The derogation from the non-refoulement principle
Applicants for international protection generally have the right to remain on the territory of Türkiye throughout the procedure.[1] However, an exception to this rule was introduced by way of emergency decree in October 2016, providing that a deportation decision “may be taken at any time during the international protection proceedings” against an applicant for reasons of: (i) leadership, membership or support of a terrorist organisation or a benefit-oriented criminal group; (ii) threat to public order or public health; or (iii) relation to terrorist organisations defined by international institutions and organisations.[2] Law No 7070 on 1 February 2018 consolidated the reform.
For foreigners who have been convicted of an offence, the Public Prosecutor shall request the opinion of the Ministry of Interior as to whether they should be removed from the country.[3]
The law effectively enables the deportation of asylum seekers, beneficiaries of international protection and beneficiaries of temporary protection (see Temporary Protection: Protection from Refoulement) on the aforementioned grounds which remain largely vague and could be interpreted widely. The reform introduced by the Decree has been criticised for facilitating and exacerbating risks of arbitrary deportations jeopardising the life and safety of refugees.[4]
Amendments to the LFIP in 2019 allow for the travel costs for removal to be borne by the deportee. If the individual does not have sufficient means , the expense shall be borne by PMM yet in the same article it states “money belonging to the foreigner, apart from the amount that is required to meet the basic needs identified by the Directorate General, will be recorded as income to the Treasury”.[5] There is no information yet about how this has been applied in practice.
A new regulation on Penal Execution Institutions and Execution of Penalties and Security Measures was enacted on 29 March 2020. According to Article 52 the following principles apply to convicts to be deported:
a) The decree on expulsion is sent to the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor where it is recorded in the execution book and sent to the highest security authority and immigration administration units.
b) Before being released from the institution, the administration of the institution informs the highest security authority of that place and the units of immigration administration on the release date of the convict. On the date of release, the convict is delivered to law enforcement for deportation proceedings.
c) The deportation of convicts not housed in institutions are carried out by immigration administration units.
Assessments regarding deportation procedures for convicts are made by the Ministry of Interior.
The country of deportation is not specified in deportation orders, which makes it questionable as to how assessment of the risk of refoulement is carried out as this assessment inherently requires an assessment of conditions in the country of deportation. This administrative deficiency is addressed in different ways by the courts. The general tendency is to assume that the country of removal is the country of origin and assess risk of refoulement based on this assumption. However, there are some positive decisions problematise the non-specification of country of removal. In 2024, the Şanlıurfa Administrative Court found a deportation decision of a Syrıan national unlawful because the deportation order did not clearly specify the country to which the foreign national would be deported. According to the Court, the absence of the Third Country Assessment Form for Nationals of Vulnerable Countries, which is required to be issued by the governorate, renders the deportation decision unlawful and contrary to the case law of the Constitutional Court. In line with this, the Court has outlined five key principles that must be followed in such assessments. First, the deportation order must clearly indicate the country to which the individual will be removed. Second, it must be determined whether the person wishes to return to their country of origin. Third, the safety of the designated third country must be investigated, and the deportation order must include concrete assessments explaining why it is considered safe for the individual. Fourth, the individual must be informed about the safety of the third country and their opinion must be obtained. Finally, the deportation and third country assessment must be conducted by the governorate.[6] However, in another case where the form was issued for a Syrian national and Germany was designated as a safe third country, the Istanbul 18th Administrative Court did not consider this determination unlawful and dismissed the case filed against the deportation order. The Court failed to question the feasibility of carrying out the deportation of a Syrian national to Germany.[7]
There are also instances where the absence of a specified country of removal is used as an excuse to avoid conducting a risk assessment, assuming that the removal will adhere to the principle of non-refoulement. Administrative practice of non-specification of country of removal and its judicial oversight renders an effective risk assessment difficult.[8]
According to the Union of Turkish Bar Association’s report published in June 2024,[9] there have been numerous complaints that migrants are being deported despite the administrative appeal period not having expired, or even after having filed a lawsuit against the deportation orders in accordance with Article 53/3 of the LFIP. An extensive survey among 47 bar associations revealed that these unlawful deportations are not isolated incidents but systematic administrative practices. A total of 491 lawyers reported that at least one of their clients was either deported before they could file an appeal within the seven-day time limit, or deported between 11 August and 11 October 2023 despite having a pending case against the deportation order. The first category involved at least 1,772 individuals, while the second affected at least 696 individuals. Furthermore, cases were documented where deportations occurred even after the Constitutional Court issued stay orders. Over half of those deported in such a manner were Syrian nationals, with others from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and other countries. Lawyers have taken multiple legal actions, including filing complaints with the Prosecutor’s Office. Additionally, it was reported that different deportation methods are used, with particular concern for Afghans being pushed back at the Iranian border into dangerous situations involving criminal gangs. Ankara Bar Association published a statement to draw attention to unlawful deportations despite the fact that a lawsuit was filed for the annulment of the deportation decision and the relevant authority was notified.[10] According to LFIP, if a lawsuit is filed against the deportation decision, people cannot be deported until the final decision has been taken by the court.
In 2024, two stakeholders — based in Van and Hatay respectively — reported incidents involving the immediate and unnotified deportation of individuals, falsely framed as transfers to Removal Centers (RCs). In Van, a stakeholder described a case in which a client, initially told he would be transferred to Kurubaş RC, was instead forcibly deported without notice. Despite multiple inquiries, the individual’s whereabouts remained unclear until he later reported being part of a group forcibly pushed back across the Iranian border, where he was also subjected to physical violence. When the stakeholder lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor’s office, the response reportedly reflected a broader sentiment of deterrence, suggesting a lack of institutional will to provide protection.
