In 2024, Türkiye hosted a population of over 2.9 million refugees[1] from Syria under the temporary protection regime and 194,637 asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protection of other nationalities, principally originating from Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran among others.[2] 9,009 asylum seekers applied for international protection; the majority is from Afghanistan (5,550). Many of the challenges highlighted in the last year’s report remain for 2024, however, some events and policy changes in 2024 deepened some of the existing concerns and caused new challenges for displaced people in Türkiye.
In 2024, key concerns in the field of migration and asylum in Türkiye centered on the conduct of public officials, both in individual practices and public discourse. Access to registration and re-registration remained a persistent barrier, while increasing reports of arbitrary decisions regarding the cancellation or deactivation of temporary protection statuses emerged. Stakeholders also highlighted the inconsistency of judicial decisions concerning these cases. Throughout the year, authorities placed significant emphasis on the declining number of registered foreign nationals in the country.[3] Some stakeholders have expressed the view that cancellation and deactivation practices may be contributing to this reduction in the number of individuals under temporary protection.[4] Anti-refugee sentiment intensified around the local elections held in March 2024, further exacerbated by the July 2024 anti-refugee riots in Kayseri.[5] Kayseri incidents had a long-lasting effect across various provinces, leading many Syrians to refrain from appearing in public due to safety concerns. Additionally, in 2024, for those with valid registration, access to health services under the General Health Insurance (GHI) scheme remained problematic.
A new phase began after December 2024. With the regime change in Syria, it is anticipated that many Syrians mays wish to return, given the presumed elimination of persecution risks. As of June 2025, there was no formal announcement regarding the lifting of temporary protection. However, official figures indicate that 250,000 individuals have returned to Syria since December 2024. In addition, following the change in U.S. administration in January 2025, significant funding cuts to international assistance programs were observed. As a result, many NGOs operating in Türkiye had to scale down their operations, which in turn adversely impacted the refugee population’s access to services and support. According to stakeholders, NGOs operating in the field have had to scale back their operations, including closing branches and reducing staff by 15% to 60%.[6]
Two years after the earthquake, the acute period is not over yet for both home and host communities, some families cannot still access water, basic needs, and shelter.
Deteriorating Access to Protection and Rights
In 2024, public authorities’ practices regarding the status of individuals under international and temporary protection became increasingly arbitrary and unpredictable. Sudden cancellations, deactivations, apprehensions, and rejections created significant uncertainty and hardship for applicants. Individuals with minor or outdated criminal records, sometimes dating back years, or those merely attempting to file a legal complaint as a victim or complainant, were at risk of being apprehended on grounds related to “public order.” These practices were further complicated by the opaque application of security codes, which often served as the basis for deportation orders or ID deactivation without clear justification. Even in cases where individuals successfully reactivated their IDs after long legal struggles against wrongful cancellations or deportation decisions, many ultimately gave up and opted for return due to the persistent uncertainty and bureaucratic fatigue. Beyond the actions of government officials, individuals increasingly lost trust in judicial actors as well. In addition to inconsistent rulings from administrative courts, obtaining a positive outcome from Magistrates’ courts in challenges against administrative detention orders became nearly impossible. As a result, many legal practitioners began to question the effectiveness of this remedy.[7]
As a consequence, an increasing number of individuals, regardless of whether they had active IDs, sought to cross Türkiye’s western borders irregularly, driven primarily by a perceived lack of future prospects in the country.[8] Many of those who succeeded, primarily men, left their families behind hoping to find safer means to reunite with them later. This separation often forced children to drop out of school to contribute economically to their househole, highlighting the severe social toll of the ongoing uncertainty and restrictive protection environment.[9]
Hostile Institutional and Political Environment
In 2024, migration policies in Türkiye continued to be shaped primarily by security concerns. The Minister of Interior, Ali Yerlikaya, frequently emphasized figures related to the reduction in the number of registered foreigners, the increase in returnees, operations targeting smuggling networks, and the number of individuals prevented from irregularly entering the country. These public statements and policy priorities reflected a predominantly enforcement-based approach, with little acknowledgment of the protection needs of those attempting to cross borders irregularly. In particular, individuals trying to enter Türkiye via the Iranian border continued to face severe risks, including exposure to freezing temperatures, attacks by wild animals, or violence by non-state actors. Despite reports of deaths and serious injuries, such incidents were largely absent from official narratives.
