parallel with the European Court of Human Rights decision in Akkad v. Turkey.
The European Court of Human Rights convicted Türkiye in a lawsuit filed on the grounds that Türkiye illegally deported a Syrian temporary protection holder to his country.[73] In 2022, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of articles 3, 5 and 13 of the ECHR in Akkad v. Türkiye judgement on the ground of expulsion of the temporary protection holder applicant to Syria[74].
On February 6, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the case of J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye (case no. 80206/17)[75]. The case involved Iraqi applicants and their four children who entered Türkiye in 2014 with valid tourist visas after ISIS bombed their house in Iraq. They had applied for residence permits but were arrested and faced deportation. They submitted an asylum request and challenged the deportation order. The ECtHR emphasised the obligation of states to thoroughly assess the risk of ill-treatment in the destination country by rigorously examining asylum applications. The Court found that Turkish authorities failed to adequately assess the applicants’ asylum requests and did not inform them properly about the rejection or the deportation orders. The Istanbul Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court did not sufficiently consider the risk of ill-treatment in Iraq. Consequently, the ECtHR concluded that deporting the applicants to Iraq would violate Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, which protect the right to life and prohibit torture and inhuman or degrading treatment[76]. On 21 March 2024, another decision ruled by ECtHR[77] (application no. 14820/19) on the deportation of an Iranian applicant faced expulsion to Iran, where she alleged that she would be at real risk of life imprisonment or death due to her conversion from Islam to Christianity. The Court unanimously held that deporting the applicant without a comprehensive evaluation of the risks involved would breach her rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.
[1] Article 80(1)(e) LFIP.
[2] Article 54(2) LFIP, as amended by Article 36 Emergency Decree 676 of 29 October 2016. The provision cites Article 54(1)(b), (d) and (k) LFIP, the latter inserted by Emergency Decree 676.
[3] Daily Sabah, ‘Turkey deports thousands of foreigners who disrupt public order’, 21 July 2022, available here.
[4] Article 77 Regulation No 28578 on Conditions of Probation, 5 March 2013, as amended by Article 1 Regulation No 30631 of 20 December 2018.
[5] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[6] Aricle 60/3 (l) LFIP.
[7] T.C. Kırklareli idare mahkemesi, ESAS NO : 2023/322, KARAR NO : 2023/581
[8] For further analysis, see; Gamze Ovacık, Turkish Judicial Practices on International Protection, Removal and Administrative Detention in Connection with the Safe Third Country Concept (On İki Levha Publications 2021) 168-177.
[9] Barolar Birliği, 22.10.2023, Yabancı Müvekkillerinhaklarında Kesinleşmiş Bir Karar Olmaksızın Sınır Dışı Edilmelerine İlişkin Açıklama, here.
[10] Barosu, “Hukuka Aykiri Sinir Dişi Etme İşlemleri Durdurulmalidir!”, 27.10.2023, available here.
[11] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2021 and March 2024.
[12] Information from a stakeholder, May 2022.
[13] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2024.
[14] Information from a stakeholder, May 2023.
[15] Information from a stakeholder, May 2023.
[16] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, May 2023.
[17] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2022 and March 2024.
[18] Karar, ‘Risk analiz merkezi kapılarını KARAR’a açtı’, 28 April 2016, available in Turkish here.
[19] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[20] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[21] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[22] For examples of decisions cancelling a “G87” code due to lack of evidence, see 1st Administrative Court of Ankara, Decision 2018/2207, 13 February 2019; Decision 2018/524, 14 March 2018.
[23] Information provded by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[24] Information provided by a stakeholder, June 2023.
[25] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, June 2024
[26] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[27] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[28] See e.g. District of Ankara, Decision 2018/462, 7 September 2018, which overturned the 1st Administrative Court of Ankara Decision 2018/524 of 14 March 2018.
[29] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, May 2023.
[30] Anadolu Agency, ‘Peace Practice’ was carried out to combat irregular migration’, 29 January 2022. Available in Turkish here.
[31] PMM, ‘2016 Yılından Bu Yana Kolluk Birimlerimizce Toplam 38.117 Göçmen Kaçakçısı Yakalandı, 9.288’i Tutuklandı’, 20 April 2022, available in Turkish here.