In Hatay, a Syrian national was similarly apprehended and represented by a lawyer who was told the individual would be transferred to an RC. However, the person was reportedly deported to Syria within half an hour of arrival at the center, without prior notification to legal counsel or the family. These cases raise serious concerns regarding due process, transparency, and access to legal safeguards in deportation procedures.[11]
PDMM has been using a form for the evaluation of a safe deportation country where Syrians could be deported. On this form, four countries are determined as safe countries for Syrians: Iran, Sudan, Haiti, and Micronesia. Refugees signed the form, but there was no information on Syrians being deported to Iran or another country based on this document.[12] As of the end of 2021 this form was still valid, but the country names had been changed; for example, Russia was included.[13] Another stakeholder mentioned that these countries are Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Sudan, and Ecuador in 2023.[14] According to stakeholders, no individual was deported to one of these countries. In 2024, in the case of a Syrian national, the Bursa 1st Administrative Court ruled that designating Ecuador as a safe third country for the applicant was not unlawful and rejected the case filed against the deportation order.[15] However, this practice might result in the cancellation of international protection and prevents individuals from re-applying for international protection.[16] In the case of an Afghan from the Hazara region, the 1st Administrative Court of Izmir discussed whether the deportation decision was suitable for his family and if the country of deportation was to be considered safe for him.[17]
Security codes
Deportation on public order, public security and public health grounds is linked to the security restriction codes issued by PMM, a practice still not governed by clear and publicly available criteria.[18] The implementation and regulation of these codes is not set out in the law but likely in internal circulars and instructions within the administration.
Security-related codes such as “G-89” for foreign terrorist fighters and “G-87” for general security seem to still be applied, though mainly in specific parts of the country, such as İstanbul.[19] The assessment of risks, conducted by the Risk Analysis Department as far as airports are concerned,[20] is made with reference to broad criteria and in practice may be based on the appearance or point of entry of the individual e.g. Turkish-Syrian border.[21] Intelligence from other countries often leads to the issuance of a security restriction code, even though the content and quality of intelligence vary depending on the issuing country.[22]
Security codes can be only appealed before the 1st Administrative Court of Ankara, since they are issued by PMM Headquarters. In appeals against the issuance of security codes, confidential documents submitted by PMM are not available to the individual or their lawyer; they can only be accessed in person at the registry of the Administrative Court of Ankara.[23] The court generally leaves a wide margin of discretion to PMM regarding the issuance of codes. A couple of years ago, it appeared as it has not taken a uniform approach to the scrutiny of codes, with some rulings annulling the issuance of codes for lack of evidence and others upholding them.[24] In Gaziantep, two rulings annulling the issuance of codes were recorded in 2022.[25] In one case, a Syrian resident challenged the G-87 code, deportation, and detention orders issued by the PMM in 2017. He won initially but lost at the regional court. His deportation was halted in 2018, and he regained his residence permit. In January 2022, the PMM reissued the orders, but he won his cases as the PMM provided no specific evidence for the G-87 code. He received a humanitarian visa instead of a residence permit. In another case, a G-82 code was issued to an INGO employee due to alleged terrorist links of her employer. She was detained for a year, her deportation was suspended in 2021, but the administrative court upheld the deportation in 2022. She reapplied for temporary protection, with 15-20 others in similar situations in Gaziantep.[26] According to stakeholders, it has become nearly impossible to cancel a security code. In 2024, the Ankara 1st Administrative Court rejected a case challenging the G-43 security code issued against a Syrian national, despite the fact that the criminal investigation had concluded with a decision of non-prosecution.[27] The Court of Appeal also dismissed the applicant’s appeal, stating that the issuance of such security codes falls within the State’s sovereign powers. [28]
In 2024, an Iraqi national challenged his deportation order, which was based on a G-87 security code, arguing that he should be protected under the principle of non-refoulement. He claimed that his previous service in Saddam’s Guards battalion, his prolonged imprisonment in Iraq, and the risk he faced from Shia groups placed him in danger upon return. Despite the fact that the public prosecutor had issued a decision of non-prosecution, the Afyonkarahisar 1st Administrative Court held that administrative courts have a broader margin of appreciation and rejected the appeal against the deportation order.[29] In another case, the same court rejected an appeal against the deportation order of an Iraqi woman whose husband was subject to a G-87 security code. Although the husband had received a decision of non-prosecution, the woman was also issued a G-87 code and deportation order solely on the basis of being his spouse. In its reasoning, the court stated that terrorist organizations specifically exploit women who do not have any criminal record, and in cases where the husband cannot be deported, there is a risk that such organizations may approach and provoke the spouse, potentially using her in activities against the State[30]. An Afghan applicant’s international protection application was rejected due to the presence of a G-87 security code. When he challenged the decision on the grounds that he had not been provided with an interview form, the İzmir 1st Administrative Court dismissed the case, reasoning that the applicant was using the international protection procedure as a means to an end rather than genuinely seeking protection[31]. Although the previous cases raise concerns regarding the disregard of the presumption of innocence, the Şanlıurfa 1st Administrative Court offered a contrasting example by annulling a deportation order based on a G-82 security code. The court explicitly relied on the principle of the presumption of innocence, noting that there were no ongoing criminal proceedings against the applicant and that enforcing the deportation order under such circumstances would constitute a violation of this fundamental principle.