The growing number of Mobile Migration Points also contributed to a heightened sense of insecurity. Individuals fearing random checks or apprehensions avoided leaving their homes, which further limited their access to essential services. However, remaining at home did not always guarantee protection. Some individuals reported that despite staying home for extended periods in anticipation of address verification visits, their IDs were nonetheless deactivated on the grounds that they could not be located.
Return Dynamics and Post-December 2024 Developments
While this report primarily focuses on developments in 2024, it also addresses the significant shifts following the political transition in Syria on 8 December 2024. As of June 2025, there has been no formal public discussion regarding the lifting of temporary protection status in Türkiye. However, Turkish authorities permitted Syrians to realise up to three “go-and-see” visits between 1 January and 1 July 2025, with the stated aim of enabling individuals to assess the feasibility of rebuilding their lives in Syria. The return infrastructure at the Turkish-Syrian border was significantly expanded to accommodate this process. Despite this, according to stakeholders, the majority of those under temporary protection continue to adopt a cautious approach, citing serious concerns regarding the current state of infrastructure, healthcare, education, and overall security conditions in Syria. Furthermore, observed trends indicate that women and children are more inclined to remain in Türkiye compared to men. This is attributed in part to their perception that they enjoy broader rights and greater protection in Türkiye. One of the main challenges observed in the return process relates to custodial disputes. Single parents, predominantly mothers, who wish to return to Syria with their children are often required to present the consent of the father, even in cases where the father has abandoned the family, is untraceable, or has already returned to Syria either voluntarily or through deportation. This requirement has created significant legal and practical barriers, effectively preventing many mothers from returning with their children despite their willingness to do so.
Asylum procedure
- Asylum statistics: In 2024, there were 9,009 applicants for international protection, which corresponds to a 52% decrease compared to 2023.[10] This represents the most significant decline in international protection applications since the introduction of the LFIP and the establishment of the PMM in 2014. It should be noted that the previous year also saw a significant decrease of 43%, which stakeholders believe does not meet the registration needs in the field and is not considered realistic.[11] Afghans were the most represented number of applicants (5,550) followed by Iraqis (1,881) and Iranians (784). According to PMM statistics,[12] 225,831 irregular migrants were apprehended in 2024, reflecting a decrease compared to 2023 (254,008). Afghans continued to constitute the largest group among those apprehended for irregular status, with 65,815 individuals. Syrians were the second most represented nationality, with 50,641 apprehensions. Other prominent nationalities included Palestinians, Egyptians, Turkmens, Moroccans, Uzbeks, Iraqis, and Iranians. While PMM does not publish disaggregated data on irregular entries, the reported figures encompass both individuals intercepted at or near borders and those whose legal status or identity documents were later cancelled by authorities. According to stakeholders, in line with these figures, Afghans remained the most frequently apprehended nationality following irregular border crossings in 2024.
- Integrated and Increased Border Control: The building of 80 percent of the borders of Iran and Syria, and a 1253 kilometer patrol road was completed including 715 patrol routes, 1,282 km of lighting, 36 kilometers of embankments, 368 cameras and sensors, 198 elevator-equipped towers, 362 electro-optical towers, 284 thermal cameras, and 139 reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles. A total of 950 million USD (30 billion TRY) has been spent on border security to date, and a budget of 136 million USD (4.5 billion TRY) has been allocated for 2024.[13] The increased border control prevented 104,000 irregular immigrants from entering the borders in Türkiye in 2024. The Minister emphasized that 223,000 irregular migrants were prevented from crossing the border in 2023 by the “border eagles”, a special branch of the military responsible for border security. Although this number dropped to 104,000 in 2024, the Minister framed the decline as a success, attributing it to effective measures taken at the source of migration, within Türkiye’s borders, and in preventing irregular exits from the country, stating that “they are not coming to our side anymore.”[14] Following the political transition in Syria on December 2024, the ‘go and see’ visits initially took place through the Çobanbey and Zeytindalı border gates, with Yayladağı later added to the list. The duration of the permission granted for these visits was limited to 15 days. Approximately 15,000 individuals returned to Türkiye after participating in these visits and were issued a V-175 restriction code.
