As elaborated in the section on Types of Accommodation, the only Reception and Accommodation Centre is in Yozgat and has a modest capacity of 100 places. Little is known by civil society about the conditions in the centre. According to latest TIHEK report, overall, the physical conditions in the centre is fine and the centre works under capacity.[1]
While the current capacity of Reception and Accommodation Centre is extremely limited as compared to the size of the population seeking international protection in Türkiye, Article 95 LFIP and the Regulation on the Establishment of Reception and Accommodation Centres and Removal Centres (“Removal Centres Regulation”), dated 22 April 2014 lay down the parameters for the operation and organisational structure of these facilities and Removal Centres.
“Persons with special needs” shall have priority access to free accommodation and other reception services provided in these facilities.[2] Reception services provided in the reception and accommodation centres may also be extended to international protection applicants and status holders residing outside the centres,[3] although in practice because of the dispersal policy, only applicants registered and residing in the same province as the centre would be able to access any such services.
However, Article 4 of the Removal Centres Regulation provides that a list of 9 general principles must be observed in all functioning and provision in the Centres, including prioritisation of persons with special needs, best interest of the child, confidentiality of personal data, due notification of residents and detainees on the nature and consequences of all proceedings they undergo, respect for right to religious affiliations and worship and non-discrimination.
Currently, almost all international protection applicants pay for private accommodation in their assigned provinces out of their own resources. Access to housing remains deeply challenging due to a range of factors, including high rental prices and advance payment requirements from owners. Rent prices are very high, resulting in two or three families living together in one place to be able to afford rent, sometimes deposits are not paid back when the tenancy contract ends, and there are also some discriminative practices. As a result, a large number of applicants, likely temporary protection beneficiaries (see Temporary Protection: Housing) remain exposed to destitution and homelessness, or accommodation in substandard makeshift camps.
The economic downturn increased living expenses, including rental fees. This had a larger effect on refugees because of their vulnerability. As of 1 July 2024, the 25% cap on annual rent increases was lifted. Although many refugees were already paying above this threshold due to discriminatory practices in the housing market, the cap had nevertheless served as a baseline protection for some. Following its removal, the official maximum increase rate has risen from 65% to 60% per month for the remainder of the year, further exacerbating the already severe housing affordability crisis faced by the refugee population.[4] In practice, rent increases are much higher than this legal limit. Property owners sometimes threaten refugee tenants with filing a complaint against them if they disagree with a rent increase or refuse to leave the house. The refugees’ fear of deportation makes them especially vulnerable to these threats.[5]Despite limited resources, when NGOs agree to provide rental support to individuals, additional challenges may arise in practice. For example, some NGOs are only able to deliver this support by transferring the funds directly to the landlord’s bank account. However, certain landlords may be unwilling to share their banking details—often due to a preference for receiving rent in cash without formal documentation. As a result, even when an institution approves rental support, the assistance may not be delivered due to the financial regulations imposed by donors[6].
Another significant obstacle arises when an individual’s international protection application is permanently rejected, or their temporary protection status is cancelled. While awaiting the issuance of a deportation order, they often remain without valid identification documents. In such cases, if conflicts emerge with their landlords, they are typically compelled to comply with the landlord’s demands—regardless of fairness—because they know that relocating would be extremely difficult. Without valid ID, they are unable to sign a new rental contract or register utilities such as electricity, water, or gas in their name. This situation leaves them highly vulnerable to exploitation and housing insecurity.[7]
Another obstacle affecting applicants’ accommodation stems from marginalisation from local communities or other refugee populations, whereby people are forced to live in districts far from the city centre, hospitals, education centres and public buildings. Although the types of challenges vary depending on the province and the profile of the applicant, the most common problems of finding a suitable place to live are decreased possibilities due to the closed neighbourhoods, reluctance of homeowners to rent their houses to refugees due to increased anti-migrant discourse and discrimination, high rent prices, unrealistic payment conditions (such as paying an annual rent), and poor housing conditions[8]. For instance, due to pervasive racism, applicants of African descent appear to be more discriminated when searching for accommodation. They primarily reside in shared residences.[9] In İstanbul, an increasing number of Afghans have settled in Küçüksu and Yenimahalle[10] and Zeytinburnu.[11] In Adana and Mersin, they mostly live in rural areas under precarious conditions together with Syrians.[12] (see Content of Temporary Protection Housing).
Recent research[13] conducted in the districts of Istanbul where high numbers of migrants, especially asylum seekers and refugees, reside shows that three key factors support the spatial segregation of vulnerable migrant groups are the availability of affordable housing, effective migrant networks, and opportunities for informal employment. The visible presence of large groups of migrants in public spaces has caused unease among citizens, highlighting the tensions related to urban inequalities and the sharing of public resources. Recent enforcement measures, such as mobile migration points, have led to a shift in the presence of migrants in Istanbul, resulting in their increased invisibility rather than a real numerical decline.[14]
According to recent findings, the majority of refugees were forced to relocate following the earthquake. While those under temporary or international protection status were generally restricted from leaving their registered provinces without government permission, this travel ban was temporarily lifted for those registered in the six most affected provinces. This led many to move to urban centres elsewhere in Türkiye, and some to travel temporarily to Northwest Syria.[15] Despite relocation, refugees continue to face rising rents, housing damage, ongoing economic difficulties, and increased discrimination, further complicating access to affordable housing, livelihoods, and essential support services.[16]
[1] Human Rights and Equality Commission of Türkiye, ‘Visit to Yozgat Reception and Accommodation Centre’, 15 June 2022, available here.
[2] Article 95(3) LFIP.
[3] Article 95(4) LFIP.
[4] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2025.
[5] Information shared by stakeholder, March – April 2024.
[6] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2025.
[7] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2025.
[8] Information shared by stakeholders, March- April 2024.
[9] Burgün, ‘Esenyurt’u ‘yurt’ edinen göçmenlerin öyküsü: Kimsesizler mezarlığına gömülmek istemiyoruz’, 27 July 2022, available in Turkish here.
[10] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[11] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[12] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[13] GAR, İstanbul İlçelerinde Kent ve Göç İlişkileri, Rapor no: 9, Nisan (April) 2024.
[14] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[15] Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Depremlerin Türkiye’yi vurmasının üzerinden bir yıl geçti, mülteciler daha da derin bir çukurda, 06.02.2024, available here.
[16] Mixed Migration Centre (2023) Türkiye Syria earthquake’s impact on Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi and Somali refugees in Türkiye. Available here.