[32] Reports from lawyers suggest that individuals labelled with the code G-89 are often from Chechnya or the Caucasus, with most of them having entered Türkiye legally and valid residency permits for many years[33]. Stakeholders in Izmir observed that the majority of G codes are issued to Syrians and Iraqis, and that this application is prevalent among Iraqis living in Samsun, Kutahya, Ordu, Afyon, and Manisa. Personal issues among Iraqis or Syrians who relayed false information to Turkish intelligence services may be an explanation of this practice.[34]
Stakeholders in Istanbul observed that any non-Syrian who has entered or stayed in Syria, even once, is almost automatically labelled as a jihadist fighter and issued a G-code.[35] The 1st Administrative Court of Izmir is regarded as one of the best courts for the impartial evaluation of code cases, and stakeholders are more likely to receive favourable rulings from it than from other courts.[36] In many cases,[37] the 1st Administrative Court of Ankara rulings annulling the issuance of a security restriction code are later overturned by higher instance courts.[38]
In June 2025, a joint report by MAZLUMDER, the Platform for Refugee Rights, and ULFED raised concerns regarding the use of security restriction codes (tahdit kodları), noting their severe impact on individuals and potential risks to the right to life. The report highlighted that the absence of an effective appeal or oversight mechanism, and observed that the existing administrative litigation process averages 1.5 years and results in dismissal of most cases. It called, for the establishment of a review commission composed of representatives from relevant authorities and a dedicated administrative mechanism to ensure timely and effective mechanisms.[39]
In 2024, particularly following the incidents in Kayseri, widespread arbitrary detention and cancellation (see: Exclusion and cancellation of temporary protection) linked to security codes occurred. Consequently, many individuals avoided contacting approaching the PDMM offices to inquire about their security status. These concerns were well-founded, based on real cases where acquaintances were suddenly apprehended after it was revealed they had a security code when they made inquiries. This led to an informal practice in which people paid approximately 100 USD to certain individuals who provided screenshots from the GöçNet system showing security code information. Lawyers have also utilized these screenshots to file lawsuits, given the difficulty in obtaining accurate official information about these codes.[40]
Operations targeting irregular migration
In previous years, the authorities conducted ‘peace practices’ and what were commonly referred to as sweeping operations targeting irregular migration, particularly in major cities.[41] Currently, these terms are no longer used; instead, Kalkan (Shield) operations, are carried out against migrant smuggling organisers and irregular immigrants, especially in metropolitan and border cities, often where mobile migration points are located. As of May 2025, 37 Kalkan operations were carried out in various cities. Sometimes operations were carried out simultaneously in different cities, while sometimes operations were targeted a specific neighbourhood in a city. In September 2024, it was announced that, during four days of operations which were carried out in 27 cities (İzmir, Edirne, Kocaeli, Muğla, Van, Antalya, İstanbul, Kırklareli, Konya, Adana, Amasya, Aydın, Bilecik, Bitlis, Erzincan, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Hakkari, Kayseri, Niğde, Ordu, Sakarya, Samsun, Şanlıurfa, Bayburt, Karaman and Osmaniye) 84 migrant smuggler was apprehended and 25 of them were arrested. During the same group of operations 1029 irregular migrants were apprehended[42]. From the beginning of 2023 to May 2023, 40,480 irregular immigrants were caught, 93% of them (37,785) were deported, and the total number of deportations since 2016 reached 487,735.[43] According to the Minister of Interior, Ali Yerlikaya, the total number of deportations in 2024 reached 141,000 — a figure he claimed to be the highest in Türkiye’s history and comparable to the deportation statistics of Frontex.[44] From 1 June 2023 to 11 April 2025, the migrants without a regular status who have been deported are approximately 260,000.[45]
Mobile migration points[46] carry out identity checks of foreigners they suspect of being irregular migrants by law enforcement units (police, and gendarmerie) and if the document that allows the legal stay cannot be shown or if any issues arise, they are being taken to mobile migration points where the PMM staff can query data with fingerprints. Accordingly, these mobile units are equipped with a biometric fingerprint detection system, the GocNet database, an interpreter, and a PDMM expert. Authorities also plan to install cameras inside the units, which typically operate from a minibus[47].When foreigners who do not have a legal right to stay in Türkiye are identified, they are sent to the removal centres and the administrative detention and deportation process is initiated. The total number of mobile migration points is 270, and they are present in 81 provinces. Since 19 July 2023, a total of 2,542,274 individuals have been checked at these mobile migration points, resulting in the detection of 164,842 irregular migrants. Authorities reported that, over time, the proportion of individuals identified as irregular migrants has significantly decreased. For instance, during the first three months of implementation, 49,999 individuals were checked, and 74.5% (37,289) were identified as irregular migrants. By contrast, in December 2024, the number of checks increased substantially to 256,377, yet only 2.7% (7,164 individuals) were identified as irregular migrants.