- Access to the territory and pushbacks at the borders: Despite the building of border walls and increasing surveillance along Türkiye’s Eastern border, it did not prevent irregular crossings and instead led to crossings shifting to more dangerous, and mountainous routes or taking place during winter months when the weather conditions are very harsh. At the eastern border with Iran, the pushback practices continued in 2024, particularly targeting single men coming from Afghanistan, who faced more pushback to Iran than other groups. In some cases, they were held for months before being subjected to pushback without being taken to removal centres or the possibility of applying for protection. There are no clear or individual assessments at the border with Iran, and the migrants are often not informed about their rights. In 2024, disturbing reports emerged from the Iran–Türkiye border, including the case of an Afghan refugee who died shortly after being detained and allegedly tortured by Turkish border police before being forcibly returned to Iranian territory.[15] Until December 2024, the border with Syria was closed, and crossings were only allowed for individuals who require specific medical treatments and their attendants, for the duration of the treatment period.
- Registration: The registration of applications remained one of the most significant barriers to people seeking international protection in Türkiye in 2024.[16] The provinces where PDMMs were willing to accept applications varied throughout the year and did not reflect a consistent practice. In a total of 1,169 neighbourhoods in 63 provinces where the foreign population exceeds 20% of the Turkish citizen population, were closed to new registrations of foreigners from 2023.[17] This practice continued in 2024. Although registrations did not cease entirely notably for vulnerable persons, they were reported as ‘almost impossible’ in numerous places. Even when applicants were able to access registration in major cities, the waiting period for referral to another province remained challenging. Inconsistencies in PDMM practices also caused difficulties. In addition to the registration problems, PDMM address verification procedures continued for both international and temporary protection holders. When they were not found at their place of registration, and their IDs became inactive. The situation leads to an increasing number of people becoming undocumented.[18]
- Voluntary return: Voluntary, safe, and dignified returns have continued to be a priority policy area for the PMM in 2024, which established its voluntary return programme in 2021. Following the regime change in Syria in December 2024, this policy began to be referred to as voluntary, safe, dignified, and regular returns. From the beginning of 2024 until 8 December, approximately 120,000 individuals were reported to have voluntarily returned to Syria.[19] In the two weeks following 8 December, an additional 23,440 individuals returned, following increased efforts by Turkish authorities to expand border gate capacity—from a daily return allowance of 3,000 to 20,000.[20] As of June 2025, the total number of Syrians who reportedly returned voluntarily reached 250,000, while overall return figures surpassed 1,000,000.[21] However, despite the developments following December 2024stakeholders have concerns whether they are voluntary or forced returns.[22]
- Increasing number of deportations: Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya stated that 141,000 deportations were carried out in 2024, marking the highest annual figure to date. The minister remarked that they are “competing” with Frontex in terms of deportation figures.[23] Unlike previous years, however, PMM refrained from publicly sharing deportation statistics, instead referring to apprehensions with the phrase ‘deportation procedures were initiated.[24] Several reports indicate that in 2024, individuals held in Removal Centers were pressured to sign voluntary return forms, and some were deported despite having pending legal cases against their deportation orders—cases which should have led to the automatic suspension of removal procedures.[25]
- Operations: In 2024, according to Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya, the government intensified its fight against migrant smuggling networks. He stated that 12,088 operations were conducted, resulting in 19,655 individuals taken into custody, 7,539 arrests, 3,102 judicial control decisions, and the confiscation of 8,339 vehicles. Emphasizing the importance of combating migrant smuggling as part of the broader strategy to stop irregular migration at its source, Yerlikaya noted that operations were carried out in coordination with governorates, police intelligence, gendarmerie, public prosecutors, and the Ministry of Justice. He further stated that the authorities aim to ensure all those involved are imprisoned, closely monitor the release dates of those already in jail, and track those who have not yet been detained.[26]
