The LFIP provides three types of international protection status in accordance with Türkiye’s “geographical limitation” policy on the 1951 Refugee Convention.
- Persons who fall within the refugee definition in Article of the 1951 Convention and come from a “European country of origin”[1] qualify for refugee status under LFIP, in full acknowledgment of Türkiye’s obligations under the 1951 Convention. The Turkish legal status of refugee under LFIP should afford rights and entitlements in accordance with the requirements of the 1951 Convention, including the prospect of long-term legal integration in Türkiye. The numbers of persons who qualified for refugee status have never been transparent but in an event organised in October 2021, PMM informed that there were 28 refugees in Türkiye.[2] In 2024, no information was shared.
- Persons who fall within the refugee definition in Article of the 1951 Convention but come from a so-called ‘non-European country of origin’, are instead offered conditional refugee status under LFIP. Conditional refugee status is a Turkish legal concept introduced by the LFIP for the purpose of differentiating in treatment between 1951 Convention-type refugees originating from ‘non-European’ states and those originating from ‘European’ states. The status of conditional refugee affords to beneficiaries a set of rights and entitlements lesser to that granted to refugee status holders and to subsidiary protection holders in some respects. Most importantly, conditional refugees are not offered the prospect of long-term legal integration in Türkiye and are excluded from Family Reunification The number of people granted conditional refugee status has never been made public. There is no data shared in 2024, the latest number was roughly 2,000 conditional refugees in October 2021.[3]
- Persons who do not fulfil the eligibility criteria for either refugee status or conditional refugee status but would however be subjected to death penalty or torture in country of origin if returned, or would be at “individualised risk of indiscriminate violence” due to situations or war or internal armed conflict, qualify for subsidiary protection status under LFIP. The Turkish legal status of subsidiary protection mirrors the subsidiary protection definition provided by the EU Qualification Directive. Similar to the conditional refugee status holders, subsidiary protection beneficiaries receive a lesser set of rights and entitlements as compared to refugee status holders and are barred from long-term legal integration in Türkiye. Notably however, unlike conditional refugees, subsidiary protection beneficiaries are granted family reunification rights in Türkiye.
Stakeholders emphasized that in practice, non-Syrian applicants arriving from outside Europe are most often granted conditional refugee status, regardless of the nature of their claim. Even in cases where the applicant’s circumstances clearly align with the criteria for subsidiary protection—particularly claims involving indiscriminate violence—authorities have been observed to issue decisions granting conditional refugee status instead.
While the specific reasoning behind this practice is not officially stated, stakeholders suggested that it may be linked to the final sentence of Article 62 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), which states that “the individual shall be allowed to remain in Türkiye until resettled to a third country.” This provision is interpreted by authorities as applying to individuals intending to seek resettlement in Europe. Another possible reason is the difference in access to the labor market: while holders of subsidiary protection are exempt from applying for a work permit, conditional refugees are still required to obtain one.
As of mid-2024, Türkiye hosted a total of 194,637 refugees and asylum seekers of various nationalities, primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. This includes 12,549 registered refugees from Afghanistan and 12,909 from Iraq. Additionally, there were 91,373 asylum seekers from Afghanistan, 89,397 from Iraq, and 9,280 from Iran.[4] In 2024, Türkiye recorded 38,725 displaced Ukrainians, including 2,620 who applied for international protection.[5]
Specifically, the Afghan community in Türkiye, often labelled by the media and political actors as “undocumented,” “illegal,” and a “security risk,” faces the strictest security measures. Consequently, they adopt strategies to become invisible and introverted in urban areas, making minimal or no claims to rights or services.[6] Furthermore, the lack of consensus on the number of foreigners in Türkiye highlighted the need for greater transparency and public dialogue on immigration issues.[7]
The earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria in February 2023, occurring at a time of limited resources and government capacity, further exacerbated anti-migrant sentiments.[8] The effects of the earthquakes are discussed under the Content of Temporary Protection, as the main refugee group in the region is Syrians under temporary protection.
Additionally, policies aimed at rendering migrant and refugee groups invisible in Türkiye have resulted in instances of discrimination and hate speech. The attack in Izmir Konak, where one refugee was killed and another severely injured, has highlighted the scapegoating of refugees as responsible for poverty and unemployment in Türkiye, exposing them to hate speech and racist attacks.[9] According to a survey, 43.6% of respondents consider irregular migration as the biggest threat to Türkiye,[10] indicating the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments and the need for addressing such issues. Refugees rank third with a percentage of 4.4% in 2024, behind the economy (60.2%) and injustice (9%).[11] (For further details, see Reception Conditions)
EU funding is almost exclusively allocated to Syrians (see Content of Temporary Protection), neglecting other groups. For instance,[12] often NGOs and civil society actors, who wish to support non-Syrians, especially Afghans must rely on their own resources, leaving those aiding Afghans unsupported and underfunded by state and international bodies. Other issues regarding the funding[13] are (1) overall budget cuts of different funding instruments, especially for the projects supporting inclusion, (2) overlooking some priorities identified by stakeholders, (3) requirements to access the EU funding through INGOs, (4) lack of targeted funding to municipalities which provide services to refugees regardless of the status or nationality, and (5) difficulties to ensure the sustainability of the projects.
[1] For the purpose of “geographical limitation” in regards to the interpretation of the 1951 Convention, Government of Türkiye considers countries members of the Council of Europe as ‘European countries of origin’.
[2] QHA, ‘Göç ve uyum konulu toplantıda Türkiye’deki göç olgusu anlatıldı’, 17 March 2021, available in Turkish here
[3] ibid.
[4] UNHCR Türkiye Factsheet September 2024, available here
[5] UNHCR, Ukraine Refugee Situation, available here
[6] GAR, October 2023, Actors and Mechanisms of (Non-)reception of the Afghans in Turkey GAR Report No. 9
[7] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[8] Sert, D., Danış, D., & Sevinin, E. (2023). Göç ve Deprem Durum Tespit Raporu. Istanbul: Göç Araştırmaları Derneği, GAR.
[9] Ege Evrensel, 16.08.2023, İHD İzmir Şubesi, Konak’taki ırkçı saldırıya ve mülteci düşmanlığına tepki gösterdi available here
[10] Kisadalga, 07.08.2023, Metropoll’den ‘en büyük tehdit’ araştırması: Düzensiz göç mü dış güçler mi?, available here
[11] Kısadalga, Anket: ‘Türkiye’nin en önemli sorunu nedir’ sorusunda ilk 10, 12.10.2024, available here
[12] GAR Report No. 9, Actors and Mechanisms of (Non-)Reception of the Afghans in Turkey, October 2023, available here
[13] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.