[48] In practice, according to observation of some stakeholders, there are some unofficial quotas for each police to capture certain numbers of migrants[49]. Some stakeholders also emphasized that the increasing number of mobile migration points had a significant impact on social life, as many individuals began to hesitate to go outside. Additionally, certain foreigners apprehended at these points were directly transferred to border gates without being processed in a removal centre. In 2024, the number of Mobile Migration Points in Gaziantep increased from 5 to 20. These points were generally established in front of public institutions such as hospitals and courthouses. In addition to irregular migrants, individuals holding International Protection (IP) or Temporary Protection (TP) IDs who were unable to verify their addresses also encountered difficulties at these locations.[50] According to Ali Yerlikaya, in 2025, the proportion of individuals identified as irregular migrants decreased to 1.8%, down from 74.5% two years earlier.[51]
Afghans have been labelled as ‘illegal migrants’ by the press and government officials, facing restrictive measures. In January 2022, Türkiye resumed deporting ‘illegal Afghans’ via Ariana Airlines and charter flights. Former Minister Soylu mentioned that five charter flights were departing every 3-5 days[52]. By September 2022, 186 charter flights had returned 44,786 Afghans, and by October 2022, 78,716 irregular migrants had been deported since January 2022. Deportations of Afghans increased by 146% over 2022[53], and continue during 2023. The detailed data regarding the charter flights have not been shared in 2023. In the first quarter of 2023, the number of immigrants deported from all nationalities was 21,211. With the 15 charter flights 2,319 migrants and with scheduled flights, 4,526 migrants were deported to Afghanistan[54]. Sometimes Afghans are deported to Pakistan with the charter flights with Pakistan nationals[55]. The other statements regarding deportations did not provide the details regarding the nationalities. In August 2024, the Minister of Interior, Ali Yerlikaya, announced that 163,745 irregular migrants had been deported over the previous 14 months, marking a 20% increase compared to the previous period and reportedly representing the highest deportation figure in Türkiye’s history. He also noted that Türkiye had conducted more deportations than all EU countries combined during this period. Since 4 June 2023, a total of 121 charter flights had deported 22,987 irregular migrants.[56]
The vast majority of returns from removal centres are believed not to be voluntary and there are serious concerns about people being forced to sign voluntary return forms.[57] Detained migrants also frequently criticised the conditions in detention centres.[58] As defined in a report[59] the conditions in the removal centres ‘contribute the degradation of the individual’s dignity and constituting forms of mistreatment, violating the rights of detainees and perpetuating their suffering’. Although legally lawyers can appeal a deportation decision and applicants are allowed to remain in the territory until the time for exercising their right to an effective remedy expires, in practice this rule is not always applied, and the risk of deportation remains[60].
Appeal before the Administrative Court
The appeal against a deportation decision is a remedy separate from remedies in the international protection procedure.[61] It has an automatic suspensive effect, following a review of the LFIP in reforms from December 2019, and the deletion of exceptions to the right to remain on the territory.[62] Appeals are made with legal counsel or by a direct petition to the court.
However, removal decisions must be appealed before the Administrative Court within seven days of notification.[63] With an amendment introduced in 2024, the procedures for challenging deportation orders were expedited. According to the new regulation, the case is considered concluded after the administration submits its initial defense. If official notification cannot be delivered to the applicant’s address, the timeframe for deeming the case as not filed has been reduced from one year to two months. It is at the court’s discretion to decide whether to hold a hearing. Applications submitted after the conclusion of the case, during interim decisions, or following a hearing must be finalized within 15 days[64]. Deportation decisions are often poorly communicated to individuals, hindering their ability to notify legal representatives or family members, this lack of communication obstructs timely appeals. In practice, detainees face obstacles in accessing legal representation, as lawyers are frequently misinformed about the detainee’s location or case status, significantly delaying legal assistance.[65] In 2024, the practice of frequent transfer of individuals, including unaccompanied minors whose age appeared to be over 18 on paper[66], from one centre to another centre made it very hard for the lawyers to trace the location and to reach out to the person[67]. Accessing information about foreigners detained is very difficult due to the lack of a centralised system[68] and Lawyers reported difficulties in trying to gather all the information and write an appeal in seven days particularly if the case needs translation work or there are difficulties accessing a client in detention[69]. This short time limit has a negative effect on both access to justice and the quality of the lawyer-client relationship. Some courts exercise the seven-day rule very strictly, which creates significant problems, as Administrative Court decisions on deportation appeals are final.