[32] Information provided by a stakeholder, June 2023.
[33] T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, “Kalkan” Operasyonları İle İzmir’de 309 Düzensiz Göçmen Yakalandı, 1 November 2023, available here.
[34] T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, Türkiye Genelinde “KALKAN Operasyonu” Düzenlendi, 15.11.2023, available here.
[35] PMM, 20.05.2023, Son Günlerde Sınırlarımızda Çekildiği İddiasıyla Dolaşıma Sokulan Gerçek Dışı Paylaşımlara İlişkin Basın Açıklaması available here.
[36] TRT Haber, Bakan Yerlikaya: 42 bin 875 düzensiz göçmen sınır dışı edildi – Son Dakika Haberleri, available here 27 September 2023.
[37] PMM, Statistics, 2023, available here.
[38] Haber Turk, Göç İdaresi Başkanı Toros: 1 Haziran’dan bu yana 45 bin 454 göçmen sınır dışı edildi, 5 October 2023, available here.
[39] PMM, 27.02.2024, Düzensiz Göçmenlerin Tespitini Kolaylaştıran ve Hızlandıran Mobil Göç Noktası Araçlarının Sayısı 162’ye Çıktı available here.
[40] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[41] Duvar, ‘Minister Soylu: Süleyman Soylu: We will not give temporary protection to those coming from Damascus’, available in Turkish here.
[42] PMM, ‘Yılbaşından Bugüne 72.578 Kaçak Göçmen Sınır Dışı Edildi’, 23 August 2022, available in Turkish here
[43] TRT Haber, 13.03.2023, Sınır dışı edilen düzensiz göçmen sayısı 21 bin 211’e ulaştı, available here
[44] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2024.
[45] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, May 2023 & Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[46] Asya Robins, ‘Sınır dışı kararı verilen İranlı mülteciler geri gönderme merkezindeki koşulları anlattı: ‘Şiddet normal bir şey’’, BBC News, 16 February 2022, available here.
[47] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, June 2024.
[48] Bianet, 21.09.2023, “Bir Geri Gönderme Merkezine günde 6 bin kişi götürülüyor” available here.
[49] Article 53 LFIP.
[50] Law No 7196 amending several acts, 6 December 2019, available in Turkish here.
[51] Article 53(3) LFIP. This time limit has been ruled to be in line with the Turkish Constitution: Constitutional Court, Decision 2016/135, 14 July 2016, available in Turkish here.
[52] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, June 2024 & Information provide by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[53] Information provided by a stakeholder, June 2023.
[54] Information provided by stakeholders, March 2024.
[55] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, 12 June 2024, available here.
[56] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[57] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[58] Resmi Gazete, 27.06.2023, available here.
[59] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2022.
[60] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[61] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[62] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2022.
[63] T.C. Istanbul 15. Idare Mahkemesi, Esas No : 2022/1043, KARAR NO : 2023/3169.
[64] T.C. Erzurum, 1. Idare Mahkemesi, Esas No : 2023/Karar No : 2023/1633.
[65] Mülteci-Der, Joint Assessment: Proposed Amendments in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection of Türkiye, 4 December 2019, available here.
[66] Information provided by a stakeholder, June 2023.
[67] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023 & Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[68] HRW, “Everything is by the Power of the Weapon”, 29 February 2024, available here.
[69] PMM, Faaliyet Raporu 2023, available here.
[70] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023 & Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2024
[71] Articles 45-51 Law No 6216 on the Formation and Procedures of the Constitutional Court.
[72] Law No 7196 amending several acts, 6 December 2019, in Turkish here.
[73] On the contrary, decisions of the Administrative Court are notified to the PDMM since they are party to the proceedings. ECHR, Akkad v. Turkiye, application number: 1557/19, 21 June 2022 available here.
[74] AKKAD/ TÜRKİYE KARARI (Başvuru No : 1557/19) AKKAD v. TURKEY [Turkish Translation] by İstanbul Bar Association, available here.
[75] CASE OF J.A. AND A.A. v. TÜRKİYE (Application no. 80206/17), available here.
[76] Ibid.
[77] ECtHR, CASE OF B.S. v. TÜRKİYE (Application no. 14820/19)¸ Strasbourg, 21 March 2024, available here.