- Mobile migration points: The Mobile Migration Points, launched on 19 July 2023, have become a key tool in Türkiye’s fight against irregular migration. By August 2024, the number of vehicles reached 268, with plans to increase to 350, including 75 stationed in Istanbul. Throughout 2024, over 1.18 million people were asked for identification at these points, resulting in the detection of 126,766 irregular migrants.[27] By December 2024, 270 Mobile Migration Points were operating across 81 provinces. Identity checks conducted at these locations rose from 49,999 in the first three months to 182,962 by six months, and 256,377 in the last month of the year. Notably, the percentage of irregular migrants detected at these points dropped sharply from 74.5% to 2.7% over this period.[28] Stakeholders emphasized that throughout 2024, Mobile Migration Points were positioned in front of courthouses, hospitals, police stations, and busy city centers. Individuals with deactivated or canceled IDs, security codes, or even criminal records with cases permanently closed years ago encountered difficulties at these points. As a result, many people began to avoid approaching these essential institutions when needed, fearing they might be stopped at a Mobile Migration Point.[29]
- Increased number of rejection decisions: PMM took 85,125 decisions in 2024, which constitutes a decrease compared to the 94,506 taken in 2023. Despite this decrease, the number of decisions on international protection applications remains significant higher compared to 51,472 in 2022. According to stakeholders, PMM continued efforts in 2024 to conclude assessments of applications that have been pending for 7 to 10 years. While no public data is available, stakeholders report that rejection rates are considerably higher than acceptance rates. One stakeholder noted that PDMMs must obtain PMM approval to accept cases, but they can reject applications independently based on their assessments.[30]
- Annulment of deportation decisions: In 2024, two Palestinian nationals who admitted to attempting to irregularly cross the Turkish-Greek border and were subsequently apprehended succeeded in having their deportation orders annulled. In its decisions, the İzmir 1st Administrative Court emphasized the ongoing situation in Palestine following 7 September 2023, particularly the continued bombardment of the Gaza Strip and the widespread killing of civilians. The court found that the deportation order had been issued without a sufficient individual assessment of these circumstances. In separate cases involving two Afghan applicants who had both previously worked for the military in Afghanistan before the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, the Aydın 1st Administrative Court and the Erzurum 1st Administrative Court annulled the deportation orders. (See: Appeal before the Administrative Court)
Reception conditions
- End of the ‘satellite cities’ concept. Previously, applicants were referred to cities depending on their profile, in case of having any vulnerability, however recently this implementation is no longer in practice in 2024 as in 2023. As per PMM Circular No. 2022/01 dated 06.06.2022, the term “province of residence” (ikamet ili) is now officially used to designate the province in which an asylum seeker is required to reside, replacing the previously used term “satellite city”. The PMM is responsible for informing which cities are open or closed to new registrations. According to the last available list, 62 provinces in Türkiye were listed as open/closed cities for the referral of international protection applicants.[31] However, they are mostly closed to international protection applications.[32]
- Agreement between the European Commission and the Government of Türkiye to support the most vulnerable refugees: The European Commission and the Government of Türkiye signed a €781 million contract to fund a social safety net for vulnerable refugees, marking the largest EU contract with Ankara to date.[33] This new Social Safety Net (SSN) contract extends the Emergency Social Safety Net program, the EU’s largest humanitarian initiative, launched in 2016. Over the next three years, the funding will support the basic needs of around two million refugees and benefit the local economy. This brings the total EU assistance to refugees and host communities in Türkiye to nearly €10 billion since 2011. The EU Facility for Refugees in Türkiye is the answer to the EU Member States’ call for significant additional funding to support refugees in the country, and manages a total of €6 billion, mobilised in two tranches. The first tranche serves to fund projects that ran until mid-2021 latest. The second tranche serves to fund projects which run until mid-2025 latest (most projects will finish earlier). The main focus areas are humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support.[34]