Appeals against deportation and administrative detention decisions mean different practices in different provinces since there are no higher judicial bodies or higher authority to standardise practices. Lawyers have found it difficult to prepare and file an appeal in such a short period. Notification is also a common issue in removal centres. The seven-day time limit starts with the notification of the deportation decision, so it carries special importance. Due to issues with official notifications, lawyers cannot be certain whether a deportation order will be issued following an applicant’s apprehension, or on what grounds. As a result, it becomes difficult to take prompt legal action upon being informed of a detention. According to a stakeholder, some applicants do not inform their lawyers for several days after being apprehended, as they initially expect to be released, which results in the loss of a significant portion—often around half—of the legal time limit to challenge the decision.[70] When the file of the applicant is sent to the court by PDMM, sometimes there is no notification. In this case, the PDMM sometimes include a note such as “refused to give their signature” before sending the documents to the court. The 1st Administrative Court of Izmir requested the Constitutional Court to conduct a normative review of the seven-day limit in January 2023.[71]
The Constitutional Court of Türkiye reviewed a petition challenging the reduction of the appeal period for deportation orders from 15 days to 7 days as stipulated in Article 53, Paragraph 3 of the LFIP. The arguments highlighted that the shortened appeal period is of vital importance because it undermines constitutional guarantees, making deportation easier and preventing foreigners in removal centres from adequately understanding their right to appeal or accessing a lawyer. Difficulties in determining the location of detained foreigners and other obstacles, such as not speaking Turkish, lack of financial means, and being under surveillance in removal centres, were cited as reasons why the 7-day period is insufficient, thus excessively restricting the right to seek legal remedy and defend against deportation, potentially leading to ill-treatment in their home countries. The Constitutional Court found that the reduction was justified by the need to limit the freedom of foreigners and reduce accommodation costs. Referring to the European Convention on Human Rights Protocol No. 7, it noted that while it mandates an opportunity to challenge deportation decisions, it does not specify a minimum appeal period. Concluding that the 7-day period was not excessively short to the extent that it prevents the preparation of an appeal or securing legal representation, it ruled that the 7-day appeal period did not violate the Constitution, without addressing the mentioned challenges.[72] According to stakeholders, in recent years – particularly in 2024 – administrative courts have begun to apply the seven-day rule more rigidly. Previously, courts were more flexible and could accept the date on which the applicant’s lawyer was informed as the starting point for the deadline. For example, the Konya 1st Administrative Court rejected the appeal of an Afghan national whose deportation order was issued on 7 November 2023. Although the applicant became aware of the legal consequences and challenged the decision on 15 November 2023 – eight days later – the court dismissed the case for missing the deadline.[73]
The mere existence of a criminal investigation can be sufficient for a deportation decision to be issued. An acquittal has not stopped deportations. Deportation decisions have started to be made even for those whose trial was pending and brought before the court due to a summary offense.[74] The quality of decisions often depends on the judges. According to stakeholders, the issuance of deportation orders solely on the basis of criminal investigations has significantly increased in 2024. The grounds for these decisions have become increasingly tenuous, with cases based, for example, on the alleged actions of a family member or even on situations where the individual concerned is merely the complainant. Although some of these weakly substantiated deportation orders can be overturned by administrative courts when challenged, the number of such successful challenges has declined. This is due both to the rising number of questionable decisions and to structural barriers—particularly the difficulty of securing legal assistance and filing an appeal within the strict seven-day deadline.[75]
For instance, in 2024, the İzmir 1st Administrative Court annulled the deportation order of a Syrian national that had been issued based on a criminal investigation targeting the applicant’s father, who was suspected of membership in an armed terrorist organization. The court reaffirmed the fundamental principle that criminal responsibility is personal.[76] Likewise, in January 2025, the Eskişehir 1st Administrative Court cancelled a deportation order issued against an Iranian transgender woman, based on a criminal investigation in which she was actually the complainant. Notably, a dissenting judge argued that the deportation order was lawful, reasoning that the applicant—being a transgender woman—had attracted public attention due to the nature of the incident, which occurred at approximately 3:00 AM in a residential neighbourhood and involved shouting, loud arguments, and the breaking of glass and bottles. According to this dissenting view, the disturbance amounted to a violation of public order, thereby justifying the deportation, regardless of her role as complainant.[77]
There are data verification centres for refugees in İzmir where individuals can update the information on their ID cards as well as a separate building from the PDMM. In the two communications, it was implied that the software used by the PMM (Göç Net database) is now connected to UYAP and can draw on personal information about foreigner nationals regarding their legal cases, etc. PMM did not have this access in the past. PMM does not require the existence of a final judgment – it is sufficient to identify a criminal file linked to the foreigner. In the past, in data verification centres, deportation procedures could be initiated if the foreigner had a security-related code such as G87. However, according to a stakeholder, this system may also be used to the detriment of foreigners. In 2024, a foreigner residing in Türkiye with a family residence permit, and the mother of a one-month-old baby, was apprehended at her home and transferred to a Removal Center. Thanks to the intervention of her lawyer, it was discovered that she had been assigned an N-99 code due to an argument she had with a doctor five years earlier—an incident that ultimately resulted in her acquittal. Despite this, and although the authorities could have accessed the underlying details of the code through the connection between UYAP and PMM systems, she was detained without any apparent effort to verify the actual basis of the code. This decision was taken while she was still breastfeeding her new-born, raising serious concerns about the proportionality and due diligence of the procedure.[78]
Since first-instance Administrative Court decisions are not shared with the public in Türkiye, it is difficult for experts and lawyers to assess the effectiveness and quality of judicial review. However there are some initiatives trying to collect and publishing the decisions.[79] In the past, there was no uniform application of the non-refoulement principle in Administrative Court reviews of deportation decisions. Even where the execution of removal was suspended by Administrative Courts, compliance with court orders was reported to be arbitrary and dependent upon the individual police officers in question.
In 2024 and in the beginning of 2025, there were some positive decisions to annul deportations. Two Palestinian nationals who admitted to attempting to irregularly cross the Turkish-Greek border and were subsequently apprehended succeeded in having their deportation orders annulled. In its decisions, the İzmir 1st Administrative Court emphasized the ongoing situation in Palestine following 7 September 2023, particularly the continued bombardment of the Gaza Strip and the widespread killing of civilians. The court found that the deportation order had been issued without a sufficient individual assessment of these circumstances[80]. In separate cases involving two Afghan applicants who had both previously worked for the military in Afghanistan before the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, the Aydın 1st Administrative Court and the Erzurum 1st Administrative Court annulled the deportation orders.[81] Another Afghan national, whose student residence permit had been rejected despite being enrolled at a university, succeeded in annulling his deportation order. In its decision, the İstanbul 15th Administrative Court referred to a 2022 report[82] published by the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Türkiye, (TIHEK), which underlined the necessity of conducting a thorough assessment before deciding on the deportation of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan.[83] In contrast, the İzmir 1st Administrative Court rejected the case of an Afghan woman challenging her deportation order. She argued that during the assessment of her international protection application, she had been incorrectly categorized as a dependent of her family, whereas her individual claim—as an Afghan woman at risk under Taliban rule—should have been assessed separately. The court held that, since her claims had already been addressed during the appeal process against the rejection of her international protection application, no further examination was necessary.[84]
These last two examples raise concerns regarding the courts’ differential treatment of applicants based on perceived functionality or social contribution, as one case involved a university student while the other concerned a woman seeking asylum on individual protection grounds.
