Exclusion and cancellation of temporary protection

Türkiye

Country Report: Exclusion and cancellation of temporary protection Last updated: 29/07/25

Author

Independent

The following categories of persons are excluded of benefitting from temporary protection in Türkiye:[1]

  1. Persons for whom there is serious reason to believe that they have been guilty of acts defined in Article 1F of the 1951 Convention;
  2. Persons for whom there is serious reason to believe that they have engaged in acts of cruelty, for whatever rationale, prior to arrival in Türkiye;
  3. Persons who have either participated in or provoked crimes or acts referred to in 1 and 2 above;

ç.   Persons, who, having participated in armed conflict in country of origin, have not permanently ceased armed activities after arrival in Türkiye;

  1. Persons proven to have engaged, planned or participated in terrorist activities;
  2. Persons who have been convicted of a serious crime and therefore deemed to be presenting a threat against society; and those who are deemed to present danger to national security, public order and public security;
  3. Persons, who prior to their arrival in Türkiye, committed crimes that would be punishable with a prison sentence in Türkiye, and have left country of origin or residence in order to avoid punishment;
  4. Persons convicted of crimes against humanity by international courts;
  5. Persons who commit any of the crimes listed in Article 4(7) of the Turkish Criminal Code i.e. crimes related to state secrets and espionage.

Such cancellation is applied in practice for temporary protection holders designated as foreign terrorist fighters (YTS), for example, even where criminal proceedings have not led to a conviction.[2] In some cases, PMM has also ordered cancellation on the basis of Article 8(1)(e) TPR.[3] It has also been applied in cases of inconsistencies between the personal details in the Temporary Protection Identification Document and the passport of the refugee, which have been determined as provision of misleading information to PMM.[4]

PMM is responsible and authorised to carry out and finalise the exclusion assessments and to communicate exclusion decisions to the persons concerned. Where it is identified that an existing beneficiary falls within the exclusion grounds listed above, their temporary protection status shall be cancelled. PMM can delegate this power to governorates as of 25 December 2019.[5]

Nevertheless, given that the LFIP provides for a derogation from non-refoulement, temporary protection beneficiaries may also be subject to removal procedures without their status being cancelled.

Beneficiaries of temporary protection were not informed by the authorities of the cancellation of their protection in 2024 as in the previous year. They did not receive any written document providing the grounds for such cancellation; thus, preventing any possibilities to appeal. Most of them learned about the cancellation of their temporary protection when going to a PDMM for other reasons, such as updating data or when their General Health Insurance (GHI) was deactivated.[6] Stakeholders reported that temporary protection statutes are being cancelled for individuals involved in criminal cases, even when the incidents are minor. For example, in one case, an individual’s temporary protection was cancelled, and a deportation order was issued solely for riding a motorcycle without a helmet. In another instance, three siblings who reported being physically assaulted were themselves issued deportation orders, and their temporary protection statuses were also cancelled. According to stakeholders, this trend is partly linked to an overly broad interpretation of the Ministry of Interior’s internal circular on combatting irregular migration (Circular No. 2019/5). The relevant provision of the circular refers to “foreigners involved in criminal actions,” but stakeholders argue that this clause has been applied excessively, even in cases involving minor infractions or incidents where the individual was the complainant. Individuals issued deportation orders on the grounds of “threat to public order” are frequently subjected to automatic cancellation of temporary protection without being officially notified. As a result, they may face three simultaneous administrative actions: a deportation order, an administrative detention order, and cancellation of temporary protection. While courts may issue positive decisions in clear-cut cases, the overall legal process often takes several years. If a restriction code is also imposed, the procedure can extend to five years. Stakeholders emphasized that the prolonged and burdensome nature of these procedures discourages individuals from pursuing legal remedies—an outcome that, in their view, may reflect the underlying political objective of the authorities.[7] According to a report, there have been instances in which women with infants were placed in removal centres and deported due to minor disputes and conflicts — such as arguments with neighbours — even in cases where no legal proceedings were initiated against them.[8]

Address verification has been in place as from 2019 nationwide. If it is determined that the person is not in the province where they are registered, their registration is deactivated, but it is not cancelled. In 2022, the Ministry of Interior Affairs announced that 122,000 Syrians were not found at their registered address and 3,791,198 addresses got verified.[9] It is legally impossible to deport many of the people, so PMM has difficulty imposing a sanction. If the Syrian applicant cannot be found at the specific address, their IDs can be cancelled which renders access to rights and services in Türkiye virtually impossible. Their IDs were reactivated when they went to PDMM, but those who could not go to PDMM lost their IDs. It is estimated by Syrian led NGOs and activists that 150 000 IDs have been cancelled as of April 2022.[10] At the same time, it is difficult to get an appointment from the Syrian Embassy, and people have to pay. The number of temporary protection holders whose address were verified and updated was 986,852 in 2023 and 2,015,955 in 2022. However, in 2023, there was no data shared regarding the cancellation of registration. Between 1 January and 31 October 2024, a total of 731,146 individuals had unverified addresses. Among them, 580,819 individuals reactivated their addresses and were still undergoing the verification process, while 150,327 had not activated their address and had not accessed public services in the past year. No data was shared regarding the number of temporary protection status cancellations during this period.[11]

In 2024, stakeholders observed that deactivation of temporary protection registration was used more frequently than outright cancellation. For instance, during address verification procedures, some individuals were asked to present notarized rental agreements. However, many landlords were unwilling or unable to visit notary offices—often due to being abroad—which prevented the completion of the activation process.

In provinces affected by the earthquake, additional challenges arose. In some areas, address verifications could not be completed due to missing property numbering (numarataj). In Hatay, individuals residing in container cities experienced long delays in address verification, especially when the container settlements were located within closed neighborhoods. Outside the container areas, further problems were reported. For example, in districts like Reyhanlı—where the impact of the earthquake was minimal—registration is closed, meaning that even if individuals were able to find housing, they could not verify their addresses.

Stakeholders noted a significant trend in Hatay: instead of processing cases individually, authorities appeared to implement mass deactivations of temporary protection statuses.[12]

 

 

 

[1] Article 8(1) TPR.

[2] Information provided by various stakeholders, May and June 2023.

[3] See e.g. Administrative Court of İzmir, Decision 2018/692, 29 November 2018, which quashed a cancellation decision on the basis that the conviction had not been established.

[4] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.

[5] Article 12(2) TPR.

[6] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.

[7] Information provided by a stakeholder April 2025.

[8] Mazlumder, Göç Politikasını Beraber İyileştirelim!, 20.06.2025, available here.

[9] Independent Turkey, İçişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Çataklı: Suriyeli mültecilerden 122 bini kayıp, 22 June 2022, available here.

[10] Rudaw, ‘Algazi: The annulment of the identity of 150 thousand Syrians marks a change in policy’, 20 April 2022, available here.

[11] T.C. İstanbu İl Göç İdaresi Müdürlüğü, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya, Adres Tahkikatlarından Sonra Suriyelilerin Sayısının 2 Milyon 935 Bin 742’ye Düştüğünü Açıkladı, 20.11.2024, available here.

[12] Information provided by multiple stakeholders March 2025.

Table of contents

  • Statistics
  • Overview of the legal framework
  • Overview of main changes since the previous report update
  • Introduction to the asylum context in Türkiye
  • Asylum Procedure
  • Reception Conditions
  • Detention of Asylum Seekers
  • Content of International Protection
  • Temporary Protection Regime
  • Content of Temporary Protection