Detention of asylum seekers
- Detention facilities: As of 2024, there are 32 Removal Centres operating across 25 provinces in Türkiye, with a total detention capacity of approximately 18,780. Throughout the year, around 350,000 individuals were held in these facilities. The centre located in Iğdır, as well as two of the three facilities in Arnavutköy, are listed as temporary Removal Centres.[35] In 2024, several reports highlighted serious concerns regarding unlawful deportations and ill-treatment in removal centres. Allegations included individuals being coerced into signing voluntary return forms, deportations carried out before the automatic suspensive effect of pending legal cases could take effect, and instances of physical violence.[36] Some accounts also reported the use of so-called “cold chambers” as a form of punishment or coercion, raising serious questions about conditions and accountability within removal centres.[37] In 2024, it was observed that many Afghan nationals were held in the Şanlıurfa Harran Temporary Accommodation Center, a facility designated for individuals under temporary protection. Among them were individuals referred from various Removal Centres for the assessment of their international protection applications, as well as others who had been apprehended outside their province of residence—despite the fact that such cases are typically expected to result in a “deemed to be withdrawn” decision.[38]
- Increasing number of transfers: The number of transfers between the centres increased significantly in 2024. Uninformed, sudden transfers are happening form one centre to another centre in different cities. This practice is problematic and potentially in violation of the right to legal representation, as lawyers are unable to locate their clients. Since the PDMMs do not provide information on where an individual is being held or any guidelines on which profiles are transferred to which locations and when, lawyers are often required to proactively search for their clients across multiple Removal Centres – a process that can take several days.
Content of international protection
- Increasing anti-migrant sentiment. Since 2022, there has been a noticeable rise in anti-migrant sentiment, with increased discussions during the election campaign in 2023 General Election focusing on issues such as voluntary return,[39] unwanted immigrants,[40] and border protection.[41] During the election periods in Türkiye—such as before and after the 2024 municipal elections—anti-migrant sentiment tends to rise, creating additional challenges for refugee communities. In late June and early July 2024, a wave of anti-Syrian unrest broke out in Kayseri following allegations that a Syrian man had sexually abused a young Syrian girl. The incident rapidly escalated into widespread violence, during which protestors raided the homes of Syrian families, set vehicles on fire, and engaged in other acts of aggression. Fourteen police officers and one firefighter were injured during the events. A broadcast ban was imposed regarding the incident and its aftermath. The Minister of Interior later announced that 67 individuals had been detained in connection with the unrest, which extended into early July.
- Policy changes in the issuing of Due to a policy change in 2023 regarding the issuing of residence permits, a number of short-term residence permits applications were denied[42] causing difficulties in accessing to the international protection application. This problem continued in 2024. Applicants whose requests for residence permits were denied continued to reside in Türkiye despite the illegality of their stay, as submitting a lawsuit has no suspensive effect. Migrants from Africa who held residence permit previously face difficulties to renew their permits, consequently they found themselves as undocumented migrants who cannot access basic rights and services due to the fear of deportation.[43]
- Resettlement: In 2024, UNHCR continued to expedite the resettlement processing of the most vulnerable refugees. More than 11,000 resettlement submissions were made during the year, 79% of which were for Syrian refugees from earthquake-affected regions. To date, over 6,800 refugees have departed to third countries. Around 13 EU countries were expected to participate in the resettlement efforts, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Italy, Finland, France, Norway, and Ireland. According to statistics shared by the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM), participation from all these countries was confirmed – except for Ireland.