If a deportation order is canceled by the court, the individual is issued a T8 Document by PDMM offices, which clearly indicates the official notification of the cancellation. However, stakeholders believe that in most cases—especially for those who previously applied for international protection—obtaining this decision does not significantly change the individual’s situation.[85] See: (Subsequent applications)
Article 60(a) LFIP on assisted voluntary return was amended in December 2019 to add that in-kind or cash support can be provided to persons deemed appropriate by the PMM in cases of voluntary return to their country of origin.[86] PMM created its own assisted voluntary return mechanism; however, such mechanism lacks transparency, and the number of returnees is unclear. There are ongoing legislative works for enactment of a regulation on assisted voluntary return, which could potentially address the issues of transparency.[87] Problems regarding voluntary returns and the process remained the same in 2024. (For more details, see Temporary Protection Procedure section) Voluntary returns are ongoing and those who returned are mostly Syrians.[88] According to Human Rights Watch,[89] since 2017, thousands of Syrian refugees have been often coerced into signing “voluntary” return forms and deported to northern Syria, in July 2023 alone, Türkiye sent back over 1,700 Syrians into the Tel Abyad area. PMM mentioned in the Annual Report 2023 there was 30% increase in voluntary and safe returns.[90] According to the UTBA report, most of the unlawful deportations were carried out under the guise of voluntary repatriation, with officials coercing applicants into signing the relevant forms. In particular, at the Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, and Adana Removal Centres, officials reportedly applied psychological pressure on detainees to obtain their signatures.[91] (See: Material conditions in Detention)
Stakeholders kept reporting that people who had been persuaded to sign a voluntary return form from removal centres came back to Türkiye in 2023. The temporary protection regulation provides a legal opportunity for re-arrivals, as it is stipulated in the law that re-application will reactivate IDs. In practice, people either cannot access registration or their applications are rejected, and they have to appeal against the decision.[92]
The complaint procedure before the Constitutional Court
An individual complaints procedure is available before the Constitutional Court, which is styled after the individual complaints procedure of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and is partially aimed at reducing the high number of complaints against Türkiye at the ECtHR. Individuals can file an individual complaint with the Constitutional Court on claims of a violation of “any of the fundamental rights and liberties provided by the Turkish Constitution and safeguarded by the ECHR and its Protocols” within 30 days of the exhaustion of all existing administrative and judicial remedies.[93]
While individual complaints to the Constitutional Court do not carry suspensive effect, the applicants can request an urgent interim measure as per Article 73 of the Rules of Court on account of “serious risk on the applicant’s life, physical and moral integrity”. This urgent application procedure by the Constitutional Court, in situations of imminent risk of deportation where the person concerned alleges a risk to their life or risk of torture if returned, is similar in nature to the Rule 39 procedure of the ECtHR. From October 2016 to December 2019, the Constitutional granted 1,545 interim measures to halt deportation decisions when automatic suspensive effect of the appeal of deportation orders were removed with a legislative amendment and stopped this practice when a legal amendment to these and other articles of the LFIP was made in December 2019 to bring back the automatic suspensive effect.[94] Lawyers no longer directly apply to the Constitutional Court when an administrative entity unlawfully deports their client but to the relevant administrative court.
On 17 July 2024, the Constitutional Court ruled on the application of an Iraqi national (Application No: 2020/18122). The Court found no violation of the applicant’s rights concerning respect for private and family life or the prohibition of ill-treatment. It also declared the claim related to the right to a fair trial inadmissible due to lack of jurisdiction. The applicant had argued that he would be at risk of persecution by al-Hashd al-Shaabi militias if returned to Iraq. While the Court acknowledged that the applicant had previously been forced to pay money to Daesh while in Iraq, it concluded that this did not establish any affiliation with the group. Furthermore, the Court was not persuaded that the applicant, as a Sunni Muslim, would face a real risk of persecution upon return.[95]
According to stakeholders, following its publication, this judgment has been frequently relied upon by administrative courts to reject the international protection claims of Iraqi nationals who assert that they are at risk in Iraq due to their Sunni identity.[96] Stakeholders also observed that the Constitutional Court has reduced the number of interim measure decisions compared to previous years. According to their assessments, the Court appears more inclined to grant interim measures in cases involving Syrian nationals, while similar requests from non-Syrian applicants are less frequently accepted.[97]
The European Court of Human Rights convicted Türkiye in a lawsuit filed on the grounds that Türkiye illegally deported a Syrian temporary protection holder to his country.[98] In 2022, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of articles 3, 5 and 13 of the ECHR in Akkad v. Türkiye judgement on the ground of expulsion of the temporary protection holder applicant to Syria.[99]
On 6 February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the case of J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye (case no. 80206/17).[100] The case involved Iraqi applicants and their four children who entered Türkiye in 2014 with valid tourist visas after ISIS bombed their house in Iraq. They had applied for residence permits but were arrested and faced deportation. They submitted an asylum request and challenged the deportation order. The ECtHR emphasised the obligation of states to thoroughly assess the risk of ill-treatment in the destination country by rigorously examining asylum applications. The Court found that Turkish authorities failed to adequately assess the applicants’ asylum requests and did not inform them properly about the rejection or the deportation orders. The Istanbul Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court did not sufficiently consider the risk of ill-treatment in Iraq. Consequently, the ECtHR concluded that deporting the applicants to Iraq would violate Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, which protect the right to life and prohibit torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.[101] On 21 March 2024, another decision ruled by ECtHR[102] (application no. 14820/19) on the deportation of an Iranian applicant faced expulsion to Iran, where she alleged that she would be at real risk of life imprisonment or death due to her conversion from Islam to Christianity. The Court unanimously held that deporting the applicant without a comprehensive evaluation of the risks involved would breach her rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Regarding the pushback incidents that occurred on the Turkish-Greek border in 2024, one case against Greece has been communicated[103], and two cases[104] were finalized in January 2025. (See: AIDA 2024 Greece)
[1] Article 80(1)(e) LFIP.
[2] Article 54(2) LFIP, as amended by Article 36 Emergency Decree 676 of 29 October 2016. The provision cites Article 54(1)(b), (d) and (k) LFIP, the latter inserted by Emergency Decree 676.
[3] Article 77 Regulation No 28578 on Conditions of Probation, 5 March 2013, as amended by Article 1 Regulation No 30631 of 20 December 2018.
[4] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[5] Aricle 60/3 (l) LFIP.
[6] T.C. Şanlıurfa 1. İdare Mahkemesi 2024/311 E., 2024/1773 K., T: 30.09.2024.
[7] T.C. İstanbul 18. İdare Mahkemesi 2024/3898 E., 2025/1922 K., T: 30.04.2025.
[8] For further analysis, see; Gamze Ovacık, Turkish Judicial Practices on International Protection, Removal and Administrative Detention in Connection with the Safe Third Country Concept (On İki Levha Publications 2021) 168-177.
[9] TBB, Hukuka Aykırı Gerçekleştirilen Sınır Dışı İşlemlerine İlişkin Rapor, Haziran 2024. here
[10] Barosu, “Hukuka Aykiri Sinir Dişi Etme İşlemleri Durdurulmalidir!”, 27.10.2023, available here.
[11] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, March and April 2025
[12] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2021 and March 2024.
[13] Information from a stakeholder, May 2022.
[14] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2024.
[15] T.C. Bursa 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/17 E., 2024/654 K., 28.05.2024 T.
[16] Information from a stakeholder, May 2023.
[17] Information from a stakeholder, May 2023.
[18] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, May 2023.
[19] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2022 and March 2024.
[20] Karar, ‘Risk analiz merkezi kapılarını KARAR’a açtı’, 28 April 2016, available in Turkish here.
[21] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[22] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[23] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[24] For examples of decisions cancelling a “G87” code due to lack of evidence, see 1st Administrative Court of Ankara, Decision 2018/2207, 13 February 2019; Decision 2018/524, 14 March 2018.
[25] Information provded by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[26] Information provided by a stakeholder, June 2023.
[27] T.C. Ankara 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2023/2293 E., 2024/713 K., 01.03.2024 T.
[28] T.C. Ankara Bölge İdare Mahkemesi 10. İdari Dava Dairesi 2024/4260 E., 2024/4979 K., 23.09.2024 T.
[29] T.C. Afyonkarahisar 1.İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/775 E., 2024/1231 K., 30.12.2024 T.
[30] T.C. Afyonkarahisar 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/772 E., 2024/1210 K. 30.12.2024.
[31] T.C. İzmir 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/1745 E., 2025/291 K., 30.01.2025 T.
[32] T.C. Şanlıurfa 1. İdare Mahkemesi 2024/257 E., 2024/1331 K., 04.07.2024 T.
[33] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, June 2024.
[34] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[35] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2025
[36] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[37] See e.g. District of Ankara, Decision 2018/462, 7 September 2018, which overturned the 1st Administrative Court of Ankara Decision 2018/524 of 14 March 2018.
[38] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, May 2023.
[39] Mazlumder, Göç Politikasını Beraber İyileştirelim, 20.06.2025, available here
[40] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, February, April, May, June 2025
[41] Anadolu Agency, ‘Peace Practice’ was carried out to combat irregular migration’, 29 January 2022. Available in Turkish here; PMM, ‘2016 Yılından Bu Yana Kolluk Birimlerimizce Toplam 38.117 Göçmen Kaçakçısı Yakalandı, 9.288’i Tutuklandı’, 20 April 2022, available in Turkish here.
[42] T. C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, “Kalkan-27” Operasyonlarında 84 Göçmen Kaçakçısı, 1029 Düzensiz Göçmen Yakalandı, 25.09.2024, available here
[43] PMM, 20.05.2023, Son Günlerde Sınırlarımızda Çekildiği İddiasıyla Dolaşıma Sokulan Gerçek Dışı Paylaşımlara İlişkin Basın Açıklaması available here.
[44] AA, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya, AA Editör Masası’nda Soruları Yanıtladı, 25.12.2024, available here
[45] T.C. Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya: “Türkiye, Göç Yönetiminde Dünyaya Model Ülke”,16.04.2025, available here
[46] Haber Turk, Göç İdaresi Başkanı Toros: 1 Haziran’dan bu yana 45 bin 454 göçmen sınır dışı edildi, 5 October 2023, available here.
[48] AA, Ibid.