Temporary protection
- Detention of Syrian nationals: Following a policy change in 2022, Syrians who enter the country are transferred to temporary accommodation centres in Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Hatay, Kilis, and Malatya. Admission to the temporary accommodation centre is at the discretion PDMM and if rejected from accessing the camp, the only alternative for Syrians is to “voluntarily return” to Syria. Hence, the camps have become a new form of detention facility for Syrians who are either not registered under the temporary protection regime or have had their temporary protection status revoked. Individuals detained in the temporary accommodation centres often face indefinite detention, unlike those in regular detention centres, which have a maximum detention period of up to 12 months. Immigration lawyers believe that the indefinite detention in these centres aims to hinder Syrians from appealing deportation decisions or to coerce them into signing voluntary return forms[44]. It is claimed that majority of Syrians who stay in Kilis and Nizip temporary accommodation centres are returned back to Syria and there are concerns among stakeholders about the voluntariness of these returns[45]. An unpublished circular dated 6 June 2022 outlined four exceptions to the requirement of staying in Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs): (1) children of individuals exempt from TAC residence; (2) those for whom travel is not advisable due to health conditions; (3) individuals married to Turkish citizens or to foreigners legally residing in Türkiye under a residence permit, work permit, or international protection status, along with their children; and (4) individuals with special needs who are not suitable for placement in TACs, as well as their dependent children. However, the implementation of these exceptions has continued to vary in practice. In some TACs like Kilis Elbeyli, there are claims of individuals being held in cold storage facilities and exposed to physical abuse.
- Registration: Registration continues to be one of the main issues faced by applicants. In a statement published in August 2024, the Ministry of Interior declared that no new registrations of Syrians under temporary protection had taken place since June 2022, effectively closing the discussion on the matter.[46] In line with this policy, the number of Syrians under temporary protection decreased to 2,901,478 as of 2024.
Content of temporary protection
- Increased EU funding: For 2023 and 2024, the EU has pledged over 2 billion EUR in support for Syrian refugees and their host communities. It was stressed that the EU would continue to collaborate with Turkiye to ensure the delivery of cross-border aid to Syria. As part of the MFF mid-term review package, the European Council on 1 February 2024 agreed to increase by 1.5 billion EUR the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve for the period 2024-2027.[47]
- Increasing numbers of apprehensions of temporary protection beneficiaries: By the end of 2024, there were 50,641 Syrians among the 225,831 people apprehended across the country. The number decreased in 2024, but was still more than double than the same figure in 2021.[48]
- 1:1 Resettlement scheme: The EU-Türkiye statement of 18 March 2016 established a specific resettlement procedure (“1:1 scheme”), under which one Syrian national would be resettled from Türkiye to the EU Member States for each Syrian national returned from Greece to Türkiye, taking into account the UN vulnerability criteria. As of March 2024, there are 65,927 persons have been resettled under this “1:1 scheme”, with primary resettlement destinations being Germany, Canada, U.S.A., and France.
- Reception: As of December 2024, ten large-scale camps are accommodating a total of 59,796 temporary protection beneficiaries, spread across eightprovinces in Southern TürkiyeAdana (Sarıçam), Hatay (Apaydın, Yayladağı, Altınözü), Kahramanmaraş (Merkez), Kilis (Elbeyli), Osmaniye (Cevdetiye), Gazinatep (Nizip), Malatya (Beydağı) and Şanlıurfa Harran. The majority of individuals under temporary protection live outside the camps.
[1] PMM, Temporary Protection Statistics, available here.
[2] UNHCR Türkiye Factsheet September 2024, available here.