[49] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[50] Information provided by stakeholders, March 2025.
[51] T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, İçişleri Bakanımız Sayın Ali Yerlikaya: Ülke Genelinde Düzensiz Göçe Yönelik Düzenlenen Denetimlerimizde 509 Düzensiz Göçmen Yakalandı, 22.05.2025, available here.
[52] Duvar, ‘Minister Soylu: Süleyman Soylu: We will not give temporary protection to those coming from Damascus’, available in Turkish here.
[53] PMM, ‘Yılbaşından Bugüne 72.578 Kaçak Göçmen Sınır Dışı Edildi’, 23 August 2022, available in Turkish here.
[54] TRT Haber, 13.03.2023, Sınır dışı edilen düzensiz göçmen sayısı 21 bin 211’e ulaştı, available here.
[55] Information provided by a stakeholder, March 2024.
[56] T.C. İçişleri Bakalnlığı Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya: “Düzensiz Göçle Mücadelede Bütün Zamanların En İyi Sayılarını Yakaladık”, 10.08.2024, available here.
[57] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, May 2023 & Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[58] Asya Robins, ‘Sınır dışı kararı verilen İranlı mülteciler geri gönderme merkezindeki koşulları anlattı: ‘Şiddet normal bir şey’’, BBC News, 16 February 2022, available here.
[59] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, June 2024.
[60] Bianet, 21.09.2023, “Bir Geri Gönderme Merkezine günde 6 bin kişi götürülüyor” available here.
[61] Article 53 LFIP.
[62] Law No 7196 amending several acts, 6 December 2019, available in Turkish here.
[63] Article 53(3) LFIP. This time limit has been ruled to be in line with the Turkish Constitution: Constitutional Court, Decision 2016/135, 14 July 2016, available in Turkish here.
[64] Law no 7533/36 21.11.2024, available in Turkish here
[65] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, June 2024 & Information provide by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[66] Information provided by a stakeholder, June 2023.
[67] Information provided by stakeholders, March 2024.
[68] Global Detention Project, Türkiye: Submission to the Committee against Torture, 12 June 2024, available here.
[69] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[70] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2025.
[71] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023.
[72] Resmi Gazete, 27.06.2023, available here.
[73] T.C. Konya 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2023/1339 E., 2024/47 K., 11.01.2024 T.
[74] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2022.
[75] Information provided by stakeholders in March, April and May 2025.
[76] T.C. İzmir 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/811 E., 2024/2422 K., 31.10.2024.
[77] T.C. Eskişehir 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/1594 E., 2025/51 K. 24.01.2025 T.
[78] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2025
[79] Mülteci-Der, Karar Bankası available here; Mülteci Hakları Merkezi, Karar Bankası here
[80] T.C. İzmir 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/2706 E., 2025/708 K., 06.03.2025 T.; T.C. İzmir 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/2707 E., 2025/707 K., 06.03.2025 T.
[81] T.C. Aydın 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/318 E., 2024/945 K., 26.11.2024 T.; T.C. Erzurum 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/417 E., 2024/1049 K., 07.06.2024 T.
[82] TIHEK, Sınır Dışı Edilen Yabancılar ve Geri Gönderme Yasağı, available here
[83] T.C. İstanbul 15. İdare Mahkemesi, 2023/1531 E., 2024/1091 K., 27.02.2024 T.
[84] T.C. İzmir 1. İdare Mahkemesi, 2024/603 E., 2024/2220 K., 09.10.2024 T.
[85] Information provided by stakeholders, February and March 2025.
[86] Mülteci-Der, Joint Assessment: Proposed Amendments in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection of Türkiye, 4 December 2019, available here.
[87] Information provided by a stakeholder, June 2023.
[88] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023 & Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[89] HRW, “Everything is by the Power of the Weapon”, 29 February 2024, available here.
[90] PMM, Faaliyet Raporu 2023, available here.
[91] TBB, Hukuka Aykırı Gerçekleştirilen Sınır Dışı İşlemlerine İlişkin Rapor, Haziran 2024 here.
[92] Information provided by a stakeholder, May 2023 & Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2024
[93] Articles 45-51 Law No 6216 on the Formation and Procedures of the Constitutional Court.
[94] Law No 7196 amending several acts, 6 December 2019, in Turkish here.
[95] T. C. Anayasa Mahkemesi N.S.M.M. Başvurusu, 2020/18122, 17.07.2024, R.G.: 23.12.2024 – 32761.
[96] Information provided by a stakeholder, April 2025.
[97] Information provided by stakeholders, March, April and May 2025.
[98] On the contrary, decisions of the Administrative Court are notified to the PDMM since they are party to the proceedings. ECHR, Akkad v. Turkiye, application number: 1557/19, 21 June 2022 available here.
[99] AKKAD/ TÜRKİYE KARARI (Başvuru No: 1557/19) AKKAD v. TURKEY [Turkish Translation] by İstanbul Bar Association, available here.
[100] CASE OF J.A. AND A.A. v. TÜRKİYE (Application no. 80206/17), available here.
[101] Ibid.
[102] ECtHR, CASE OF B.S. v. TÜRKİYE (Application no. 14820/19)¸ Strasbourg, 21 March 2024, available here.
[103] ECHR, Salman Muhammad v. Greece, 34331/22, communicated on 10.06.2024, available here.
[104] ECHR, G.R.J. v. Greece, 15067/21, 07.01.2025, available here; ECHR, A.R.E. v. Greece, 15783/21, 07.01.2025, available here.