[3] T.C., Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya, Adres Tahkikatlarından Sonra Suriyelilerin Sayısının 2 Milyon 935 Bin 742’ye Düştüğünü Açıkladı, 20.11.2024, available here
[4] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2025
[5] BBC Türkçe, Kayseri olayları: Türkiye genelinde gözaltına alınan 1065 kişiden 28’i tutuklandı, 01.07.2024, available here
[6] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, March, April and May 2025
[7] Information provided by stakeholders, March, April and May 2025
[8] Mülteci-Der, Belirsizlikle Başa Çıkmak, 24.01.2025, available here
[9] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2025
[10] PMM, International Protection Statistics, available here
[11] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, February, March, April and May 2025
[12] PMM, Irregular Migration Statistics, available here
[13] PMM, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya: “Göçü Kaynağında Durdurduk”, 14 August 2024, available here
[14] AA, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya, AA Editör Masası’nda soruları yanıtladı, available here.
[15] BBC Persian, Afghan refugee dies after being “tortured by Turkish police” at the border with Iran, August 2024, available here
[16] Information provided by stakeholders, February, March, – April and May 2025.
[17] PMM, “İstanbul’da 39 İlçenin Yabancıların İkamet İzinlerine Kapatıldığı” İddialarına İlişkin Basın Açıklaması, 16 July 2023, available here.
[18] Information provided by stakeholders, March, April and May 2025.
[19] PMM, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya: “Gönüllü Geri Dönüş İşlemlerinde Randevu Sistemi Devreye Alındı, Sınır Kapılarında 7/24 Çalışma Esasına Geçildi”, 25.12.2024, available here.
[20] X (Twitter), PMM, available here.
[21] PMM, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya, 2016 Yılından İtibaren Ülkesine Gönüllü Geri Dönüş Yapan Suriyeli Sayısının 1 Milyona Ulaştığını Açıkladı, 28.05.2025, available here.
[22] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, March, April and May 2025.
[23] AA, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya, AA Editör Masası’nda soruları yanıtladı available here.
[24] T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, Kalkan-25 Operasyonları İle 2 Bin 563 Düzensiz Göçmen Yakalandı, 02.07.2024, available here
[25] UTBA, Report on Unlawful Deportation Proceedings, June 2024, available here; Lighthouse Reports, Turkey’s EU-funded deportation machine, 11.10.2024, available here.
[26] AA, Ibid.
[27] PMM, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya: “Göçü Kaynağında Durdurduk”, 14 August 2024, available here.
[28] AA, ibid.
[29] Information provided by stakeholders, March, April, May 2025.
[30] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, April and May 2025.
[31] For the earlier list of cities as of August 2017, see Refugee Rights Türkiye, Avukatlar için mülteci hukuku el kitabı, August 2017, available in Turkish here, 409.
[32] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, April and May 2025.
[33] EU signs a €781 million agreement with Türkiye to continue support to most vulnerable refugees, September 2023, here
[34] European Comission, The EU Facility For Refugees in Turkey Factsheet, December 2024, available here.
[35] PMM Faaliyet Raporu
[36] UTBA Report
[37] Karar, Avukatlardan Geri Gönderme Merkezi için çarpıcı iddialar: göçmenlere ‘Sessiz Oda’ ve ‘Soğuk Oda’ işkencesi, 07 November 2024, available here; Karar, Deprem mağdurlarına çifte darbe: Göçmen aileye sınır dışı kararı, 19 November 2024, available here
[38] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, March 2025.
[39] AA, 20.05.2024, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Suriyeli mültecilerin ülkelerine dönmesini sağlayacağız, available here.
[40] News, 06.09.2022, İYİ Parti “Milli Göç Doktrini”ni açıkladı, Akşener tarih verdi, available here.
[41] Euronews, 14.03.2024. ‘Kılıçdaroğlu: Suriyeli ve Afganları göndereceğiz, demografik yapının değişmesini istemiyoruz’, available here.
[42] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[43] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2024.
[44] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, 12 June 2024, available here
[45] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2024.
[46] PMM, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya: “Göçü Kaynağında Durdurduk”, 14.08.2024, available here
[47] Euroepan Commission, Commission signs €400 million agreement with Türkiye to support its recovery after the 2023 earthquakes, 07.02.2024, available here